SECOND DIVISION.
.
SALVADOR P.
MALBAROSA,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
125761
April 30, 2003
-versus-
HON. COURT OF
APPEALSAND S.E.A.
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Philtectic Corporation
and Commonwealth Insurance Co., Inc. were only two of the group of
companies
wholly-owned and controlled by respondent S.E.A. Development
Corporation
(SEADC). The petitioner Salvador P. Malbarosa was the president
and
general manager of Philtectic Corporation, and an officer of other
corporations
belonging to the SEADC group of companies. The respondent
assigned
to the petitioner one of its vehicles covered by Certificate of
Registration
No. 04275865[1]
described as a 1982 model Mitsubishi Gallant Super Saloon, with plate
number
PCA 180 for his use. He was also issued membership certificates in the
Architectural Center, Inc. Louis Da Costa was the president of the
respondent
and Commonwealth Insurance Co., Inc., while Senen Valero was the
Vice-Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the respondent and Vice-Chairman of the
Board
of Directors of Philtectic Corporation.
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Sometime in the first
week of January 1990, the petitioner intimated to Senen Valero his
desire
to retire from the SEADC group of companies and requested that his 1989
incentive compensation as president of Philtectic Corporation be paid
to
him. On January 8, 1990, the petitioner sent a letter to Senen
Valero
tendering his resignation, effective February 28, 1990 from all his
positions
in the SEADC group of companies, and reiterating therein his request
for
the payment of his incentive compensation for 1989.[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Louis Da Costa met with
the petitioner on two occasions, one of which was on February 5, 1990
to
discuss the amount of the 1989 incentive compensation petitioner was
entitled
to, and the mode of payment thereof. Da Costa ventured that the
petitioner
would be entitled to an incentive compensation in the amount of around
P395,000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On March 14, 1990,
the respondent, through Senen Valero, signed a letter-offer addressed
to
the petitioner[3]
stating therein that petitioner’s resignation from all the positions in
the SEADC group of companies had been accepted by the respondent, and
that
he was entitled to an incentive compensation in the amount of
P251,057.67,
and proposing that the amount be satisfied, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
- The 1982 Mitsubishi
Super saloon car assigned to you by the company shall be transferred to
you at a value of P220,000.00. (Although you have indicated a
value
of P180,000.00, our survey in the market indicates that P220,000.00 is
a reasonable reflection of the value of the car.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
- The membership share
of our subsidiary, Tradestar International, Inc. in the Architectural
Center,
Inc. will be transferred to you. (Although we do not as yet have
full information as to the value of these shares, we have been informed
that the shares have traded recently in the vicinity of P60,000.00.)[4]
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The respondent required
that if the petitioner agreed to the offer, he had to affix his
conformity
on the space provided therefor and the date thereof on the right bottom
portion of the letter, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Agreed:
SALVADOR P.
MALBAROSA
Date:
_____________________[5]
On March 16, 1990,
Da
Costa met with the petitioner and handed to him the original copy
of the March 14, 1990 Letter-offer for his consideration and
conformity.
The petitioner was dismayed when he read the letter and learned that he
was being offered an incentive compensation of only P251,057.67.
He told Da Costa that he was entitled to no less than P395,000 as
incentive
compensation. The petitioner refused to sign the letter-offer on
the space provided therefor. He received the original of the
letter
and wrote on the duplicate copy of the letter-offer retained by Da
Costa,
the words: "Rec’d original for review purposes."[6]
Despite the lapse of more than two weeks, the respondent had not
received
the original of the March 14, 1990 Letter-offer of the respondent with
the conformity of the petitioner on the space provided therefor.
The respondent decided to withdraw its March 14, 1990 Offer. On April
3,
1996, the Board of Directors of the respondent approved a resolution
authorizing
the Philtectic Corporation and/or Senen Valero to demand from the
petitioner
for the return of the car and to take such action against the
petitioner
including the institution of an action in court against the petitioner
for the recovery of the motor vehicle.[7]
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On April 4, 1990,
Philtectic
Corporation, through its counsel, wrote the petitioner withdrawing the
March 14, 1990 Letter-offer of the respondent and demanding that the
petitioner
return the car and his membership certificate in the Architectural
Center,
Inc. within 24 hours from his receipt thereof.[8]
The petitioner received the original copy of the letter on the same
day.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On April 7, 1990, the
petitioner wrote the counsel of Philtectic Corporation informing the
latter
that he cannot comply with said demand as he already accepted the March
14, 1990 Letter-offer of the respondent when he affixed on March 28,
1990
his signature on the original copy of the letter-offer.[9]
The petitioner enclosed a xerox copy of the original copy of the March
14, 1990 Letter-offer of the respondent, bearing his signature on the
space
provided therefore dated March 28, 1990.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
With the refusal of
the petitioner to return the vehicle, the respondent, as plaintiff,
filed
a complaint against the petitioner, as defendant, for recovery of
personal
property with replevin with damages and attorney’s fees, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully prayed before this Honorable
Court
that:
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1. Before
hearing
and upon approval of plaintiff’s bond, a writ be issued immediately for
the seizure of the vehicle described in paragraph 3 hereof, wherever it
may be found, and for its delivery to plaintiff;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. After
trial
of the issues, judgment be rendered adjudging that plaintiff has the
right
to the possession of the said motor vehicle, and, in the alternative,
that
defendant must deliver such motor vehicle to plaintiff or pay to
plaintiff
the value thereof in case delivery cannot be made;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. After
trial,
hold the defendant liable to plaintiff for the use of the motor vehicle
in the amount of P1,000.00 per day from date of demand until the motor
vehicle is returned to plaintiff.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. After
trial,
hold the defendant liable to plaintiff for attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation in the amount of P100,000.00.
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Plaintiffs likewise
prays for such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the
circumstances.[11]
On April 30, 1990, the
trial court issued an order for the issuance of a writ of replevin.[12]
Correspondingly, the writ of replevin was issued on May 8, 1990.[13]
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On May 11, 1990, the
Sheriff served the writ on the petitioner and was able to take
possession
of the vehicle in question. On May 15, 1990, the petitioner was
able
to recover the possession of the vehicle upon his filing of the
counter-bond.[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his Answer to the
complaint, the petitioner, as defendant therein, alleged
that
he had already agreed on March 28, 1990 to the March 14, 1990
Letter-offer
of the respondent, the plaintiff therein, and had notified
the
said plaintiff of his acceptance; hence, he had the right to the
possession
of the car. Philtectic Corporation had no right to withdraw the
offer
of the respondent SEADC. The petitioner testified that after
conferring
with his counsel, he had decided to accept the offer of the respondent,
and had affixed his signature on the space below the word "Agree"
in the March 14, 1990 Letter-offer, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Agreed:
(Sgd.)
SALVADOR P.
MALBAROSA
Date: 3 - 28 - 90[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner adduced
evidence that on March 9, 1990, he had written Senen Valero that he was
agreeable to an incentive compensation of P218,000 to be settled by the
respondent by transferring the car to the petitioner valued at P180,000
and P38,000 worth of shares of the Architectural Center, Inc. on
the claim of Da Costa that respondent was almost bankrupt.
However, the petitioner learned that the respondent was financially
sound;
hence, he had decided to receive his incentive compensation of P395,000
in cash.[16]
On March 29, 1990, the petitioner called up the office of Louis Da
Costa
to inform the latter of his acceptance of the letter-offer of the
respondent.
However, the petitioner was told by Liwayway Dinglasan, the telephone
receptionist
of Commonwealth Insurance Co, that Da Costa was out of the
office.
The petitioner asked Liwayway to inform Da Costa that he had called him
up and that he had already accepted the letter-offer.
Liwayway promised to relay the message to Da Costa. Liwayway
testified
that she had relayed the petitioner’s message to Da Costa and that the
latter merely nodded his head.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After trial, the court
a quo rendered its Decision[17]
on July 28, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, judgment is rendered ordering the
defendant:
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1.
To deliver the motor vehicle prescribed [sic] in the complaint to
plaintiff SEADC, or pay its value of P220,000 in case delivery cannot
be
made;
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2.
pay plaintiff SEADC P50,000 as and for attorney’s fees; and
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3.
Cost of litigation.
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SO ORDERED.[18]
The trial court stated
that there existed no perfected contract between the petitioner and the
respondent on the latter’s March 14, 1990 Letter-offer for failure of
the
petitioner to effectively notify the respondent of his acceptance of
said
letter-offer before the respondent withdrew the same. The respondent
filed
a motion for the amendment of the decision of the trial court, praying
that the petitioner should be ordered to pay to the respondent
reasonable
rentals for the car. On October 10, 1992, the court a quo
issued
an order, granting plaintiff’s motion and amending the
dispositive
portion of its July 28, 1992 Decision:
1.
Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiff lease rentals for the use of the
motor vehicle at the rate of P1,000.00 per Day from May 8, 1990 up to
the
date of actual delivery to the plaintiff of the motor vehicle; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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2.
Ordering First Integrated Bonding & Insurance Co. to make good on
its
obligations to plaintiff under the Counterbond issued pursuant to this
case.
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SO ORDERED.[19]
The petitioner appealed
from the decision and the order of the court a quo to the Court
of
Appeals.
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On February 8, 1996,
the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision,[20]
affirming the decision of the trial court. The dispositive
portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the Decision dated July 28, 1992 and the Order dated October 10, 1992
of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 158) are hereby
AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the period of payment of rentals at the rate
of P1,000.00 per day shall be from the time this decision becomes final
until actual delivery of the motor vehicle to plaintiff-appellee
is made.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Costs against the
defendant-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The Court of Appeals
stated
that the petitioner had not accepted the respondent’s March 14, 1990
Letter-offer
before the respondent withdrew said offer on April 4, 1990.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner filed
a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
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The petitioner raises
two issues, namely: (a) whether or not there was a valid acceptance on
his part of the March 14, 1990 Letter-offer of the respondent;[22]
and (b) whether or not there was an effective withdrawal by the
respondent
of said letter-offer.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petition is dismissed.cralaw:red
Anent the first issue,
the petitioner posits that the respondent had given him a
reasonable
time from March 14, 1990 within which to accept or reject its
March
14, 1990 Letter-offer. He had already accepted the offer of the
respondent
when he affixed his conformity thereto on the space provided therefor
on
March 28, 1990[23]
and had sent to the respondent corporation on April 7, 1990 a copy of
said
March 14, 1990 Letter-offer bearing his conformity to the offer of the
respondent; hence, the respondent can no longer demand the return of
the
vehicle in question. He further avers that he had already impliedly
accepted
the offer when after said respondent’s offer, he retained possession of
the car.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For its part, the respondent
contends that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual.
The
jurisdiction of the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended,
is limited to revising and correcting errors of law of the CA. As
concluded by the Court of Appeals, there had been no acceptance by the
petitioner of its March 14, 1990 Letter-offer. The receipt by the
petitioner of the original of the March 14, 1990 Letter-offer for
review
purposes amounted merely to a counter-offer of the petitioner.
The
findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the petitioner.
The
petitioner adduced no proof that the respondent had granted him a
period
within which to accept its offer. The latter deemed its offer as not
accepted
by the petitioner in light of petitioner’s ambivalence and indecision
on
March 16, 1990 when he received the letter-offer of respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We do not agree with
the petitioner.cralaw:red
Under Article 1318 of
the Civil Code, the essential requisites of a contract are as follows:
Art.
1318.
There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1)
Consent of the contracting parties;
(2)
Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3)
Cause of the obligation which is established.
Under Article 1319 of
the
New Civil Code, the consent by a party is manifested by the
meeting
of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are
to constitute the contract. An offer may be reached at any time
until
it is accepted. An offer that is not accepted does not give rise to a
consent.
The contract does not come into existence.[24]
To produce a contract, there must be acceptance of the offer which may
be express or implied[25]
but must not qualify the terms of the offer. The acceptance must
be absolute, unconditional and without variance of any sort from the
offer.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The acceptance of an
offer must be made known to the offeror.[27]
Unless the offeror knows of the acceptance, there is no meeting of the
minds of the parties, no real concurrence of offer and acceptance.[28]
The offeror may withdraw its offer and revoke the same before
acceptance
thereof by the offeree. The contract is perfected only from the
time
an acceptance of an offer is made known to the offeror. If an
offeror
prescribes the exclusive manner in which acceptance of his offer shall
be indicated by the offeree, an acceptance of the offer in the manner
prescribed
will bind the offeror. On the other hand, an attempt on the part
of the offeree to accept the offer in a different manner does not bind
the offeror as the absence of the meeting of the minds on the altered
type
of acceptance.[29]
An offer made inter praesentes must be accepted immediately. If
the
parties intended that there should be an express acceptance, the
contract
will be perfected only upon knowledge by the offeror of the express
acceptance
by the offeree of the offer. An acceptance which is not made in
the
manner prescribed by the offeror is not effective but constitutes a
counter-offer
which the offeror may accept or reject.[30]
The contract is not perfected if the offeror revokes or withdraws its
offer
and the revocation or withdrawal of the offeror is the first to reach
the
offeree.[31]
The acceptance by the offeree of the offer after knowledge of the
revocation
or withdrawal of the offer is inefficacious. The termination of
the
contract when the negotiations of the parties terminate and the offer
and
acceptance concur, is largely a question of fact to be determined by
the
trial court.[32]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, the respondent
made its offer through its Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors,
Senen
Valero. On March 16, 1990, Da Costa handed over the original of
the
March 14, 1990 Letter-offer of the respondent to the petitioner.
The respondent required the petitioner to accept the offer by affixing
his signature on the space provided in said letter-offer and writing
the
date of said acceptance, thus foreclosing an implied acceptance or any
other mode of acceptance by the petitioner. However, when the
letter-offer
of the respondent was delivered to the petitioner on March 16, 1990, he
did not accept or reject the same for the reason that he needed time to
decide whether to reject or accept the same.[33]
There was no contract perfected between the petitioner and the
respondent
corporation.[34]
Although the petitioner claims that he had affixed his conformity to
the
letter-offer on March 28, 1990, the petitioner failed to transmit the
said
copy to the respondent. It was only on April 7, 1990 when the
petitioner
appended to his letter to the respondent a copy of the said March 14,
1990
Letter-offer bearing his conformity that he notified the respondent of
his acceptance to said offer. But then, the respondent, through
Philtectic
Corporation, had already withdrawn its offer and had already notified
the
petitioner of said withdrawal via respondent’s letter dated April 4,
1990
which was delivered to the petitioner on the same day.
Indubitably,
there was no contract perfected by the parties on the March 14, 1990
Letter-offer
of the respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner’s plaint
that he was not accorded by the respondent reasonable time to accept or
reject its offer does not persuade. It must be underscored that
there
was no time frame fixed by the respondent for the petitioner to accept
or reject its offer. When the offeror has not fixed a period for
the offeree to accept the offer, and the offer is made to a person
present,
the acceptance must be made immediately.[35]
In this case, the respondent made its offer to the petitioner when Da
Costa
handed over on March 16, 1990 to the petitioner its March 14, 1990
Letter-offer
but that the petitioner did not accept the offer. The respondent,
thus, had the option to withdraw or revoke the offer, which the
respondent
did on April 4, 1990.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Even if it is assumed
that the petitioner was given a reasonable period to accept or reject
the
offer of the respondent, the evidence on record shows that from March
16,
1990 to April 3, 1990, the petitioner had more than two weeks which was
more than sufficient for the petitioner to accept the offer of the
respondent.
Although the petitioner avers that he had accepted the offer of the
respondent
on March 28, 1990, however, he failed to transmit to the respondent the
copy of the March 14, 1990 Letter-offer bearing his conformity
thereto.
Unless and until the respondent received said copy of the letter-offer,
it cannot be argued that a contract had already been perfected between
the petitioner and the respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the second issue,
the petitioner avers that Philtectic Corporation, although a
wholly-owned
and controlled subsidiary of the respondent, had no authority to
withdraw
the offer of the respondent. The resolution of the respondent
authorizing
Philtectic Corporation to take such action against the petitioner
including
the institution of an action against him for the recovery of the
subject
car does not authorize Philtectic Corporation to withdraw the March 14,
1990 Letter-offer of the respondent. The withdrawal by Philtectic
Corporation on April 4, 1990 of the offer of the respondent was
ineffective
insofar as the petitioner was concerned. The respondent, for its
part, asserts that the petitioner had failed to put in issue the matter
of lack of authority of Philtectic Corporation to withdraw for and in
behalf
of the respondent its March 14, 1990 Letter-offer. It contends
that
the authority of Philtectic Corporation to take such action including
the
institution of an action against the petitioner for the recovery of the
car necessarily included the authority to withdraw the respondent’s
offer.
Even then, there was no need for the respondent to withdraw its offer
because
the petitioner had already rejected the respondent’s offer on March 16,
1990 when the petitioner received the original of the March 14, 1990
Letter-offer
of the respondent without the petitioner affixing his signature on the
space therefor.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We do not agree with
the petitioner. Implicit in the authority given to Philtectic
Corporation
to demand for and recover from the petitioner the subject car and to
institute
the appropriate action against him to recover possession of the car is
the authority to withdraw the respondent’s March 14, 1990
Letter-offer.
It cannot be argued that respondent authorized Philtectic Corporation
to
demand and sue for the recovery of the car and yet did not authorize it
to withdraw its March 14, 1990 Letter-offer to the petitioner. Besides,
when he testified, Senen Valero stated that the April 4, 1990 letter of
Philtectic Corporation to the petitioner was upon his instruction and
conformably
with the aforesaid resolution of the Board of Directors of the
respondent:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q
Mr. Valero, after the Board passed this resolution. (sic) What action
did
you take, if any?
A
After that resolution was passed. (sic) I instructed our lawyers to
proceed
with the demand letter for the recovery of the vehicle.cralaw:red
Q
Do you know if that demand letter was every (sic) made by your lawyer?
A
Yes. I know that because I was the one who gave the instruction and
before
it was finally served on Malbarosa, I was shown about the demand letter.cralaw:red
C/Pltf. -
Your honor, or rather…
Mr. Valero, if
I show you a copy of that letter, will you be able to identify the same?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
I am now showing to you a copy of the letter dated April 4, 1990,
addressed
to Mr. Salvador P. Malbarosa and signed by Romulo, Mabanta,
Buenaventura,
Sayoc and Delos Angeles by _____. What relation, if any, does that
demand
letter have with the demand letter that you are talking about?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A
It’s the same one I am referring to.cralaw:red
C/Pltf. - Your honor,
we manifest that the letter has been previously marked as our exh. "D".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q
Mr. Valero, on the first paragraph of this demand letter, you stated
that
the letter is written in behalf of Philtectic Corporation. Do you have
any knowledge why it was written this way?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A
Yes. Because Philtectic, being the agent used here by S.E.A.
Development
Corporation for the one using the car, it was only deemed proper
that Philtectic will be the one to send the demand letter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q
In the second paragraph of that letter, Mr. Valero, you stated that
there
was an allusion made to the offer made on March 14, 1990. That the 1982
Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon car with plate# M-PCA-189 assigned to
you
by the company, and the membership share in the Architectural Center
Inc.,
be transferred to you in settlement. You previously stated about
this March 14 letter. What relation, if any, does this second paragraph
with the letter-offer that you previously stated.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
C/Def. - Objection,
your honor. This witness is incompetent
C/Pltf. - But he was
the one who instructed, your honor.cralaw:red
Court - LET the witness
answer.cralaw:red
Witness- (Stenographer
reads back the previous question asked by counsel for him to answer,
and)
A
It is the same.[36]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is dismissed. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals
is AFFIRMED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bellosillo, J.,
(Chairman),
Quisumbing, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Exhibit "A."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Exhibit "1."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Exhibit "3."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Exhibit "C-1."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Exhibit "C-3."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Exhibit "C-2."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Exhibit "G-2."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Exhibit "D."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Exhibit "5."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Records, pp. 5-6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Id., at 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id., at 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Id., at 33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Exhibit "3-B."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Exhibit "J-1."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Penned by Judge Jose R. Hernandez.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Records, pp. 186-187.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Id., at 202.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Penned by Associate Justice Salome A. Montoya, with Associate
Justices
Godardo A. Jacinto and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, concurring.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 24-25.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Exhibit "C."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Exhibit "3-B."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Gamboa v. Ronsalez, 17 Phil. 381.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Article 1320, New Civil Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Uy v. Hon. Evangelista, 361 SCRA 95 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Jardine Davies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 333 SCRA 689 (2000).
[28]
Enriquez v. Sun Life Assurance, 41 Phil. 269.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Allied Steel & Conveyor’s, Incv. Ford Motor Company, 277 FEDERAL
REPORTERS 2nd, 907 (1960).
[30]
TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, 1985
ed.,
Vol. IV, pp. 462-463.
[31]
TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, Vol.
IV,
p. 2, 466, 1991 ed., citing 6 Planiol, Ripert, 180.
[32]
Id., citing 8 Manresa, 649-650.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
TSN, Malbarosa, 21 March 1991, p. 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Krohn-Fechheimer Co. v. Palmer, et al., 221 SOUTHWESTERN REPORTS, 353
(1920).
[35]
See note 30, supra, at 469.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
TSN, Valero, February 6, 1991, pp. 12-14, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |