
SECOND DIVISION
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R.
No.
117406
January 16, 2001 -versus-
ALBERTO GARCIA Y
BOTON,
Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from
the decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 161, Pasig, Metro Manila finding
accused-appellant
Alberto Garcia guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to pay the victim P20,000.00 as moral damages,
and
to pay the costs.
The information[2]
against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about the
11th day of December, 1992 in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro
Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named
accused, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did
then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with
the undersigned complainant against her will and consent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Contrary to law.cralaw:red
Upon arraignment on
February 2, 1993, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon
he was tried.cralaw:red
Complainant Grace Garcia
is the daughter of accused-appellant. She and her mother,
Luzviminda
Garcia, testified as follows:
In the afternoon of
December 10, 1992, accused-appellant arrived home from work,
drunk.
Except for Grace, then 13 years of age, nobody else was home.
Grace
was resting in her room when accused-appellant lay ("pumatong") on top
of her. Accused-appellant held Grace’s hands with one hand while
he fondled her private parts with the other. Grace screamed at
accused-appellant
as she asked, "Tatay, why are you doing this to me when I am your
daughter?"[3]
She punched accused-appellant
but he hit her back on the right jaw with such force that she lost
consciousness.
Accused-appellant then got up, took off his clothes, and undressed
complainant,
and again lay on top of her, kissing her and mashing her breasts.[4]
Then, accused-appellant inserted his penis into Grace’s vagina, which
made
Grace cry.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When he was through,
accused-appellant told Grace not to tell anyone what he had done to her
or he would kill her, her mother, and her elder sister. But
shortly
after the incident, Grace told her mother what accused-appellant
had done to her. On December 12, 1992, accompanied by her mother and
sister,
Grace went to the Marikina Police Station to report the incident. They
then proceeded to Camp Crame for a medical examination where Grace was
examined by Dr. Vladimir V. Villaseñor, Medico-Legal Officer of
the Crime Laboratory Service, Philippine National Police.[6]
The date of examination appears to be December 11, 1992 as shown in the
Medico-Legal Report (Exh. A) of the Crime Laboratory Service of the
PNP.6
Dr. Villaseñor’s testimony was dispensed with after stipulations
were made in open court that he was the one who examined the victim and
that the findings of his examination are stated in Medico-Legal Report
No. M-1917-92, dated December 14, 1992 (Exh. A).[7]
After the prosecution
rested its case on November 15, 1993, the defense prayed for and was
granted
a period of 15 days within which to file a demurrer to evidence
without
leave of court.[8]
However, the defense failed to do so within the period granted to it.
Hence,
on January 21, 1994, the defense was ordered to present its evidence.[9]
On March 8, 1994, the
court reconsidered its order on motion of accused-appellant who claimed
that the stenographer failed to complete the transcript of stenographic
notes of the proceedings. Accused-appellant was granted 10 days within
which to file a demurrer to evidence.[10]
But accused-appellant again failed to file a demurrer to the evidence,
prompting the court to declare him to have waived the right to present
his evidence and consider the case submitted for decision.[11]
Accused-appellant moved
for a reconsideration alleging that there was no Judge to preside over
the case because Judge Eugenio Labitoria had been appointed to the
Court
of Appeals.[12]
But the new judge, Honorable Santiago Ranada, found the excuse to be
without
merit and accordingly denied accused-appellant’s motion.[13]
On February 26, 1996, Judge Ranada rendered a decision, the dispositive
part of which states:[14]
WHEREFORE, foregoing
considered, accused Alberto Garcia y Boton is found guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt for the crime of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the offended party, Grace Garcia, the amount
of P20,000.000, and to pay the costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant contends:[15]
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT WHOSE
TESTIMONY IS TAINTED WITH DOUBTS AND CONTRADICTIONS.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF RAPE WITHOUT HIS GUILT PROVEN
BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
We find these contentions
to be without merit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
First. In adjudging
rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an
accusation
of rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more
difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of
the
nature of the crime in which only two persons are involved, the
testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c)
the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[16]
This review will be
confined to the evidence presented by the prosecution because, as
already
stated, accused-appellant failed to present his evidence. It has
been held that the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of
the victim, provided such testimony is credible, natural, convincing,
and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.[17]
The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
accorded
great respect because of its opportunity to hear their testimonies and
observe their demeanor and manner of testifying. The exception is when
it has overlooked or misapplied some facts which could have affected
the
result of the case.[18]
In this case, Grace’s
testimony, both on direct and on cross-examination, is clear and
spontaneous.
She narrated how accused-appellant had raped her on or about December
11,
1992 and her narration was made with such richness of detail as only
one
telling the truth could do so.cralaw:red
On direct-examination,
she stated:[19]
Q:
Now, what happened next after your father undressed you?
A:
He la[y] on top of me, kissed me, mas[h]ed my breasts and then he
inserted
his penis inside my vagina. Then, he continued mashing my breast[s], he
kissed my entire body.cralaw:red
.
Q:
And what did you fe[e]l after your father inserted his penis into your
vagina?
A:
I felt pain, ma’[a]m.cralaw:red
Q:
After that what else happened?
A:
After that from his penis came out white sticky fluid.cralaw:red
Q:
And after that white, sticky fluid came out [of] the private part[s] of
your father, what happened next if any?
A:
[It was as if] my private part[s] (vagina) [were] being cut with a
knife.cralaw:red
On cross-examination,
she was equally firm and clear:[20]
Q:
And, because also, you hate your father, you also wanted him to be put
in jail, is it not?
A:
Not because of that, but because he really raped me, sir.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q:
And also, your mother would do everything just to [end] their affair,
is
it not?
A:
My mother did not tell us what she would do about it, sir.cralaw:red
Q:
Don’t you pity your father?
A:
I pity my father, sir.cralaw:red
Q:
Then, why do you [want him to be put] in jail, when you say you pity
him?
A:
I pity him, but I pity myself inasmuch as he raped me, sir.cralaw:red
Q:
So you really [want] him to be in jail?
A:
If the court [finds it warranted], yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q:
Please look again at your father, don’t you feel pain seeing that your
father [is] thinner now?
A:
No, sir.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When asked by the defense
if she filed charges against her father because she hated him for his
"womanizing"
which resulted in frequent quarrels between him and her mother, Grace
replied,
"All I need is justice because he abused me, sir."[21]
When asked again if she accused her father of committing a crime
because
she pitied her mother, Grace reiterated that she did so "because he
really
raped me."[22]
When the defense persisted
in asking what she felt for her father and the reason why she accused
him
of a heinous crime, Grace’s eyes welled up with tears.[23]
In another case, this Court said that the crying of the victim during
her
testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the
verity
born out of human nature and experience.[24]
In this case, the misty eyes of the victim revealed the depths of shame
and suffering she endured when her personhood was violated, giving
credibility
to her testimony.cralaw:red
Second. Accused-appellant
contends that Grace’s testimony is inconsistent with that of her
mother.
Accused-appellant points out that, after being asked where she was in
the
afternoon of December 11, 1992, Grace said she was in their house
and that was when her father raped her. She was alone in the
house
with her father. Her mother was in her office and did not arrive
home until around 7 p.m. Grace said she told her mother what happened
to
her in the afternoon of December 12, 1992.[25]
But, it is contended, when her mother Luzviminda testified, the latter
said that Grace told her about the incident in the afternoon of
December
11, 1992 but she took complainant to the hospital for examination in
the
morning of the same date. And when the fiscal asked for a
clarification
with respect to the date when the crime was committed, Luzviminda said
she had actually been told by her daughter that the latter had
been
raped by her father on December 7 and that December 11, 1992 was the
date
when they saw a doctor. Luzviminda said she did not immediately
bring
her daughter to the hospital because her daughter went to school on
December
7, 1992.[26]
Indeed, there are apparent
inconsistencies not only between the testimony of the victim and that
of
her mother but also in statements made by the victim, as the following
portion of the victim’s testimony shows:[27]
FISCAL:
Ms. Witness, you said
on cross examination that your father on December 11, 1992 went to work
and left your house that time at 6:00 p.m. and returned back home at
7:00
a.m. the following day. Do you remember that?
A:
Yes, Ma’am.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q:
Now, your complain[t] is about [the manner by which] your father abused
you. What time did your father ma[k]e that abuse on your person?
.
A:
5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Ma’am.cralaw:red
Q:
Of what date?
A:
December 11, 1992, Ma’am. At 5:00 p.m. in the afternoon that day, he
already
abused me.cralaw:red
Q:
Tell us why he was there at home at that time.cralaw:red
A:
He was there at home and drinking wine, Ma’am. And, at 5:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of December 11, 1992, he abused me. Left the house at
6:00
a.m., December 12, 1992 and returned at 7:00 p.m., Ma’am.cralaw:red
COURT:
I still do not understand.
Now, let us clear this. What time did your father leave the house on
December
11, 1992?
A:
6:00 a.m., your Honor.cralaw:red
Q:
How could he abuse you when you said that he left your house that time
and returned at 7:00 p.m.?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A:
It is like this, your Honor. He arrived home at 7:00 p.m. Then [he]
slept
and woke up at 6:00 a.m., the following day. Ate breakfast and slept
again.
He woke up at 12:00 noon that day, and woke up at 4:00 p.m. Started
drinking
wine at 4:30 p.m. and, at exactly 5:00 p.m., he already abused me, your
Honor.cralaw:red
COURT:
So, it is not December
11, 1992, but December 10, 1992?
A: Yes, your Honor.cralaw:red
COURT:
I think, it is clear
now. The date is December 10, 1992, and not that stated in the
Information.
The date there is December 11, 1992, when in fact, upon questioning,
the
witness made this Court understand that the crime was committed upon
her
person on December 10, 1992. Proceed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
.
COURT:
And why was he there
at home by 5:00 p.m., December 12, 1992?
A:
He was still there abusing me, Ma’am.cralaw:red
Q:
And what time was your father drinking wine?
A:
4:30 p.m., December 12, 1992, Ma’am.cralaw:red
Q:
What do you mean by the [phrase] "he left me in the house after abusing
me and when he returned home, it was already around 7:00 p.m."?
A:
Because that is the usual time that he comes home from work, Ma’am.
After
abusing me, he left the house and when he returned home, it was already
7:00 p.m. of December 12, 1992, Ma’am.cralaw:red
However, these contradictions,
which relate to the date when the latter was raped, do not concern
material
facts. They are irrelevant to the issue of whether the elements
of
rape are present in the case. But, on material points, the testimonies
of Grace and her mother Luzviminda are consistent. The prosecution
presented
Luzviminda Garcia to prove that she is the mother of private
complainant
and that she was aware of the present case filed against Grace’s
father,
as well as to prove damages.[28]
Her testimony is consistent with that previously given by Grace.
Luzviminda
said, "My youngest daughter, Grace, complained to me that her father
approached
her already nude and started to mash her breasts. He forced her to
undress
and lie down and once lying down her father forced his organ into my
daughter’s
organ."[29]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In People v. Ayo,[30]
reiterating what had been said in other cases, we held that when a
woman
claims that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has been committed and that if her testimony meets the
test
of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis
thereof.
Unless she is motivated by truth, no woman, much less an eight-year old
girl, would subject herself to the rigors of a public trial, describing
before total strangers the shameful, humiliating and degrading
experience
of the sexual assault. The testimony of Grace establishes the
fact
that, through force and intimidation, her father succeeded in abusing
her.
Grace testified that her father pinned her on the bed and punched her
on
the jaw when she resisted. Her testimony is corroborated by the
medico-legal
report of Dr. Villaseñor which states that the hymen of the
victim
had "shallow healed lacerations at 3 and 8 o’clock" positions.[31]
Indeed, as held in People
v. Lim,[32]
the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the
crime.
In this case, Grace stated in her complaint that she had been raped "on
or about the 11th day of December, 1992."[33]
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (before these were amended by the Rules
on Criminal Procedure that took effect on December 1, 2000) provides:
Sec. 11. Time of the
commission of the offense.- It is not necessary to state in the
complaint
or information the precise time at which the offense was committed
except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the acts may be
alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date
at
which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will
permit.cralaw:red
Since time is not a
material element of rape, it is sufficient that complainant alleged in
the complaint that the crime was committed on or about December 11,
1992.
What this Court said in People v. Maglente,[34]
another case of incestuous rape, applies to this case:
It is indeed incumbent
upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable
doubt but to justify acquittal based on reasonable doubt, the doubt
should
relate to the facts constitutive of the crime charged. Discrepancies
should
touch on significant facts which are crucial to the guilt or innocence
of an accused. Conversely, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for
acquittal.
We stress that the exact date when complainant was sexually abused is
not
an essential element of the offense of rape. What is material in a rape
case is the commission of the rape by the accused-appellant against the
complainant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At all events, the defense
should have taken steps to impeach the credibility of the testimonies
of
the two witnesses. However, the defense failed to do so. It
did not ask Grace whether she had previously made statements
contradictory
or inconsistent with her testimony nor did it make her explain
any
inconsistency. The credibility of the testimonies of the victim
and
her mother could only be questioned if they fail to explain the
inconsistencies.
Such procedure was not followed in this case, where the defense even
decided
not to cross-examine complainant’s mother.cralaw:red
Third. Considering the
evidence in this case, we are convinced beyond a shadow of doubt that
accused-appellant
is guilty of rape committed against his own daughter. Even
without
the use of force, the conviction of accused-appellant for rape would be
justified because, as a result of his relationship to the victim,
accused-appellant
exercised moral ascendancy over her. This fact takes the place of
intimidation.
However, the award of P20,000.00 as indemnity to complainant should be
increased to P50,000.00 in line with our current rulings.[35]
In addition, complainant should be awarded moral damages amounting to
P50,000.00
as held in several cases.[36]
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellant Alberto Garcia
guilty
of rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the award of civil indemnity should be
increased
to P50,000.00 and, in addition, accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay
complainant
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon , Jr., JJ.,
concur.
____________________________ Endnotes:
[1]
Per Judge Santiago Ranada, Jr.
[2]
Records, p. 1.
[3]
TSN (Grace Garcia), pp. 2-7, June 8, 1993.
[4]
Id. at 7-8.
[5]
Id. at 8-9.
[6]
Id. at 9-11.
[7]
Records, p. 77.
[8]
Id. at 77.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Id. at 81.
[10]
Id. at 91.
[11]
Id. at 94.
[12]
Id. at 97-99.
[13]
Id. at 103-104.
[14]
Decision, p. 5.
[15]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 119.
[16]
People v. Barcelona, G.R. No. 125341, February 9, 2000; People v. Bea,
306 SCRA 653 (1999).
[17]
People v. Barcelona, supra; People v. Bonghanoy, 308 SCRA 383 (1999).
[18]
People v. Salonga, G.R. No. 128647, March 31, 2000; People v.
[19]
TSN (Grace Garcia), pp. 8-9, June 8, 1993.
[20]
TSN (Grace Garcia), pp. 11 and 18, July 26, 1993.
[21]
TSN, p. 7, July 26, 1993.
[22]
Id. at 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Id. at 19.
[24]
People v. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82 (1996); People v. Joya, 227 SCRA 9 (1993).
[25]
TSN, pp. 5-9, June 8, 1993.
[26]
TSN (Luzviminda Garcia), pp. 10-14, July 28, 1993.
[27]
TSN, pp. 19-21, July 26, 1993.
[28]
TSN, p. 3, July 28, 1993.
[29]
Id. at 10-11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
305 SCRA 543 (1999).
[31]
Records, p. 72.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
312 SCRA 550 (1999).
[33]
Records, p. 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
306 SCRA 546 (1999).
[35]
See People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998); People v. Gementiza, 285
SCRA
478 (1998).
[36]
See People v. Lustre, G.R. No. 134562, April 6, 2000; People v.
Maglente,
supra; People v. Cantos, 305 SCRA 786 (1999). |