EN BANC.
.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
121211
April 30, 2003 - versus -
RONETO DEGAMO
ALIAS
"ROY,"
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER
CURIAM:
Before Us for automatic
review is a Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 12)
of
Ormoc City imposing the supreme penalty of death on appellant Roneto
Degamo
alias "Roy" for the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon and
the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 4, 1994,
a complaint was filed before the trial court charging appellant with
the
crime of rape to which, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On January 17, 1995,
before the start of the trial proper, the court a quo allowed the
complaint
to be amended to include the allegation that by reason of the incident
of rape, the victim has become insane[1],
to wit:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
undersigned
Prosecutor accuses RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy of the crime of RAPE
committed
as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That on or about the
1st day of October 1994 at around 1:00 o’clock in the early morning, in
Brgy. Punta, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy, being then
armed
with a bladed weapon, by means of violence and intimidation, did then
and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the
complainant herein ELLEN VERTUDAZO, against her will and in her own
house.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
All contrary to law
and with the aggravating circumstances that the said offense was
committed
in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given
provocation
for the offense; and that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim
become insane.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In violation of
Article
335, Revised Penal Code. Upon
re-arraignment,
appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[2]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Trial ensued.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As borne out by its
evidence, the following is the version of the prosecution:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Complainant Ellen
Vertudazo
and her children were living in a rented apartment at Barangay Punta,
Ormoc
City. She and her family just moved into the neighborhood on July 15,
1994.[3]
She was not personally acquainted with appellant although she knew him
to be one of their neighbors. On August 2, 1994, her brother-in-law,
Venancio,
came from the province for a visit and stayed in her house. It was
during
this time that appellant became acquainted with Venancio. On September
30, 1994, appellant invited Venancio for a night out. Venancio left
complainant’s
house immediately after supper, telling her that he would return to the
house. Later that night, or on October 1, 1994, at around 1:00 in the
morning,
complainant heard someone calling her name. She unwittingly opened the
door thinking that Venancio had returned.[4]
Thereupon, appellant forced his way inside the house and poked a knife
at complainant’s neck. She tried to move away from appellant but he
grabbed
her and told her that he would kill her if she will not accede to his
demands.
Appellant then told her to put off the light, strip off her clothes and
not make any noise. Overwhelmed with fear, complainant meekly followed
the orders of appellant who proceeded to kiss her lips, breasts and all
parts of her body. He laid her on the concrete floor and succeeded in
having
carnal knowledge of her. Appellant was holding the knife while having
sexual
intercourse with complainant. He warned her not to tell anyone about
the
incident, then he left. Complainant went upstairs and just cried. In
the
morning of the same day, complainant reported the incident to the
Barangay
Captain and to the police. She submitted herself for medical
examination
at the health. center on October 3, 1994. Upon learning of the
incident,
her husband, who was working in Saudi Arabia, immediately came home.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Due to her traumatic
experience at the hands of appellant, complainant underwent psychiatric
treatment in Tacloban City.[6]
She was first brought to Dr. Gemelina Cerro-Go[7]
for treatment on November 8, 1994. Dr. Go found her case of psychosis
already
acute and chronic. Complainant was talking to herself and each time Dr.
Go would ask her a question, she repeatedly said, "Gi padlock ang akong
hunahuna." Dr. Go also observed that complainant talked irrelevantly,
had
lost association and had severe destructive inclinations. She did not
listen
to anybody and just kept staring outside the window. Dr. Go
concluded
that complainant was suffering from psychosis, a form of mental
disorder,
induced by an overwhelming trauma secondary to rape. Complainant
visited
Dr. Go again on December 15, 1994 and on January 3, 1995. Dr. Go
prescribed
anti-psychotic drugs to complainant who, after three weeks of
treatment,
showed signs of improvement. Complainant could already sleep although
she
has not yet regained her normal or regular sleeping pattern. Her
delusions
and hallucinations were not as serious anymore, but she was still out
of
contact. She could not function normally as a wife and as a
mother.
Since complainant still suffered from psychosis, Dr. Go administered to
her a dose of low acting tranquilizer injections, anti-depressants and
short acting oral tablets.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dr. Go clarified that
psychosis is usually the technical term for insanity.[9]
She declared that complainant has not fully recovered from psychosis
and
that without continuous treatment, complainant would regress and she
would
completely lose all aspects of functioning.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant’s version
is based on his lone testimony. He admits that he and complainant were
neighbors but claims that they were lovers. He further testified that
he
met complainant for the first time during the last week of August 1994
at a neighborhood store. Complainant readily agreed when he asked her
if
it would be possible for them to get to know each other better. Later,
at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, he and complainant had a
conversation
in front of the gate of her apartment. He learned from her that her
husband
was working abroad. When he told the complainant that he wanted to
court
her, complainant said, "It’s up to you." Encouraged by complainant’s
reply,
he returned at midnight and knocked at the gate of her apartment.
Complainant
peeped through the jalousies and went down to the first floor. She
opened
the gate and let him in. Upon having entered the house, he sat at the
sofa,
placed his hands on the shoulder of complainant, who by then had
already
sat beside him, and touched her ears. She did nothing to repel
appellant’s
advances but just looked up. When asked to remove her shirt,
complainant
willingly obliged. He proceeded to kiss complainant all over. She
removed
her short pants when appellant asked her to do so. He then removed his
shirt and continued to kiss complainant’s breasts, chest and thighs. He
wanted that they move upstairs but she demurred saying that her
children
were upstairs. Complainant instead suggested that they move to the
cement
floor since the sofa was noisy. He got aroused after transferring to
the
floor, so he removed his short pants and briefs. Complainant likewise
removed
her underwear. They had sexual intercourse without him having to use
force
on complainant. Thereafter, they dressed up. He left the place at 1:00
in the morning. They repeated the same act on four more occasions
usually
at 12:00 midnight. He did not have to use force, much less threaten
complainant
with a knife when they had sexual intercourse on October 1, 1994.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On May 22, 1995, the
trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE,
decision is hereby rendered finding the accused RONETO DEGAMO, a. k. a.
Roy, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape defined and penalized under
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act 7659. Appreciating the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling
and nighttime with no mitigating circumstance to offset any of the two
and pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, this court
imposes
upon the same Roneto Degamo, a.k.a. Roy, the extreme penalty of DEATH.
Further, the same Roneto Degamo, a. k. a. Roy, is directed to indemnify
Ellen Vertudazo the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to
pay
the costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As the
sentence
imposed is death, the jail warden of Ormoc City is directed to
immediately
commit the person of Roneto Degamo, a. k. a. Roy, to the National
Bilibid
Prisons at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila while awaiting the review of this
decision
by the Supreme Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this automatic
review.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A discussion of certain
procedural rules is in order before going into the merits of the case.
It has not escaped our notice that the complaint for rape with use of a
deadly weapon was amended after arraignment of appellant to include the
allegation that the victim has become insane by reason or on the
occasion
of the rape. Although the penalty for rape with the use of a deadly
weapon
under the original Information is reclusion perpetua to death, the
mandatory
penalty of death is imposed where the victim has become insane by
reason
or on the occasion of rape as alleged in the Amended Information.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, an amendment after the plea of the accused
is
permitted only as to matters of form, provided: (i) leave of court is
obtained;
and (ii) such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the
accused.
A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already
been arraigned.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Teehankee, Jr. vs.
Madayag,[13]
we had occasion to state that a substantial amendment consists of
recital
of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction
of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following were
held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate
only
to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense
different
or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional
allegations
which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume;
and (4) amendment, which does not adversely affect any substantial
right
of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We further elucidated
in the Teehankee case that the test as to whether an amendment is only
of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether
or
not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
equally
available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence
which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the
information
in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the
amendment
is one of form and not of substance.[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Tested against the
foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is clearly not one of
substance
as it falls under all of the formal amendments enumerated in the
Teehankee
case. The insertion of the phrase that the victim has become insane by
reason or on occasion of the rape in the Information merely raised the
penalty that may be imposed in case of conviction and does not charge
another
offense different from that charged in the original Information.
Whatever
defense appellant may have raised under the original information for
rape
committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape committed with a
deadly weapon where the victim has become insane by reason or on
occasion
of the rape. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial
right
of appellant. Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the
amendment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, it is
also settled that amendment of an information to charge a more serious
offense is permissible and does not constitute double jeopardy even
where
the accused was already arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge,
where the basis of the more serious charge did not exist, but comes as
a subsequent event.[15]
In this case the basis for the amendment was the psychosis of
complainant
which was determined after the filing of the information.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Unlike other qualifying
circumstances, insanity of the victim by reason or on occasion of the
rape
may not be readily discerned right after the commission of the crime.
The
resultant insanity of the victim could be easily mistaken as a mere
initial
reaction, such as shock, to the incident. In other cases, it may take
some
weeks or even months for the insanity of the victim to manifest.
Consequently,
a psychiatrist would need some time with the victim before concluding
that
she is indeed suffering from insanity as a result of rape. Under these
circumstances, the subsequent diagnosis of insanity by reason or on
occasion
of the rape is akin to a supervening event; in which case, the
corresponding
amendment of the information may be allowed, as correctly done by the
trial
court.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Besides, the trial
proper started only after appellant had been re-arraigned and appellant
never objected to the amendment at any stage of the proceedings. It is
basic that objection to the amendment of an information or complaint
must
be raised at the time the amendment is made, otherwise, silence would
be
deemed a consent to said amendment. It is a time-honored doctrine that
objection to the amendment must be seasonably made, for when the trial
was had upon an information substituted for the complaint or
information
without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. It
cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We shall now proceed
to the merits of the case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court gave
credence to the testimony of victim Ellen Vertudazo that appellant
raped
her with the use of a deadly weapon. It held that she would not have
agreed
to endure the indignities of physical examination of her private parts
and the embarrassment of a public trial were it not for a desire to
seek
justice for herself. Moreover, the trial court found that other than
the
self-serving testimony of appellant, no evidence was introduced to
support
his claim that he and complainant were having an illicit love affair;
and
that there was no ill motive on the part of complainant for imputing
the
serious charge of rape against appellant.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his Appellant’s
Brief, appellant raises a single assignment of error, to wit: "The
trial
court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the
crime of rape", in support of which, he argues:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1.
The
fact that at first complainant said she opened the door for the accused
and later denied this, is not an inconsequential contradiction.
2.
Complainant
had not become insane by reason of the rape because she gave
intelligent
answers on the witness stand.
We find the appeal
without
merit.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is doctrinal that
the evaluation of testimonial evidence by trial courts is accorded
great
respect precisely because of its chance to observe first-hand the
demeanor
of the witnesses, a matter which is important in determining whether
what
has been testified to may be taken to be the truth or falsehood.[17]
Appellant failed to show any cogent reason for us to disturb the
findings
of the trial court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Complainant and her
family had just moved in the neighborhood a little more than two months
before she was raped. Prior to the incident of rape, she only knew
appellant
as one of her neighbors but did not personally know him.[18]
Appellant would have us to believe that hours after a chance meeting at
a nearby sari-sari store, complainant, a married woman with children,
was
so morally debased as to readily accede to his sexual advances at her
own
apartment while her children were asleep. Like the trial court, we find
it unlikely for a married woman with children who had just moved into
the
neighborhood to place herself on public trial for rape where she would
be subjected to suspicion, morbid curiosity, malicious imputations and
close scrutiny of her personal life and character, not to speak of the
humiliation and scandal she and her family would suffer, if she were
merely
concocting her charge against appellant and would not be able to prove
it in court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant insists that
the complaint was prompted by complainant’s fear that her husband’s
relatives
might discover her infidelity. We are not convinced. Aside from the
bare
assertion of appellant that he and complainant were having an affair,
he
failed to present corroborative evidence of any kind such as love
notes,
mementos or pictures[19]
or the testimonies of neighbors, relatives or friends. There is no
showing
that the relatives of complainant’s husband even suspected that she was
having an illicit affair. Further, complainant not only filed the
charges
of rape immediately after the incident, she also submitted herself for
medical examination and sought psychiatric treatment due to the trauma
caused by her ordeal. If she and appellant were indeed lovers, there
would
have been no reason for her to be so traumatized by their sexual
liaisons
and undergo psychiatric treatment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Worth noting too is
the fact that there is no evidence nor even an indication that
complainant
was impelled by an improper motive in making the accusation against
appellant.
The absence of any improper motive of complainant to impute such a
serious
offense against appellant persuades us that complainant filed the rape
charge against appellant for no other reason than to seek justice for
the
bestial deed committed against her. Settled is the doctrine that when
there
is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
prosecution
witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in
a serious offense, the testimony deserves full faith and credit.[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant presses that
the trial court should have taken note that complainant gave
contradicting
testimonies as she had earlier testified that she opened the door to
appellant
but later denied this on cross examination; and that complainant must
have
perceived the serious implications of her earlier testimony so she
deliberately
changed her testimony.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After a review of the
testimony of complainant, we find no such contradictions. Complainant
clearly
testified that she opened the door when she heard someone calling her
name
to open it because she thought that her brother-in-law, Venancio, who
left
the house earlier at the invitation of appellant, had already come home
for the night. It was too late when she realized that it was appellant
alone who had called on her to open the door.[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant further argues
that the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon in the
commission
of the crime should not be considered since the weapon was never
presented
as evidence in court. We are not persuaded.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is settled that the
non-presentation of the weapon used in the commission of rape is not
essential
to the conviction of the accused.[22]
The testimony of the rape victim that appellant was armed with a deadly
weapon when he committed the crime is sufficient to establish that fact
for so long as the victim is credible.[23]
It must be stressed that in rape, it is usually only the victim who can
attest to its occurrence and that is why courts subject the testimony
of
the alleged victims to strict scrutiny before relying on it for the
conviction
of the accused.[24]
In the present case, complainant positively described how appellant,
armed
with a knife, threatened and raped her. Appellant failed to show any
compelling
reason for us to brush aside the probative weight given by the trial
court
to the testimony of herein complainant. Absent any showing that certain
facts of substance and significance have been plainly overlooked or
that
the trial court’s findings are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions
reached
by the trial court must be respected and the judgment rendered should
be
affirmed.[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We take note that Dr.
Ernesto Calipayan conducted a physical examination of the victim on
October
3, 1994, and he issued a Medical Certificate wherein it is stated that
the "entire vulva and vestibule are normally looking and showed no
signs
of traumatic injury" and that a microscopic examination of the cervical
and vaginal smear showed that it is negative for sperm cells.[26]
Said findings however, do not demolish the positive testimony of the
victim
that she had been raped by appellant. The absence of traumatic injury
on
her vulva and vestibule is not a strong proof that appellant did not
use
force on the victim who submitted to the dastardly act of appellant
because
of the knife wielded by him. It is within the realm of logic, reason
and
human experience that the victim, who had given birth to two children,
because of the fear for her life, may not have exerted that degree of
resistance
that would have been needed to produce traumatic injury on her private
parts.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, the fact that
no sperm was found in the cervical and vaginal smear is satisfactorily
explained by Dr. Calipayan that human spermatozoa will not survive
between
forty-eight to seventy-two hours.[27]
In complainant’s case, she was examined on October 3, 1994, or more
than
forty-eight hours after she was raped on October 1, 1994 between 12:00
midnight and 1:00 in the morning.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is a settled rule
that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not connote absolute certainty,
it means that degree of proof which, after an investigation of the
whole
record, produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the
accused’s
culpability.[28]
It signifies such proof that convinces and satisfies the reason and
conscience
of those who are to act upon it that appellant is guilty of the crime
charged.[29]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
there is no doubt that appellant had committed the crime of rape.
Appellant
failed to show that the trial court committed any reversible error in
finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping complainant with the use
of
a deadly weapon.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, whenever the crime of rape is
committed
with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua
to death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In meting out the penalty
of death, the trial court considered dwelling and nighttime as
aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime of rape committed with a
deadly
weapon.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court should
not have considered the aggravating circumstance of nighttime against
appellant.
Not only was it not alleged as an aggravating circumstance in the
Information,
but also, there is no clear proof that appellant deliberately took
advantage
of the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Complainant
herself even testified that the flourescent light at the ground floor
of
the house was not switched off until after appellant had already
entered
the house and told her to turn it off.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, the trial court
did not err in imposing the penalty of death on appellant. It is
established by the prosecution that the crime of rape with the use of a
deadly weapon was committed in the dwelling of complainant. Dwelling is
alleged in the Information and was unrefuted by appellant. Under
Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, in cases where the law provides a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the presence of an aggravating
circumstance
warrants the imposition of the greater penalty which is death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We now turn to the issue
as to whether or not the qualifying circumstance of insanity of the
victim
by reason or on occasion of the rape committed against complainant
should
likewise be considered in the imposition of the proper penalty.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Republic Act No. 7659[31]
expressly provides that when by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court
observes:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There is no
jurisprudence
yet, however, which construed the provision "has become insane." Though
there is no doubt that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim
becomes permanently insane, there is no ruling yet whether temporary
insanity
by reason of rape (when the victim responded to psychiatric treatment
as
in the present case) still falls within the purview of the same
provision.[32]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For the guidance of
the Bench and the Bar, we deem it proper to resolve what should be the
correct construction of the provision "has become insane" by reason or
on occasion of the rape committed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is a hornbook doctrine
in statutory construction that it is the duty of the court in
construing
a law to determine legislative intention from its language.[33]
The history of events that transpired during the process of enacting a
law, from its introduction in the legislature to its final validation
has
generally been the first extrinsic aid to which courts turn to construe
an ambiguous act.[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Republic Act No. 2632[35]
is the first law that introduced the qualifying circumstance of
insanity
by reason or on occasion of rape, amending Article 335 of the Revised
Penal
Code. An examination of the deliberation of the lawmakers in enacting
R.A.
No. 2632, convinces us that the degree of insanity, whether permanent
or
temporary, is not relevant in considering the same as a qualifying
circumstance
for as long as the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of
the rape.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Congressional records[36]
disclose that when Senator Pedro Sabido first broached the possibility
of regarding insanity as a qualifying circumstance in rape, he
described
it as "perpetual incapacity or insanity". The interpellations on Senate
Bill No. 21 which later evolved into R.A. No. 2632 did not include the
rationale for the inclusion of the victim’s insanity by reason or
occasion
of rape as a qualifying circumstance. Neither did the legislators
discuss
the degree of insanity of the victim by reason or on occasion of rape
for
it to be considered as a qualifying circumstance. After the
interpellations
on the other proposed amendments to Senate Bill No. 21, the Senate
session
was suspended. Upon resumption of the session, the legislators agreed,
among other matters, that the provision, "when by reason or on occasion
of rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua
shall be likewise reclusion perpetua", be incorporated in the law.[37]
Thus, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 2632, read as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Art. 335. When and how
rape is committed. Penalties - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using
force or intimidation;
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. When the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. When the woman is
under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned
in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The crime of rape
shall
be punished by reclusion temporal.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Whenever the crime
of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When by reason or on
the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed the penalty shall be
reclusion
perpetua to death.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When the rape is
frustrated
or attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When by reason or on
the occasion of the rape the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall
be likewise reclusion perpetua. [Emphasis supplied]
Significantly, the
words
"perpetual" and "incapacity" were not retained by the legislators. They
merely used the word "insanity". It is well-established in legal
hermeneutics
that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or
word thereof be given effect since the lawmaking body is presumed to
know
the meaning of the words employed in the statute and to have used them
advisedly.[38]
Applied inversely, the courts should not interject a condition, make a
distinction, or impose any limitation where the legislators did not opt
to do so.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, it is without
any doubt that when the legislators included the victim’s resultant
insanity
as a qualifying circumstance in rape cases, it did not intend or impose
as a condition that the insanity must be of permanent nature, or that
it
should have been manifested by the victim before the filing of the
complaint
of information, before, during or after trial. Otherwise, it would have
been so expressly stated, especially so, that Senator Sabido had
initially
suggested "perpetual incapacity or insanity," As the Congressional
records
reveal, the legislators chose not to include the word "perpetual" in
the
bill enacted into law.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 2632, was further amended by
Republic Act No. 4111 whereby the penalty is increased to death "when
by
reason or on the occasion of rape, the victim has become insane".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
R.A. No. 7659 which
took effect on December 31, 1993, merely reiterated the imposition of
death
penalty "when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the enactment of
both R.A. Nos. 4111 and 7659, the legislators merely reiterated or
reproduced
the provision on insanity under R.A. No. 2632 except as to the
imposable
penalty, without making any distinction as to the degree of insanity
that
may or may not be considered as a qualifying circumstance.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Consequently, the fact
that the victim during trial or while the case is pending, has returned
to normal behavior after undergoing treatment, does not exculpate the
appellant
from the penalty of death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is inherently difficult
for us to set the parameters or fix a hard and fast rule as to when
insanity
may be considered a qualifying circumstance. Whether the rape resulted
in the insanity of the victim shall have to be resolved by the courts
on
a case to case basis. Suffice it to be stated that the resultant
insanity
of the victim in rape cases must at least be manifest at the time of
filing
the complaint or information or at any time thereafter before judgment
is rendered, in which case, the information may accordingly be amended.[39]
The reason for this is simple. Rape is always a traumatic
experience
for the victim who necessarily suffers untold psychological and
emotional
damage. Like victims of other crimes, rape victims have different ways
of coping with the trauma brought about by the crime. While one may
exhibit
shock or depression immediately after the crime and recover thereafter,
another might require a longer period to exhibit these same symptoms
and
not return to normalcy. Certainly, one can never calculate or measure
the
depths of the psychological and emotional damage that rape inflicts on
the victim.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
Dr. Go had competently and convincingly testified that victim Ellen
Vertudazo
suffered psychosis or insanity from which she seems to have improved
due
to her treatment which treatment should be continuous and may last from
six months to five years so that the victim may not suffer from
regression;
and that as of February 16, 1995, the date Dr. Go testified,
complainant
has not fully recovered from her psychosis.[40]
The qualifying circumstance of insanity had already attached
notwithstanding
the recovery of the victim from her illness. The penalty of death is
imposable.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As to the damages awarded,
the trial court erred in awarding the mere sum of P30,000.00 to
complainant
as civil indemnity. Complainant is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity
in accordance with our established rulings in cases where the crime of
rape is committed, qualified by any of the circumstances under which
the
death penalty is authorized by law.[41]
In the present case, the victim became insane by reason of the rape
committed
against her; and in the commission of rape with the use of a deadly
weapon,
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present. Actually, the
trial
court had two grounds for the imposition of death penalty.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Complainant is likewise
entitled to moral damages without need of further proof in the sum of
P50,000.00.[42]
The fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical
and
psychological sufferings which constitute the basis for moral damages
is
too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the
victim
since the court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her
part as a gauge of her credibility.[43]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In addition, complainant
is entitled to the amount of P25,000.00 as and for exemplary damages[44]
considering the aggravating circumstance of dwelling; and to the amount
of P25,000.00 by way of temperate damages[45]
in lieu of actual damages, considering that complainant had to undergo
psychiatric treatment but was not able to present proof of the expenses
she incurred in her treatment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Three members of the
Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes
the death penalty, is unconstitutional; however, they submit to the
ruling
of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that
the death penalty should be imposed accordingly.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the judgment
of the lower court convicting appellant Roneto Degamo alias "Roy" of
qualified
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellant is ordered to pay complainant Ellen
Vertudazo
the amounts of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), as civil
indemnity;
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), as moral damages; Twenty-Five
Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages. Costs against appellant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Upon the finality of
this decision and pursuant to Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, amending
Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President of the Philippines for
possible
exercise of the pardoning power.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna,
JJ.,
concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Id., pp. 21,25 and 33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Id., pp. 31 and 33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
TSN, January 24, 1995, pp. 9-10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id., pp. 14 and 40.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id., pp. 10-20.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id., pp. 8, 20-23 and 50.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
She finished her specialization in psychiatry at the University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH) from 1975-1977 and has
since handled thousands of psychiatric cases and appeared in court in a
number of cases as an expert witness in the field of psychiatry; and,
admitted
by appellant as an expert witness, TSN, February 16, 1995, pp. 2-7.
[8]
Id., pp. 16-19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
TSN, February 16, 1995, pp. 7 and 16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id., pp. 19-21.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
TSN, April 4, 1995, pp. 17-70.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Records, p. 163.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
207 SCRA 135, 142 (1992).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, 769-770 (1950); Teehankee case, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
U.S. vs. Mabiral, 4 Phil. 308.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
People vs. Ramos, 330 SCRA 453, 458 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
TSN, January 24, 1995, p. 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535, 554 (1991) citing People vs. Soterol,
140
SCRA 400, 405 (1985) and People vs. Hacbang, 164 SCRA 441, 449-450
(1988).
[20]
People vs. Ballenas, 330 SCRA 519, 534 (2000); People vs. Conde, 330
SCRA
645, 652 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
TSN, January 24, 1995, pp. 36-37.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
People vs. Vitancur, 345 SCRA 414, 424 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
People vs. Travero, 276 SCRA 301, 313 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Vitancur case, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Exhibit "C", Records, p. 137.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
TSN, April 4, 1995, pp. 7-8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
People vs. Mariano, 345 SCRA 1, 16 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
TSN, January 24, 1995, p. 16, 30-31.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Entitled "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes
amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code as amended, Other
Special
Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes", effective December 31, 1993.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Rollo, p. 67.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199, 270 (1998).
[34]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
An Act to Amend Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (Re: Rape),
effective
June 18, 1960.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
There was no discussion on the insanity amendment in the House of
Representatives.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Congressional Record, Vol. I, No. 40, March 24, 1958, p. 573.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, 313 SCRA 88, 102 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
Melo vs. People, 85 Phil 766, 769-770 (1950); Teehankee vs. Madayag,
supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
TSN, February 16, 1995, pp. 18-21.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
People vs. Escano, G.R. No. 140218-23, February 13, 2002; People vs.
Perez,
G.R. No. 142556, February 5, 2003.
[42]
People vs. Manlod, G.R. No. 142901-02, July 23, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411, 430-431 [1998].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 146464-67, November 15, 2002; People
vs.
Barcelon, Jr., G.R. No. 144308, September 24, 2002.
[45]
People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 134121, March 6, 2003; People vs. Abrazaldo,
G.R. No. 124392, February 7, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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