FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES ALFREDO
AND ENCARNACION CHING,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
118830
February 24, 2003 - versus -
COURT OF APPEALS,
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK,
AND FERDINAND J.
GUERRERO, SENIOR DEPUTY
SHERIFF, MANILA,
Respondents. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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D E C I S I O N
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AZCUNA,
J.: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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This petition for review
on certiorari, under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside
the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 31795, dated October 27,
1994,
as well as its resolution,[2]
dated January 27, 1995, denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts, gathered
from the records of the petition, involve three different cases filed
in
separate jurisdictions.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On August 6, 1981, respondent
Family Savings Bank (Bank) filed a complaint[3]
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, for the collection of
a sum of money against its debtor Cheng Ban Yek & Co., Inc. and
petitioner
Alfredo Ching, who acted as a surety for Cheng Ban Yek & Co., Inc.[4]
A day after the complaint was filed, the Bank was able to obtain a writ
of preliminary attachment against the defendants.[5]
Armed with a writ of preliminary attachment, the deputy sheriff of the
CFI of Manila, herein respondent Ferdinand J. Guerrero, proceeded to
levy
upon a conjugal property[6]
belonging to petitioners, spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On July 26, 1982, petitioners
filed a petition[8]
with the CFI of Rizal,[9]
seeking to declare illegal the levy on attachment upon their conjugal
property.[10]
Petitioners claimed that the branch sheriff had no authority to levy
upon
a property belonging to the conjugal partnership. The trial court,
however,
dismissed the case on August 8, 1983 for lack of jurisdiction because
the
subject property was already under custodia legis of the CFI of Manila.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Meanwhile, summary judgment
was rendered in the collection case in favor of the Bank on August 12,
1982.[12]
The defendants therein, including petitioner Alfredo Ching, appealed
the
summary judgment to the Court of Appeals.[13]
While the case was on appeal,[14]
the trial court granted the Bank’s motion for execution pending appeal.[15]
As a consequence, the attached conjugal property was levied upon and
sold
through public auction by the deputy sheriff to the Bank on October 10,
1983.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On September 5, 1984,
in an effort to prevent the deputy sheriff from consolidating the sale,
petitioners filed a second annulment case[17]
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.[18]
Petitioners sought to declare void the levy and sale on execution of
their
conjugal property by reiterating the same argument raised in the first
annulment case, i.e., that the branch sheriff had no authority to levy
upon a property belonging to the conjugal partnership.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 15, 1985,
while the second annulment case was pending, the Court of Appeals
dismissed
the appeal filed in the collection case and affirmed in toto the
summary
judgment rendered by the CFI of Manila.[20]
The matter was elevated to us on a petition for review,[21]
but was eventually dismissed for having been filed out of time and for
lack of merit.[22]
Hence, the decision in the collection case became final.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 13, 1990,
the RTC of Makati rendered judgment in the second annulment case in
favor
of petitioners and declared null and void the levy and sale on
execution
upon the conjugal property.[23]
Respondents elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 31795. On October 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals issued the
assailed
decision, reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC of Makati.[24]
The Court of Appeals declared that the Makati annulment case is barred
by res judicata because of the prior Rizal annulment case and Manila
collection
case. Hence, this appeal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners pray for
the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals on the following
grounds:[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I
The Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the decisions rendered in the Manila collection
case
and Rizal annulment case, taken together, constitute res judicata or
bar
by prior judgment to the annulment case filed with the RTC of Makati.
Assuming
there is res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the Court of Appeals
erred
in not holding that respondents have waived this defense.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II
The Court of Appeals
erred in holding that petitioner Encarnacion Ching waived or abandoned
her right or claim on her conjugal property when she did not intervene
in the Manila collection case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
III
In any event, the Court
of Appeals erred in not deciding the Makati annulment case on its
merits
on equitable considerations.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We deny the petition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Makati annulment
case should have been dismissed from the start for lack of
jurisdiction.
The RTC of Makati does not have the authority to nullify the levy and
sale
on execution that was ordered by the CFI of Manila, a co-equal court.
The
determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in
execution
of a judgment was valid, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the
court that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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Beginning with the
case of Orais v. Escaño,[27]
down to the subsequent cases of Nuñez v. Low,[28]
Cabigao v. del Rosario,[29]
Hubahib v. Insular Drug Co., Inc.,[30]
National Power Corp. v. De Veyra,[31]
Luciano v. Provincial Governor,[32]
De Leon v. Hon. Judge Salvador,[33]
Cojuangco v. Villegas,[34]
Darwin v. Tokonaga,[35]
we laid down the long standing doctrine that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of
concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or
city,
having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not
permitted
to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders
or
judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and
seriously
hamper the administration of justice.
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There is no dispute
that the subject conjugal property was under custodia legis of the CFI
of Manila. It was initially attached under a writ of preliminary
attachment
issued by the CFI of Manila. Said property was later on levied upon and
sold under a writ of execution issued by the same court. Since the
attachment,
levy and sale have been carried out upon orders of the CFI of Manila,
any
and all questions concerning the validity and regularity thereof
necessarily
had to be addressed to the CFI of Manila.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners, however,
contend that one of the owners of the property, petitioner Encarnacion
Ching, was not a party to the collection case. Not being a party
thereto,
Encarnacion Ching should be allowed to file a separate case as a
third-party
claimant and said filing cannot be considered as an encroachment upon
the
jurisdiction of a co-equal and coordinate court.[36]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We do not agree.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 16 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court authorizes a third person, who is not the
judgment
debtor or his agent, to vindicate his claim to a property levied
through
an entirely separate and distinct action. Said rule reads as follows:[37]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SECTION 16. Proceedings
where property claimed by third person. If the property levied on is
claimed
by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such
person
makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession
thereof,
stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon
the
officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee,
the
officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment
obligee,
on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to
indemnify
the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the
property
levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be
determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for
damages
for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the
bond
unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120)
days
from the date of the filing of the bond.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The officer shall not
be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any
third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained
shall
prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to
the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from
claiming damages in the same or separate action against a third-party
claimant
who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x x x x x x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Ong v. Tating,[38]
we elucidated on the applicability of Section 16 of Rule 39 of the
Rules
of Court. We held therein that a separate and distinct case from that
in
which the execution has issued is proper if instituted by a "stranger"
to the latter suit. Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on
the part of the sheriff in the execution proceedings is made by a party
to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may only be
applied with, and obtained from, the executing court. This is true even
if a new party has been impleaded in the suit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Is a spouse, who was
not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed
on
account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a
"stranger?"
In Mariano v. Court of Appeals,[39]
we answered this question in the negative. In that case, the CFI of
Caloocan
City declared the wife to be the judgment obligor and, consequently, a
writ of execution was issued against her. Thereupon, the sheriff
proceeded
to levy upon the conjugal properties of the wife and her husband. The
wife
initially filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
praying
for the annulment of the writ of execution. However, the petition was
adjudged
to be without merit and was accordingly dismissed. The husband then
filed
a complaint with the CFI of Quezon City for the annulment of the writ
of
execution, alleging therein that the conjugal properties cannot be made
to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by the wife. The
executing
party moved to dismiss the annulment case, but the motion was denied.
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals, in Mariano, ruled that the CFI of Quezon
City, in continuing to hear the annulment case, had not interfered with
the executing court. We reversed the Court of Appeals’ ruling and held
that there was interference by the CFI of Quezon City with the
execution
of the CFI of Caloocan City. We ruled that the husband of the judgment
debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and
adjudged
against his wife, which would allow the filing of a separate and
independent
action.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts of the Mariano
case are similar to this case. Clearly, it was inappropriate for
petitioners
to institute a separate case for annulment when they could have easily
questioned the execution of their conjugal property in the collection
case.
We note in fact that the trial court in the Rizal annulment case
specifically
informed petitioners that Encarnacion Ching’s rights could be
ventilated
in the Manila collection case by the mere expedient of intervening
therein.[40]
Apparently, petitioners ignored the trial court’s advice, as
Encarnacion
Ching did not intervene therein and petitioners instituted another
annulment
case after their conjugal property was levied upon and sold on
execution.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There have been instances
where we ruled that a spouse may file a separate case against a
wrongful
execution.[41]
However, in those cases, we allowed the institution of a separate and
independent
action because what were executed upon were the paraphernal or
exclusive
property of a spouse who was not a party to the case. In those
instances,
said spouse can truly be deemed a "stranger." In the present case, the
levy and sale on execution was made upon the conjugal property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In any case, even without
the intervention of Encarnacion Ching in the collection case, it
appears
that Alfredo Ching was able to raise the conjugal nature of the
property
in both the trial court and appellate court. A perusal of the records
reveals
that petitioner Alfredo Ching filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to
Quash Writ of Execution before the CFI of Manila. In the motion, he
specifically
argued that the execution was invalid for having been enforced upon
their
conjugal property.[42]
Alfredo Ching raised this argument again on appeal in CA G.R. CV No.
02421.[43]
Evidently, due process has been afforded to petitioners as regards the
execution on their conjugal property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Considering that that
the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to hear Civil Case No.
8389,
it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by
petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petition
for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Vitug and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J.,
on leave.chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, p. 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Civil Case No. 142309.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Rollo, Annex [K] of Petition, pp. 117-131.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-3151 of
the Registry of Deeds for Rizal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
See note 4, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Civil Case No. 46116.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
The case initially heard by Branch 26 of the CFI of Rizal until it was
subsequently transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and
re-docketed
as Civil Case No. 599.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Rollo, Annex [5] of Comment, pp. 299-304.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Id., Annex [15] of Comment, pp. 353-354.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Records, pp. 560-573, Court of Appeals decision in CA G.R. CV No. 02421.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
CA G.R. CV No. 02421.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
See note 4, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Civil Case No. 8389.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
The case was initially raffled to Branch 141 but was subsequently
transferred
to Branch 58.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Rollo, Annex [C] of Petition, pp. 63-73.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
See note 4, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
G.R. No. 73708.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Records, p. 575.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
See note 4, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Rollo, Annex [A] of Petition, pp. 52-60.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Id., p. 13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Rejuso v. Estinopa, 72 SCRA 509 (1976).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
14 Phil. 208 (1909).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
19 Phil. 244 (1911).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
44 Phil. 182 (1922).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
64 Phil. 119 (1937).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
3 SCRA 646 (1961).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
28 SCRA 517 (1969).chan
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[33]
36 SCRA 567 (1970).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
184 SCRA 374 (1990).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
197 SCRA 442 (1991).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Rollo, pp. 28-31.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Italics supplied.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
149 SCRA 265 (1987).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
174 SCRA 59 (1989).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
See note 11, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 378 (1990); Naguit v. Court of Appeals, 347
SCRA
60 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
Records, pp. 643-644.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
Id., pp. 36-72.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |