SECOND DIVISION.
.
VICTOR G.
VALENCIA,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
122363
April 29, 2003
-versus-
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COURT
OF APPEALS,
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,AS
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY,
HON. ERNESTO GARILAO, SECRETARYOF
AGRARIAN REFORM,
CRISOSTOMO M. CORPIN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,DAR
REGION VII,
SANTOS GARGAYA, JULIANO MAGDAYAO, CRESCENCIANO FRIAS,FEDERICO JARE, ROSENDO
LOBRESCO, ERNESTO LOBRESCO,FELICIANO
LOBRESCO,
CATALINO MANTAC, VICTORIANO MONTE-FALCON,FRANCISCO
OBANG,
AMBROSIO SEMILLANO, ROGELIO TAMAYOAND
EDILBERTO
LOBRESCO,
Respondents. |
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
.
The tenancy crisis in the
Philippines is not just of recent vintage. History is
replete
with instances where tenant-farmers, relegated to a life of perpetual
bondage,
have rushed onto the battlefield with hopes of freedom from imminent
thralldom,
aptly described by Professor Harold J. Laski as the normal life of the
poor - their perpetual fear of the morrow, their haunting sense of
impending
disaster, their fitful search for beauty that perpetually eludes them.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Every administration
that took over the reins of government saw the gravity of this
problem.
Thus, each offered to the tenant-tillers its own version of the
appropriate
legislation for their emancipation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Agricultural Tenancy
Act of 1954 (R. A. No. 1199), the initial attempt of President
Magsaysay
at agrarian reform, was conceived as a remedial legislation to uplift
the
social and economic status of tenants. It was insinuated in the
legislative
deliberations that several provisions therein operated to deprive the
landowner
of his right to contract and his right to property without due process
of law. But, it was also argued, this involved societal values
and
the agricultural tenancy act was meant to remedy an existing social
evil.
Hence, all tenancy laws that followed thereafter were crafted along
this
line. This case is now being scrutinized and tested against the
bedrock
of legal and equitable safeguards to achieve a truly successful and
balanced
agrarian reform initiative.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For more than a quarter
of a century petitioner Victor G. Valencia, a government retiree,
sought
justice through administrative and judicial channels to regain
possession
of his two (2) parcels of land which he claims to have been unjustly
withheld
from him by persons claiming to be tenants with the ostensible
complicity
of government officials implementing the agrarian reform program.
In the meantime his appeal for fairness and justice was denied him
through
procedural infirmities. We are now asked to probe into his lonely
plight with a reminder that it is our solemn duty to dispense equal
justice
to the rich and the poor.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We have repeatedly stressed
that social justice - or any justice for that matter - is for the
deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his
hovel.
It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the
balance
in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy
and compassion. But never is it justified to give
preference
to the poor simply because they are poor, or reject the rich simply
because
they are rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and the
rich
alike according to the mandate of the law.[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The property in dispute
involves two (2) parcels of land situated at Barangay Linothangan,
Canlaon
City, Negros Oriental, covered by TCT No. H-T-137 with an area of
23.7279
hectares, and by Homestead Application No. HA-231601 with Final Proof
and
Tax Declaration No. 0515 with an area of 6.4397 hectares.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 7 May 1957 Victor
G. Valencia acquired the first parcel covered by TCT No. H-T-137 from a
certain Bonifacio Supnet. The only tenant of the property at that
time was a certain Digoy Besario who was succeeded by his son Jesus
Besario.
On 2 July 1961 Valencia and Jesus Besario terminated their
landlord-tenant
relationship through a public instrument voluntarily executed by them,
thus reverting the actual physical possession of the property to
petitioner
Valencia.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 22 October 1962
Valencia entered into a ten (10)-year civil law lease agreement over
his
two (2) parcels of land with a certain Glicerio Henson. Before
the
ten (10)-year lease expired, apparently without objection from Henson,
Valencia leased the property for five (5) years to Fr. Andres Flores
under
a civil law lease concept beginning 21 August 1970 or until 30 June
1975
after which the lease was cancelled and inscribed as Entry No. 1578 in
TCT No. H-T-137. The lease agreement between Valencia and
Fr.
Flores was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering
the
land without Valencia’s written consent. This was admitted by the
parties as reflected in the DAR Investigation Report and
Recommendations.[2]
The prohibition against subleasing or encumbering of the land
apparently
included the prohibition against installing a leasehold tenant
thereon.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in the prior lease agreement
with
Henson no such prohibition was stipulated.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
During the period of
his lease, Henson instituted Crescenciano Frias and Marciano Frias to
work
on the property, although only Crescenciano Frias apparently remained
in
the land while Marciano Frias must have abandoned his cause if any, as
he was not impleaded in this case; neither did he appear on record to
have
been issued a CLT in his name.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
During the lease of
Fr. Andres Flores, he designated Francisco Obang (as overseer), Rogelio
Tamayo, Federico Jare, Feliciano Lobresco, Melchor Moncada, Rosendo
Lobresco,
Victoriano Montefalcon, Santos Gargaya, Catalino Mantac, Herodita
Semillano,
Ernesto Lobresco, Natividad Lobresco and Alfredo Demerin, along with
Crescenciano
and Marciano Frias, to cultivate the land. These farmhands shared
their produce with Fr. Flores. Subsequently, Francisco Obang,
Santos
Gargaya, Crescenciano Frias, Federico Jare, Rosendo Lobresco, Juliano
Magdayao,
Ernesto Lobresco, Feliciano Lobresco, Catalino Mantac, Victoriano
Montefalcon,
Ambrosio Semillano, Rogelio Tamayo and Edilberto Lobresco, became
recipients
of CLTs and are collectively referred to herein as private respondents.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When the lease agreement
between Valencia and Fr. Flores expired on 30 June 1975, Valencia
demanded
that private respondents vacate the premises. Instead of
complying
with the demand, they refused and continued cultivating the land
despite
the demand for them to vacate. Valencia wanted to regain
possession
of his property so he could work it by administration, having in fact
appointed
Bernie Bautista as overseer until petitioner could retire from the
government
service.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his initial step
in his long and agonizing journey, Valencia filed a letter of protest
with
the Minister of Agrarian Reform to take back the actual possession of
his
property that was subject of the civil law lease agreement.
On 20 March 1976 his letter was referred to the DAR Regional Office in
Cebu City.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Meanwhile, without
the knowledge much less consent of Valencia, private respondents
applied
for Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) under the Operation Land
Transfer
(OLT) Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 claiming they were
bona fide tenants of the property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 10 December 1985,
while the investigation was being conducted by the DAR pursuant to
petitioner’s
letter of protest of 20 March 1976, but before it could be terminated,
the DAR issued the questioned CLTs to private respondents.
The DAR Team Office in Canlaon City pursuant to the Operation Land
Transfer
Program under Pres. Decree No. 27 and Letter of Instruction No. 474
identified
the following persons as farmer-beneficiaries:[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
NAME
CLT NO. LOT
NO.
AREA (hectares)
A. TAX DEC. No. 0515
1. Santos
Gargaya
0-071160
0111
0.3300 ha.cralaw:red
2. Juliano
Magdayao
a) 0-071161
0122
0.3350 ha.cralaw:red
b) 0-071163
0114
0.2550 ha.cralaw:red
c) 0-071166
0117
0.4825 ha.cralaw:red
d) 0-071175
0124
0.3140 ha.cralaw:red
B. TCT No. HT-137
3. Crescenciano
Frias
0-071164
0115
0.8890 ha.cralaw:red
4. Federico
Jare
a) 0-71171
0120
0.4600 ha.cralaw:red
b) 0-71172
0121
0.2500 ha.cralaw:red
5. Rosendo
Lobresco
a) 0-071189
0135
0.2335 ha.cralaw:red
b) 0-071182
0129
1.0325 ha.cralaw:red
6. Ernesto
Lobresco
a) 0-071185
0132
0.8900 ha.cralaw:red
b) 0-71187
0133
0.8400 ha.cralaw:red
7. Feliciano
Lobresco
0-071188
0134
0.3400 ha.cralaw:red
8. Catalino
Mantac
0-071162
0113
0.0425 ha.cralaw:red
9. Victoriano Montefalcon
0-071190
0136
0.1800 ha.cralaw:red
10. Francisco
Obang
0-071168
0118
1.200 has.cralaw:red
11. Ambrosio Semillano
a) 0-071165
0116
0.0340 ha.cralaw:red
b) 0-071176
0125
0.1135 ha.cralaw:red
c) 0-071177
0126
0.0340 ha.cralaw:red
12. Rogelio
Tamayo
0-071194
0139
0.3400 ha
13. Edilberto
Lobresco
0-071173
0122
1.2040 has.cralaw:red
Total Area 10.1055 has
In view of the issuance
of CLTs to private respondents, petitioner Valencia filed a second
letter
of protest and requested an investigation and subsequent cancellation
of
the CLTs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In February 1988
petitioner
Valencia and Catalino Mantac, one of private respondents,
entered
into a leasehold contract undertaking to have a profit-sharing
agreement.
No other respondent entered into any agreement or tenancy contract,
whether
written or verbal, with Valencia, Henson or Fr. Flores.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 6 and 8 July 1988
an administrative investigation was conducted by the DAR Hearing
Officer,
Atty. Vilmo Ampong. This was done more than twelve (12) years
after
the initial letter of protest was filed on 20 March 1976.
After
an on-site investigation and inspection of the Valencia property, Atty.
Ampong, in his Investigation Report and Recommendations dated 7
December
1988 found that: (a) Bernie Bautista, without any authority from
protestant Valencia, obtained and/or received shares of the palay
produced
every
harvest from private respondents starting 1975 to 1983 with his wife
Hazel
issuing the corresponding receipts; (b) Since the time Bautista and
spouse
obtained and/or received the owner's shares of the produce from private
respondents not a single cavan nor its equivalent in cash was turned
over
or remitted to Valencia; (c) Private respondents stopped giving the
landowner's
shares to Bautista and his wife when they already refused to issue
receipts,
and so from then on private respondents appropriated to themselves all
the landowner's shares; (d) While enjoying the possession, cultivation
and utilization of the two (2) parcels of land, some of the private
respondents
sublet their farmholdings for financial considerations and turned them
over to the sublessees for specified periods;[4]
(e) The DAR Team Office in Canlaon City had the landholding included in
the Final Survey of 1983 notwithstanding Valencia’s pending protest
contesting
the issuance of the CLTs;[5]
and, (f) Sometime in February 1988 Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered
into a leasehold contract over a 0.0425 hectare of the 23.7279 hectares
covered by TCT No. H-T-137.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Atty. Vilmo Ampong also
found that the right of private respondents to the land ceased upon the
termination of the lease contracts, except as regards respondent
Catalino
Mantac with whom petitioner Valencia entered into a tenancy
agreement.
Atty. Ampong further confirmed that Valencia did not receive anything
from
private respondents as consideration for tilling his land.
Consequently,
Atty. Ampong recommended that the CLTs issued to private respondents be
cancelled and the final survey conducted on the landholding of Valencia
set aside.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 24 August 1989 the
DAR Regional Office in Cebu City, in DARRO Adm. Case No. VII-117-89,
notwithstanding
the Investigation Report and Recommendations of its DAR Team Office,
dismissed
Valencia's protest and held that private respondents had the right to
continue
on the land until otherwise ordered by the court.[7]
Valencia moved for reconsideration but on 12 July 1991 the motion was
denied.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This setback of Valencia
prompted him to appeal to the Office of the President under authority
of
DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, arguing that the Secretary of
Agrarian
Reform[8]
erred in considering private respondents as tenants and in not
recognizing
petitioner’s right of retention under R. A. No. 6657 otherwise known as
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 8 October 1993 Executive
Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., by authority of the President,
affirmed
the order of the DAR of 12 July 1991 subject to the modification that
the
area acquired by petitioner Valencia as homestead be excluded from the
coverage of P. D. No. 27.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Valencia then brought
his case to the Court of Appeals contending that the Executive
Secretary
erred in recognizing private respondents as tenants and disallowing him
and his seven (7) "compulsory heirs" from exercising their right of
retention
under R. A. No. 6657. However, in a decision promulgated on 27
July
1995 the Court of Appeals dismissed the case on a technical ground,
i.e.,
that his appeal was filed out of time.[9]
The appellate court ruled that petitioner should have filed with it a
petition
for review within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order of the
DAR
Secretary pursuant to Sec. 54 of R. A. No. 6657 and Supreme Court Adm.
Circ. No. 1-95, instead of elevating the case to the Office of the
President
pursuant to DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994. Hence,
according
to the Court of Appeals, the petition of Valencia was filed out of
time.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 22 September 1995
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In its
Resolution
the Court of Appeals, citing Shell Philippines, Inc. v. Central
Bank,[10]
held that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or
regulation
issued to implement the law, the basic law prevails because the rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.[11]
Thus, DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, according to the Court of
Appeals, cannot be considered valid and effective since it runs counter
to Sec. 54 of R. A. No. 6657 which provides for an appeal from any
decision,
order, award or ruling by the DAR to the Court of Appeals.[12]
Likewise, the appellate court held that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative
remedies does not apply in the present case where the respondent is a
Department
Secretary whose acts, as alter ego of the President, bear the implied
approval
of the latter.[13]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Valencia filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R.
SP No. 32669 dated 27 July 1995 as well as its Resolution denying his
Motion
for Reconsideration of 22 September 1995.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner contends
that DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, is valid not being contrary
to law and jurisprudence, and should be accorded respect being the
Agrarian
Reform Secretary’s construction of the law that his Department
administers
and implements.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Public respondents,
on the other hand, aver that Secs. 15 and 20 of Book VII of E. O. No.
292
which are cited as the legal bases of DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3 refer to
the
procedure for administrative appeals from an agency to the Department
Head
which in this case is the DAR through its Secretary. They argue
that
there
is no provision for appeal to the Office of the President since in the
administrative structure the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is the alter
ego of the President. They contend that Sec. 23 of Book VII
cites the finality of the decision of the appellate agency without
providing
for a further appeal, and that Sec. 25 provides for judicial review
from
an agency decision, as they point to Sec. 54 of R. A. No. 6657[14]
and SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We agree with petitioner.
Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of
interpretation.
Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi
modus.[16]
This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and
intelligible
system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different
legislative
and quasi-legislative acts. Where two (2) rules on the same
subject,
or on related subjects, are apparently in conflict with each other,
they
are to be reconciled by construction, so far as may be, on any fair and
reasonable hypothesis. Validity and legal effect should therefore
be given to both, if this can be done without destroying the evident
intent
and meaning of the later act. Every statute should receive such a
construction as will harmonize it with the pre-existing body of laws.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Harmonizing DAR Memo.
Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, with SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95 and Sec. 54 of
R. A. No. 6657 would be consistent with promoting the ends of
substantial
justice for all parties seeking the protective mantle of the law.
To reconcile and harmonize them, due consideration must be given to the
purpose for which each was promulgated. The purpose of DAR Memo.
Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, is to provide a mode of appeal for matters
not falling within the jurisdictional ambit of the Department of
Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) under R. A. No. 6657 and correct
technical
errors of the administrative agency. In such exceptional cases,
the
Department Secretary has established a mode of appeal from the
Department
of Agrarian Reform to the Office of the President as a plain, speedy,
adequate
and inexpensive remedy in the ordinary course of law. This would
enable the Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary, to
review technical matters within the expertise of the administrative
machinery
before judicial review can be resorted to by way of an appeal to the
Court
of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other hand, the
purpose of SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95, now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, is to invoke the constitutional power of
judicial
review over quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Agrarian
Reform under R. A. No. 6657 and the Office of the President in other
cases
by providing for an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Section 54 of
R. A. No. 6657 is consistent with SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95 and Rule 43 in
that it establishes a mode of appeal from the DARAB to the Court of
Appeals.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Angara v. Electoral
Commission this Court upheld the promulgation of the rules of procedure
of the Commission since they were necessary to the proper exercise of
its
express power to hear and decide election contests involving members of
the legislature, although not specifically granted by the Constitution
or statute.[17]
We ruled[18]
-chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x x the creation
of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted
to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of
construction
that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other
is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I,
pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate
such
rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power
x
x x must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission. (Emphasis supplied) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, the power of the
Department Secretary to promulgate internal rules of administrative
procedure
is lodged in him by necessary implication as part of his express power
to "promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department
objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects."[19]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Is an appeal to the
Office of the President from the Department Secretary pursuant to DAR
Memo.
Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, proper under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner contends
that an appeal to the Office of the President from the Secretary of
Agrarian
Reform is proper under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
On the other hand, it is the contention of public respondent, the
Office
of the Solicitor General, that an exception to this well-settled
principle
is the doctrine of qualified political agency. Where the
respondent
is a Department Secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless the
President
actually disapproves them, administrative remedies have already been
exhausted.
Recourse to the court may be made at that point, according to private
respondents,
a view that was sustained by the Court of Appeals. In this case,
the appellate court ruled that the appeal before it was filed beyond
the
reglementary period as petitioner appealed to the Office of the
President,
and not to the Court of Appeals, where it should have been
brought.
In Tan v. Director of Forestry this Court ruled that even if the
respondent
was a Department Secretary, an appeal to the President was proper where
the law expressly provided for exhaustion.[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As a valid exercise
of the Secretary’s rule-making power to issue internal rules of
procedure,
DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, expressly provides for an appeal
to the Office of the President. Thus, petitioner Valencia filed
on
24 November 1993 a timely appeal by way of a petition for review under
Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Office
of
the President, which was received on 11 November 1993, well within the
fifteen (15)-day reglementary period.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
An administrative
decision
must first be appealed to administrative superiors up to the highest
level
before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review.
The power of judicial review may therefore be exercised only if an
appeal
is first made by the highest administrative body in the hierarchy of
the
executive branch of government.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Calo v. Fuertes this
Court held that an administrative appeal to the President was the final
step in the administrative process and thus a condition precedent to a
judicial appeal.[21]
Hence, an appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of
the
Department Secretary in an administrative case is the last step that an
aggrieved party should take in the administrative hierarchy, as it is a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Indeed, certain procedural
technicalities have beclouded this case from the outset such that the
substantive
issue regarding the true nature of the relationship between petitioner
and private respondents was not addressed by the Court of Appeals,
hence,
the raison d’être of the case. It must necessarily be
discussed
if this Court were to resolve with finality the protracted conflict
that
has lasted over twenty-five (25) years. We are resolving the
question
at this point to bring this case once and for all to a just, fair and
equitable
conclusion. Where there are clear errors of law this Court must
exercise
its constitutional power of judicial review to correct such errors.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The substantive issue
to be resolved may be expressed in this manner: Can a contract of
civil law lease prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on
the land subject matter of the lease agreement? Otherwise
stated,
can petitioner’s civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the
subject
premises without express authority to do so under Art. 1649 of the
Civil
Code, more so when the lessee is expressly prohibited from doing so, as
in the instant case?
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Contrary to the
impression
of private respondents, Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended,
does
not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant
without
the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically
authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is basically a
personal
right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. But
certainly
nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding
is automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon. A
different
interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation where a
person
who wants to be a tenant, and taking advantage of this perceived
ambiguity
in the law, asks a third person to become a civil law lessee of the
landowner.
Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right over the
property than the landowner himself. This tenant would then gain
security of tenure, and eventually become owner of the land by
operation
of law. This is most unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting
landowner who entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith
only
to realize later on that he can no longer regain possession of his
property
due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other hand, under
the express provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot
assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a
stipulation
to the contrary. In the case before us, not only is there no
stipulation
to the contrary; the lessee is expressly prohibited from subleasing or
encumbering the land, which includes installing a leasehold tenant
thereon
since the right to do so is an attribute of ownership. Plainly
stated
therefore, a contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law
lessee
from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease
agreement.
An extensive and correct discussion of the statutory interpretation of
Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, is provided by the minority view
in Bernas v. Court of Appeals.[22]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When Sec. 6 provides
that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the
person
who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary,
or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same,
it assumes that there is already an existing agricultural leasehold
relation,
i.e., a tenant or agricultural lessee already works the land. The
epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural
Leasehold
Relations," which assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on
the
land; not until then. This is precisely what we are still asked
to
determine in the instant proceedings.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To better understand
Sec. 6, let us refer to its precursor, Sec. 8 of R. A. No. 1199, as
amended.[23]
Again, Sec. 8 of R. A. No. 1199 assumes the existence of a tenancy
relation.
As its epigraph suggests, it is a "Limitation of Relation," and the
purpose
is merely to limit the tenancy "to the person who furnishes the land,
either
as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person
who
actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from
within
his immediate farm household." Once the tenancy relation is
established,
the parties to that relation are limited to the persons therein
stated.
Obviously, inherent in the right of landholders to install a tenant is
their authority to do so; otherwise, without such authority, civil law
lessees as landholders cannot install a tenant on the
landholding.
Neither Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844 nor Sec. 8 of R. A. No. 1199
automatically
authorizes the persons named therein to employ a tenant on the
landholding.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to Mr. Justice
Guillermo S. Santos and CAR Executive Judge Artemio C. Macalino,
respected
authorities on agrarian reform, the reason for Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844
and Sec. 8 of R. A. No. 1199 in limiting the relationship to the lessee
and the lessor is to "discourage absenteeism on the part of the lessor
and the custom of co-tenancy" under which "the tenant (lessee)
employs
another to do the farm work for him, although it is he with whom the
landholder
(lessor) deals directly. Thus, under this practice, the one who
actually
works the land gets the short end of the bargain, for the nominal or
‘capitalist’
lessee hugs for himself a major portion of the harvest."[24]
This breeds exploitation, discontent and confusion x x x x The
kasugpong,
kasapi, or katulong also works at the pleasure of the nominal tenant.[25]
When the new law, therefore, limited tenancy relation to the landholder
and the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of
labor
available from within his immediate farm household, it eliminated the
nominal
tenant or middleman from the picture.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Another noted authority
on land reform, Dean Jeremias U. Montemayor,[27]
explains the rationale for Sec. 8 of R. A. No. 1199, the precursor of
Sec.
6 of R. A. No. 3844:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Since the law establishes
a special relationship in tenancy with important consequences, it
properly
pinpoints the persons to whom said relationship shall apply. The
spirit of the law is to prevent both landholder absenteeism and tenant
absenteeism. Thus, it would seem that the discretionary powers
and
important duties of the landholder, like the choice of crop or seed,
cannot
be left to the will or capacity of an agent or overseer, just as the
cultivation
of the land cannot be entrusted by the tenant to some other
people.
Tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character.[28]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 6 as already
stated simply enumerates who are the parties to an existing contract of
agricultural tenancy, which presupposes that a tenancy already
exists.
It does not state that those who furnish the landholding, i.e., either
as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, are
automatically
authorized to employ a tenant on the landholding. The reason is
obvious.
The civil lease agreement may be restrictive. Even the owner
himself
may not be free to install a tenant, as when his ownership or
possession
is encumbered or is subject to a lien or condition that he should not
employ
a tenant thereon. This contemplates a situation where the
property
may be intended for some other specific purpose allowed by law, such
as,
its conversion into an industrial estate or a residential subdivision.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under Lastimoza v. Blanco,[29]
private respondents in that case could not be lawful tenants of the
landowner
for the reason that the civil law lessees, after failing to return the
landholding to the landowner, already became deforciants. A
deforciant
cannot install a lawful tenant who is entitled to security of tenure.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Attention may be
invited
to settled jurisprudence that the existence of an agricultural
leasehold
relationship is not terminated by changes of ownership in case of sale,
or transfer of legal possession as in lease.[30]
This, again, assumes that tenancy already exists. In the case at
bar, no such relationship was ever created between the civil law
lessees
and private respondents, and subsequently, between Valencia and private
respondents except Catalino Mantac. With respect to the lease
agreement
between Valencia and Fr. Flores, the lessee did not have any authority
to sublease Valencia’s property due to the prohibition in their lease
agreement.
It is likewise in clear and unambiguous terms that the lease agreement
was only for a limited duration with no extension.[31]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Ponce v. Guevarra[32]
and Joya v. Pareja[33]
the agricultural leasehold relations were preserved because the "legal
possessors therein were clearly clothed with legal authority or
capacity
to install tenants." But even assuming that they were not so authorized
as in the Ponce case where the civil law lessee was expressly barred
from
installing a tenant under their contract of lease, the subsequent
actions
of the landowners in extending the lifetime of the lease, or in
negotiating
for better terms with the tenants, placed the landowners in estoppel to
contest the agricultural leasehold relations. Consequently, the
tenants
in those cases may be categorized as tenants de jure enjoying tenurial
security guaranteed by the Agricultural Tenancy Law, now by the
Agricultural
Land Reform Code, as amended. This is not the case before us.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It must be noted that
Valencia never extended the term of the civil law lease, nor did he
negotiate
with respondents for "better terms" upon the expiration of the
lease.
He wanted precisely to recover possession of the property upon the
expiration
of the contract on 30 June 1975, except from Mantac with whom he
already
entered into a tenancy contract as herein before stated. Valencia
appointed an overseer to prepare for his eventual takeover and to
cultivate
the property through labor administration after his long years in the
government
service. Verily, the intention of Valencia after the expiration
of
the lease contract was for him to cultivate the land by administration,
or by himself, and not to surrender possession, much less ownership, to
the private respondents.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There may be
apprehensions
that should Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844 be construed as not to vest the
civil
law lessee or legal possessor with automatic authority to install
tenants,
it would in effect open the floodgates to their ejectment on the mere
pretext
that the civil law lessee or legal possessor was not so authorized by
the
landowner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This is more imagined
than real. In the very recent case of Ganzon v. Court of
Appeals,
decided 30 July 2002, this Court resolved the issue of whether the
private
respondents should be considered agricultural tenants of the petitioner.[34]
The Court ruled that the respondents were not instituted as
agricultural
lessees but as civil law lessees of the land. This was evident
from
the contract of lease executed by the parties. The respondents
were
neither "impliedly" instituted as tenants nor designated as
agricultural
lessees by reason alone of the acquiescence by petitioner to the
continued
possession of the property.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Department of
Agrarian
Reform in Ganzon made the factual determination that the agreement
entered
into between Florisco Banhaw (one of the respondents) and Carolina L.
Ganzon
(petitioner) was a civil law lease. However, there was no
evidence
to prove that the other defendants in that case allegedly instituted as
tenants were sharing or paying rentals to Florisco Banhaw or to the
landowner.
The DAR held that mere allegation without the corresponding receipts
would
not sufficiently establish a tenancy relationship especially since
there
was an express prohibition in the civil law lease contract from
subleasing
the subject land to any other person.[35]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
From the foregoing discussion,
it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law lessee cannot
automatically
institute tenants on the property under to Sec. 6 of R. A. No.
3844.
The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law
lessee, although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the
property
unless expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition
exists
or is stipulated in the contract of lease the occupants of the property
are merely civil law sublessees whose rights terminate upon the
expiration
of the civil law lease agreement.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the present case,
the Decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as modified by the
Office
of the President through the Executive Secretary, held that private
respondents
were deemed leasehold tenants. They anchored their proposition on
Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, otherwise known as The
Agricultural
Land Reform Code, which states that since the civil law lessees had a
valid
contract with Valencia, the sublessees were automatically deemed his
tenants
by operation of law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This conclusion espoused
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is arbitrary and unfounded.
The
following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a
tenancy
relationship:[36]
(a) the parties being landowner and tenant; (b) the subject matter is
agricultural
land; (c) there is consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is
agricultural
production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (f)
there
is sharing of harvests between the parties. An allegation that an
agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not make the case
an agrarian dispute.[37]
Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security
of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order
to entitle the claimant to security of tenure.[38]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A tenancy relationship
cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this
allegation.
Hence, a perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a
tenancy
relationship does exist between petitioner and private respondents.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The principal factor
in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancy
is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant
does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The
intent
of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and
their
written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not
contrary
to law, are even more important.[39]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Caballes v. DAR[40]
the Court held that all these requisites must concur in order to create
a tenancy relationship. The absence of one does not make an
occupant
or a cultivator thereof or a planter thereon a de jure tenant.
This
is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure
tenant
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.[41]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The security of tenure
guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure,
not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.[42]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Berenguer, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals this Court ruled that the respondents’ self-serving
statements
regarding their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed
relationship.[43]
The fact alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a
presumption
of the existence of agricultural tenancy.[44]
Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere
scintilla
of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established; there
must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the
element
of sharing.[45]
Bejasa v. Court of Appeals similarly ruled that to prove sharing of
harvests,
a receipt or any other evidence must be presented as self-serving
statements
are deemed inadequate.[46]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the present case,
it is not disputed that the relationship between Valencia and Henson,
and
subsequently, Valencia and Fr. Flores, partook of a civil law
lease.
Henson and later Fr. Flores were not instituted as agricultural lessees
but as civil law lessees. As a finding of fact, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform held that a written civil law lease contract between
Valencia
and Fr. Flores was on file which contained in clear and precise terms
the
stipulation prohibiting the subleasing or encumbering of his parcels of
land without the written consent of Valencia.[47]
The Secretary even went as far as stating for the record that such
stipulation
barring the subletting of the property was violated by Fr. Flores when
he subleased the subject parcels of land to private respondents.[48]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The findings of fact
by the DAR Hearing Officer, Atty. Ampong, in his Investigation Report
and
Recommendations dated 7 December 1988 concerning the admission by
private
respondents that they never turned over the rentals or harvests to
Valencia
and, instead, to his overseer who was not authorized to receive any
payments,
must be deemed conclusive.[49]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As to the civil law
lease between Valencia and Fr. Flores, the prohibition against
subletting
the property without the written consent of Valencia must be
upheld.
Thus, there is no tenurial security for private respondents designated
by the civil law lessee, except for the oft-mentioned Catalino Mantac.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, it must
be noted that private respondents Ernesto Lobresco and Francisco Obang
sublet the land to third persons. Even assuming arguendo then
that
they were tenants, although installed without authority, the act of
subletting
to third persons extinguished the agricultural leasehold relations of
Ernesto
Lobresco and Francisco Obang as it constituted an abandonment of the
landholding
due to absence of personal cultivation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Since private respondents
with the exception of Catalino Mantac cannot be deemed tenants in
contemplation
of law, they are therefore not entitled to Certificates of Land
Transfer
(CLTs) under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant to
Pres.
Decree No. 27 and L.O.I. No. 474. All other persons found in the
land in question are considered unlawful occupants of the property
unless
otherwise authorized by the landowner to possess the same in a lawful
capacity.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Even as we uphold time
and again the existence and validity of implied agricultural tenancy
agreements,
we encourage the forging of written documents to prevent ambiguity as
to
the terms set by both parties and for them to express their intent in
clear
language. This would minimize and even prevent the "shotgun
approach"
to tenancy relations imposed by some officials of the Government
without
complying with the essential requisites of tenancy as provided by
law.
Agreements must be entered freely and voluntarily by the parties
concerned
without the influence of third parties, much less the Government,
making
representations for either side. An express tenancy agreement
would
facilitate the aims of the agricultural tenancy laws and promote social
justice for both landowner and tenant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
With respect to the
retention limits of land ownership by Valencia and his "direct
descendants,"
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law allows landowners whose lands
have
been covered by Pres. Decree No. 27 to keep the area originally
retained
by them provided the original homestead grantees who still own the
original
homestead at the time of the approval of Rep. Act No. 6657 shall retain
the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate the homestead.[50]
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or
contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner, as a general rule.[51]
However, the factual determination of whether Valencia and his "direct
descendants" have complied with Sec. 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 should be
addressed
by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Ascertaining if petitioner
and his "direct descendants" are within the seven (7)-hectare retention
limit provided by Pres. Decree No. 27 requires the technical expertise
of the administrative agency concerned.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is appalling to note
that it took over twelve (12) years for the Agrarian Reform Team 202 of
the Canlaon City Office of the DAR to act on a simple matter calling
for
a preliminary determination of tenancy status, in spite of a telegram
sent
on 30 March 1976 by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform directing the Team
Leader of A.R.T. 202 to investigate and submit a report on the
landholding
of petitioner Valencia.[52]
This is truly a travesty of great magnitude and a clear-cut case of
undue
delay and administrative injustice, for the rights of the landowner
must
equally be protected just as passionately as the rights of the
tenant-tiller,
especially so that in the meantime he has been deprived of the actual
possession
of his property which he envisioned to cultivate himself after retiring
from the government service; worse, he was not paid his landholder’s
shares
in the harvests, and there is no telling when, if ever, he will ever be
paid by private respondents who claim to be his "tenants."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Executive or administrative
justice must always be dispensed with an even hand, regardless of a
person’s
economic station in life.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R.
SP No. 32669 dated 27 July 1995 and its Resolution dated 22 September
1995
denying the Motion for Reconsideration are REVERSED
and
SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. The area acquired
by petitioner Victor G. Valencia under his Homestead Application No.
HA-231601
with Final Proof and Tax Declaration No. 0515 is EXCLUDED from the
coverage
of Pres. Decree No. 27, hence, must be retained by him;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. The Certificates
of Land Transfer (CLTs) issued to private respondents Santos Gargaya
(CLT
No. 0-071160), Juliano Magdayao (CLTs Nos. 0-071161, 0-071163, 0-071166
& 0-071175), Crescenciano Frias (CLT No. 0-071164), Federico Jare
(CLTs
Nos. 0-071171 & 0-071172), Rosendo Lobresco (CLTs Nos. 0-071189
&
0-071182), Ernesto Lobresco (CLTs Nos. 0-071185 & 0-071187),
Feliciano
Lobresco (CLT No. 0-071188), Victoriano Montefalcon (CLT No. 0-071190),
Francisco Obang (CLT No. 0-071168), Ambrosio Semillano (CLTs Nos.
0-071165,
0-071176 & 0-071177), Rogelio Tamayo (CLT No. 0-071194) and
Edilberto
Lobresco (CLT No. 0-071173) are CANCELLED and NULLIFIED for having been
issued without factual and legal basis;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. The agricultural
leasehold of respondent Catalino Mantac (CLT No. 0-071162) covering an
area of 0.0425 hectare subject of tenancy agreement with petitioner
Victor
G. Valencia is maintained and respected;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. All unlawful occupants
of the property under TCT No. H-T-137 and Homestead Application No.
HA-231601
with Final Proof, and Tax Declaration No. 0515 including but not
limited
to the private respondents mentioned in par. 2 hereof are ORDERED to
IMMEDIATELY
VACATE and RETURN peacefully to the lawful owner, petitioner Victor G.
Valencia, the parcels of land respectively possessed or occupied by
them.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
No pronouncement as
to costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez,
and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Gelos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86186, 8 May 1992, 208 SCRA 608,
616;
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118712, and
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118745, 6
October
1995, 249 SCRA 149.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
In re Operation Land Transfer Protest, Victor G. Valencia, Protestant,
Investigation Report and Recommendations, Department of Agrarian
Reform,
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office No. 25, Dumaguete City. See
Rollo,
pp. 72-73.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, pp. 62-63. Pres. Decree No. 27 ordered the emancipation of
all tenant-farmers as of 21 October 1972, the date it was
decreed.
The Decree applies to all tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands
primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share-crop or
lease-tenancy,
whether classified as landed estate or not. L.O.I. No. 474
issued pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 27 provides that all tenanted
rice/corn
lands with areas of seven (7) hectares or less belonging to landowners
who own other agricultural lands or more than seven (7) hectares in
aggregate
areas, or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban
purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves
and
their families, are now placed under the land transfer program of the
government.
L.O.I. No. 474 was issued on 21 October 1976. See V. Agustin, Code of
Agrarian
Reforms of the Philippines: Republic Act No. 3844 (As Amended) With
Notes
and Comments (1st ed., 1981), p. 79.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
(a) Ernesto Lobresco to Francisco Palermo, Jr., P3,000.00 for four (4)
croppings and to Hazel Bautista P3,000.00 for five (5) croppings;
(b)
Melchor Moncada to Virgilio Marquez P3,000.00 for five (5) croppings;
and,
(c) Francisco Obang to Florencio Suanque P10,000.00 for five (5) years.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 70-71.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
See Note 2 and Rollo, pp. 69-71.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Order penned by Atty. Crisostomo M. Corpin, DAR Regional Director,
Region
VII.
[8]
In the meantime the official title of the Minister of Agrarian Reform
was
changed to Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
[9]
CA-G.R. SP No. 32669, 27 July 1995.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
G.R. No. 51353, 27 June 1988, 162 SCRA 628.
[11]
Id. at 634.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Rollo, pp. 28-29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id. at 28-29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Sec. 54 of Rep. Act No. 6657 states: "Any decision, order, award or
ruling
of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the
application,
implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other
pertinent
laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by
certiorari
except as otherwise provided in this Act within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof. The findings of fact of the DAR shall
be final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95 dated 16 May 1995 provides for the mode of
appeal
from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies such as the
Office
of the President and the Department of Agrarian Reform under Rep. Act
No.
6657. It is now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil
Procedure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed., 1990), p. 817.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
63 Phil. 139, 177 (1936).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Sec. 7, No. 3, Chapt. 2, Bk. IV, Exec. Order No. 292 (1987).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
210 Phil. 261-262 (1983).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
115 Phil. 393 (1962).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
G.R. No. 85041, 5 August 1993, 225 SCRA 119, 139-155.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Sec. 8. Limitation of Relation. - The relation of landholder and tenant
shall be limited to the person who furnishes land, either as owner,
lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person who
actually
works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his
immediate farm household.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Santos and Macalino, The Agricultural Land Reform Code 11 (1963 ed.).
See
also M. German, Share and Leasehold Tenancy 32 (2d ed., 2001).
[25]
Id. at 213-214.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Id. at 214.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
III J. Montemayor, Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation 40 (1968 ed.).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
See Secs. 37 and 44 of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
110 Phil. 835 (1961).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Endaya v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88113, 23 October 1992, 215 SCRA
109,
114.
[31]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
119 Phil. 923 (1961).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
106 Phil. 645 (1959).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
G.R. No. 136831, 30 July 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Benavidez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125848, 6 September 1999, 313
SCRA
714, citing Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, 367 Phil. 438 (1999), and other
cases.
See also Heirs of Herman Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
109992,
7 March 2000, 327 SCRA 293.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
Id. at 113.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
Isidro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105586, 15 December 1993, 228 SCRA
503, 511.
[40]
G.R. No. 78214, 5 December 1998, 168 SCRA 247, 254.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 215 Phil. 430, 130 (1984).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
Philippine National Railways v. Del Valle, No. L-29381, 30 September
1969,
29 SCRA 573, 580.
[43]
G.R. No. 60287, 17 August 1988, 164 SCRA 431, 439.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
G.R. No. 108941, 6 July 2000, 335 SCRA 190, 199.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
In the Matter of the Petition for Exclusion from Operation Land
Transfer
Involving Parcels of Land Situated at Barangay Linothangan, Negros
Oriental,
Victor G. Valencia, Protestant, Order of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,
Hon. Benjamin T. Leong, DARRO Adm. Case No. VII-117-89, 12 July 1991,
p.
8. See Rollo, p. 84. The written civil law lease contract between
Valencia and Fr. Flores was marked as Annex "I."
[48]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
See Note 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[50]
See Sec. 6 of Rep. Act. No. 6657, as amended.
[51]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[52]
Rollo, p. 68.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
|