FIRST DIVISION
LAGRIMAS A. BOY,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
125088
April 14, 2004
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS,
ISAGANI P. RAMOS
AND ERLINDA GASINGAN
RAMOS,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in an
ejectment case, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 38716, which reversed and
set
aside the decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54,[2]
and reinstated the decision[3]
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14,[4]
ordering petitioner to vacate the disputed premises and to pay rent
until
the premises are vacated and possession is turned over to private
respondents.
The facts, as stated
by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On September 24, 1993,
the spouses Isagani P. Ramos and Erlinda Gasingan Ramos, private
respondents
herein, filed an action for ejectment against Lagrimas A. Boy
(Lagrimas),
petitioner herein, with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. In
their
Complaint, the spouses Ramos alleged that they are the owners of a
parcel
of land with an area of 55.75 square meters, and the house existing
thereon,
situated at 1151 Florentino Torres St., Singalong, Manila. They
acquired
the said properties from Lagrimas who sold the same to them by virtue
of
a Deed of Absolute Sale,[5]
which was executed on June 4, 1986. However, Lagrimas requested for
time
to vacate the premises, and they agreed thereto, because they were not
in immediate need of the premises. Time came when they needed the said
house as they were only renting their own residence. They then demanded
that Lagrimas vacate the subject premises, but she refused to do so.
Hence,
they initiated this action for ejectment against Lagrimas.[6]
In her Answer, Lagrimas
alleged that sometime in September 1984, in order to accommodate her
brother’s
need for a placement fee to work abroad, she borrowed P15,000 from the
spouses Ramos, who asked for the subject property as collateral. On
June
4, 1986, the spouses Ramos caused her to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale
purporting
to show that she sold the property in question to them for the sum of
P31,000.
The balance of P16,000 was promised to be paid on that date, but the
promise
was never fulfilled. Sometime in May 1988, Erlinda Ramos and Lagrimas
executed
an agreement (Kasunduan)[7]
acknowledging that the subject parcel of land, together with the upper
portion of the house thereon, had been sold by Lagrimas to the spouses
Ramos for P31,000; that of the said price, the sum of P22,500
(representing
P15,000 cash loan plus P7,500 as interest from September 1984 to May
1988)
had been paid; that the balance of P8,500 would be paid on the last
week
of August 1988; and that possession of the property would be
transferred
to the spouses Ramos only upon full payment of the purchase price.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lagrimas admitted that
the counsel of the spouses Ramos sent her a letter demanding that she
vacate
the premises. Lagrimas alleged that the demand for her to pay the sum
of
P6,000 per month has no legal basis. Lagrimas was summoned by the
Punong
Barangay for conciliation, but no settlement was reached.[9]
The Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) noted the existence of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
the spouses Ramos and Lagrimas on June 4, 1986. The Deed was duly
acknowledged
before a Notary Public and the parties therein did not deny its due
execution.
The MeTC observed that Lagrimas’ defense that the spouses Ramos still
had
to pay the amount of P16,000 to complete the full consideration of
P31,000
was nowhere to be found in the Deed of Absolute Sale.[10]
The MeTC held that the
Kasunduan, which Lagrimas attached to her Answer, cannot be given
binding
effect. The MeTC stated that while Erlinda Ramos admitted the existence
of said document, she thought that Lagrimas was only asking for an
additional
amount. Erlinda Ramos claimed that after signing and reading the
document,
she realized that it did not contain the true facts of the situation
since
they had already purchased the subject property and were, therefore,
the
owners thereof. Erlinda Ramos, thereafter, refused to give her
residence
certificate and asked the notary public not to notarize the document.
Said
incident was attested to by way of affidavit by Lutgarda Reyes, the
friend
and companion of Lagrimas.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, the MeTC ruled
that the continued occupation by Lagrimas of said property after the
sale,
without payment of rent, was by mere tolerance. It held that since the
spouses Ramos, who were staying in a rented place, were asked to vacate
the same, they were in need to take possession of their own property.[12]
The MeTC thus rendered
judgment in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of
which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [herein private
respondents]
and against the defendant [herein petitioner], ordering the latter and
the persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises known as
1151
Florentino [Torres] Street, Singalong, Manila. The defendant is
likewise
ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of P1,000.00 per month as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises from the filing
of this complaint until the premises is vacated and possession is
turned
over to the plaintiffs; the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees
plus the costs of the suit.cralaw:red
Defendant’s counterclaim
is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[13]
Petitioner appealed
said decision to the Regional Trial Court, which rendered judgment in
her
favor, thus:
In view of the foregoing,
this Court hereby reverses the assailed Decision and dismisses the
complaint.
Costs against the appellee.cralaw:red
The order previously
issued granting execution pending appeal is accordingly recalled.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) held that the Kasunduan was binding between the parties and was
the
true agreement between them. It ruled that pending the determination of
the question of ownership, it cannot deprive the party in actual
possession
of the right to continue peacefully with said possession. Since the
question
of ownership was inextricably woven with that of possession, the RTC
held
that the MeTC should have dismissed the case because jurisdiction
pertains
to another tribunal.[15]
Private respondents
filed a petition for review of the decision of the RTC with the Court
of
Appeals. They faulted the respondent Judge for giving credence to the
Kasunduan
and holding that it prevailed over the Deed of Absolute Sale. The Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the respondent Judge herein appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[16]
The Court of Appeals
found, thus:
A review of the records
discloses that the private respondent [herein petitioner Lagrimas]
acquired
the subject property from one Marianita C. Valera by virtue of two
instruments.
The first one is a Deed of Sale dated September 27, 1984, in which the
vendor Marianita C. Valera sold a house of light wooden materials and
her
rights as a bonafide tenant of the land on which it stands, to the
vendee
Lagrimas A. Boy for P31,000.00 (Annex 1 to the Affidavit of Lagrimas A.
Boy, p. 67, Record). The second one is a deed of absolute sale and
assignment
of rights dated March 18, 1985, in which the vendor Ma. Nita C. Valera
sold a residential house and her rights and interests over a parcel of
land in which it is located, to vendee Lagrimas A. Boy, for the price
of
P31,000.00 (Annex 2, Affidavit of Lagrimas A. Boy, pp. 68-69, Record).cralaw:red
It appears from the
foregoing that Marianita C. Valera was originally one of the
tenants/residents
of 669 square meters of land owned by the PNB. She constructed a house
on a 55.75 square meter portion of the said land. In 1984, she sold the
house and only her rights as tenant of the land to private respondent,
because the PNB had not yet sold the land to the residents. In 1985,
the
sale of the land to the residents had already been accomplished. Hence,
she sold the house and her rights and interests to the land to the
private
respondent.cralaw:red
Significantly, these
contracts coincide with certain events in the relationship between the
petitioners [herein private respondents spouses Ramos] and private
respondent.
According to the Answer of private respondent, sometime in September,
1984,
she borrowed the sum of P15,000.00 from the petitioners to accommodate
her brother’s placement fee to work abroad (par. 7, Answer, p. 19,
Record).
And on March 19, 1985, the private respondent executed a deed of real
estate
mortgage (Annex a to the Affidavit of Erlinda C. Ramos, pp. 54-55,
Record),
in which she mortgaged the properties she has acquired from Marianita
C.
Valera to the petitioners, to secure a loan in the amount of
P26,200.00,
payable within three months.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
One year later, on June
4, 1986, the private respondent executed a deed of absolute sale in
which
she sold the same property acquired from Marianita C. Valera to the
petitioners,
for the price of P31,000.00.[17]
Considering that petitioner
borrowed P26,200 from private respondents, which loan was covered by a
real estate mortgage of the subject house and lot, and the subsequent
sale
of the property to private respondents for P31,000 after non-payment of
the loan, the Court of Appeals did not give credence to the statement
in
the Kasunduan that private respondents paid only P22,500 to petitioner
since her indebtedness already reached P26,200. The Court of Appeals
gave
weight to the argument of private respondents that Erlinda Ramos was
merely
tricked into signing the Kasunduan. It gave credence to the version of
private respondents on how the Kasunduan came to be executed but not
notarized,
thus:
x x x Erlinda G. Ramos
alleged in her affidavit that sometime in May, 1988, the exact date of
which she cannot recall, Lagrimas Boy went to their residence and
pleaded
that even if they have already fully paid the subject house and lot,
she
was asking for an additional amount because she needed the money and
there
was no one for her to approach (walang ibang matatakbuhan). She
[Erlinda
Ramos] claimed she committed a mistake because she agreed to give an
additional
amount and went with [Lagrimas] to Atty. Estacio at the City Hall.
[Lagrimas]
arrive[d] ahead [of] Atty. Estacio in company with her friend Lutgarda
Bayas. Atty. Estacio told her [Erlinda Ramos] that she will give an
additional
amount and she agreed without the knowledge of her husband. Atty.
Estacio
handed to her a piece of paper and she was made to sign and she acceded
and signed it without reading. After [Lagrimas] and her witnesses
including
her companion Lutgarda Bayas signed the paper, she [Erlinda Ramos]
go[t]
it and read it. It was at that point that she discovered that what were
written thereon were not in accordance with the true and real fact and
situation that the subject house and lot already belongs to them
because
they have purchased it already and {Lagrimas} only requested for an
addition.
She [Erlinda Ramos] told Atty. Estacio to change (baguhin) the
statement
because she was not agreeable and she did not give her residence
certificate
(Cedula). Notary Public Estacio said that he cannot notarize the
document
(purported Kasunduan) because she [Erlinda Ramos] refused saying she
was
"Pumapalag." He said that Erlinda Ramos and [Lagrimas] should talk to
each
other again. She [Erlinda Ramos] committed another mistake because she
left the place leaving the piece of paper -- purported "Kasunduan"
without
knowing that [Lagrimas] kept it. Erlinda Ramos innocently failed to
demand
the said piece of paper which [Lagrimas] is now using. She returned to
Atty. Estacio to get the piece of paper but he answered her saying
naibasura
na and she trusted him but this time, it turned out that [Lagrimas]
kept
it which she is using now in this case.[18]
The Court of Appeals
stated that the fact that petitioner has remained in possession of the
property sold, and paid its real estate taxes, would have made out a
case
for equitable mortgage. However, it noted that petitioner did not raise
this defense, but admitted having sold the property to private
respondents,
alleging only that they have not paid the purchase price in full. It,
therefore,
ruled that the preponderance of evidence is against petitioner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this petition,
with the following assigned errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT INTERPRETING THAT THE
"KASUNDUAN"
EXECUTED BY AND BETWEEN PETITIONER (DEFENDANT) AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
(PLAINTIFF)
SUPERSEDES THE DEED OF SALE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN CONSUMMATED.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MISINTERPRETING AND
DISREGARDING
THE "KASUNDUAN" AS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING AND DISMISSING THE
DECISION
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND [IN REINSTATING] THE DECISION OF THE
COURT
A QUO.[19]
Petitioner contends
that, as ruled by the RTC, since the question of ownership in this case
is interwoven with that of possession, the MeTC should have dismissed
the
case because jurisdiction pertains to another tribunal.cralaw:red
The contention is without
merit.cralaw:red
The only issue for resolution
in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
party litigants.[20]
Prior to the effectivity
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980),
the jurisdiction of inferior courts was confined to receiving evidence
of ownership in order to determine only the nature and extent of
possession,
by reason of which such jurisdiction was lost the moment it became
apparent
that the issue of possession was interwoven with that of ownership.[21]
With the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior courts were granted jurisdiction to
resolve
questions of ownership provisionally in order to determine the issue of
possession, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction
of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
x x x
(2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided,
That when in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.cralaw:red
Section 16, Rule 70
(Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer) of the Rules of Court, as
amended,
similarly provides:
Sec. 16. Resolving defense
of ownership.—When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only
to
determine the issue of possession.cralaw:red
Thus, in forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases, if the defendant raises the question of
ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without
deciding the issue of ownership, the inferior courts have the undoubted
competence provisionally to resolve the issue of ownership for the sole
purpose of determining the issue of possession.[22]
The MeTC, therefore, did not err in taking cognizance of the instant
case.cralaw:red
Petitioner also contends
that the Court of Appeals erred by misinterpreting and disregarding the
Kasunduan, which is binding between the parties and expressed their
true
intent. Petitioner asserts that the Kasunduan supersedes the Deed of
Absolute
Sale, which is actually a contract to sell. In effect, petitioner is
asking
this Court to review the factual finding of Court of Appeals on the
true
nature of the Kasunduan.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As a rule, the findings
of the fact of the Court of Appeals are final and cannot be reviewed on
appeal by this Court, provided they are borne out by the record or are
based on substantial evidence.[23]
After reviewing the records herein, this Court finds no ground to
change
the factual finding of the Court of Appeals on the Kasunduan, with the
resulting holding that it is not binding on the parties.cralaw:red
The remaining issue
is whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that private
respondents
have a right of material possession over the disputed property.cralaw:red
It has been established
that petitioner sold the subject property to private respondents for
the
price of P31,000, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale,[24]
the due execution of which was not controverted by petitioner. The
contract
is absolute in nature,
without any provision
that title to the property is reserved in the vendor until full payment
of the purchase price.[25]
By the contract of sale,[26]
petitioner (as vendor), obligated herself to transfer the ownership of,
and to deliver, the subject property to private respondents (as
vendees)
after they paid the price of P31,000. Under Article 1477 of the Civil
Code,
the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon
the actual or constructive delivery thereof. In addition, Article 1498
of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, as in this case, the execution thereof shall be equivalent
to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if
from
the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. In
this case, the Deed of Absolute Sale does not contain any stipulation
against
the constructive delivery of the property to private respondents. In
the
absence of stipulation to the contrary, the ownership of the property
sold
passes to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.[27]
The Deed of Absolute Sale, therefore, supports private respondents’
right
of material possession over the subject property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The finding of the MeTC,
sustained by the Court of Appeals, is that the continued occupation by
petitioner of said property after the sale, without payment of rent,
was
by mere tolerance. Private respondents claimed that petitioner
requested
for time to vacate the premises and they agreed thereto because they
did
not need the property at that time. However, when private respondents
were
asked to vacate their rented residence, they demanded that petitioner
vacate
the subject property, but petitioner refused to do so. A person who
occupies
the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without
any
contract between them, is bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate
the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the
proper remedy against him.[28]
WHEREFORE, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 38716, which
reversed
and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court, and reinstated
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban,
Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
CA Rollo, p. 23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
In Civil Case No. 95-73140.
[3]
CA Rollo, p. 28.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
In Civil Case No. 142623 CV.
[5]
CA Rollo, pp. 33-34.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[7]
CA Rollo, p. 35.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Rollo, p. 26.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
CA Rollo, p. 29.
[10]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
CA Rollo, p. 30.
[12]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
CA Rollo, p. 30.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
CA Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[15]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Rollo, p. 31.
[17]
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 13-14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Anicete, et al. v. Balanon, G.R. Nos. 150820-21, April 30, 2003.
[21]
Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 347, 362 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Anicete v. Balanon, supra, note 20; Refugia v. Court of Appeals, supra,
note 21.
[23]
Bantingal v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 60, 66 (2001)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Annex "F," CA Rollo, p. 33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Dignos v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 375, 382 (1988).
[26]
Civil Code, Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting
parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate
thing, and the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or its
equivalent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A
contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
[27]
Dignos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 25, at 383; Froilan v. Pan
Oriental
Shipping Co., et al., 12 SCRA 276, 285 (1964).
[28]
Rivera v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154203, July 8, 2003.; Refugia v. Court of
Appeals,
supra, note 21, at 370. |