SECOND DIVISION.
.
HEIRS OF MIGUEL
FRANCO,
NAMELY: MODESTA,LEONIDES
ROMULA,
EMMA, JOHNNY, RAMON, BERNARDO,PACITA, ALL
SURNAMED
FRANCO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
123924
December 11, 2003
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
AND HEIRS OF FAUSTINA CABADING,
REPRESENTED BY
VICTORIA
CABADING,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA,
J.:
Before us is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari seeking to overturn a Decision rendered by the
Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals[1]
on 6 October 1995 in CA G.R. CV No. 37609. The Court of Appeals
reversed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 7[2]
("RTC") and ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-20203 issued in the
name
of Miguel Franco (whose heirs are the petitioners herein), and the
issuance
of a new transfer certificate of title for Lot No. 5172-B, PSD-64806,
in
favor of the heirs of Quintin Franco[3]
("Quintin"). Quintin was the patentee[4]
of a parcel of public land, surveyed as Lot No. 5172, Cad. 85 Ext.
("subject
property"), located at Lianib, Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, and
containing
an area of 70.6381 hectares. Being the patentee, Original Certificate
of
Title No. P-436 covering subject property was issued in Quintin's name
on 9 July 1954.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Quintin died intestate
on 8 December 1967. His brother, Miguel Franco ("Miguel,"), filed a
Petition
for Issuance of Letters of Administration on 17 October 1968, before
the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte ("intestate court"),
praying
that he be appointed as administrator of Quintin's estate. This
Petition,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. R-531, was opposed by Faustina Franco Vda. De
Cabading ("Faustina"), the sister of the decedent, on the ground that
Miguel
was unfit to be the administrator.[5]
She prayed for her own appointment as administratrix instead of Miguel.
Upon motion of Miguel, the intestate court appointed him as special
administrator
of the estate on 3 December 1969.[6]
However, on 23 July 1971, Faustina, then apparently joined by the other
heirs of Quintin except Miguel,[7]
moved for the latter's removal as special administrator.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 27 August 1973, the
intestate court issued an Order[8]
declaring inter alia that, based on the evidence, Quintin was the
absolute
owner of the subject property. This finding was subsequently used by
the
intestate court as one of the grounds for granting the motion to remove
Miguel as special administrator, per the Order dated 1 September 1973.
In the latter Order, the intestate court said that since Miguel was
claiming
ownership over half of the subject property, his conflicting interest
rendered
him incapable of rendering a true and faithful account of the estate.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Miguel filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[10]
of the 1 September 1973 Order, wherein he alleged for the first time
that
one-half of the subject property was transferred to him by virtue of a
document entitled "General Power of Administration" and executed by
Quintin
in 1967. It was also discovered that on the basis of this "General
Power
of Administration" Miguel had filed a Petition dated 2 January 1972
before
Branch 1 of the Dipolog Court of First Instance, docketed as Misc. Sp.
No. 2993,[11]
seeking the cancellation of OCT No. P-436. This Petition was granted in
the Order[12]
of 6 January 1973, wherein it was directed that the new transfer
certificates
of title be issued, one in the name of the heirs of Quintin and the
other
name of Miguel. Thus, Miguel was able to obtain Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (TCT) T-20203, covering half of the subject property, on 13
February
1973.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The other heirs asked
the intestate court to cancel TCT No. T-20203 shortly after learning
about
it through a Motion for Reconsideration filed in the estate
proceedings.
On 4 May 1977, the intestate court issued an order[14]
cancelling TCT No. T-20203 issued in the name of Miguel, on the ground
that Miguel's acquisition of the title was fraudulent. The Court of
Appeals
reversed the Order in its Decision[15]
of 29 February 1984. According to the appellate court, the intestate
court
had no jurisdiction to settle questions of property ownership.[16]
This Court, in a Resolution[17]
dated 1 October 1984, affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Consequently, private
respondents as plaintiffs, filed before the RTC a complaint, docketed
as
Civil Case No. 3847, seeking the cancellation of TCT No. T-20203 in the
name of Miguel, who had died in the meantime.[18]
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.[19]
The RTC found that the "General Power of Administration" evinced an
existing
trust relation between Quintin and his brother Miguel, with Quintin as
the signatory thereof acknowledging that he was holding half of the
property
titled in his name in trust for Miguel. Applying Article 1452[20]
of the Civil Code, the RTC concluded that a trust had been created by
force
of law in favor of Miguel to the extent of one-half of the property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On appeal, the Court
of Appeals rendered on 6 October 1995 the challenged Decision[21]
reversing the RTC decision, ordering the cancellation of TCT No.
T-20203
and directing the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in
the
name of the Heirs of Quintin. The appellate court concluded that Miguel
had succeeded in registering the property through fraud, surreptitious
conduct, and bad faith. As basis, it recited the following
circumstances:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. In his
petition
for the issuance of letters of administration, Miguel admitted that the
subject property in its entirety belonged to his brother, Quintin, with
his inclusion of the entire property in the list of properties left
behind
by Quintin, without asserting ownership over it or any part thereof;[22]
2. The intestate
court
had declared that Quintin was the absolute owner of the subject
property
and dismissed, for lack of sufficient evidence, the claim of Miguel to
half of the property;[23]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. OCT No. P-436,
covering
the entire subject property, was registered as early as 9 July 1954 but
it was only on 13 February 1973 that Miguel Franco obtained the TCT
covering
half of the property in his name. His silence for 19 years had
militated
against his claim of ownership and may well be indicative of laches on
his part;[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. The subject
property
was solely declared for taxation purposes in the name of Quintin;[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
5. The "General
Power
of Administration," on which Miguel anchored his claim of ownership,
had
simply documented a delegated power to administer property and could
not
be a source of ownership;[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
6. The Order dated
6
January 1973 of Judge Rafael Mendoza in Misc. Sp. Proc. No. 2993, which
directed the cancellation of OCT No. P-436 was issued without factual
basis.
Section 112 of the old Land Registration Act which was the apparent
basis
of the Order contemplated only summary proceedings for
non-controversial
erasures, alterations or amendment of entries in a certificate of title
and therefore could not be invoked if there is no unanimity among the
parties,
or if one of them had posed an adverse claim or serious objection which
would render the case controversial.[27]
After their motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners
brought
forth the present petition. While asserting that the transfer and
registration
of one-half of the subject property in the name of Miguel was not done
through fraud or in bad faith, they point out that at no time did the
respondents
question the execution or genuineness of the "General Power of
Administration"
which purportedly admits of the existence of a trust relation between
Quintin
and Miguel. They also claim that the Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate
the recognition which Quintin had accorded to the rights and interest
of
Miguel.
The findings of the
RTC
and the Court of Appeals are contradictory; hence, the review of the
case
is in order.[28]
After a thorough examination of the case, we hold that the petition
lacks
merit and affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Miguel's claim of ownership
to half of the subject property is belied by his statement in the
Verified
Petition[29]
for issuance of letters administration that he filed on 17 October
1968.
Therein, he stated:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"7. That
said
Quintin Franco left the following properties:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a. A parcel of
agricultural
land located at Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte known as Lot No. 5172,
Dipolog
Cadastre-85 Ext., Cad. Case No. 9. LRC Cad. Rec. No. 769, (S.A. 7612),
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-436, under Tax Dec. No.
676, assessed at P26,120.00, with an area of 706,381 sq. m. (citations
omitted.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While he explicitly
declared
that the subject property belonged to Quintin, at the same time he was
remarkably silent about his claim that he acquired one-half thereof
during
the lifetime of Quintin. He asserted his claim to the subject property
quite belatedly, i.e., four years after he stated under oath and in a
court
pleading that it belonged in its entirety to his brother. Thus, the
statement
and the accompanying silence may be appreciated in more than one
context.
It is a declaration against interest[30]
and a judicial admission combined.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A declaration against
interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of
the
facts in dispute.[31]
In the same vein, a judicial admission binds the person who makes the
same,
and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no
amount
of rationalization can offset it.[32]
In the case at bar,
there is no showing of palpable mistake on the part of Miguel when he
made
the admission. In his Motion to Admit Amended Petition, he merely
alleged
inadvertence in failing to state his claim of co-ownership. Yet no
evidence
was adduced to prove the alleged inadvertence. And even assuming there
was indeed such a mistake, Miguel had ample opportunity to make the
rectification
in the initial stages of the intestate proceedings.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bearing on the weight
of the combined declaration against interest and judicial admission is
the assumption, arising from his duty as special administrator of the
estate
of Quintin, that he had full knowledge of the status and extent of the
property holdings of the decedent.[33]
The following observation of the Court of Appeals is worth citing:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"This
tolerant
silence militates against Miguel Franco's claim of 'co-ownership.'
Juxtaposed
with his previous judicial admission of Quintin Franco's absolute
ownership
of Lot No. 5172, it is not difficult to see that the act of Miguel
Franco
in registering one-half of the property in his name was an insidious
and
surreptitious, if not belated, maneuver to deprive the legal heirs of
Quintin
Franco of their lawful share and interest in the property. As a matter
of fact, Miguel Franco may well be charged with laches."[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The statement under
oath
of Miguel was made in the intestate proceedings. It was presented in
evidence
and utilized as such in Civil Case No. 3847.[35]
Thus from the substantive and procedural standpoints alike, the
statement
being both a declaration against interest and judicial admission should
be accorded the full evidentiary value it deserves.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Another important point,
albeit simply corollary. The intestate court in its Order[36]
dated 27 August 1973 declared that Quintin was the absolute owner of
the
property and accordingly denied Miguel's claim of ownership over half
the
subject property. The Order was apparently issued for the purpose of
determining
which properties should be included for the inventory of the estate of
Miguel. While the intestate court does not have the authority to rule
with
finality on questions of ownership over the property of the decedent,
it
is not precluded from making a provisional determination over such
questions
for purposes relevant to the settlement of the estate, such as ruling
whether
or not to include properties in the inventory of the estate.[37]
And yet, at no time did Miguel file a motion for the reconsideration of
the 27 August 1973 Order of the intestate court which denied Miguel's
claim
of ownership. It was the 1 September 1973 Order of the intestate court,
by virtue of which Miguel was removed as special administrator, that he
contested.[38]
While the 27 August 1973 Order is a provisional determination of
ownership
over the subject property, yet conformably to ordinary experience any
prudent
claimant is expected to dispute such an order which rejects his claim
of
ownership. Miguel's inaction unmistakably bolsters the unshakeable
weight
that should be accorded the statement as a declaration against interest
and a judicial admission.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Now, the issue viewed
from the perspective of the Torrens system of registration. Under the
Land
Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens title
becomes
indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the
decree
of registration. The decree is incontrovertible and becomes binding on
all persons whether or not they were notified of, or participated in,
the
in rem registration process.[39]
OCT No. P-436, covering the subject property in its entirety, was
registered
as early as 9 July 1954 in the name of Quintin. A Torrens title is the
best evidence of ownership of registered land.[40]
Whatever claim of ownership Miguel had raised should have been weighed
against Quintin's title. Unfortunately, the Dipolog RTC, Branch 1
apparently
ignored this fundamental principle when on 6 January 1973 it issued the
Order directing the registration of half of the subject property in the
name of Miguel.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The undue haste which
characterized Miguel's success in obtaining judicial registration of
his
ownership over half of the subject property is noticeable. His petition
seeking the issuance of a title over his purported half of the property
was dated 2 January 1973, and yet incredibly, it was granted only four
days later, or on 6 January 1973. As the Court of Appeals correctly
noted:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The order
dated January 6, 1973 of Judge Rafael T. Mendoza in Misc. Sp. Proc. No.
