THIRD DIVISION
WENONAH L.
MARQUEZ
AZARCON,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 124611
March 20, 2003
-versus-
HOUSING
AND LAND
USE ARBITER CHARITO BUNAGAN,BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS
(SPECIAL DIVISION),EQUITY HOMES, INC.,
SAGANA CONSTRUCTIONAND DEVELOPMENT
CORP. AND J. M. BUILDERS, INC.,
Respondents. |
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Presented for this Court's
consideration is the issue of whether the Court of Appeals correctly
held
that the Writ of Execution issued to enforce a decision of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) was in accordance with said
decision.
The antecedents of the
case are as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 10, 1985,
private respondents Sagana Construction and Development Corporation
(SAGANA)
and J. M. Builders as vendors, and petitioner Wenonah L.
Marquez-Azarcon
(Azarcon) as vendee, entered into a contract to sell a house and lot
(subject
property) located at Sagana Homes, Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City[1]
under which Azarcon was to pay, as she did, an initial amount of
P49,740.00,
the balance to be paid through an SSS housing loan.[2]
Azarcon's SSS loan application
was disapproved, however, on account partly of SAGANA's failure to
submit
certain requirements[3]
including the title to the subject property which had been burned and
was
pending reconstitution. She thus offered to pay the balance of
P101,560.00
in cash but SAGANA refused to accept the same unless she paid interest
thereon.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As Azarcon refused to
pay interest on the balance of the purchase price, she filed a
complaint
against SAGANA and J. M. Builders before the HLURB.[5]
Azarcon in the meantime occupied the subject property.[6]
After hearing, a Housing
and Land Use Arbiter (HLA) rendered a decision[7]
ordering Azarcon to pay the balance of the purchase price, and SAGANA
to
deliver the Deed of Sale and the title covering the subject property.cralaw:red
SAGANA appealed the
Decision of the HLA before the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB
(Board)
assigning as error HLA's refusal to assess against Azarcon rentals for
the use of the subject property and interest in the concept of penalty
for "default" in the payment of the balance of the purchase price.[8]
By Decision[9]
of October 19, 1992, the Board ordered Azarcon to pay, in addition to
the
balance of the purchase price, interest thereon and rentals at
P3,000.00
per month from the time of the delivery of the subject property until
full
payment of the purchase price.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Azarcon moved to reconsider
the order for the payment of interest and rentals.cralaw:red
The Board, by Decision[10]
of May 10, 1993, deleted the order for Azarcon to pay interest. The
dispositive
portion of the amended Decision, upon which the controversy in this
case
arises, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the decision sought to be considered is hereby modified by
setting aside Order Nos. 2 and 3 of the decision, and incorporating
therein
substitute Orders which shall read as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. Requiring the complainant
to tender the amount of P101,560.00 within fifteen (15) days from
finality
of this decision; however, in the event such amount remains unpaid as
of
the end of said period, the same shall earn interest at the rate of six
(6%) percent per annum, reckoned from such finality until the same is
fully
paid;
2. Requiring complainant,
to immediately pay upon promulgation of this decision without prejudice
to such appeal as may thereafter be filed and pending such appeal, if
any,
the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month as rental for
her
use and occupancy of the premises subject of this case, reckoned from
the
time of her occupancy of the unit until the amount set forth in the
preceding
order is fully paid; the said amount of rental shall form part of the
purchase
price of the premises as herein adjusted, and may be paid as a whole in
one lump sum in advance, or through monthly amortizations, at the
option
of the complainant;
3. Requiring the respondent
to accept .the price tendered by complainants, together with the
payment
of rentals set forth in the preceding order, in full satisfaction .of
his
claims, rights and interests over the property, within ten (10) days
from
such tender/offer or actual payment, as the case maybe, and
consequently
within a period not later than ten (10) days thereafter, execute the
necessary
documents and deliver title to the premises in the name of complainant.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As none of the parties
appealed the decision of the Board, it became final and executory.cralaw:red
In accordance with the
decision, Azarcon paid the balance of the purchase price which was
received
by SAGANA on July 22, 1993.[11]
SAGANA refused, however, to execute a Deed of Sale over the subject
property
and to deliver the title covering it on the ground that Azarcon had yet
to pay rentals in accordance with the decision.[12]
On August 23, 1993,
SAGANA filed before the Board a Motion for Execution[13]
of its decision with respect to its order for Azarcon to pay rentals.
The
Board referred the motion to the HLA, the decision having become final
and executory.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 20, 1993,
Azarcon also filed a Motion for Execution[14]
of the same Board decision in light of SAGANA's refusal to issue a Deed
of Sale in her favor and to deliver the title covering the subject
property.cralaw:red
By Order of March 18,
1994,[15]
the HLA denied Azarcon's motion and granted that of SAGANA, thus
directing
Azarcon to pay rentals, as "the payment.of the sum of P101,560.00
[by her] did not discharge all [her] obligations to [SAGANA] pursuant
to
the dispositive portion of the final judgment."[16]
A Writ of Execution[17]
was accordingly issued on March 21, 1994 to enforce the payment of
rentals
by Azarcon.cralaw:red
On April 13, 1994, Azarcon
filed before the Board a Motion for Reconsideration of the HLA Order of
March 18, 1994 and for the quashal of the Writ of Execution issued in
accordance
therewith.[18]
By Resolution[19]
of June 7, 1995, the Board denied Azarcon's motion, it holding that she
was indeed liable to pay rentals in addition to the balance of the
purchase
price.[20]
Azarcon thus filed a
Petition for Certiorari[21]
with the Court of Appeals on August 21, 1995, she alleging that the
March
18, 1994 Order issued by the HLA (granting SAGANA's Motion for
Execution)
varied the terms of the Board decision and, as such, the Board acted
with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it, by
Resolution of June 7, 1995, denied her Motion for Reconsideration of
the
said HLA Order.[22]
In its Comment[23]
to Azarcon's petition before the Court of Appeals, SAGANA alleged that
Azarcon failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, she having
failed
to appeal to the Office of the President following the 1987 HLURB Rules
of Procedure which was in effect when petitioner filed her petition on
August 21, 1995, the specific provision of which reads:
Section 28. Appeal to
the Office of the President. - Any party may appeal the decision of the
Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within 30 days
from
receipt thereof x x x x[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It thus prayed for the
dismissal of the petition.cralaw:red
By Decision[25]
of November 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals, holding that Azarcon
properly
availed of the remedy of certiorari, nonetheless dismissed her petition
upon a finding that the HLA March 18, 1994 Order was issued in
accordance
with the Board Decision of May 10, 1993, hence, the correctness of the
Board Resolution of June 7, 1995 denying reconsideration of the said
HLA
March 18, 1994 Order. Thus the Court of Appeals held:
A closer examination
of the entire judgment reveals that the rentals aside from the
P101,560.00
shall form part of the purchase price. The amount initially paid by
petitioner
is not in full satisfaction of the purchase price. For if this was the
intent of the Board, it should have so stated in paragraph no. 1 of the
dispositive portion. There would have been no need for Nos. 2 and 3 of
the dispositive portion.cralaw:red
This becomes more apparent
in view of the fact that the payment of rentals is reckoned from the
petitioner
occupied the unit until the amount of P101,560.00 is paid by
petitioner.
This implies that the rentals and the P101,560.00 form the totality of
the purchase price.cralaw:red
Complementary to Nos.
1 and 2 of the dispositive portion, No. 3 requires private respondents
to accept the price tendered by petitioner, "together with the payment
of the rentals set forth in the preceding order" referring to No. 2.
Such
amounts, the judgment further states, will be in full satisfaction of
private
respondents' claims, rights and interests over the property.
Afterwhich,
the private respondents shall execute the necessary documents and
deliver
title to the petitioner. This explains why the prayer of petitioner for
a writ of execution to compel private respondents to execute the
necessary
documents cannot begranted. Petitioner has to pay the rentals first
before the execution of the necessary documents in her favor. The order
of Arbiter Bunagan, therefore, seeks to implement what must necessarily
follow after No. 1, which is the payment of rentals in accordance with
No. 2.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Likewise, denial of
the motion for reconsideration by the Arbiter's order for the issuance
of a writ of execution in favor of private respondents is correct.
There
was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board in finding
that:
"x x x From the respective
averments of the parties, it is also clear that both are fully aware
that
the obligation of the complainant is not limited to or has not been
discharged
by the amount already paid to respondent. Complainant only argues that
her obligation to pay rentals has not yet accrued because she has not
yet
made a choice as to the manner of payment. We cannot agree with the
complainant's
position as this will mean that complainant's obligation to pay may not
at all become due because the demandability thereof will be solely
dependent
upon her will.cralaw:red
xxx
WHEREFORE, IN VIEWOF THE FOREGOING, complainant's motion for reconsideration and motion
to
quash writ of execution are hereby DENIED. Let the appropriate writ of
execution be issued for the payment of the rentals to be reckoned from
March of 1988 to July 1993." (pp. 4-5, Resolution)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In effect, the Board's
resolution affirmed the Arbiter's order for the implementation of no. 2
of the dispositive portion requiring petitioner to pay rentals.cralaw:red
x x x[26]
(Underscoring supplied).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Her Motion for Reconsideration[27]
having been denied by the Court of Appeals,[28]
Azarcon comes to this .Court via the present petition for review on
certiorari,
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in this wise:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY 10 MAY 1993
DECISION
AS ORDERING PETITIONER-APPELLANT LIABLE FOR THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE
PRICE PLUS RENTALS IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EXPRESS DIRECTIVES OF
ITS
DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHICH FIND SUPPORT IN THE FACTS ESTABLISHED THEREIN.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING PUBLIC RESPONDENT BOARD'S FINDING THAT
PETITIONER-APPELLANT
WAS AWARE THAT SHE WAS LIABLE FOR THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE
PLUS
RENTALS.[29]
SAGANA, in its Comment[30]
once more maintains that Azarcon's petition for Certiorari before the
Court
of Appeals should have been dismissed due to her failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies.[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The questioned Order,
however, merely involves an interpretation of the dispositive portion
of
the Board decision which had become final and executory. Hence, Azarcon
properly filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals[32]
where she ascribed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
order.cralaw:red
On the merits of Azarcon's
present petition:
Azarcon insists that,
in accordance with the May 10, 1993 Board Decision, she was to pay the
balance of the purchase price or to pay rentals. SAGANA contends,
however,
that the Board decision held Azarcon liable to pay rentals "to be
reckoned
from the time she occupied the premises and up to the time that she has
fully paid the [balance] in the amount of P101,560.00," and to pay
P101,560.00
balance. Thus it amplifies its contention:
The term "purchase price
as adjusted" as used in directive no. 2 of the dispositive portion of
the
decision clearly refers to the cumulative amounts of P101,560.00 and
the
rentals. If the plain and literal meaning of directive no. 2 of the
dispositive
portion of the decision were to be disregarded and petitioner's
interpretation
that her obligation is discharged with the payment of the amount of
P101,560.00
were to be followed, then there is no "purchase price as adjusted" to
speak
of because the purchase price would have remained the same and without
any adjustment. The language of directive no. 2 is clear and
unequivocal,
viz:
"Requiring complainant,
to immediately pay upon Promulgation of this decision without prejudice
to such appeal as may thereafter be filed and pending such appeal, if
any
the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos a month as rental for
her
use and occupancy of the premises subject of this case, reckoned from
the
time occupancy of the unit until the amount set forth in preceding
order
is fully paid; said amount of rental shall form part of the purchase
price
as herein adjusted, and may be paid as a whole in one lump sum in
advance,
or through mont[h]ly amortizations, at the option of the
complainant."
mphasis supplied)
Thus, in granting private
respondent's motion for execution, public respondent Arbiter correctly
ruled as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"it is clear that the
payment by complainant of the sum of P101,560.00 did not discharge all
its obligations to the respondent pursuant to the dispositive portion
of
the final judgment."[33]
The dispute thus arises
from the parties' conflicting understanding or interpretation of the
phrase
"the said amount of rental shall form part of the purchase price as
adjusted"
found in the fallo, Azarcon contending that the payment of rentals is
an
alternative to the payment of the balance of the purchase price, and
SAGANA
contending that the rental payments shall be in addition to the balance
of the purchase price.cralaw:red
Of the parties' interpretations,
SAGANA's is contrary to their agreement. They agreed upon the purchase
price of the subject property in 1995 when they entered into the
contract
to sell. The amount agreed upon became the law between them.[34]
In the absence of any showing that the agreement is contrary to law,
courts
are without power to alter what parties have clearly, voluntarily and
knowingly
agreed upon.[35]
To follow the interpretation
proffered by SAGANA would allow the Board to alter the parties'
agreement
on the purchase price.cralaw:red
Upon the other hand,
Azarcon's interpretation is more in accord with the finding of the
Board
that the delay in the payment of the purchase price was not due to her
fault, precisely on account of which finding it deleted the order for
the
payment of interest by Azarcon. Held the Board:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"[SAGANA] has failed
to convincingly refute [AZARCON's] argument that the non-release of the
loan was due to its non-submission of certain requirements.cralaw:red
Hence, for this reason,
the.issue [of whether or not Azarcon is liable for the payment of
interest] is resolved in the negative. We are convinced that [Azarcon]
should not be held responsible for the delay in the release of the loan
and consequently for the non-payment of the purchase price. Such being
the case, we believe that a recall of our previous ruling ordering
[Azarcon]
to pay interest by way of damages is in order.[36]
(Underscoring supplied).cralaw:red
If Azarcon had been
spared by the Board of paying interest by way of damages because she
was
not responsible "for the delay in the release of the loan and
consequently
for the non-payment of [the balance] of the purchase price," why should
the Board have intended to make her liable to pay rentals over and
above
the balance of the purchase price, especially given her tender of
payment
of such balance after the loan application was not approved, which
tender
SAGANA refused to accept without interest being paid thereon?
That
the Board had no such intention, the following portion of its May 10,
1993
decision instructs:
In the absence of payment
through housing loan, the buyer should effect payment through other
means
within a reasonable period. The seller should also extend all support
and
assistance to make it possible for the buyer to find such means,
particularly
if it contributed to the non-release of the loan. If parties cannot
agree
on the substitute method of payment on the period for effecting the
same,
then the Board may step to fix the same. Meantime we believe that until
this matter can be resolved, complainant should pay rentals as
equitable
payment for use of the premises, which can be applied to the
balance
of the purchase price.[37]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).cralaw:red
From the immediately
foregoing disquisition of the Board, it is clear that the payment of
rentals
was devised by it merely as an interim scheme, until a "substitute
method
of payment [of the balance of the purchase price]" was agreed upon by
the
parties.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Since Azarcon fully
paid the balance of the purchase price on July 22, 1993, less than
three
months after the Board decision was promulgated on May 10, 1993, that
part
of the decision respecting "payment through other means" devised by the
Board for Azarcon to, in the meantime, "pay rentals as equitable
payment
for the use of the premises, which can be applied to the balance of the
purchase price," had become functus oficio. To hold otherwise would be
to fault Azarcon in whom none was, as reflected above, found by the
Board.
It would also gloss over Azarcon's initial payment of a substantial
amount
when they entered into the contract to sell and her tender of payment
of
the balance which was, however, rejected by SAGANA. It would thus
ignore
the interest of justice and equity which underlies all systems of
justice.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The position of petitioner, Wenonah L.
Marquez-Azarcon,
that the Writ of Execution in question varied the terms of the HLURB
May
13, 1993 decision is upheld.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Panganiban,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo at 28- 29.
[2]
Id. at 29.
[3]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
Id. at 66.
[7]
Id. at 29.
[8]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Id. at 41-42.
[10]
Id. at 41-47.
[11]
Per receipt issued by Sagana Construction & Development
Corporation;
Rollo at 31, 49.
[12]
Rollo at 15.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
CA Rollo at 51.
[14]
Rollo at 50-53.
[15]
Id. at 54-58.
[16]
Id. at 57.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Id. at 59-61.
[18]
Id. at 15.
[19]
Id. at 62-66.
[20]
Id. at 65-66.
[21]
CA Rollo at 1-45.
[22]
Id. at 7-8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Id. at 52-55.
[24]
Incorporated in Section 2, Rule XVIII of the 1996 Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board Rules of Procedure.
[25]
Rollo at 28-38.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Id. at 36-38.
[27]
CA Rollo at 79-91.
[28]
Rollo at 40.
[29]
Id. at 16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Id. at 76-87.
[31]
Id at 79-82.
[32]
Vide Jose Clavano v. HLURB, G. R. No. 143781, February 27, 2002; Ruiz
v.
Caneba, 191 SCRA 865 (1990).
[33]
Rollo at 83-84.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Article 1159, Civil Code.
[35]
Vide Opulencia v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 385 (1998); Sanchez v.
Court
of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647 (1997); Esguerra v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA
380 (1997); Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226 SCRA 314 (1993); Gregorio
Araneta,
Inc. v. Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co., Ltd., 20 SCRA 330
(1967)
[36]
Rollo at 45.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Id. at 46. |