SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
122766
June 20, 2003
-versus-
FELIPE ESPONILLA
AND SAMSON ESPONILLA,
Appellants.
D E C I S I
O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is an Appeal by Appellants
Felipe Esponilla and Samson Esponilla from the decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39, in
Criminal
Case No. 36890 convicting them of murder and sentencing each of them to
reclusion perpetua.
In the Information dated
October 15, 1991, the appellants were charged with murder committed as
follows:
INFORMATION
The Provincial
Prosecutor
of Iloilo, through the undersigned, accuses FELIPE ESPONILLA and SAMSON
ESPONILLA of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about
the
28th day of June, 1991, in the Municipality of Igbaras, Province of
Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to
better realize their purpose, armed with a firearms (sic) of unknown
Caliber,
with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill and with treachery
and/or
evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously
assault, attack and shoot Jose Eumag with the firearms with which they
were then provided, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter gun
shot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death
immediately
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
At their arraignment,
the
appellants, with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the charge.chanrobles virtual law library The Evidence of
the
Prosecution[3]
Spouses Jose Eumag,
61 years old,[4]
and Enriqueta Eumag, 69 years old, lived in their farm at the outskirts
of Barangay Igtalongon, Igbaras, Iloilo,[5]
about a kilometer away from the farm of Felipe Esponilla and his
brother
Samson Esponilla at Barangay Pinaopawan, Igbaras, Iloilo. The
Spouses
Eumag and the Esponilla brothers had known each other for a long
time.
Felipe in particular used to pass by the house of the Eumags and had
borrowed
money from Jose.[6]
The Eumags had known Samson, Felipe’s brother, since his childhood.[7]
But neighborliness metamorphosed
into resentment when Jose testified against Dionisio Esponilla, a first
cousin of Felipe and Samson, in an arson case filed by Gerardo Eumag,[8]
a brother of Jose. While the case was pending trial, Dionisio was
detained at the Municipal Jail of Igbaras[9]
where he committed suicide on February 5, 1989. Consequently, the
case was dismissed. On September 14, 1989, Jose was shot on his
right
thigh but he survived. Felipe and Samson were charged with
frustrated
murder in an Information filed in the RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 36,
docketed
as Criminal Case No. 34297, for the shooting of Jose.[10]
As of June 1991, the
trial was ongoing. On June 28, 1991, at about 9:30 a.m., Spouses
Jose and Enriqueta were in their rice field, which was about nine
hundred
meters away from their house, for another day’s work of farming.[11]
Jose was plowing the field with his carabao while Enriqueta, who was
about
four arms’ length away from her husband, was cutting the grasses.
Felipe, Jose’s brother, was threshing palay in his farm about one
hundred
arms’ length from where Jose and Enriqueta were. Suddenly,
Enriqueta
heard a gunshot. She saw her husband fall to the ground, face
down.
She instinctively looked at the direction from where the gunshot rang
out
and saw Felipe and Samson beside the dike, about seven meters away from
Jose, each holding a firearm still aimed at the victim. She
rushed
to her husband and helped him stand up, to no avail. She shouted
for help. Felipe and Samson backtracked and hurriedly ran away.[12]
Enriqueta frantically
waved to Felix, shouting that Jose had been shot. Felix rushed to
where Enriqueta was and was aghast to see his brother Jose bloodied all
over. Felix and Enriqueta carried Jose to a drier portion of the
rice field.[13]
By then, Jose was already dead. They decided to bring the
victim’s
body to the poblacion for autopsy.[14]
Felipe rushed to the Igbaras Police Station and reported the
incident.
His report was entered by SPO2 Antonio G. Emboltorio in the police
blotter.[15]
At 12:00 noon, Dr. Priscilla C. Gallo, Medical Officer of Igbaras,
Iloilo,
conducted a post-mortem examination of the cadaver of the victim and
made
the following findings:
Post-Mortem
Examination
Name
:
JOSE EUMAG Y MORALESchanrobles virtual law library
Age
: 61 years old
Sex
: Male
C.S.
: Married
Address
: Sitio Tarugan, Brgy. Igtalongon, Igbaras, Iloilo
Occupation
: Farmer
Nature of
Incident
: Shooting
Date of
Incident
: June 28, 1991
Time of
Incident
: 9:30 A.M.
Place of
Incident
: Brgy. Igtalongon, Igbaras, Iloilo
Place of
Autopsy
: Igbaras, Iloilo
Date of
Autopsy
: June 28, 1991
Time of
Autopsy
: 12:05 p.m.chanrobles virtual law library
Post-mortem
examination
done by: Dr. Priscilla C. Gallo
Medical Officer
Igbaras, Iloilo
Informant:
Enriqueta M. Eumag
Wife
Findings:
Victim wearing
maong
pants, blue black T-shirt and maroon/white stripped (sic) polo shirt
Trunk:
Gunshot wound,
entrance
5 cm. above the right pelvic rim, 10 mm in size, midscapular line right
with multiple exit.chanrobles virtual law library
Gunshot wound
entrance,
right upper outer quadrant of right buttockschanrobles virtual law library
Fracture of the
right
hipbone noted
Cause of death:
Cardio-Pulmonary
Arrest
Severe
Hemorrhage
secondary to gunshot wounds
(SGD.) PRISCILLA
C.
GALLO, M.D.
Medical Officer
Igbaras, Iloilo.[16]
Dr. Gallo found two
gunshot
entrance wounds at the right portion of the pelvic bone, each wound
about
two inches apart. The first entrance wound had multiple exits at
the abdominal area, while the second entrance wound had no exit
wound.
She recovered two pellets at the upper outer quadrant of the
buttock.
According to Dr. Gallo’s report, two wounds could have been caused by a
single shotgun blast.[17]
Jose’s wake lasted for
almost a month.[18]
He was finally laid to rest on July 25, 1991.[19]
Enriqueta testified that when her husband was still alive, he earned at
least ten cavans of palay per cropping. During the extended wake,
she spent at least P80,200: P7,500 for funeral services and burial
expenses,
P600 for religious services, and P72,100 for food and other expenses.[20]
All expenses were, however, unreceipted.[21]
During the trial, Felipe
pleaded on many occasions to Enriqueta for her to agree to settle the
case
amicably, and offered to pay her P6,000; but Enriqueta declined.[22]
Felipe and Samson’s mother also offered to settle the case amicably but
Enriqueta was adamant and rejected the offer outright.
The Defenses of
the
Accused
Felipe and Samson interposed
twin defenses of denial and alibi.[23]
Felipe testified that he was a farmer who lived in his farm located
right
at the middle of the boundary of Barangays Tigbanaba and Pinaopawan,
Igbaras,
Iloilo.[24]
He denied shooting Jose. While he admitted that he was not in
good
terms with the Eumags, Felipe stated that he and his brother Samson,
who
was at that time in a distant Barangay Anono-o, Guimbal, Iloilo, could
not have harmed Jose because if they did, the incident would definitely
be attributed to them, considering their strained relationship with the
Eumags. Felipe claimed that the charge against them was but a
concoction
of Enriqueta for refusing her demand of P10,000 for the settlement of
the
frustrated murder case filed by Jose against them.[25]
Felipe testified that
in the morning of June 28, 1991, he was busy at work in his farm the
whole
day. He went to the nearby farm of Santiago Flores, the President
of the Communal Irrigation System and NIA water master, and asked
permission
to irrigate his farm. He also asked Santiago to help him clear
his
farm. Santiago agreed. The two cleared and cleaned the
two-kilometer
irrigation canal for two hours. At about 10:30 a.m., they went
back
to the farm of Santiago and took a respite. Thereafter, Felipe
checked
the flow of the canal and returned to his farm. He took his lunch
at his nearby house. He then continued on working the canal and
at
6:00 p.m., he called it a day.[26]chanrobles virtual law library
Felipe’s neighbor Santiago
Flores, a relative of the victim and a kagawad of Barangay Tigbanaba,
corroborated
his alibi. He testified that he was with Felipe irrigating the
latter’s
farm the whole day on June 28, 1991. He testified that at about
7:30
a.m. that day, he was seeding the farm when Felipe arrived and sought
his
assistance to irrigate his rice field. Santiago obliged and,
after
thirty minutes, the two went to his house and ate breakfast.
Thereupon,
the two proceeded to the main irrigation canal and cleared and cleaned
it. They diverted the flow of the water towards the rice field of
Felipe. The two returned to Santiago’s farm at about 10:30 a.m.,
after which they parted ways.[27]
Santiago said that he was persuaded by Felipe and Samson’s parents to
testify[28]
and that at no time did he attend the wake of his deceased nephew.[29]
Samson, for his part,
likewise denied any involvement in the killing of Jose. He
testified
that on June 23, 1991, he was at Delfin Estañol’s poultry farm
at
Barangay Anono-o, Guimbal, Iloilo, and left the farm only on June 28,
1991.
It was impossible for him to have killed Jose, as he was fifteen
kilometers
away from where the killing took place. He never left Delfin’s
farm
until he was picked up by five policemen on June 29, 1991 who brought
him
to Igbaras for investigation. After the investigation, he
proceeded
to Pinaopawan and helped his father in his farm. When he learned
from his brother Felipe that a warrant of arrest had been issued
against
them, Samson immediately went to the police station and surrendered
himself.[30]
He and his brother Felipe bore no grudge against Jose despite what had
happened to their cousin Dionisio.[31]
Delfin Estañol
corroborated appellant Samson’s alibi. Delfin said that he had
engaged
the services of Samson on May 5, 1991 as helper in his poultry.
As
helper, Samson received P400 per month plus free board and
lodging.
From that day on until June 29, 1991, Samson had been staying in his
place,
taking care of his 500 chickens. Delfin averred that at no time
did
Samson leave his place much less on June 28, 1991. On June 29,
1991,
Samson was arrested and stopped working for Delfin.[32]
When Delfin confronted Enriqueta about Samson’s arrest, she replied
that
she lodged the charge against Samson and Felipe for refusing to pay her.[33]
Roque Emague testified
that at the time of the shooting, he was at the nearby farm of Mario
Eurolfan[34]
grazing his four goats. He was about ten arms’ length away from
Jose
whom he noticed to be all alone. As he was untangling the ropes
of
his goats that got intertwined, Roque heard a shot and simultaneously
noticed
a person whom he did not know, shoot Jose at point blank range with a
shotgun.
Afraid for his life, Roque hid. When he saw the assailant walk
towards
the creek en route to the mountains, Roque dashed home. Roque
described
the assassin as tall, small-built, with white complexion, and in his
mid-thirties.
He said that he never saw Felipe and Samson or Aquilino within the
vicinity.[35]
Aquilino Estremera,
for his part, testified that at about 9:00 a.m. of June 28, 1991, he
was
walking along Barangay Igtalongon on his way to his cousin, Juanito
Espinosa.
As he passed by the farm of the Eumags, he saw Roque tying his
goats.
Suddenly, a man whom he saw for the very first time shot Jose. He
was about ten arms’ length away from the victim. Aquilino ran,
but
stopped and looked back. He saw the assassin flee to the
mountains.
He also saw Roque scampering. Aquilino described the assailant as
tall, skinny, with curly hair, and fair in complexion. He added
that
he never noticed Enriqueta at the crime scene.[36]chanrobles virtual law library
On October 28, 1994,
the trial court convicted Felipe and Samson of murder, qualified by
treachery.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the accused Felipe Esponilla and Samson Esponilla
are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
there
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused
are further ordered to pay jointly and severally actual damages to the
wife of the deceased the total amount of P40,000, and to his legal
heirs,
the amount of P50,000 for his wrongful death, P30,000 as moral damages
and the costs.
The accused
Samson Esponilla who is detained is credited with the number of days he
spent under detention if he is qualified, otherwise, he shall be
credited
only with four-fifths (4/5) of his preventive imprisonment.
Pursuant to the case
of People vs. Ricardo C. Cortez, G.R. No. 92560, October 15, 1991, the
bail bond put up by the accused Felipe Esponilla is cancelled and said
accused is hereby ordered detained at the Iloilo Rehabilitation Center,
to be transmitted to the National Penetentiary (sic) or Bureau of
Corrections
in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, together with the other accused Samson
Esponilla,
even if they appeal.
SO ORDERED.[37]
The trial court
ruled that the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence
to
prove their guilt of the crime charged. It held that although the
prosecution failed to prove who between the two shot Jose,
nevertheless,
the prosecution proved that Felipe and Samson conspired to kill Jose,
and
that one of them shot Jose to death. The court concluded that
both
of them are liable for the death of Jose.[38]chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court said
that the appellants failed to prove their twin defenses of denial and
alibi.
It ratiocinated that it was not physically impossible for the
appellants
to be at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission
thereof.
It took into consideration the geographical proximity of the places
where
the appellants alleged they were at the time. Besides, according
to the trial court, alibi crumbles upon positive identification.[39]
In their brief, Felipe
and Samson, now the appellants, assert that:
I
THE LOWER COURT
ERRED
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF MURDER BASED ON ONE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
II
GRANTING FOR THE
SAKE
OF ARGUMENT THAT ACCUSED ARE GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING A
CASE OF MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE[40]
On the first assignment
of errors, the appellants assert that the prosecution failed to present
any eyewitness to the actual killing of the victim. The testimony
of Enriqueta does not constitute circumstantial evidence sufficient to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It would be the
height
of folly for them to have remained at the situs criminis, still toting
their guns after one of them had already fired a shot, knowing that it
was broad daylight, and Enriqueta could have easily seen and identified
them, thus ensuring their prosecution and conviction.cralaw:red
The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), for its part, contends that the prosecution had adduced
a chain of circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish the
culpability
for the death of Jose:
i. On June
28, 1993 at around 9:30 a.m., Jose Eumag was plowing his ricefield
while
his wife Enriqueta was pulling weeds or grasses;
ii. Suddenly,
a gunshot was fired which hit Jose and caused him to fall on the ground
face down;
iii. Enriqueta
shouted for help; looked at the place where the gunshot came from; and,
saw the appellants Felipe and Samson still pointing their guns on her
fallen
husband Jose;
iv. Immediately after
Enriqueta saw the appellants still pointing their guns at her fallen
husband,
appellants Felipe and Samson ran away.cralaw:red
The combination of all
the abovementioned circumstances produces the needed proof beyond
reasonable
doubt that indeed the appellants are guilty of killing their victim
Jose.cralaw:red
Said circumstances are
further corroborated by the testimony of prosecution witness Dra.
Priscilla
C. Gallo to the effect that the victim Jose suffered two (2) gunshot
wounds
caused by one (1) gunshot blast (tsn., Dra. Priscilla C. Gallo, April
20,
1992, p. 26).cralaw:red
It is to be observed
that the testimony of prosecution witness Enriqueta as to the
circumstances
surrounding the shooting of her husband Jose to death by the appellants
was direct, clear and straight-forward.cralaw:red
Besides, no motive on
the part of prosecution witness Enriqueta to falsely testify against
the
appellants was established (People v. Laurora, 211 SCRA 202; People v.
Bechayda, 212 SCRA 336).[41]chanrobles virtual law library
The Court agrees with
the ruminations of the OSG. It is not absurd for the appellants
to
have committed the crime in broad daylight and brazenly tarry before
fleeing
from the situs criminis. Such devil-may-care attitude is not
uncommon
for criminals. Indeed, some criminals intentionally reveal their
identities to witnesses to sow fear in them, and demonstrate defiance
of
the law. In this case, the appellants killed Jose in broad
daylight
in full view of Enriqueta. The appellants wanted Enriqueta to
know
that they and no one else killed Jose for testifying against Dionisio
and
for charging them for frustrated murder. Even as Jose was already
mortally wounded, the appellants still pointed their guns at Jose and
made
it clear to Enriqueta that they had shot Jose. Jose may have
survived
when he was shot on September 14, 1989; they saw to it that Jose will
not
survive the second time around.cralaw:red
Admittedly, Enriqueta
Eumag did not actually see any of the appellants shoot her
husband.
Nonetheless, direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non for the
conviction
of an accused. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime and
the
perpetrators thereof is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.[42]
Under the Rules of Court[43]
and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had even on
circumstantial
evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. For circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis
that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except
that
of guilt.[44]
Wharton suggests four
basic guidelines in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, to
wit:
(1) it should be acted upon with caution; (2) all the essential
facts
must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3)
the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt; and (4)
the
facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to
convince
the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who
committed the offense.[45]
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the
accused
cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of
evidence.
It is more like a puzzle which, when put together, reveals a remarkable
picture pointing towards the conclusion that the accused is the author
of the crime.[46]
In this case, the prosecution
adduced sufficient testimony and physical evidence, albeit
circumstantial,
to prove that indeed the appellants killed the victim.cralaw:red
First. Enriqueta
narrated the lurid details of how the appellants killed the victim in
broad
daylight at a relatively close range:chanrobles virtual law library
FISCAL BARRIOS:
Q
In the morning of June 28, 1991, about 9:30 o’clock more or less, can
you
still recall where were you?
A
I was at the farm.cralaw:red
Q
Do you have companion when you said you were in your farm that morning
of about 9:30 o’clock of June 28, 1991?
A
My husband, who is plowing our farm at that time.cralaw:red
Q
Where is that farm of yours located, what barangay?
A
At Barangay Igtalongon.cralaw:red
Q
You said you were together with your husband who was then plowing your
farm or field, can you tell the Court how far were you at your husband
at that particular time of June 28, 1991?chanrobles virtual law library
A
About four arms length.cralaw:red
Q
Now, where were you sitting in relation to your husband who was thenI withdraw the question.cralaw:red
Q
Now in relation to your husband, who was then plowing the field, where
were you situated?
A
I was at the right side.cralaw:red
Q
And while you were at the right side, what were you doing then at that
particular time?
A
I was pulling grasses.cralaw:red
Q
And at that particular moment, about four arms length to the right side
of your husband, was there any unusual incident that happened?
A
I heard a shot.cralaw:red
Q
And what happened when you heard a shot?
A
My husband fell down on his stomach.cralaw:red
Q
How many shots did you hear?
A
One.cralaw:red
Q
And when you saw your husband fell down on the ground on his stomach,
what
else happened or what did you do?chanrobles virtual law library
A
I tried to help my husband and I was shouting for help.cralaw:red
Q
Before you went to your husband to let him stand and before you shouted
for help, did you see anybody within the premises where your husband
fell?
A
Felipe and Samson Esponilla.cralaw:red
Q
Where were they in relation to your husband before your husband fell?
A
At the side of the dike at the back of my husband.cralaw:red
COURT:
At the side of what?
WITNESS ANSWER:
At the side of the dike
at the back of my husband.cralaw:red
FISCAL BARRIOS:
When you saw these Samson
and Felipe Esponilla to the direction or rather at the back towards the
direction at the back of your husband, what were they doing?
A
I saw them pointing their gun to my husband.cralaw:red
Q
Who was holding the firearm?
A
Two of them.cralaw:red
Q
When you saw them still pointing their firearms, your husband had
already
fallen on the ground?chanrobles virtual law library
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
How far were they from your husband from the place where your husband
was,
when you saw them still pointing with their firearms?
A
Five arms’ length.cralaw:red
Q
Now, when you saw them still pointing their firearm, your husband had
already
fallen on the ground, to whom or what direction were they pointing
their
firearm?
A
At my husband.cralaw:red
Q
You said that you then went to your husband to let him stand up and
shout
for help, can you tell us what did these two accused do when you
shouted
for help?
A
They run away.chanrobles virtual law library
Q
To what direction did you see them run away?
A
At the back of my husband.[47]
Second. Enriqueta
testified that aside from her, there was no other person in the
periphery
where her husband was shot:
Q
Immediately before and after your husband was shot to death by the two
accused, Felix and Samson Esponilla, can you tell if there were persons
within or near the premises were (sic) you and your husband (were) at
the
time, aside from the accused Felix and Samson Esponilla?
A
No more, sir.cralaw:red
Q
When you look to the direction where you saw the two accused Felipe and
Samson Esponilla, you saw them still in the position of pointing their
firearm towards your husband, what was or what were their position,
were
they standing or sitting or squatting?
A
They are standing.[48]
The trial court concluded
that Enriqueta was a credible witness and her testimony entitled to
full
probative weight. So does this Court. It is the trial court
and not this Court that had the opportunity to observe Enriquieta’s
manner
of testifying, her furtive glances, her calmness, sighs, or the scant
or
full realization of her oath.[49]
The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
entitled
to respect.[50]
After all, it is well-settled that where there is no evidence that the
witness against the accused was actuated by any improper motive, and
absent
any compelling reason to conclude otherwise, her testimony will be
given
full faith and credit.[51]
Third. The prosecution
convincingly established that the appellants were driven by a personal
grudge against the victim. There was no love lost between the
victim
and the appellants, who ascribed to Jose the death of their cousin
Dionisio.
The criminal case for frustrated murder against the appellants for the
shooting of Jose was pending in the RTC, Branch 36, Iloilo City.
Aside from the appellants, no one was known to harbor a grudge against
the victim.cralaw:red
Motive is a key element
when establishing guilt through circumstantial evidence. Coupled
with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be
reasonably
inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient
to support a conviction.[52]chanrobles virtual law library
Fourth. Dr. Priscilla
C. Gallo, who conducted the post-mortem examination on Jose, testified
that the wounds sustained by the latter could have been caused by a
single
gunshot blast at the back. This dovetailed with the testimony of
Enriqueta that she heard one gunshot and that immediately after Jose
was
shot, she saw the appellants, each armed with a gun, only seven meters
behind Jose.cralaw:red
Fifth. When Enriqueta
shouted for help, the appellants fled from the situs criminis.
Flight
is an implied admission of guilt. It betrays a guilty conscience;
it is silent yet a resounding admission of guilt.[53]
Sixth. Enriqueta
testified that appellant Felipe and appellants’ mother repeatedly
offered
to settle the case for the appellants to escape prosecution and
conviction
for the crime charged. The appellants never offered a morsel of
evidence
to controvert the testimony of Enriqueta. In criminal cases,
except
those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed
by
law to be amicably settled or compromised, an offer of compromise by
the
accused is an implied admission of guilt.[54]
The above-cited circumstances
taken together constitute one unbroken chain leading to the fair and
reasonable
conclusion that the appellants, to the exclusion of others, shot the
victim
to death.[55]
It does not matter who
of the two appellants actually shot Jose. As correctly held by
the
trial court, the appellants conspired to kill Jose. The act of
one
is the act of both.[56]
Case law has it that
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged,
but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions,
and circumstances which vary according to the purpose
accomplished.
Previous agreement to commit a crime is not essential to establish
conspiracy,
it being sufficient that the condition attending its commission and the
acts executed may be indicative of a common design to accomplish a
criminal
purpose and objective. If there is a chain of circumstances to
that
effect, conspiracy has been established.[57]chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, the rule is that
conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial evidence,
as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence
of
direct proof thereof, as in the present case, it may be deduced from
the
mode, method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves, when such acts point to a
joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.
Hence, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some
overt
act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime
planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active
participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself or it may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of
the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other
co-conspirators.[58]
In the case at bar,
it was established that the appellants suddenly arrived at the farmland
of the victim, each armed with a gun. Even as Jose was shot, both
the appellants tarried at the scene, their firearms pointed at the
fallen
victim, ready to finish him off. They left the situs criminis
together
after Enriqueta had shouted for help. There is no evidence that
one
prevented the other from shooting the victim. The acts of the
appellants
before, during and after the commission of the crime indicated a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.
If one of the two shot the victim, the other, armed with a lethal
weapon,
was nonetheless present at the scene of the crime, undoubtedly to lend
moral and material assistance to the actual assassin - another badge of
conspiracy. Thus, the appellants as conspirators are equally
liable
as the principals for the crime. As the State Supreme Court of
Hawaii
held:
Conspirators are one
man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm
and the law says that the acts, words and declarations of each, while
in
the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations
of all.[59]
It is pointless for
the Court to still ascertain who among the appellants shot the victim.cralaw:red
The trial court correctly
overruled the appellants’ defenses of denial-alibi. For the
defense
of alibi to prosper, the defense must establish positive, clear and
satisfactory
proof that it was physically impossible for the appellants to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely
that they were somewhere else.[60]
Alibi is one of the weakest, if not the weakest, of defenses in
criminal
prosecution because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove.
The appellants’ barefaced denial of the crime charged which is merely
negative
and self-serving, cannot prevail over the straightforward, positive and
spontaneous testimony of Enriqueta. As regards appellant Felipe,
his evidence would indicate that Barangay Tigbanaba, where he allegedly
spent the whole day, was only two kilometers away[61]
from the scene of the crime and could be negotiated by a trek.[62]
The same is true with appellant Samson, Barangay Anono-o, Gimbal,
Iloilo,
where he was allegedly working as helper for Delfin Estañol, was
only less than an hour away from Barangay Igtalongon by jeep.[63]
Thus, even if the appellants were respectively seen at these locations,
it was not physically impossible for them to have gone to the locus
criminis
at the time the crime was committed, and thereafter return to the said
places.chanrobles virtual law library
The Court is not impervious
to the testimony of appellant Felipe Esponilla, that Enriqueta demanded
P10,000 for the settlement of Criminal Case No. 32497 and threatened
that
if he refused, she will file another criminal case against him:
Q
According to you, you were not in the farm of Jose Eumag in the morning
of June 28, 1991, and you were not also in the company of your brother
Samson Esponilla, and furthermore, you said you have not shot Jose
Eumag
that morning of June 28, 1991, can you tell us if you were in good
terms
with Enriqueta Eumag on June 28, 1991?
A
No more.cralaw:red
Q
Can you tell us the reason why you were not in good terms with
Enriqueta
Eumag on June 28, 1991?
A
Because she was asking me the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos for the
dismissal
of the case she filed against me, the case of frustrated homicide, but
I told her that I have not done this crime and you have to dismiss
it.
I told her that it was not true, that she was just daydreaming and she
got angry of me.cralaw:red
Q
This other case, this frustrated homicide case, in what court is this
case
pending?
A
In branch 36.cralaw:red
Q
When you said that Enriqueta Eumag asked for Ten Thousand Pesos to be
paid
by you and you refused, can you tell us what did Enriqueta Eumag answer
in reply to you?
A
She told me that if I am not going to pay her she will file again an
additional
case.[64]
The Court finds the
testimony of the appellant incredible. For one thing, the
appellant
never claimed in the counter-affidavit he filed with the Office of the
Investigating Prosecutor that Enriqueta demanded P10,000.[65]
This Court does not believe that Enriqueta, who was 69 years old when
the
crime was committed, would tergiversate the truth and falsely charge
the
appellants for murder, a quasi-heinous crime, in consideration of
P10,000.
The Crime
Committed
by the Appellants
On their second assignment
of error, the appellants assert that if found guilty, they should only
be made liable for the crime of homicide and not for murder. They
claim that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the
qualifying
circumstance of treachery.chanrobles virtual law library
The Court does not agree.
The trial court correctly appreciated treachery as having qualified the
killing of the victim to murder. Treachery is present when the
shooting
was unexpected and sudden, giving the unarmed victim no chance
whatsoever
to defend himself. The two conditions for treachery to be present
are (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position
to defend himself, and (2) the offender consciously adopted the
particular
means, method, or form of attack employed by him.[66]
In the case at bar,
the victim was shot at the back. Though the Court is not
unmindful
that a shot at the back of the victim’s body is not conclusive proof
that
there was treachery, nonetheless, in this case, the victim was in a
wide
open field, plowing his farm. The attack was a complete surprise
and was unprovoked. There was hardly any risk at all to the
appellants.
The victim was plowing his farmland, completely impervious that death
was
at hand. He was unarmed and was not in a position to defend
himself
against the assault of the appellants. Clearly, he was killed in
a treacherous manner.cralaw:red
The appellants are therefore
guilty of murder, the prescribed penalty for which, under Article 248
of
the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. There
being
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the
killing,
the lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed, i.e.,
reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.chanrobles virtual law library
Civil Liabilities
of the Appellants
The trial court correctly
awarded to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000
which needs no proof other than that of the death of the victim.[67]
However, the amount of P30,000 moral damages should be increased to
P50,000
in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[68]
The Court cannot sustain the award of actual damages in the amount of
P40,000
considering that there were no receipts presented to support them.[69]
Nevertheless, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.[70]
Finally, the trial court
was correct in not awarding damages for lost earnings. The
prosecution
merely relied on Enriqueta Eumag’s self-serving statement, that her
husband
was earning at least ten cavans of palay per cropping as farmer.
Compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and requires
due
proof of the amount of the damage suffered. For loss of income
due
to death, there must be unbiased proof of the deceased’s average
income.
Also, the award for lost income refers to the net income of the
deceased,
that is, his total income less his average expenses. In this
case,
Enriqueta gave only a self-serving testimony of her husband’s
income.
No proof of the victim’s expenses were adduced; thus, there can be no
reliable
estimate of his lost income.[71]
WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, Branch 39, in
Criminal
Case No. 36890, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellants
Felipe Esponilla and Samson Esponilla are ordered, jointly and
severally,
to pay the heirs of the victim Jose Eumag civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000, moral damages in the amount of P50,000, and temperate
damages
in the amount of P25,000.cralaw:red
Costs de oficio.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J.,
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Judge Jose G. Abdallah.
[2]
Records, p. 1.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Enriqueta Eumag, Dr.
Priscilla
Gallo, and SPO4 Marcos Tañales, Jr.
[4]
Records, p. 104.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Id. at 51.
[6]
Id. at 52.
[7]
Id. at 252.
[8]
TSN, 10 January 1994, p. 10 (Samson Esponilla).
[9]
Records, p. 61.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Id. at 59.
[11]
Id. at 89.
[12]
Id. at 52-59; 90-93.
[13]
Id. at 55-56.
[14]
Id. at 58.
[15]
Id. at 106.
[16]
Id. at 105.
[17]
Id. at 69-74.
[18]
Id. at 62.
[19]
Id. at 88.
[20]
Id. at 87.
[21]
Id. at 107.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
Id. at 288-290 (rebuttal).chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
The appellants testified and presented, as witnesses, Santiago Flores,
Roque Emague, Aquilino Estremera and Delfin Estañol.
[24]
Records, p. 260.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
Id. at 265-266.
[26]
Id. at 261-264.
[27]
Id. at 115-118.
[28]
Id. at 126.chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
Id. at 124.chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
Id. at 243-247.
[31]
Id. at 284.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Id. at 219-222.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
Id. at 311-312 (Sur-rebuttal).
[34]
Id. at 280.chanrobles virtual law library
[35]
Id. at 143-147.
[36]
Id. at 175-178.
[37]
Id. at 337-338.
[38]
Id. at 332-333.
[39]
Id. at 333-334.
[40]
Rollo, p. 122.chanrobles virtual law library
[41]
Id. at 124-126.chanrobles virtual law library
[42]
People v. Danao, 253 SCRA 146 (1996).
[43]
Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court.
[44]
People v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 200 (2000).
[45]
People v. Orcula, Sr., 335 SCRA 129 (2000).
[46]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[47]
TSN, 20 April 1992, pp. 4-7 (Felipe Esponilla).
[48]
Id. at 7-8.chanrobles virtual law library
[49]
People v. Gonzales, 338 SCRA 371 (2000).
[50]
People v. Lomerio, 326 SCRA 530 (2000).
[51]
People v. Dacibar, 325 SCRA 725 (2000).
[52]
People v. Taliman, 342 SCRA 534 (2000).
[53]
People v. Mendoza, 332 SCRA 485 (2000).
[54]
Section 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[55]
People v. Mendoza, 301 SCRA 66 (1999).
[56]
People v. Taliman, 342 SCRA 534 (2000).
[57]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[58]
People v. Mendoza, supra.
[59]
Territory v. Goto, 27 Hawaii 65 (1923).
[60]
People v. Molina, 311 SCRA 517 (1999).
[61]
Records, p. 267.chanrobles virtual law library
[62]
Id. at 268.chanrobles virtual law library
[63]
Id. at 224.chanrobles virtual law library
[64]
TSN, 4 March 1994, p. 8, (Samson Esponilla).
[65]
Records, pp. 4-11.chanrobles virtual law library
[66]
People v. Gutierrez, Jr., 302 SCRA 643 (1999).
[67]
People v. Abadies, G.R. No. 135975, 14 August 2002.
[68]
People v. Catampongan, 318 SCRA 674 (1999).
[69]
People v. Orcula, Sr., supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[70]
People v. Garcia, G.R. 145505, 14 March 2003.
[71]
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 132915, 6 August 2002. |