FIRST DIVISION
NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
106804
August 12, 2004
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
AND ANTONINO POBRE,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The
Case
Before Us is a Petition
for Review[1]
of the 30 March 1992 decision[2]
and 14 August 1992 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
16930. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision[3]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Tabaco, Albay in Civil Case No.
T-552.
The Antecedents
Petitioner National
Power Corporation (“NPC”) is a public corporation created to generate
geothermal,
hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power
nationwide.[4]
NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of
eminent domain.cralaw:red
Private respondent Antonino
Pobre (“Pobre”) is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land (“Property”)
located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. The
Property
is covered by TCT No. 4067 and Subdivision Plan 11-9709.cralaw:red
In 1963, Pobre began
developing the Property as a resort-subdivision, which he named as
“Tiwi
Hot Springs Resort Subdivision.” On 12 January 1966, the then Court of
First Instance of Albay approved the subdivision plan of the
Property.
The Register of Deeds thus cancelled TCT No. 4067 and issued
independent
titles for the approved lots. In 1969, Pobre started advertising
and selling the lots.cralaw:red
On 4 August 1965, the
Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and
steam
were present beneath the Property. The Commission on Volcanology found
the thermal mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and
potentially
for commercial or industrial use.cralaw:red
NPC then became involved
with Pobre’s Property in three instances.cralaw:red
First was on 18 February
1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the
approved
subdivision plan.cralaw:red
Second was sometime
in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against
Pobre
to acquire an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property.[5]
On 23 October 1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the
lots
upon NPC’s payment of P25 per square meter or a total amount of
P207,790.
NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells.
While
this first expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials
beyond
the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste
materials
altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did
not act on Pobre’s complaints and NPC continued with its dumping.chanrobles virtual law library
Third was on 1 September
1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to
acquire
an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is
the subject of this petition. NPC needed the lot for the
construction
and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation
No. 739[6]
and Republic Act No. 5092.[7]
NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with the Philippine National
Bank.
The deposit represented 10% of the total market value of the lots
covered
by the second expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered the
5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial court’s issuance of a writ of
possession
to NPC.cralaw:red
On 10 December 1984,
Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation.
Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for
just
compensation of all the lots affected by NPC’s actions and for the
payment
of damages.cralaw:red
On 2 January 1985, NPC
filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground
that
NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in
1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre’s opposition.cralaw:red
On 8 January 1985, the
trial court granted NPC’s motion to dismiss but the trial court allowed
Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The trial court
admitted
Pobre’s exhibits on the damages because NPC failed to object.cralaw:red
On 30 August 1985, the
trial court ordered the case submitted for decision since NPC failed to
appear to present its evidence. The trial court denied NPC’s motion to
reconsider the submission of the case for decision.chanrobles virtual law library
NPC filed a petition
for certiorari[8]
with the then Intermediate Appellate Court, questioning the 30 August
1985
Order of the trial court. On 12 February 1987, the Intermediate
Appellate
Court dismissed NPC’s petition but directed the lower court to rule on
NPC’s objections to Pobre’s documentary exhibits.cralaw:red
On 27 March 1987, the
trial court admitted all of Pobre’s exhibits and upheld its Order dated
30 August 1985. The trial court considered the case submitted for
decision.cralaw:red
On 29 April 1987, the
trial court issued its Decision in favor of Pobre. The
dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendant
and against the plaintiff, ordering the plaintiff to pay unto the
defendant:
(1) The sum of
THREE
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
(P3,448,450.00)
PESOS which is the fair market value of the subdivision of defendant
with
an area of sixty eight thousand nine hundred sixty nine (68,969)
square meters, plus legal rate of interest per annum from September 6,
1979 until the whole amount is paid, and upon payment thereof by the
plaintiff
the defendant is hereby ordered to execute the necessary
Deed
of Conveyance or Absolute Sale of the property in favor of the
plaintiff;chanrobles virtual law library
(2) The sum
of
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS for
and
as attorney’s fees.
Costs against the
plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On 13 July 1987, NPC
filed
its motion for reconsideration of the decision. On 30 October 1987, the
trial court issued its Order denying NPC’s motion for reconsideration.
NPC appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On 30 March 1992, the Court of Appeals upheld
the
decision of the trial court but deleted the award of attorney’s
fees.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
by reason of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
the modification that the award of attorney’s fees is deleted. No
pronouncement as to costs.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.[10]
The Court of Appeals
denied
NPC’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 14 August 1992. The Ruling of the
Trial Court
In its 69-page decision,
the trial court recounted in great detail the scale and scope of the
damage
NPC inflicted on the Property that Pobre had developed into a
resort-subdivision.
Pobre’s Property suffered “permanent injury” because of the noise,
water,
air and land pollution generated by NPC’s geothermal plants. The
construction and operation of the geothermal plants drastically changed
the topography of the Property making it no longer viable as a
resort-subdivision.
The chemicals emitted by the geothermal plants damaged the natural
resources
in the Property and endangered the lives of the residents.cralaw:red
NPC did not only take
the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property, but also the
remaining
area of the 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC had rendered
Pobre’s entire Property useless as a resort-subdivision. The Property
has
become useful only to NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobre’s entire
Property
and pay for it.cralaw:red
The trial court found
the following badges of NPC’s bad faith: (1) NPC allowed five years to
pass before it moved for the dismissal of the second expropriation
case;
(2) NPC did not act on Pobre’s plea for NPC to eliminate or at least
reduce
the damage to the Property; and (3) NPC singled out Pobre’s
Property
for piecemeal expropriation when NPC could have expropriated other
properties
which were not affected in their entirety by NPC’s operation.chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court found
the just compensation to be P50 per square meter or a total of
P3,448,450
for Pobre’s 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC failed to contest
this
valuation. Since NPC was in bad faith and it employed dilatory tactics
to prolong this case, the trial court imposed legal interest on the
P3,448,450
from 6 September 1979 until full payment. The trial court awarded Pobre
attorney’s fees of P150,000.
The Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the appellate court
deleted the award of attorney’s fees because Pobre did not properly
plead
for it.
The Issues
NPC claims that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors
that
warrant reversal of the appellate court’s Decision:
1.
In not annulling the appealed Decision for having been rendered by the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction;
2.
In holding that NPC had “taken” the entire Property of Pobre;
3.
Assuming arguendo that there was “taking” of the entire Property,
in not excluding from the Property the 8,311.60 square-meter portion
NPC
had previously expropriated and paid for;chanrobles virtual law library
4.
In holding that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial
court
at P3,448,450.00 with interest from September 6, 1979 until fully paid,
is just and fair;chanrobles virtual law library
5.
In not holding that the just compensation should be fixed at P25.00 per
square meter only as what NPC and Pobre had previously mutually
agreed
upon; andchanrobles virtual law library
6. In
not
totally setting aside the appealed Decision of the trial court.[11] Procedural
Issues
NPC, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, insists that at the time that it
moved
for the dismissal of its complaint, Pobre had yet to serve an answer or
a motion for summary judgment on NPC. Thus, NPC as plaintiff had
the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint. NPC
relies
on Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules then in
effect.
NPC argues that the dismissal of the complaint should have carried with
it the dismissal of the entire case including Pobre’s counterclaim.chanrobles virtual law library
NPC’s belated attack
on Pobre’s claim for damages must fail. The trial court’s
reservation
of Pobre’s right to recover damages in the same case is already beyond
review. The 8 January 1985 Order of the trial court attained finality
when
NPC failed to move for its reconsideration within the 15-day
reglementary
period. NPC opposed the order only on 27 May 1985 or more than four
months
from the issuance of the order.cralaw:red
We cannot fault the
Court of Appeals for not considering NPC’s objections against the
subsistence
of Pobre’s claim for damages. NPC neither included this issue in its
assignment
of errors nor discussed it in its appellant’s brief. NPC also failed to
question the trial court’s 8 January 1985 Order in the petition for
certiorari[12]
it had earlier filed with the Court of Appeals. It is only before this
Court that NPC now vigorously assails the preservation of Pobre’s claim
for damages. Clearly, NPC’s opposition to the existence of
Pobre’s
claim for damages is a mere afterthought. Rules of fair play,
justice
and due process dictate that parties cannot raise an issue for the
first
time on appeal.[13]chanrobles virtual law library
We must correct NPC’s
claim that it filed the notice of dismissal just “shortly” after it had
filed the complaint for expropriation. While NPC had intimated
several
times to the trial court its desire to dismiss the expropriation case
it
filed on 5 September 1979,[14]
it was only on 2 January 1985 that NPC filed its notice of dismissal.[15]
It took NPC more than five years to actually file the notice of
dismissal.
Five years is definitely not a short period of time. NPC obviously
dilly-dallied
in filing its notice of dismissal while NPC meanwhile burdened Pobre’s
property rights.cralaw:red
Even a timely opposition
against Pobre’s claim for damages would not yield a favorable ruling
for
NPC. It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that
is applicable to this case but Rule 67 of the same Rules, as well as
jurisprudence
on expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to dismissal of civil actions
in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent domain cases.cralaw:red
Eminent domain is the
authority and right of the state, as sovereign, to take private
property
for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of
just
compensation.[16]
The power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to the local
governments,
other public entities and public utilities[17]
such as NPC. Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of
eminent domain.[18]
“Eminent Domain” was the former title of Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of
Court.
In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect
on
1 July 1997, the prescribed method of expropriation is still found in
Rule
67, but its title is now “Expropriation.”
Section 1, Rule 17 of
the 1964 Rules of Court provided the exception to the general rule that
the dismissal of the complaint is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court.[19]
For as long as all of the elements of Section 1, Rule 17 were present
the
dismissal of the complaint rested exclusively on the plaintiff’s will.[20]
The defending party and even the courts were powerless to prevent the
dismissal.[21]
The courts could only accept and record the dismissal.[22]
A plain reading of Section
1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court makes it obvious that this rule
was
not intended to supplement Rule 67 of the same Rules. Section 1, Rule
17
of the 1964 Rules of Court, provided that:chanrobles virtual law library
Section 1.
Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff
without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before
service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless
otherwise
stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
plaintiff
who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or
including
the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised
without
approval of the court.
While Section 1, Rule
17
spoke of the “service of answer or summary judgment,” the Rules then
did
not require the filing of an answer or summary judgment in eminent
domain
cases.[23]
In lieu of an answer, Section 3 of Rule 67 required the defendant to
file
a single motion to dismiss where he
should
present all of his objections and
defenses
to the taking of his property for the purpose specified in the
complaint.[24]
In short, in expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the motion
to dismiss took the place of the answer.
The records show that
Pobre had already filed and served on NPC his “motion to dismiss/answer”[25]
even before NPC filed its own motion to dismiss. NPC filed its notice
of
dismissal of the complaint on 2 January 1985. However, as early
as
10 December 1984, Pobre had already filed with the trial court and
served
on NPC his “motion to dismiss/answer.” A certain Divina Cerela
received
Pobre’s pleading on behalf of NPC.[26]
Unfortunately for NPC, even Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of
Court
could not save its cause.chanrobles virtual law library
NPC is in no position
to invoke Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A
plaintiff
loses his right under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of
the complaint once the defendant had served on the plaintiff the answer
or a motion for summary judgment before the plaintiff could file his
notice
of dismissal of the complaint.[27]
Pobre’s “motion to dismiss/answer,” filed and served way ahead of NPC’s
motion to dismiss, takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming
the
same applies.cralaw:red
In expropriation cases,
there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s matter of right to dismiss
the
complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered
damages
at the start of the taking. The plaintiff’s right in
expropriation
cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court
approval
and to certain conditions.[28]
The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of
Court
conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to
other
civil actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this
exceptional
right.[29]
The power of eminent
domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his
right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in
court.[30]
The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there
is payment of just compensation and there is due process of law.[31]
If the propriety of
the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to
judicial
scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial
inquiry
because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The
dismissal,
withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made
arbitrarily.
If it appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some
public
use,[32]
then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action.[33]
However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage
because
of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose
the defendant’s right to have his damages ascertained either in the
same
case or in a separate action.[34]chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, NPC’s theory that
the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of Pobre’s
claim for damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the
1964 Rules of Court that provided for the dismissal of the defendant’s
claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the expropriation case.
Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation
case,
the claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in the same
action,
for all damages occasioned by the institution of the expropriation case.[35]
The dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain conditions,
such
as the reservation of the defendant’s right to recover damages either
in
the same or in another action.[36]
The trial court in this case reserved Pobre’s right to prove his claim
in the same case, a reservation that has become final due to NPC’s own
fault.cralaw:red
Factual Findings of
the Trial and Appellate Courts Bind the Court
The trial and appellate
courts held that even before the first expropriation case, Pobre had
already
established his Property as a resort-subdivision. NPC had wrought so
much
damage to the Property that NPC had made the Property uninhabitable as
a resort-subdivision. NPC’s facilities such as steam wells, nag
wells,
power plants, power lines, and canals had hemmed in Pobre’s
Property.
NPC’s operations of its geothermal project also posed a risk to lives
and
properties.cralaw:red
We uphold the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts. Questions of facts are
beyond
the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a petition for review may
only raise questions of law.[37]
Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this Court.[38]
We thus find no reason to set aside the two courts’ factual findings.chanrobles virtual law library
NPC points out that
it did not take Pobre’s 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC argues that
assuming
that it is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 square-meter portion that
it
had successfully expropriated and fully paid for should have been
excluded
from the 68,969 square-meter Property that Pobre claims NPC had damaged.cralaw:red
We are not persuaded.cralaw:red
In its 30 October 1987
Order denying NPC’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court pointed
out that the Property originally had a total area of 141,300
square
meters.[39]
Pobre converted the Property into a resort-subdivision and sold lots to
the public. What remained of the lots are the 68,969 square
meters
of land.[40]
Pobre no longer claimed damages for the other lots that he had before
the
expropriation.cralaw:red
Pobre identified in
court the lots forming the 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC had the
opportunity
to object to the identification of the lots.[41]
NPC, however, failed to do so. Thus, we do not disturb the trial and
appellate
courts’ finding on the total land area NPC had damaged.cralaw:red
NPC must Pay Just Compensation
for the Entire Property
Ordinarily, the dismissal
of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land
to the landowner.[42]
However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the
landowner
because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the
only
remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of
just
compensation.[43]chanrobles virtual law library
In this case, we agree
with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and
practical
to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no
longer
habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to
Pobre
and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the
Property
as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter
Property.cralaw:red
In United States v.
Causby,[44]
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private property is rendered
uninhabitable
by an entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is
deemed
complete. Such taking is thus compensable.cralaw:red
In this jurisdiction,
the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without
expropriation
and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property
owner
may demand payment of just compensation.[45]
This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that
private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.[46]
In the recent case of
National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo,[47]
the Court compelled the National Housing Authority (“NHA”) to pay just
compensation to the landowners even after the NHA had already abandoned
the expropriation case. The Court pointed out that a government
agency
could not initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person’s
property,
and then just decide not to proceed with the expropriation. Such a
complete
turn-around is arbitrary and capricious and was condemned by the Court
in the strongest possible terms. NHA was held liable to the landowners
for the prejudice that they had suffered.chanrobles virtual law library
In this case, NPC appropriated
Pobre’s Property without resort to expropriation proceedings. NPC
dismissed
its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did
NPC
institute expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554
square-meter
portion subject of the second expropriation. The only issues that the
trial
court had to settle were the amount of just compensation and damages
that
NPC had to pay Pobre.cralaw:red
This case ceased to
be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for
expropriation.
Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of
damages,
the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just
compensation
to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before
commissioners,
for instance, was dispensable.cralaw:red
We have held that the
usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived
when
the government itself initially violates procedural requirements.[48]
NPC’s taking of Pobre’s property without filing the appropriate
expropriation
proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression of
procedural
due process.cralaw:red
From the beginning,
NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings for Pobre’s entire
68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC embarked
on a piecemeal expropriation of the Property. Even as the second
expropriation
case was still pending, NPC was well aware of the damage that it had
unleashed
on the entire Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to Pobre’s
repeated
demands for NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on his Property.cralaw:red
NPC moved for the dismissal
of the complaint for the second expropriation on the ground that
it had found an alternative site and there was stiff opposition from
Pobre.[49]
NPC abandoned the second expropriation case five years after it had
already
deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has
demonstrated
its utter disregard for Pobre’s property rights.chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, it would now be
futile to compel NPC to institute expropriation proceedings to
determine
the just compensation for Pobre’s 68,969 square-meter Property.
Pobre
must be spared any further delay in his pursuit to receive just
compensation
from NPC.cralaw:red
Just compensation is
the fair and full equivalent of the loss.[50]
The trial and appellate courts endeavored to meet this standard.
The P50 per square meter valuation of the 68,969 square-meter Property
is reasonable considering that the Property was already an established
resort-subdivision. NPC has itself to blame for not contesting the
valuation
before the trial court. Based on the P50 per square meter
valuation,
the total amount of just compensation that NPC must pay Pobre is
P3,448,450.cralaw:red
The landowner is entitled
to legal interest on the price of the land from the time of the taking
up to the time of full payment by the government.[51]
In accord with jurisprudence, we fix the legal interest at six per cent
(6%) per annum.[52]
The legal interest should accrue from 6 September 1979, the date when
the
trial court issued the writ of possession to NPC, up to the time that
NPC
fully pays Pobre.[53]chanrobles virtual law library
NPC’s abuse of its eminent
domain authority is appalling. However, we cannot award moral damages
because
Pobre did not assert his right to it.[54]
We also cannot award attorney’s fees in Pobre’s favor since he did not
appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals denying recovery of
attorney’s
fees.[55]
Nonetheless, we find
it proper to award P50,000 in temperate damages to Pobre. The court may
award temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but
less
than compensatory damages, if the court finds that a party has suffered
some pecuniary loss but its amount cannot be proved with certainty from
the nature of the case.[56]
As the trial and appellate courts noted, Pobre’s resort-subdivision was
no longer just a dream because Pobre had already established the
resort-subdivision
and the prospect for it was initially encouraging. That is, until
NPC permanently damaged Pobre’s Property. NPC did not just
destroy
the property. NPC dashed Pobre’s hope of seeing his Property achieve
its
full potential as a resort-subdivision.cralaw:red
The lesson in this case
must not be lost on entities with eminent domain authority. Such
entities cannot trifle with a citizen’s property rights. The power of
eminent
domain is an extraordinary power they must wield with
circumspection
and utmost regard for procedural requirements. Thus, we hold NPC liable
for exemplary damages of P100,000. Exemplary damages or corrective
damages
are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[57]chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, we DENY the
petition for lack of merit. The appealed Decision of the Court of
Appeals
dated 30 March 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
National Power Corporation is ordered to pay Antonino Pobre P3,448,450
as just compensation for the 68,969 square-meter Property at P50 per
square
meter. National Power Corporation is directed to pay legal interest at
6% per annum on the amount adjudged from 6 September 1979 until fully
paid.
Upon National Power Corporation’s payment of the full amount, Antonino
Pobre is ordered to execute a Deed of Conveyance of the Property in
National
Power Corporation’s favor. National Power Corporation is further
ordered
to pay temperate and exemplary damages of P50,000 and P100,000,
respectively.
No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Chairman,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin,
Jr.
with Associate Justices Luis A. Javellana and Artemon D. Luna
concurring.
[3]
Penned by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6395, “An Act Revising the Charter
of the National Power Corporation,” as amended.
[5]
Docketed as Civil Case No. T-50 in the then Court of First Instance,
Branch
VI, Tabaco, Albay.
[6]
“Tiwi Geothermal Reservation.”chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
“An Act to Promote and Regulate the Exploration,
Development,
Exploitation and Utilization of Geothermal Energy, Natural
Gas and Methane Gas, to Encourage its Conservation, and for other
Purposes.”chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 07682.
[9]
Rollo, p. 109.
[10]
Ibid., p. 139.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 234-235.
[12]
Supra note 8.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108738, 17 June 1994, 233 SCRA 301.
[14]
Records, pp. 38-39, 43.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Ibid., p. 45.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, 40 Phil. 550 (1919).
[17]
Moday v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107916, 20 February 1997, 268 SCRA
586.
[18]
OSCAR M. HERRERA, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. III, 1999 ed., 311.
[19]
BA Finance Corporation v. Co, G.R. No. 105751, 30 June 1993, 224 SCRA
163.
[20]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Section 3, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now
requires the filing of an answer in expropriation cases.
[24]
Section 3, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section
3. Defenses and objections. — If a defendant has no objection or
defense
to the action or the taking of his property, he may file and serve a
notice
of appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically
designating
or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within
the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled
to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If
a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in
the
complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking
of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in
the
summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the
property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and
extent
of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to
the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any
subsequent pleading.
A
defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the
court,
in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer
to
be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof.
However,
at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a
defendant
has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the
amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may
share
in the distribution of the award.
[25]
Records, pp. 40-42.chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Ibid., p. 42.
[27]
Go v. Cruz, G.R. No. 58986, 17 April 1989, 172 SCRA 247.
[28]
See Republic of the Philippines v. Baylosis, 109 Phil. 580 (1960);
Metropolitan
Water District v. De Los Angeles, 55 Phil. 776 (1931).
[29]
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer
makes the dismissal of the complaint
automatic.
The right of the plaintiff to dismiss his action before the defendant
has
filed his answer or asked for summary judgment must be first confirmed
by the court in an order issued by it. The new provision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section
2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in
the
preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff’s
instance save upon the approval of the court and upon such terms and
conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by
a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for
dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The
dismissal
shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
his
counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his
counterclaim
resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the
order,
a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A
class
suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court.chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[31]
Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, supra note 16.
[32]
Metropolitan Water District v. De Los Angeles, supra note 28.
[33]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Ibid.
[35]
Ibid.
[36]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[37]
Inland Trailways, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 457 (1996).
[38]
Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109849, 26 February 1997, 268
SCRA
703.
[39]
Records, p. 253.chanrobles virtual law library
[40]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[41]
TSN, 5 February 1985, pp. 14-22.
[42]
Metropolitan Water District v. De Los Angeles, supra note 28.
[43]
Militante v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 522
(2000);
Amigable v. Cuenca, 150 Phil. 422 (1972); Ministerio v. Court of First
Instance of Cebu, 148-B Phil. 474 (1971); Alfonso v. Pasay City, 106
Phil.
1017 (1960).chanrobles virtual law library
[44]
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
[45]
Supra note 43.chanrobles virtual law library
[46]
Section 2, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution is now enshrined in
Section
9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
[47]
G.R. No. 154411, 19 June 2003, 404 SCRA 389.chanrobles virtual law library
[48]
Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu (Branch VIII), No. L-65037, 23 November 1988,167
SCRA
615.
[49]
Records, p. 45.chanrobles virtual law library
[50]
Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286 (1915).
[51]
De Los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos.
71998-99,
2 June 1993, 223 SCRA 11; National Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,
214 Phil. 583 (1984); Amigable v. Cuenca, 150 Phil. 422 (1972).chanrobles virtual law library
[52]
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 214 Phil. 583 (1984).
[53]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[54]
People v. Adora, 341 Phil. 441 (1997).
[55]
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 52.
[56]
Article 2224, Civil Code.
[57]
Article 2229, Civil Code. |