FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
123298
November 27, 2003
-versus-
FRANCISCO L.
CALPITO
ALIAS "FRANCIS,"
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA,
J.:
On appeal is the
Decision dated July 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City[1]
in Criminal Case No. 91-01-59 finding appellant Francisco Calpito alias
"Francis" guilty of the crime of Murder, and sentencing him to suffer
the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the amount of P50,000.[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant was charged
with the crime of Robbery with Homicide under an information which
reads,
as follows:
That on or
about the 21st day of November, 1990, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused,
armed with a deadly weapon, with intent [to] gain did, then and there
willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and intimidation on the
person of FLORENTINA VILLAS rob, take and carry away a shoulder bag
containing
cash in the amount of P15,000 and jewelries amounting to P30,000
belonging
to Florentina Villas; that on the occasion of said robbery and by
reason
thereof and for the purpose of enabling him to take/rob and carry away
the above-mentioned bag, taking advantage of superior strength with
treachery
and with intent to kill, said accused did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully,
and feloniously attack and stab with the said weapon Florentina Villas
and Israel Montilla inflicting wounds on Florentina Villas which caused
her death and [a] wound on Israel Montilla which necessitated medical
attendance
on him for a period of 5-7 days and [which] incapacitated him from
performing
his usual work for the same length of time.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Contrary to law.[3]
Initially, appellant
entered
a plea of not guilty and waived pre-trial.[4]
Upon appellant's motion, a reinvestigation of the case was conducted.[5]
However, the prosecution. resolved to maintain the original information.[6]
On January 15, 1993, appellant was re-arraigned, and after being
appraised
of the consequences of the nature of his offense, he changed his plea
to
one of guilty.[7]
The court a quo thereafter received the prosecution's evidence to prove
the nature and extent of appellant's culpability as to the crime
charged.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The prosecution presented
its sole witness in the person of Israel Montilla, the grandson of the
victim Florentina Villas. In his testimony,[9]
he narrated that at around 2:00 a.m. of November 21, 1990, he was
sleeping
in the sala of the victim's residence when he was awakened by the
victim's
shout for help. He then rushed to the victim's bedroom which was just
2½
meters away from the sofa on which he slept. By the doorway, he met
appellant
who was holding a fan knife in his right hand and the victim's shoulder
bag in his left. He grappled with appellant, who suddenly stabbed him
on
his left upper arm. While Montilla searched for something with which he
could defend himself, appellant rushed out of the house through the
kitchen
door, the lock of which the latter had destroyed. Montilla looked
inside
the bedroom and saw his grandmother on the bed lying in a pool of
blood,
with stab wounds all over her body.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Montilla further declared
that no other person was inside the bedroom when the incident happened.
He was able to recognize appellant because of the fluorescent light. He
testified that he could not be mistaken regarding the assailant's
identity,
since he had long, known appellant, who resided near the victim's
house.
He also stated that appellant, in his haste, left a flashlight and a
cap
which had the latter's name written on its inside portion. He added
that
he had known appellant to be a drug user, and that at the time of the
incident,
the latter appeared to be under the influence of drugs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Medico-legal Reports[10]
submitted by Dr. Benjamin Ver disclosed that the victim suffered a
total
of 4 stab wounds and 7 incise wounds on different parts of her body.
These
wounds caused the victim's death, at the age of 74.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The court a quo, finding
the charge of Robbery with Homicide unsubstantiated by evidence,
convicted
appellant of the crime of Murder. Appellant was thus sentenced, as
follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
in view of the plea of guilty of accused Francisco Calpito alias
"Francis"
to the crime charged in the information and considering the evidence
adduced
by the prosecution which sufficiently established the absolute
culpability
and degree of participation of the herein accused in the killing of the
deceased, accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt not of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, but of Murder, the prosecution
having
failed to prove with sufficient amplitude the existence of Robbery,
[and]
the Court hereby sentences accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua,
to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000, and to pay the
costs.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant, thereafter,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[12]
arguing that the trial court erred in convicting him of Murder instead
of Homicide, and in failing to apply the mitigating circumstance of
minority.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Acting on the motion,
the court a quo ordered the reception of evidence to prove appellant's
minority. Appellant presented the testimony[13]
of Paquito Ato, Civil Registrar of Butuan City who allegedly issued the
former's birth certificate, the original of which was submitted as
evidence.
On this birth certificate, it was stated that appellant was born on May
31, 1974, thus indicating that he was only 16 on November 20, 1990 when
the crime happened. Ato confirmed the authenticity of the aforesaid
document,
and its late registration, as indicated thereon. He further declared
that
it was applied for by appellant's mother, who supplied to him all the
details
on appellant's birth. He, however, admitted that he was unable to
verify
the information given, as the hospital where appellant was born no
longer
existed, and as the named attending physician no longer resided in
Butuan
City.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In its Order dated September
15, 1995, the court a quo denied the motion and affirmed appellant's
conviction
for Murder. It further found the submitted birth certificate dubious
and
self-serving.[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, the instant appeal.
Appellant questions his conviction on two grounds:
I.
THE COURT A QUO
ERRED
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
ANY QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II.
THE COURT A QUO
ERRED
IN NOT APPRECIATING THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY
INTERPOSED BY THE DEFENSE.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant disputes the
court a quo's finding of the attendance of qualifying circumstances in
the commission of the crime. The information alleged the qualifying
circumstances
of treachery and abuse of superior strength. Although the assailed
decision
did not discuss which of these qualified the killing to murder, a
perusal
of the facts of the case readily reveals that abuse of superior
strength
attended the crime. In several cases, this Court has ruled that this
circumstance
depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim
and
the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous
for the aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the
commission of the crime.[16]
In a recent case, it was held that an attack made by a man with a
deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes an abuse of
the
aggressor's superior strength.[17]
The circumstance must apply with more reason in the present case, where
the abuse of superior strength is evident from the notorious disparity
between the relative strength of the victim, a 74-year-old unarmed
woman,
and the assailant, a young man armed with a knife.
With respect to treachery,
this Court holds that it cannot be considered in the present case. This
circumstance cannot be appreciated where the prosecution only proved
the
events after the attack happened, but not the manner the attack
commenced
or how the act which resulted in the victim's death unfolded.[18]
It must be noted that in this case, the prosecution's lone witness only
accounted for what transpired after the stabbing, as he did not see the
actual attack on the victim.cralaw:red
Given the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the court a quo therefore
correctly
convicted appellant for Murder.cralaw:red
This Court, however,
disagrees with the trial court in its conclusion on the mitigating
circumstance
of minority. In its order,[19]
the court a quo found appellant's birth certificate doubtful because
there
appeared a slight discrepancy between the name stated thereon and the
name
being used by appellant. It also took into consideration the fact that
the document was belatedly registered by appellant's mother, who
appeared
to have supplied the necessary information so that her son may avail of
the aforesaid mitigating circumstance.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the outset, it must
be borne in mind that in assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance
of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it
being more beneficial to the latter.[20]
In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance
on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This Court emphasizes
that while the submitted birth certificate is not entirely
satisfactory,
a careful review of the records reveals other evidence of appellant's
minority.
In the December 19, 1994 hearing, upon being asked by the trial court,
appellant declared that he was 20 years old,[22]
consequently indicating that on November 21 1990, he must have been
only
16 years old. Also, as appearing in appellant's sworn statement
executed
on November 21, 1991,[23]
he declared that he was 18 years old, hence evincing that he must have
been only 17 at the time of the incident. Notwithstanding the
discrepancy,
both declarations nonetheless show that he was below 18 when he
committed
the crime. This Court has held that the claim of minority by an
appellant
will be upheld even without any proof to corroborate his testimony,
especially
so when coupled by the fact that the prosecution failed to present
contradictory
evidence thereto.[24]
In this case, the prosecution only questioned the submitted birth
certificate,
but did not adduce any evidence to disprove appellant's claim of
minority
when he committed the crime. Accordingly, the mitigating circumstance
of
minority should, as a matter of fairness, be appreciated in favor of
appellant,
especially in light of the compassionate liberality this Court has
granted
to minors involved in serious crimes.[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, this Court
agrees with appellant's claim that he should be credited with the
mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty to the offense charged. The
requisites
of this circumstance are:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(1) that
the
offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(2) that the
confession
of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the competent court
that
is to try the case; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(3) that the
confession
of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution.[26]
In this case, upon re-arraignment, appellant, in the presence of his
counsel,
and in open court, voluntarily pleaded guilty to the crime charged
before
the prosecution presented its evidence.[27]
This mitigating circumstance should therefore be considered in
computing
the proper penalty.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the matter of
appellant's
civil liability, this Court finds it appropriate to impose additional
damages
in line with prevailing jurisprudence: exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000[28]
and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.[29]
The civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 is sustained.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lastly, modifications
on the imposable penalty are in order. As the crime was committed prior
to the amendment of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by Republic
Act
7659, the appropriate penalty for Murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum
period to death.[30]
In view of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the
penalty
next lower in degree shall be imposed in its proper period, pursuant to
Article 68 (2) of the Code, which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium.[31]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being an ordinary
mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty and no aggravating circumstance, the
maximum
penalty should be taken from the minimum period of the imposable
penalty,
which is prision mayor in its maximum period, while the minimum should
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is anywhere
within
the range of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor
in its medium period.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the court a quo finding appellant Francisco L. Calpito alias
"Francis"
guilty of Murder is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATIONS that he is
sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of 10 years of prision mayor medium as
MINIMUM, to 12 years of prision mayor maximum as MAXIMUM and
that,
in addition to the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000, he is
further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000 as exemplary damages and
P25,000 as temperate damages. Costs de officio. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban,
Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ.,
concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Branch 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Rollo, p. 40.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Records, pp. 1–2.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Certificate of Arraignment, Records, p. 59; Order, Records, p. 60.
[5]
Records, p. 73.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id., at 77–79.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id., at 101.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id., at 105.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
TSN, February 23, 1994, pp. 1–12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Records, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Rollo, p. 11.chan
robles virtual law librarychan robles virtual law library
[12]
Records, pp. 121–123.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
TSN, December 19, 1994, pp. 2–8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Records, p. 134.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Rollo, p. 30.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
People v. Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233 (1994).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
People v. Appegu, 379 SCRA 703 (2002).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
People v. Baniega, 377 SCRA 170 (2002); People v. Bulan, 374 SCRA 618
(2002).
[19]
Records, supra, note 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
People v. Regalario, 220 SCRA 368 (1993) citing US v. Bergantino, 3
Phil
118 (1903).
[21]
People v. Barreta, 343 SCRA 199 (2000); People v. Regalario, supra,
note
20, citing People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 (1991).
[22]
TSN, December 19, 1994, p. 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Records, pp. 70–71.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
People v. Monteron, 378 SCRA 340 (2002) citing People v. Chua, 339 SCRA
426 (2000).
[25]
People v. Regalario, supra, note 20.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
People v. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47 (1988).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
See note 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 137782, April 1, 2003; People v. Alcodia,
G.R.
No. 134121, March 6, 2003.
[29]
People v. delos Santos, G.R. No. 135919, May 9, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
People v. Alfon, G.R. No. 126028, March 14, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
People v. Paredes, 264 SCRA 578 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |