FIRST DIVISION
SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
119293
June 10, 2003
-versus-
NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION,SECOND
DIVISION,
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM),
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
AZCUNA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before Us is a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to set aside the Decision of the
Second Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
Injunction
Case No. 00468-94 dated November 29, 1994,[1]
and its resolution dated February 1, 1995[2]
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM),
exclusive
bargaining agent of petitioner’s daily-paid rank and file employees,
executed
a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they agreed to
submit
all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also
included
a mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout agreement. The pertinent
provisions
of the said CBA are quoted hereunder:
ARTICLE IV
GRIEVANCE MACHINERY
Section 1. - The
parties
hereto agree on the principle that all disputes between labor and
management
may be solved through friendly negotiation;that an open conflict
in any form involves losses to the parties, and that, therefore, every
effort shall be exerted to avoid such an open conflict. In furtherance
of the foregoing principle, the parties hereto have agreed to establish
a procedure for the adjustment of grievances so as to (1) provide an
opportunity
for discussion of any request or complaint and (2) establish procedure
for the processing and settlement of grievances.chanrobles virtual law library
x
x
x x
x
x x
x
x ARTICLE V
ARBITRATION
Section 1. Any and
all
disputes, disagreements and controversies of any kind between the
COMPANY
and the UNION and/or the workers involving or relating to wages, hours
of work, conditions of employment and/or employer-employee relations
arising
during the effectivity of this Agreement or any renewal thereof, shall
be settled by arbitration through a Committee in accordance with the
procedure
established in this Article. No dispute, disagreement or controversy
which
may be submitted to the grievance procedure in Article IV shall be
presented
for arbitration until all the steps of the grievance procedure are
exhausted.
x
x
x x
x
x x
x
x ARTICLE VI
STRIKES AND WORK
STOPPAGES
Section 1. The
UNION
agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slowdown
of
work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusal to handle any merchandise,
picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or general
strikes,
or any other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY
during
the term of this Agreement.chanrobles virtual law library
Section 2. The
COMPANY
agrees that there shall be no lockout during the term of this Agreement
so long as the procedure outlined in Article IV hereof is followed by
the
UNION.[3]
On April 11, 1994,
IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the
National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike, docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-04-180-94, against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1)
illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation
of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members,
(5)
labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members,
(7)
non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of
unfair
labor practice.[4]
The next day, IBM filed
another notice of strike, this time through its president Edilberto
Galvez,
raising similar grounds: (1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only
contracting,
(3) violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and
(5) other acts of unfair labor practice. This was docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-04-182-94.[5]
The Galvez group subsequently
requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with that of the
Colomeda group,[6]
to which the latter opposed, alleging Galvez’s lack of authority in
filing
the same.[7]chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner thereafter
filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to
Dismiss,
on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that
they
affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from each
other.[8]
After several conciliation
meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the real issues
involved
are non-strikeable. Hence on May 2, 1994, he issued separate
letter-orders
to both union groups, converting their notices of strike into
preventive
mediation. The said letter-orders, in part, read:
During the
conciliation meetings, it was clearly established that the real issues
involved are illegal dismissal, labor only contracting and internal
union
disputes, which affect not only the interest of the San Miguel
Corporation
but also the interests of the MAGNOLIA-NESTLE CORPORATION, the SAN
MIGUEL
FOODS, INC., and the SAN MIGUEL JUICES, INC.
Considering that
San
Miguel Corporation is the only impleaded employer-respondent, and
considering
further that the aforesaid companies are separate and distinct
corporate
entities, we deemed it wise to reduce and treat your Notice of Strike
as
Preventive Mediation case for the four (4) different companies in order
to evolve voluntary settlement of the disputes.[9]
[Emphasis supplied]
On May 16, 1994, while
separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing, the Colomeda
group
filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a strike vote. Petitioner
opposed
by filing a Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike Vote
Illegal,[10]
invoking the case of PAL v. Drilon,[11]
which held that no strike could be legally declared during the pendency
of preventive mediation. NCMB Director Ubaldo in response issued
another
letter to the Colomeda Group reiterating the conversion of the notice
of
strike into a case of preventive mediation and emphasizing the findings
that the grounds raised center only on an intra-union conflict, which
is
not strikeable, thus:
x
x x
x
x x
x
x xchanrobles virtual law library
A perusal of the
records
of the case clearly shows that the basic point to be resolved entails
the
question of as to who between the two (2) groups shall represent the
workers
for collective bargaining purposes, which has been the subject of a
Petition
for Interpleader case pending resolution before the Office of the
Secretary
of Labor and Employment. Similarly, the other issues raised which have
been discussed by the parties at the plant level, are ancillary issues
to the main question, that is, the union leadership.[12]
[Emphasis supplied]
Meanwhile, on May 23,
1994,
the Galvez group filed its second notice of strike against petitioner,
docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-05-263-94. Additional grounds were set forth
therein,
including discrimination, coercion of employees, illegal lockout and
illegal
closure.[13]
The NCMB however found these grounds to be mere amplifications of those
alleged in the first notice that the group filed. It therefore ordered
the consolidation of the second notice with the preceding one that was
earlier reduced to preventive mediation.[14]
On the same date, the group likewise notified the NCMB of its intention
to hold a strike vote on May 27, 1994.
On May 27, 1994, the
Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their strike vote,
which
favored the holding of a strike.[15]
In reply, NCMB issued a letter again advising them that by virtue of
the
PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is deemed not to have been
filed, consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for lack of
compliance
with the notice requirement.[16]
Despite this and the pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings,
on June 4, 1994, IBM went on strike. The strike paralyzed the
operations
of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly worth P29.98 million in
daily
lost production.[17]
Two days after the declaration
of strike, or on June 6, 1994, petitioner filed with public respondent
NLRC an amended Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress Order and
Deputization
Order.[18]
After due hearing and ocular inspection, the NLRC on June 13, 1994
resolved
to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free ingress to
and egress from petitioner’s plants, without prejudice to the union’s
right
to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case.[19]
To minimize further
damage to itself, petitioner on June 16, 1994, entered into a
Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent-union, calling for a lifting of
the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of "good faith
talks"
between the management and the labor management committees. The MOA,
signed
in the presence of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) officials,
expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will
continue
and will not be affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement.[20]
The picket lines ended and work was then resumed.chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent thereafter
moved to reconsider the issuance of the TRO, and sought to dismiss the
injunction case in view of the cessation of its picketing activities as
a result of the signed MOA. It argued that the case had become moot and
academic there being no more prohibited activities to restrain, be they
actual or threatened.[21]
Petitioner, however, opposed and submitted copies of flyers being
circulated
by IBM, as proof of the union’s alleged threat to revive the strike.[22]
The NLRC did not rule on the opposition to the TRO and allowed it to
lapse.cralaw:red
On November 29, 1994,
the NLRC issued the challenged decision, denying the petition for
injunction
for lack of factual basis. It found that the circumstances at the time
did not constitute or no longer constituted an actual or threatened
commission
of unlawful acts.[23]
It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its
resolution
dated February 1, 1995.[24]
Hence, this petition.cralaw:red
Aggrieved by public
respondent’s denial of a permanent injunction, petitioner contends that:
A.
THE NLRC GRAVELY
ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO ENFORCE, BY INJUNCTION, THE PARTIES’
RECIPROCAL
OBLIGATIONS TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION AND NOT TO STRIKE.
B.
THE NLRC GRAVELY
ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN WITHHOLDING INJUNCTION WHICH IS THE ONLY IMMEDIATE
AND
EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE DISASTROUS ECONOMIC WARFARE THAT
ARBITRATION
IS DESIGNED TO AVOID.
C.
THE NLRC GRAVELY
ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE TRO TO LAPSE WITHOUT RESOLVING THE
PRAYER
FOR INJUNCTION, DENYING INJUNCTION WITHOUT EXPRESSING THE FACTS AND THE
LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED AND ISSUING ITS DENIAL FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE
LAPSE
OF THE TRO.[25]
We find for the petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
Article 254 of the Labor
Code provides that no temporary or permanent injunction or restraining
order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be
issued
by any court or other entity except as otherwise provided in Articles
218
and 264 of the Labor Code. Under the first exception, Article 218 (e)
of
the Labor Code expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to "enjoin or
restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful
acts, or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor
dispute
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable
damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party x x x." The second exception, on the
other
hand, is when the labor organization or the employer engages in any of
the "prohibited activities" enumerated in Article 264.cralaw:red
Pursuant to Article
218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to
restrain
an actual or threatened unlawful strike. In the case of San Miguel
Corporation
v. NLRC,[26]
where the same issue of NLRC’s duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was
raised,
we ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied
the petition for injunction to restrain the union from declaring a
strike
based on non-strikeable grounds. Further, in IBM v. NLRC,[27]
we held that it is the "legal duty and obligation" of the NLRC to
enjoin
a partial strike staged in violation of the law. Failure promptly to
issue
an injunction by the public respondent was likewise held therein to be
an abuse of discretion.cralaw:red
In the case at bar,
petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the respondent’s
strike.
A strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the
rights
of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment.
However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds.[28]
One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code and
its Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of
strike
with the NCMB. Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary
settlement
of disputes,[29]
this requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of which shall
render a strike illegal.[30]
In the present case,
NCMB converted IBM’s notices into preventive mediation as it found that
the real issues raised are non-strikeable. Such order is in pursuance
of
the NCMB’s duty to exert "all efforts at mediation and conciliation to
enable the parties to settle the dispute amicably,"[31]
and in line with the state policy of favoring voluntary modes of
settling
labor disputes.[32]
In accordance with the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the said
conversion
has the effect of dismissing the notices of strike filed by respondent.[33]
A case in point is PAL v. Drilon,[34]
where we declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid notice of
strike,
in view of the NCMB’s conversion of the notice therein into a
preventive
mediation case. We ruled, thus:chanrobles virtual law library
The NCMB
had
declared the notice of strike as "appropriate for preventive
mediation."
The effect of that declaration (which PALEA did not ask to be
reconsidered
or set aside) was to drop the case from the docket of notice of
strikes,
as provided in Rule 41 of the NCMB Rules, as if there was no notice of
strike. During the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings no
strike
could be legally declared. The strike which the union mounted, while
preventive mediation proceedings were ongoing, was aptly described by
the
petitioner as "an ambush." [Emphasis supplied]
Clearly, therefore,
applying
the aforecited ruling to the case at bar, when the NCMB ordered the
preventive
mediation on May 2, 1994, respondent had thereupon lost the notices of
strike it had filed. Subsequently, however, it still defiantly
proceeded
with the strike while mediation was ongoing, and notwithstanding the
letter-advisories
of NCMB warning it of its lack of notice of strike. In the case of
NUWHRAIN
v. NLRC,[35]
where the petitioner-union therein similarly defied a prohibition by
the
NCMB, we said:
Petitioners
should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by the NCMB
when the latter dismissed the notices of strike after finding that the
alleged acts of discrimination of the hotel were not ULP, hence not
"strikeable."
The refusal of the petitioners to heed said proscription of the NCMB is
reflective of bad faith.
Such disregard of
the
mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of the Implementing
Rules,
which explicitly oblige the parties to bargain collectively in good
faith
and prohibit them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.[36]
The NCMB having no
coercive
powers of injunction, petitioner sought recourse from the public
respondent.
The NLRC issued a TRO only for free ingress to and egress from
petitioner’s
plants, but did not enjoin the unlawful strike itself. It ignored the
fatal
lack of notice of strike, and five months after came out with a
decision
summarily rejecting petitioner’s cited jurisprudence in this wise:chanrobles virtual law library
Complainant’s
scholarly and impressive arguments, formidably supported by a long line
of jurisprudence cannot however be appropriately considered in the
favorable
resolution of the instant case for the complainant. The cited
jurisprudence
do not squarely cover and apply in this case, as they are not similarly
situated and the remedy sought for were different.[37]
Unfortunately, the NLRC
decision stated no reason to substantiate the above conclusion.
Public respondent, in
its decision, moreover ruled that there was a lack of factual basis in
issuing the injunction. Contrary to the NLRC’s finding, we find that at
the time the injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to
revive
the unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers then being circulated by
the IBM-NCR Council which led the union. These flyers categorically
declared:
"Ipaalala n’yo sa management na hindi iniaatras ang ating Notice of
Strike
(NOS) at anumang oras ay pwede nating muling itirik ang picket line."[38]
These flyers were not denied by respondent, and were dated June 19,
1994,
just a day after the union’s manifestation with the NLRC that there
existed
no threat of commission of prohibited activities.chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, it bears stressing
that Article 264(a) of the Labor Code[39]
explicitly states that a declaration of strike without first having
filed
the required notice is a prohibited activity, which may be prevented
through
an injunction in accordance with Article 254. Clearly, public
respondent
should have granted the injunctive relief to prevent the grave damage
brought
about by the unlawful strike.cralaw:red
Also noteworthy is public
respondent’s disregard of petitioner’s argument pointing out the
union’s
failure to observe the CBA provisions on grievance and arbitration. In
the case of San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC,[40]
we ruled that the union therein violated the mandatory provisions of
the
CBA when it filed a notice of strike without availing of the remedies
prescribed
therein. Thus we held:
x
x x For failing to exhaust all steps in the grievance
machinery
and arbitration proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement,
the notice of strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private
respondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and arbitration
proceedings. In the case of Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can Co., the
court declared as illegal the strike staged by the union for not
complying
with the grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining
agreement.
[Citations omitted]
As in the abovecited
case,
petitioner herein evinced its willingness to negotiate with the union
by
seeking for an order from the NLRC to compel observance of the
grievance
and arbitration proceedings. Respondent however resorted to force
without
exhausting all available means within its reach. Such infringement of
the
aforecited CBA provisions constitutes further justification for the
issuance
of an injunction against the strike. As we said long ago: "Strikes held
in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining
agreement
are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration
clauses.
These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their
ends
have to be achieved."[41]
As to petitioner’s allegation
of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA, jurisprudence has
enunciated
that such clauses only bar strikes which are economic in nature, but
not
strikes grounded on unfair labor practices.[42]
The notices filed in the case at bar alleged unfair labor practices,
the
initial determination of which would entail fact-finding that is best
left
for the labor arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding herein of the
invalidity
of the notices of strike dispenses with the need to discuss this issue.chanrobles virtual law library
We cannot sanction the
respondent-union’s brazen disregard of legal requirements imposed
purposely
to carry out the state policy of promoting voluntary modes of settling
disputes. The state’s commitment to enforce mutual compliance therewith
to foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than our Constitution.[43]
Trade unionism and strikes are legitimate weapons of labor granted by
our
statutes. But misuse of these instruments can be the subject of
judicial
intervention to forestall grave injury to a business enterprise.[44]
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the NLRC in
Injunction Case No. 00468-94 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner and
private respondent are hereby directed to submit the issues raised in
the
dismissed notices of strike to grievance procedure and proceed with
arbitration
proceedings as prescribed in their CBA, if necessary. No pronouncement
as to costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Entitled: "San Miguel Corp. v. Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa, et al.,
"rollo,
pp. 27-36.
[2]
Rollo, p. 37.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Rollo, pp.38-48.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 59-61.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 63-65.
[6]
Rollo, p. 66.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 67-72.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 82-89.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 90-93.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 123-127.
[11]
193 SCRA 223 (1991).
[12]
Rollo, pp. 128-129.
[13]
Rollo, p. 130.
[14]
Rollo, p. 137.
[15]
Rollo, p. 138.
[16]
Rollo, p. 139.
[17]
Rollo, p. 10.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 152-168.
[19]
Rollo, p.169.
[20]
Rollo, pp. 169-170.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 171-197.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 225-227.
[23]
Supra, note 1.
[24]
Supra, note 2.
[25]
Rollo, p. 12.
[26]
304 SCRA 1(1999).chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
198 SCRA 586 (1991).chanrobles virtual law library
[28]
AIUP et al., v. NLRC et al., 305 SCRA 219 (1999).chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
NFSW v. Ovejera et al., 114 SCRA 354 (1982).chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
NFL et al., v. NLRC, et al., 283 SCRA 275 (1997), First City Interlink
Transportation Co. v. Confesor, 272 SCRA 124 (1997), Lapanday Workers
Union
v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 95 (1995).
[31]
Rules to Implement the Labor Code, Book V, Rule XXII, Sec. 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
LABOR CODE, art. 211(a).chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
Rules to Implement the Labor Code, Book V, Rule XXII,
Sec.
1. Grounds for strike and lockout - A strike or lockout may be declared
in cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice. Violations
of collective bargaining agreements, except flagrant and/or malicious
refusal
to comply with its economic provisions, shall not be considered unfair
labor practice and shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout may be
declared on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes or
on
issues brought to voluntary or compulsory arbitration.
xxx
xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Sec.
3. Notice of Strike or Lockout - xxx Any notice which does not conform
with the requirements of this and the foregoing sections shall be
deemed
as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed
by
the regional branch of the Board.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Supra, note 11.chanrobles virtual law library
[35]
287 SCRA 192 (1998).
[36]
Rules to Implement the Labor Code, Book V, Rule XXII, Sec. 6.
[37]
Rollo, p. 35.
[38]
Rollo, p. 228.chanrobles virtual law library
[39]
Art. 264 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES - (a) No labor organization or employer
shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained
collectively
in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed
the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary
strike
or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry.
( mphasis supplied.)
[40]
Supra, note 26.chanrobles virtual law library
[41]
Insurefco Paper Pulp & Project Workers’ Union v. Insular Sugar
Refining
Corp., 95 Phil. 761 (1954).
[42]
MSMG-UWP v. Ramos, et al., 326 SCRA 428 (2000), citing Master Iron
Labor
Union et al., v. NLRC et al., 219 SCRA 47(1993).
[43]
CONSTITUTION, art. XIII, sec. 3.chanrobles virtual law library
[44]
Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, 144 SCRA 628 (1986). |