SECOND DIVISION
CARLOS A. GOTHONG
LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
113576
July 1, 2004
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. PACIENCIO M. BALBON,
AND COKALIONG
SHIPPING
LINES, INC.,
Respondents.
x - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CARLOS GOTHONG
LINES,
INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
118235
July 1, 2004 -versus-
COURT OF APPEALSAND COKALIONG
SHIPPING
LINES, INC.,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
Before the Court are two
Petitions for Review on Certiorari. The first petition, docketed as
G.R.
No. 118235, assails the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32307. The second
petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 113576, assails the Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33174. The Antecedents
Carlos A. Gothong Lines,
Inc. (Gothong, for brevity), filed an application, docketed as Case No.
93-036, with the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) for provisional
authority
to re-route its vessel M/V Our Lady of Guadalupe.[3]
In due course, Gothong was granted a special permit by the MARINA to
operate
its vessel in the Cebu–Cagayan–Cebu–Cagayan–Cebu–Cagayan–Jagna-Cagayan
route. Gothong prayed in its application, viz:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Authority:
1. That a
Provisional
Authority be immediately granted the applicant for the vessel M/V OUR
LADY
OF GUADALUPE in the route herein applied for, to wit:
Cebu–Surigao–Cebu–Surigao–Cebu–Surigao–Cebu-Maasin–Cebu;chanrobles virtual law library
2. That upon due
notice
and hearing, this Authority grant the herein applicant Certificate of
Public
Convenience for the vessel M/V OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE in the route
applied
for; andchanrobles virtual law library
3. That
Applicant be
granted such other relief and remedies just, fair, and equitable under
the circumstances.[4]
Cokaliong Shipping
Lines,
Inc. (Cokaliong, for brevity), the owner-operator of two vessels, the
M/V
Filipinas-Tandag and M/V Filipinas- Surigao, opposed the application,
alleging
that the MARINA had previously issued in its favor a permit to operate
its vessels serving the Cebu–Surigao-Tandang link and the Cebu–Maasin
link.
It also alleged that to allow Gothong to operate its vessel along the
said
routes could be a cause of over-tonnage and a big possibility of a
cut-throat
competition.[5]
After Gothong’s documentary
evidence was admitted, the MARINA considered the application for a
provisional
authority submitted for resolution on July 22, 1993.cralaw:red
On August 10, 1993,
the MARINA issued an Order denying the application of Gothong for a
provisional
authority until such time that MARINA had conducted the necessary
actual
market study/survey in the applied route. The dispositive portion
of the Order reads:
In view
thereof,
the applicant’s request for Provisional Authority to operate the vessel
M/V “OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE” in the
Cebu-Surigao-Cebu-Surigao-Cebu-Surigao-Cebu-Maasin-Cebu
route is hereby DENIED, until such time that this Authority has
conducted
the necessary actual market study/survey in the applied route to verify
if additional shipping services/frequency of trips are warranted
therein.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Gothong filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the order, to which Cokaliong filed an
opposition.
Gothong complained that the denial of its application for a provisional
authority effectively dismissed its application without any
countervailing
evidence being submitted by the oppositor. It asserted that the
order
was based solely on Cokaliong’s opposition, and that its evidence was
sufficient
for the MARINA to grant its application for provisional
authority.
In an Urgent Motion dated September 29, 1983, Cokaliong submitted
documents
showing that the M/V Our Lady of Guadalupe was unseaworthy.[7]
On October 1, 1993,
the MARINA issued an Order granting the application of Gothong for
provisional
authority to carry passengers and cargoes for the
Cebu–Surigao–Cebu–Surigao–Cebu–Surigao–Cebu–Maasin-Cebu
route of its vessel, the M/V Our Lady of Guadalupe.[8]
The provisional authority granted to Gothong was subject to several
conditions,
one of which reads:chanrobles virtual law library
20.
That
this PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY shall be valid for a period of THREE (3)
MONTHS
from date hereof.
It may be
cancelled,
revoked or modified at any time as public interest may require and is
without
prejudice to whatever decision this Authority may finally render on the
basic application for a Certificate of Public Convenience.[9]
On October 6, 1993,
Cokaliong
filed a Motion for Revocation of the provisional authority on the
following
grounds:
1. Market
condition
does not warrant additional capacities:
2. There has been
an
increase in vessels plying the subject route, therefore, the route is
over-tonnaged;
3. The route is
being
adequately served by oppositor, as well as by Trans-Asia Shipping
lines,
Inc. and Escano Lines and therefore there is no urgent public need; andchanrobles virtual law library
4. M/V “OUR LADY
OF
GUADALUPE” is unseaworthy.[10]
However, Cokaliong
failed
to serve copies of its motion on Gothong and to set the same for
hearing
on a specific date and time.
On October 8, 1993,
the MARINA issued an Order setting the motion of Cokaliong for hearing
on October 21, 1993 at 9:30 a.m.[11]
However, the MARINA also suspended the provisional authority it issued
in Gothong’s favor pending the said hearing, on account of the therein
alleged unseaworthiness of the vessel. It ordered Gothong to cease and
desist from operating the vessel until the motion shall have been
resolved.
The MARINA also ordered Gothong to file its reply to Cokaliong’s
pleading.chanrobles virtual law library
Instead of doing so,
Gothong filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on October 12,
1993 with the Court of Appeals with a prayer for a temporary
restraining
order and for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the October 8,
1993
Order of the MARINA. Gothong claimed that the MARINA acted with
grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
suspended the operation of the M/V Our Lady of Guadalupe ex parte and
without
any notice of hearing of Cokaliong’s motion and the proper and timely
service
thereof on it. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32307
and was raffled to the 16th Division of the CA. On October 15,
1993,
the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution requiring the respondents
MARINA
and Cokaliong to file their comment thereon and ordering them to desist
from enforcing or directing the enforcement of the assailed order.[12]
The Court set for hearing the petitioner’s plea for a preliminary
injunction
on November 16, 1993. During the hearing the parties agreed to
maintain
the status quo until the resolution of Gothong’s plea for a writ of
preliminary
injunction.[13]
On December 20, 1993,
Gothong filed a motion with the MARINA for an extension of its
provisional
authority to operate the vessel for a period of three months from
January
1, 1994. The MARINA issued the Order granting the motion on December
29,
1993.[14]
In the meantime, the
respondent MARINA filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 32307 its comment and
supplement
thereto.[15]
Respondent Cokaliong, likewise, filed its comment.[16]
On February 1, 1994,
Cokaliong filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court
of Appeals with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction for the nullification of the December 29,
1993
Order of the MARINA granting an extension of Gothong’s provisional
authority
to operate its vessel. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
33174
and raffled to the 13th Division of the Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
On February 22, 1994,
the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order in CA-G.R. SP
No. 33174 directing the respondents to cease and desist from enforcing
the assailed Order of the MARINA. It also issued a resolution in
the same case, holding that there was no need to consolidate the case
with
CA-G.R. SP No. 32307 pending in the 16th Division of the appellate
court,
since the issues raised therein were different. The CA also granted in
the same Order Cokaliong’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction on
a bond of P500,000.00.[17]
On February 11, 1994,
Gothong filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court,
docketed
as G.R. No. 113576, for the nullification of the February 3, 1994
Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in G.R. SP No. 33174 and for the Court to order
the CA to consolidate CA-G.R. No. 33174 with CA-G.R. No. 32307 pending
in the 16th Division of the CA. On February 28, 1994, the Court
issued
a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 113576 and required the
respondents
to comment on the petition.cralaw:red
On March 9, 1994, the
Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 32307 dismissing
the
petition for the petitioner’s failure to file a motion for
reconsideration
of the assailed order with the MARINA before filing its petition in the
Court of Appeals.[18]
Gothong filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the CA
denied the same. Gothong then filed its petition for review on
certiorari
with this Court for the reversal of the CA decision. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 118235. The two petitions were then
consolidated
for resolution.chanrobles virtual law library
The Issues
From our review of the
records, the issues for resolution in the two petitions are (a) whether
the private respondent Cokaliong is guilty of forum shopping in filing
its petition in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 33174,
despite the pendency of the petition filed by Gothong, docketed as
CA-G.R.
SP No. 32307; (b) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not
consolidating
CA-G.R. SP No. 33174, raffled to its 13th Division, with CA-G.R. SP No.
32307 pending before the 16th Division; (c) whether the Court of
Appeals
erred in issuing a temporary restraining order in CA-G.R. SP No. 33174;
and, (d) whether the 16th Division of the appellate court erred in
dismissing
the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 32307 filed by Gothong,
for
its failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order.
The Ruling of the
Court
On the first issue,
petitioner Gothong asserts that the respondent was present during the
hearing
in CA-G.R. SP No. 32307 on November 16, 1993 and agreed to maintain the
status quo, yet it filed its petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
33174,
in the CA. It contends that the act of respondent Cokaliong constitutes
forum shopping or malpractice proscribed by Section 17 of the Interim
Rules,
because it violated the status quo agreement of the parties during the
hearing of November 16, 1993 in the Court of Appeals. The
petitioner
avers that the extension of the provisional authority granted to it by
the MARINA was ministerial, in view of the status quo order of the CA
in
CA-G.R. SP No. 32307. It avers that if the MARINA erred in
extending
its provisional authority, it behooved the respondent to have assailed
the same in CA-G.R. SP No. 32307, instead of filing its petition in
CA-G.R.
SP No. 33174.cralaw:red
On the issue of forum
shopping, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
There is forum shopping
when a party seek (sic) to obtain remedies in an action in one court
which
had already been solicited and, what is worse, already refused in other
actions and proceedings in other tribunal (MB Finance Corp. v.
Abesamis,
G.R. No. 93875, March 22, 1991) 195 SCRA 592.cralaw:red
In GSIS v. Rebecca Panlilio,
et al., G.R. No. 83385, Nov. 26, 1990, 191 SCRA 655, it was held that:
“forum shopping” exists “whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari)
in another.” However, as held in another case,” both actions, (must)
involve
the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances.” (citing
Palm Avenue Realty Dev’t. Corp. v. PCGG, 153 SCRA 579, 591).cralaw:red
In the present case,
COKALIANG (sic) does not seek to obtain a remedy against the original
three
months provisional authority granted by MARINA to GO THONG.
The action in this case seeks a remedy against the Order granting GO
THONG
an extension of its Provisional Authority. In the first case, GO
THONG claims that there was a violation of due process. In this
case,
it is COKALIONG that is claiming lack of due process. The two actions
involve
different events, facts and circumstances.[19]
We agree with the Court
of Appeals. The subject of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 32307
was
the Order issued by the MARINA dated October 8, 1998, suspending, ex
parte,
the provisional authority it issued on October 1, 1993 in favor of the
petitioner. The petitioner alleged therein that the MARINA
violated
its right to due process by suspending its provisional authority ex
parte
and declaring the suspension order immediately effective until the
motion
for reconsideration of the respondent shall have been resolved by
it.
On the other hand, the subject of the respondent’s petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 33174, was the Order of the MARINA dated December 29, 1993,
extending
the provisional authority of the petitioner for another three months
from
January 1, 1994. Any judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 32307 would not then constitute res judicata in CA-G.R. SP No.
37174,
and vice versa. The reliefs prayed for in CA-G.R. SP No. 32307
are
different from those in CA-G.R. SP No. 33174. As such, the
pendency
of one case did not bar the filing of the petition in the other
case.
Thus, the prescription against forum shopping is not applicable in the
case at bar.[20]
On the second issue,
the petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the
consolidation
of CA-G.R. SP No. 32307 and CA-G.R. SP No. 33174, on its claim that the
petitions in the said cases involved the same parties and the same
basic
issues. The petitioner posits that the MARINA extended its provisional
authority for another three months from the expiry of the original
period
therefor precisely because of the pendency in the Court of Appeals of
CA-G.R.
SP No. 32307, and the existence of the parties’ status quo agreement
allowing
the operation of the vessel pending the CA’s resolution of its petition
for a writ of preliminary injunction.chanrobles virtual law library
In resolving the issue,
the CA ratiocinated that a consolidation of the two cases was
inappropriate
on the following grounds:
The Sixteenth Division
had in effect already rejected this case when Justice Montenegro
returned
the case for reraffle. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the RIRCA
(Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals), consolidation of cases which
is
merely permissive, should be with the conformity of all the Justices
concerned
and may be allowed when the cases to be consolidated involve the same
parties
and/or related questions of fact and/or law. In this case,
Justice
Montenegro of the Sixteenth Division and who was a member of the
Division
who participated in CA-G.R. SP 32307 had in effect rejected
consolidation
when he asked that the case be reraffled.cralaw:red
In any event, there
was no need of consolidation or referral to the Sixteenth Division,
because
the issues in the two (2) cases are different.cralaw:red
In CA-G.R. SP No. 32307,
the petitioner is GO THONG. It seeks to restrains (sic) MARINA from
implementing
the order of October 8, 1993 suspending the provisional authority
granted
by MARINA for GO THONG to service the Cebu-Surigao Lines for a period
of
three months from October 3, 1993 to December 29, 1993. This is
the
order which it seeks to nullify for having been issued without due
process.
When the sixteenth division issued the first status quo resolution, the
Court specifically mentioned the order of October 8. Otherwise
stated,
the status quo which the Court ordered to be maintained, was the
Provisional
Authority for GO THONG to service the Cebu-Surigao Lines from October
3,
1993 to December 29, 1993. With the expiration of this period,
the
contention of COKALIONG that SP No. 32307 may have already been
rendered
moot and academic is not without merit. But we leave this to the
Sixteenth Division.cralaw:red
The present case is
totally different. The petitioner here is COKALIONG. The petitioner do
not seek to interfere with the status quo referred to in SP No. 32307
which
is the Provisional Authority granted to GO THONG to operate subject
route
from October 3, 1993 to December 29, 1993. The Order sought to be
herein
annulled and restrained is totally different and was not yet in
existence
when the status quo order was issued in SP No. 32307. The Order
sought
to be annulled and restrained in this case as having been allegedly
issued
without due process is the Order of December 29, 1993 granting GO THONG
an extension of its Provisional Authority to operate and service
the Cebu-Surigao lines from January 1, 1994. This is a
supervening
event which is not within the status quo order in SP 32307.cralaw:red
The issue of due process
raised by GO THONG in SP No. 32307 is not the same issue of due process
raised by COKALIONG in this case. COKALIONG could not raise the
issue
of lack of due process in SP No. 32307 first because, it is not a
petitioner
in said case, and second, when the petition therein was filed, its
right
to due process have not yet been violated.[21]chanrobles virtual law library
We are in full accord
with the Court of Appeals. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, it
applied for an extension of its provisional authority on December 20,
1993
not because of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 32307 in the Court of
Appeals
and the status quo agreement of the parties, but solely on the
following
allegation it made in its motion before the MARINA:
3. That
there
is a continuing and insistent public demand for the operation of the
vessel
M/V OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE in the route:
Cebu-Surigao-Cebu-Surigao-Cebu-Surigao-Cebu-Maasin-Cebu
for the transportation of passengers and cargoes.
4. Therefore,
there
is need to renew the subject Provisional Authority.
5. The vessel M/V
OUR
LADY OF GUADALUPE has complete and valid certificate to attest to her
seaworthiness.[22]
The MARINA, in the
exercise
of its discretion, found merit in the petitioner’s motion and granted
the
same in an Order dated December 23, 1993. The Court has reviewed
the said Order of the MARINA and found no showing therein that the
order
was issued precisely because of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 32307
and
the November 16, 1993 status quo agreement of the parties made before
the
Court of Appeals.
On the third issue,
the Court of Appeals resolved to issue a temporary restraining order in
favor of the respondent, later converting it into a writ of preliminary
injunction on a bond of P500,000.00, ratiocinating as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
Whether or not it is
the ministerial duty of MARINA to grant an extension of the Provisional
Authority of GO THONG is what this petition is all about. MARINA has
not
made this pretense but denied that there was denial of due process.
Significantly,
MARINA originally denied GO THONG’s application only to reconsider it,
and, thereafter to suspend it pending COKALIONG’s Motion for Revocation
in view of COKALIONG’s allegation of Guadalupe’s unseaworthiness, only
to extend it, after the expiration of the provisional authority which
it
tried to suspend were it not for the status quo order of [the] 16th
division.
MARINA does not deny that there was no hearing on GO THONG’s
application
for extension. Given the strong allegations of petitioner of the
absence
of due process and the denial – grant – suspension – extension stance
of
MARINA, this Court is of the considered view that it has to look into
the
verity of these allegations if it were to remain faithful to its sworn
duty to uphold the constitution, in view of the primacy of due process
in the heirarchy of constitutional rights. To do so, it has to
delve
deeper into the merits of the petition.cralaw:red
When MARINA issued the
3-month Provisional Authority, it sustained the erroneous argument of
Go
Thong in its “Manifestation with Urgent Motion for Reconsideration”
that
the August 10, 1993 denial of its application was based solely on
oppositor’s
pleading.chanrobles virtual law library
Considering that the
continuance of the acts complained of unless restrained, would render
the
judgment in this case ineffectual and probably work an injustice on
petitioner,
we resolve to issue the writ prayed for.[23]
The petitioner avers
that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright the petition
in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33174 because of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 32307 in
the said court. Instead, the CA issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining
the enforcement of the MARINA’s December 29, 1993 Order. The
petitioner
argues that the CA, thus, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction.cralaw:red
We do not agree with
the petitioner. With our ruling that the proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No.
32307 did not bar the filing of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.33174, it
follows that the appellate court had to take cognizance of the petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 33174, and consider the plea for a temporary
restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction. It bears stressing that the
matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary
restraining order is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the
court, and this Court will not interfere with the appellate court’s
exercise
of its discretion unless of manifest abuse.[24]
In this case, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in
issuing
a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction.
The Court notes that although the MARINA suspended on October 8, 1993
the
efficacy of the provisional authority granted in favor of the
petitioner
pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the respondent,
it later issued an Order on December 29, 1993 extending such
provisional
authority for a period of three months from January 1, 1994.cralaw:red
On the last issue, the
petitioner contends that the CA erred when it dismissed its petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 32307 merely because it did not file a motion for
reconsideration
of the assailed Order of the MARINA before it filed its petition in the
Court of Appeals. The petitioner argues that the procedural
requirement
of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply:chanrobles virtual law library
In the instant case,
MARINA immediately suspended the petitioner’s PA on the basis solely of
the defective “motion for revocation” filed by defendant
Cokaliong.
No notice or opportunity to be heard was accorded Gothong. While
MARINA required Gothong to file a reply to said “motion for revocation”
which MARINA also set for hearing on October 21, 1993, the fact remains
that without notice or opportunity to be heard the Gothong PA was
suspended
and rights thereunder created were peremptorily revoked. It was
really
a case of “shoot first, ask questions later.” This is contrary to
the essence of due process of law.[25]
The CA, on the other
hand, dismissed the petition for prematurity, viz:
What is evident is that
Petitioner opted to file the instant Petition and completely
disregarded
the principle of “exhaustion of administrative remedies.” If any
party like the petitioner feels aggrieved by any order, decision,
ruling,
regulation or policy promulgated by the Public Respondent MARINA, then
such aggrieved party must first exhaust administrative remedies before
invoking judicial intervention. Hence, what can be reasonably
inferred
from the action of Petitioner in filing the instant Petition is that it
waived its opportunity to be heard and submit its evidence to refute
Private
respondent’s allegations by not complying with the directive contained
in the disputed order being assailed by herein Petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
“Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies when the same is available before filing an
action
for certiorari is fatal” (Ganub vs. Ramos, 27 SCRA 1174).cralaw:red
Besides, petitioner’s
allegation that the sole reason or consideration which served as the
basis
of the issuance of the 08 October 1993 Order was herein private
respondent’s
motion for revocation is not well founded, it appearing clearly that
public
respondent was guided by considerations of “public interest” and
“public
safety” in suspending the provisional authority contained in the 01
October
1993 Order, in view of the call to consider the issue of
“seaworthiness”
raised by herein private respondent.[26]
We agree with the Court
of Appeals. We note that the provisional authority granted to the
petitioner may be cancelled, revoked or modified at any time by the
MARINA
as public interest may require. The respondent alleged that the vessel
of the petitioner, the M/V OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE, was unseaworthy and
submitted
documentary evidence to prove its claim. In light of such
evidence,
the MARINA resolved to suspend the efficacy of the provisional
authority
it earlier granted to the petitioner, pending the resolution of
Cokaliong’s
motion for the revocation of the provisional authority granted to the
petitioner.
Instead of filing its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals,
the petitioner should have filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the
assailed Order, and adduced documentary evidence to controvert that of
the respondent’s to enable the MARINA to reconsider the suspension of
the
provisional authority granted to the petitioner. It bears
stressing
that certiorari will not lie if the aggrieved party has a speedy and
adequate
remedy at law.chanrobles virtual law library
Certiorari is an extraordinary
remedy and will not issue in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the public respondent, in this case, the MARINA. Since
the
MARINA, in the interest of the public service, is authorized to cancel,
revoke or modify, at any time, the provisional authority granted to the
petitioner, it cannot be claimed that it committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in suspending the efficacy of the provisional authority
issued
to the petitioner pending resolution of the respondent’s claim that the
M/V OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE was unseaworthy.cralaw:red
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petitions in G.R. No. 113576 and G.R. No. 118235 are
DENIED
for lack of merit.cralaw:red
Costs against the petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez,
J.,
on leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jeorge S. Imperial, with Associate Justices
Pacita Cañizares-Nye and Eduardo G. Montenegro concurring.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Oscar M. Herrera, with Associate Justices
Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago and Corona Ibay-Somera concurring.
[3]
Annex “C,” Petition, G.R. No. 118235.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Rollo, p. 57 (G.R. No. 113576).chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Id. at 28-32.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Id. at 41.
[7]
Id. at 52-69.
[8]
Id. at 70-77.
[9]
Rollo, p. 532 (G.R. No. 118235).
[10]
Rollo, p. 83 (G.R. No. 113576).
[11]
Id. at 105-106.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Id. at 150-151.
[13]
Id. at 323-324.
[14]
Id. at 204-205.
[15]
Id. at 152-186.
[16]
Id. at 187.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Id. at 369-380.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Rollo, pp. 40-48 (G.R. No. 118235).
[19]
Id. at 382.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
See Gochan v. Gochan, 372 SCRA 256 (2001).
[21]
Rollo, pp. 498-499 (G.R. No. 113576).
[22]
Id. at 420.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Id. at 500-502.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 368 (1999).
[25]
Rollo, p. 31 (G.R. No. 111832).chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Id. at 46-47. |