SECOND DIVISION
GEORGE (CULHI)
HAMBON,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
122150
March 17, 2003
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner George (Culhi)
Hambon filed herein petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following
issues: WHETHER OR NOT A
CIVIL
CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING UNDER
ARTICLE
32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE
TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE
FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO
RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE
RESERVATION
BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE
PROSECUTION
STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO
APPEAR
DESPITE NOTICE
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SHOULD A STRICT
INTERPRETATION
OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH INFRINGES ON A RIGHT
OF A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO WOULD
DIMINISH, MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The factual background
that led to the filing of the petition is as follows:
On June 6, 1989, the
petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6),
a complaint for damages[2]
for the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by
the
respondent bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.[3]
In answer thereto, respondent contended that the criminal case arising
from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical
Injuries
thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986,[4]
had already been provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court
of
Tuba, Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to petitioner's lack of interest;[5]
and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil
liabilities
of respondent.[6]
After trial, the Regional
Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that
the
civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and
that
petitioner is entitled to damages. The dispositive portion of the
RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment
is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes to pay
plaintiff
George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for hospitalization and medical
expenses
and P10,000.00 for native rituals, as Actual Damages; the sum of
P10,000.00
as Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as
Attorney's
fees and costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal,[8]
the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995,[9]
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed
petitioner's
complaint for damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to the appellate
court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a
separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the
criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal case carried with it
the
dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the
dismissal
was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an
adjudication on the merits.[10]
Hence, herein petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.cralaw:red
Petitioner argues that
the ruling in the case of Abellana v. Marave[11]
should be observed, i.e., a civil action for damages may be filed and
proceed
independently of the criminal action even without reservation to file
the
same has been made;[12]
and that the requirement of reservation, as provided in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his substantial
right.[13]
The petition must be
denied.cralaw:red
Petitioner filed the
complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,[14]
is the prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution
of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.cralaw:red
Such civil action includes
recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Article
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the
same act or omission of the accused.cralaw:red
Under the foregoing
rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex
delicto)
and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict)
are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived,
reserved or previously instituted.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, in Maniago v.
Court of Appeals,[15]
the Court ruled that the right to bring an action for damages under the
Civil Code must be reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111,
otherwise
it should be dismissed;[16]
and that the reservation requirement does not impair, diminish or
defeat
substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general
interest
of orderly procedure.[17]
In the Maniago case,
petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven by Herminio
Andaya
that figured in a vehicular accident with the jeepney owned by
respondent
Alfredo Boado. The petitioner therein initially sought for
the suspension of the civil case for damages filed against him in view
of the pendency of the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and multiple physical injuries filed against his
driver. The respondent, in the criminal case, did not reserve the
right to bring the separate civil action against the petitioner or his
driver. The criminal case was later dismissed for the failure of
the prosecution to prosecute its case. On appeal, the Court
identified
the issues as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil action for
damages
despite the absence of reservation; (2) whether the dismissal of the
criminal
case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action; and (3) whether
the reservation requirement is substantive in character and beyond the
rule-making power of the Court.[18]
The Court expounded:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
§1quite clearly
requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all
civil
actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de
deemed
to have been instituted with the criminal case In other words
the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of
the
civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from
quasi-delict
under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will
de deemed instituted with the criminal action.cralaw:red
Contrary to private
respondent's contention, the requirement that before a separate civil
action
may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat
substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general
interest
of procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in
nature.
For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that
any
person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended
party
the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever
questioned
the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought
separately.[19]
While the Abellana case
ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the
rule
explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.cralaw:red
x x x Prior reservation
is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil
actions
can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart
from or simultaneous with the criminal action.cralaw:red
Far from altering
substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to
borrow
the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":
‘to avoid multiplicity
of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to
clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in
short,
the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the
parties-litigants.'[20]
Thus, herein petitioner
Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil
action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so,
Civil
Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him without prior
reservation
should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
2049,
whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was
impliedly
instituted therein was likewise dismissed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
and
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED
in
toto.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J.,
(Chairman),
Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 10-11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 1761-R.
[3]
Records, pp. 1-4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id., Exhibit "2", p. 135.
[5]
Id., Exhibit "3", pp. 136-137.
[6]
Id. p. 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id. p. 181.
[8]
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 36991 entitled George (Culhi) Hambon,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus Valentino U. Cerantes, Defendant-Appellant.
[9]
CA Rollo, p. 88.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id., pp. 85-88.
[11]
57 SCRA 106 (1974).
[12]
Rollo, p. 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id., p. 15.
[14]
Bar Matter No. 375, approved per SC Resolution dated June 17, 1988, and
re-affirmed per SC Resolution dated July 7, 1998 (effective October 1,
1988).
[15]
324 Phil. 34 [1996].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id., at 41.
[17]
Id., at 47.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Id., at 38, 40-41.
[19]
Id., at 41-42, 47.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119771, April
24,
1998, 289 SCRA 568, 574, 578. |