2993, directing the Register of Deeds to cancel OCT No. P-436 and to
issue
new separate transfer certificates of title for Lot No. 5172-A and Lot
No. 5172-B to the Heirs of Quintin Franco and Miguel Franco,
respectively,
was therefore without factual basis. Besides, it would appear that the
order was based on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No.
496)
which contemplates summary proceeding for non-controversial erasures,
alterations,
or amendments of entries in a certificate of title x
x
x "[41]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is clear from
reading
Section 112 of the old Land Registration Act[42]
that the same may be utilized only under limited circumstances.[43]
Proceedings under Section 112 are summary in nature, contemplating
corrections
or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not
controversial
issues.[44]
More importantly, resort to the procedure laid down in Section 112
would
be available only if there is a "unanimity among the parties, or there
is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
interest."[45]
Such unanimity among the parties has been held to mean "the absence of
serious controversy between the parties in interest as to the title of
the party seeking relief under said section."[46]
Clearly, there was no such unanimity among the parties in interest,
namely,
all the heirs of Quintin. The surreptitious registration by Miguel of
the
property had worked to the prejudice of the other heirs of Quintin.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There is no document
in existence whereby the ownership of any portion of the subject
property
was conveyed by Quintin to Miguel. The "General Power of
Administration"
does not suffice in that regard. Indeed, it does not contain any
language
that operates as a conveyance of the subject property.cralaw:red
The RTC ruling, from
which petitioners draw heavy support, maintained that Miguel owned half
of the property because the document entitled "General Power of
Administration"
states that it "admits of an existing trust relation between the
signatory
Quintin Franco on the one hand, and Miguel Franco on the other hand."[47]
The RTC cited Article
1452 of the Civil
Code which reads, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Article
1452.
If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent
the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of
all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in
proportion
to the interest of each.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Article 1452
presupposes
the concurrence of two requisites before a trust can be created,
namely:
that two or more persons agree to purchase a property, and that they
consent
that one should take the title in his name for everyone's benefit.[48]
The aforementioned provision is not applicable in this case, as it
clearly
speaks of an instance when the property is acquired through a joint
purchase
by two or more persons. That circumstance is not present in this case
since
the subject property was acquired through Quintin's application for a
patent.
There is no proof that Miguel had joined Quintin in acquiring the
property.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lastly,
as noted by the Court of Appeals, while tax receipts and declarations
and
receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not,
in
themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.[49]
The subject property had been consistently declared for taxation
purposes
in the name of Quintin, and this fact taken in conjunction with the
other
circumstances inexorably lead to the conclusion that Miguel's claim of
ownership cannot be sustained.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, even without having
to inquire into the authenticity and due execution of the "General
Power
of Administration," it is safe to conclude that Miguel did not have any
ownership rights over any portion of the subject property and that the
registration of half of the property in his name was baseless and
afflicted
with fraud.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the above
premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the
decision of the Court of appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez
and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
The Decision in CA G.R. CV No. 37609 was penned by Justice O. Agcaoili,
concurred in by Justices C. Francisco and E. Verzola.
[2]
The RTC Decision was rendered by Judge J. Angeles.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, p. 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Under the provisions of Chapter V of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141,
as
amended). See Rollo, p. 23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Records, p. 166.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id. at p. 173.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id. at p. 24. The Records do not indicate at which stage of the
proceedings
the other heirs joined Faustina Franco in her opposition.
[8]
Id. at p. 188.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Id. at p. 190.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id. at p. 192.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
This particular proceeding was apparently misdocketed. Considering that
an original certificate of title had already been issued, any petition
to reopen the same, or amend the decree of registration should have
been
docketed as G.L.R.O. Rec. No. or L.R.C. Rec. No. in accordance with
Sec.
112, Act No. 496.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Records, p. 207.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id. at p. 208.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Id. at p. 234.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Id. at p. 273.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id. at p. 257.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Id. at p. 274.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
While Civil Case No. 3847 was initiated by all of the heirs of Quintin
Franco save Miguel Franco, it appears that only the heirs of Faustina
Franco
Vda. De Cabading actively pursued litigation of the case. On 19 July
1990,
the RTC issued an order declaring as non-suited the plaintiff-heirs of
Maria Franco Agdinaoy, Juan Franco, and Eudofia Franco Agdinaoy,
respectively,
while archived the case with respect to Julia Franco Mata, who had
died.
Id. at p. 132.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Id. at p. 41.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
"If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common
consent
the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of
all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in
proportion
to the interest of each." Art. 1452, New Civil Code.
[21]
Records, p. 23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Rollo, p. 28.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Id., pp. 28–29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Id., p. 29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Id. at pp. 29–30.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Among the exceptional circumstances that would compel the Supreme Court
to review the findings of fact of the lower courts is when the findings
of fact are conflicting. See e.g., Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 226 Phil.
Rep.
496, 510 (1986).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Records, p. 164; Rollo, p. 75.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
See Sec. 25, Rule 130. "The act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him."
[31]
Noda v. Cruz-Arnaldo, G.R. No. L-57322, June 22, 1987.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Yuliongsu v. PNB, 130 Phil. Rep. 575, 580 (1968).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
A special administrator is required to make and return to the court a
true
and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate
of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to
the
possession of any other person for him. See Section 1(a), Rule 81,
Rules
of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Rollo, pp. 28–29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Private respondents alleged in their Complaint that Miguel had admitted
in his petition for issuance of letters administration that Quintin was
the owner of the entire subject property. See Records, p. 5. The actual
Petition is likewise offered by private respondents as Exhibit "X", and
paragraph 7 of the petition marked as Exhibit "X-1". Records, p. 146.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Id. at p. 188.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
See In the Matter of the Intestate of Deceased Ismael Reyes v. Reyes,
G.R.
No. 139587, 22 November 2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
See Records, p. 192. It is also in this Motion for Reconsideration that
Miguel first reveals the existence of the Special Power of
Administration
executed by Quintin.
[39]
David v. Malay, G.R. No. 132644, November 19, 1999.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
Sps. Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84464, June 21, 1991.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
Rollo, pp. 29–30.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
Act No. 496. Sec. 112 thereof is now Sec. 108, P.D. No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree.
[43]
Sec. 112 reads in full: "No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be
made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of
title
or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the clerk
or any register of deeds, except by order of the court. Any registered
owner or other person in interest may at any time apply by petition to
the court, upon the ground that registered interests of any
description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and
ceased; or that new interests have arisen or been created which do not
appear upon the certificate; or that any error, omission, or mistake
was
made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any
duplicate
certificate; or that the registered owner has been married; or if
registered
as married, that the marriage has been terminated or that a corporation
which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the
same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other
reasonable
ground; and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the
petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the
entry
of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a
certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions,
requiring security if necessary, as it may deem proper: Provided,
however,
that this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to
open the original decree of registration, and that nothing shall be
done
or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest
of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or
his
heirs or assigns, without his or their written consent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Any petition filed under this section and all petitions and motions
filed
under the provisions of this Act after original registration shall be
filed
and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration
was
entered."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Quevada v. Glorioso, G.R. No. 121270, August 27, 1998 citing Republic
v.
CFI of Baguio-Benguet, 119 SCRA 405 (1982).
[45]
This doctrine enunciated in Taguman v. Republic, 94 Phil. 171, 175
(1953)
has been subsequently upheld in a long line of cases. See e.g.,
Government
v. Laperal, 108 Phil. Rep. 860, 862 (1960); Lamera v. Callanga, 153
Phil.
Rep. 306, 308–309 (1973); Fojas v. De Gray, 217 Phil. Rep. 76, 80
(1984);
Quevada v. Glorioso, 356 Phil. Rep. 107, 188 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
See Enriquez v. Atienza (1957), 100 Phil. 1072, 1077–1078.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
Records, p. 500.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[48]
Nito v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102657, 9 August 1993, 225 SCRA 231,
235. See also Ceniza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46345, 30 January
1990,
181 SCRA 552, 555.
[49]
See also Ranola v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. Rep. 1, 11 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |