SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION
REGINA
P. DIZON,
AMPARO D. BARTOLOME, FIDELINA D. BALZA,ESTER ABAD DIZON
AND JOSEPH ANTHONY DIZON, RAYMUND A. DIZON,GERARD A. DIZON
AND JOSE A. DIZON, JR.,
Petitioners, |
G.R.
No.
122544/G.R. No. 124741
January 28, 2003
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS and
OVERLAND EXPRESS LINES, INC.,
Respondents.
|
REGINA
P. DIZON,
AMPARO D. BARTOLOME, FIDELINA D. BALZA,ESTER ABAD DIZON
AND JOSEPH ANTHONY DIZON, RAYMUND A. DIZON,GERARD A. DIZON
AND JOSE A. DIZON, JR.,
Petitioners, |
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS,
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCIONAND OVERLAND
EXPRESS
LINES, INC.,
Respondents. |
R E S O L U T I O
N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
On January 28, 1999,
this Court rendered judgment in these consolidated cases as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, both petitions are GRANTED. The decision dated March 29,
1994 and the resolution dated October 19, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV Nos.
25153-54,
as well as the decision dated December 11, 1995 and the resolution
dated
April 23, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33113 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Let the records of this
case be remanded to the trial court for immediate execution of the
judgment
dated November 22, 1982 in Civil Case No. VIII-29155 of the then City
Court
(now Metropolitan Trial Court) of Quezon City, Branch III as affirmed
in
the decision dated September 26, 1984 of the then Intermediate
Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) and in the resolution dated June 19, 1985
of this Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, petitioners
are ordered to REFUND to private respondent the amount of P300,000.00
which
they received through Alice A. Dizon on June 20, 1975.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Private respondent filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, Second Motion for Reconsideration, and
Motion
to Suspend Procedural Rules in the Higher Interest of Substantial
Justice,
all of which have been denied by this Court. This notwithstanding, the
cases were set for oral argument on March 21, 2001, on the following
issues:
1. WHETHER THERE ARE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD JUSTIFY SUSPENSION OF THE RULES OF COURT;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. WHETHER THE SUM OF
P300,000.00 RECEIVED BY ALICE DIZON FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS
INTENDED
AS PARTIAL PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY, OR AS PAYMENT
OF BACK RENTALS ON THE PROPERTY;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. WHETHER ALICE DIZON
WAS AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE THE SUM OF P300,000.00 ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONERS;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. (A) IF SO, WHETHER
PETITIONERS ARE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE BELATED EXERCISE BY
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT OF ITS OPTION TO BUY WHEN THEY ACCEPTED THE SAID PARTIAL
PAYMENT;
(B) IF SO, WHETHER ALICE DIZON CAN VALIDLY BIND PETITIONERS IN THE
ABSENCE
OF A WRITTEN POWER OF ATTORNEY;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
5. (A) WHETHER THERE
WAS A PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE BETWEEN THE PARTIES;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(B) WHETHER THERE WAS
A CONTRACT OF SALE AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARES OF FIDELA AND
ALICE
DIZON; ANDchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
6. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE HAS PRESCRIBED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In order to resolve
the first issue, it is necessary to pass upon the other questions which
relate to the merits of the case. It is only where there exist strong
compelling
reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a
miscarriage
thereof, that this Court can suspend the rules.[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After reviewing the
records, we find that, despite all of private respondent’s
protestations,
there is absolutely no written proof of Alice Dizon’s authority to bind
petitioners. First of all, she was not even a co-owner of the property.
Neither was she empowered by the co-owners to act on their behalf.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The acceptance of the
amount of P300,000.00, purportedly as partial payment of the purchase
price
of the land, was an act integral to the sale of the land. As a matter
of
fact, private respondent invokes such receipt of payment as giving rise
to a perfected contract of sale. In this connection, Article 1874 of
the
Civil Code is explicit that: "When a sale of a piece of land or any
interest
therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in
writing;
otherwise, the sale shall be void."
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When the sale of a
piece of land or any interest thereon is through an agent, the
authority
of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void.
Thus
the authority of an agent to execute a contract for the sale of real
estate
must be conferred in writing and must give him specific authority,
either
to conduct the general business of the principal or to execute a
binding
contract containing terms and conditions which are in the contract he
did
execute. A special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any
contract
by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired
either
gratuitously or for a valuable consideration. The express mandate
required
by law to enable an appointee of an agency (couched) in general terms
to
sell must be one that expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale
as a necessary ingredient of the act mentioned. For the principal to
confer
the right upon an agent to sell real estate, a power of attorney must
so
express the powers of the agent in clear and unmistakable language.
When
there is any reasonable doubt that the language so used conveys such
power,
no such construction shall be given the document.[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It necessarily follows,
therefore, that petitioners cannot be deemed to have received partial
payment
of the supposed purchase price for the land through Alice Dizon. It
cannot
even be said that Alice Dizon’s acceptance of the money bound at least
the share of Fidela Dizon, in the absence of a written power of
attorney
from the latter. It should be borne in mind that the Receipt dated June
20, 1975, while made out in the name of Fidela Dizon, was signed by
Alice
Dizon alone.cralaw:red
Moreover, there could
not have been a perfected contract of sale. As we held in our Decision
dated January 28, 1999, the implied renewal of the contract of lease
between
the parties affected only those terms and conditions which are germane
to the lessee’s right of continued enjoyment of the property. The
option
to purchase afforded private respondent expired after the one-year
period
granted in the contract. Otherwise stated, the implied renewal of the
lease
did not include the option to purchase. We see no reason to disturb our
ruling on this point, viz:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, there
was a contract of lease for one (1) year with option to purchase. The
contract
of lease expired without the private respondent, as lessee, purchasing
the property but remained in possession thereof. Hence, there was an
implicit
renewal of the contract of lease on a monthly basis. The other terms of
the original contract of lease which are revived in the implied new
lease
under Article 1670 of the New Civil Code are only those terms which are
germane to the lessee’s right of continued enjoyment of the property
leased.
Therefore, an implied new lease does not ipso facto carry with it any
implied
revival of private respondent's option to purchase (as lessee thereof)
the leased premises. The provision entitling the lessee the option to
purchase
the leased premises is not deemed incorporated in the impliedly renewed
contract because it is alien to the possession of the lessee. Private
respondent’s
right to exercise the option to purchase expired with the termination
of
the original contract of lease for one year. The rationale of this
Court
is that:
"This
is a reasonable construction of the provision, which is based on the
presumption
that when the lessor allows the lessee to continue enjoying possession
of the property for fifteen days after the expiration of the contract
he
is willing that such enjoyment shall be for the entire period
corresponding
to the rent which is customarily paid - in this case up to the end of
the
month because the rent was paid monthly. craNecessarily,
if the presumed will of the parties refers to the enjoyment of
possession
the presumption covers the other terms of the contract related to such
possession, such as the amount of rental, the date when it must be
paid,
the care of the property, the responsibility for repairs, etc.craBut
no such presumption may be indulged in with respect to special
agreements
which by nature are foreign to the right of occupancy or enjoyment
inherent
in a contract of lease."[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There
being no merit in the arguments advanced by private respondent, there
is
no need to suspend the Rules of Court and to admit the motion for
reconsideration.
While it is within the power of the Court to suspend its own rules, or
to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the interest
of
justice require it, however, the movant must show strong compelling
reasons
such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage
thereof,[4]
none of which obtains in this case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Litigation
must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient
administration
of justice requires that, once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ACCORDINGLY,crathe
Motion to Suspend Procedural Rules in the Higher Interest of
Substantial
Justice filed by private respondent is DENIED WITH FINALITY. No further
pleadings will be entertained in these cases.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno,
J.
,
concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), see separate opinion, hereto attached.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:cralaw:red
[1]
Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico, et al., G.R. No. 140486, February
6, 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Cosmic Lumber Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 168, 176 [1996].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Dizon, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 302 SCRA 288, 300-301
[1999],
citing Dizon v. Magsaysay, 57 SCRA 250, 254 [1974].
[4]
Equitable-PCI Bank v. Ku, G.R. No. 142950 March 26, 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Vda. de Cochingyan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
116092,
June 29, 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |