FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R.
No.
126281
June 10, 2003
-versus-
SERGIO A. CARATAO,
Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
AZCUNA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sergio A. Caratao appeals
from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Libertad, Butuan City,
Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 5143, dated December 22, 1995, finding
him
guilty of murder, as follows:
WHEREFORE,
in the light of the foregoing findings of facts and law, with the
attendan[ce]
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the court finds the
accused
Sergio A. Caratao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code. Republic Act No. 7659 defining
heinous
crimes was not yet passed and effective at the time of the commission
of
the crime. Accused Sergio A. Caratao is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided
for in Art. 41, Revised Penal Code. Further, the knife used in the
commission
of the crime is hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the
government. Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased
Edgardo "Tado" Bulawin, the following:
(1)
P50,000.00
- for the death of Edgardo "Tado" Bulawin;
(2)
P22,050.00
- as actual damages ; and -
(3)
P20,000.00
- as moral damages.
And also to pay
the
costs.[1]
On July 21, 1992,
appellant
was charged under an amended information, thus:
That on or
about the 27th day of April, 1992, at, more or less, 4:20 o’clock in
the
evening, at Nalco Commissary Compound, Hill Top Village, Nasipit,
Agusan
del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the above-name[d] accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to
kill
and with evident premeditation and treachery and with cruelty, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and
stab
Edgardo Bulawin, thus inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different
parts of his body, which directly caused his death.chanrobles virtual law library
CONTRARY TO LAW:
(Article
248, of the Revised Penal Code).[2]
Upon his arraignment on
August 11, 1992, appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty.[3]
Trial thereafter ensued and the court a quo rendered the assailed
Decision.
The prosecution relies
on the eyewitness accounts of Martin Sugala, Eugenio Agudera and
Roberto
Mangmang. The widow of the deceased, Moreta Bulawin, testified to prove
civil damages. Their testimonies are summarized below.cralaw:red
Martin Sugala, a rice
dispatching checker employed with Nasipit Agusan Lumber Company (NALCO)
at Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, testified that at around 4:00 p.m.,
appellant
and his wife entered the commissary canteen of NALCO. Appellant’s wife
approached Sugala and told him that her husband was angry. Sugala
asked appellant about this. Appellant replied, saying that he was not
given
additional rice vale by the victim Edgardo "Tado" Bulawin, NALCO’s rice
vale issuer. After checking that there was extra rice available, Sugala
assured appellant that he would give him an additional 25 kilos.cralaw:red
Shortly thereafter,
Sugala saw the victim walk out of the canteen. Sensing that appellant
was
about to rush to the victim, the witness restrained him and said, "Do
not
do anything harsh because we are all brothers here, anyway I am giving
you [an] additional 25 kilos of rice." He placed his arm around
appellant
and accompanied him to the issuing area for the additional rice. Upon
reaching
the issuing area, he first checked the rice being issued to two
employees.
After this, he noticed that appellant was no longer near him. Through
the
canteen’s screened windows, he next saw appellant standing one meter
behind
the victim, who was then already astride his motorbike. About 5 meters
from Sugala’s position, the victim’s motorbike was facing towards the
exit
gate, with its engine already running.[4]
At that moment, he saw appellant attack the victim from behind:
Q. What did you observe
next?
A. When I saw that Sergio
Caratao was already about 1 meter away from the back of Edgardo
Bulawin,
I shouted to him saying "Bay, your rice is ready." At that moment, I
saw
that the left hand of Caratao was on the shoulder of Bulawin and his
right
hand was on the side of Bulawin. I thought he only boxed the latter.chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Aside from thrusting
his hand at the side of Bulawin, what else if any did you see Caratao
do
with his hand?
A. When the right hand
was on the side of Bulawin, it was retracted very fast and I saw that
that
hand was holding a knife, and [that he] immediately made another thrust
towards here. (witness pointing to his nose)
ATTY. GONZALES: With
the permission of the Court, may we request the witness to re-enact
what
[he] actually saw, and we request the jail guard to act as the victim.cralaw:red
COURT: Okay.cralaw:red
INTERPRETER: (Jail
guard Meode being requested to act as Edgardo Bulawin and the witness
as
accused Sergio Caratao.)
(Edgardo Bulawin made
an initial stance as if riding on a motorcycle with both hands on the
handle
bars of the motorcycle.)
ATTY GONZALES:
Q. Where was Caratao
when you first saw him, how far was he?
A. This distance, Sir.
(witness demonstrating a distance of about 1 meter from the back of
Bulawin)
Q. Then re-enact what
you saw.cralaw:red
A. After I shouted "Bay,
your rice is ready," I saw Sergio Caratao, in a simultaneous action,
place
his left hand on the left shoulder of Bulawin and the right hand of
Caratao
on the right side of Bulawin. When Sergio Caratao withdrew his right
hand
from the right side of Bulawin, I saw that the right hand has a knife
in
it, and a second thrusting motion was made towards the face of Bulawin.
After that, Bulawin got off from his motorcycle and ran towards the
cemented
road. Sergio Caratao remained standing on the place of the incident
still
holding that knife, and after that, Caratao and his wife went home.[5]
Sugala also recalled
seeing many people at the scene of the incident, such as some NALCO
employees,
security guards, and outsiders who buy rice from the canteen called the
blackmarketers.[6]
Roberto Mangmang, canteen
dispatcher of NALCO, corroborated Sugala’s testimony. He testified that
in the afternoon of April 27, 1992, while walking from the canteen
towards
the gate, he saw the victim in a squatting position, tinkering with his
motorbike.[7]
Shortly thereafter, on his way back to the canteen, at around 4:20
p.m.,
he saw appellant behind the victim who was already astride his
motorbike
facing the gate, with his hands on its handle bars. From a distance of
one and a half meter, he witnessed appellant put his left hand on the
victim’s
left shoulder and thrust his right hand on the victim’s right side.
Immediately
thereafter, appellant made another thrust at the victim’s face. At that
point, Mangmang saw that appellant was holding a dagger, and he later
heard
somebody shout, "Do, run!" The victim then ran out through the gate
towards
the hospital, while appellant ran home. Mangmang followed the victim
and
saw his intestines bulging and coming out. He then brought the victim
to
the nearby hospital aboard a tricycle.[8]
He testified having seen many employees in the area at the time of the
incident, whom he could not identify.[9]
Eugenio Agudera, the
security guard of NALCO, testified that on April 27, 1992, he likewise
saw the stabbing incident four meters away from the guardhouse by the
gate
of the canteen. At around 4:15 p.m., he witnessed appellant sneak from
behind the victim who was astride his motorcycle, and stab the victim’s
right side with a knife. Immediately thereafter,
appellant
delivered a second blow, with a slashing motion
across
the victim’s mouth. Upon seeing this, he shouted, "Run, Do!," directed
at the victim. The victim then ran out towards the highway through the
gate, while clutching his stomach as it bled profusely.[10]
Agudera also confirmed the presence of those who witnessed the incident
such as Clemente Felias, Roberto Mangmang, Dino Macabugto, Martin
Sugala
and the blackmarketers.[11]chanrobles virtual law library
Moreta Bulawin, wife
of the victim, testified that she saw her husband in St. Christopher
Hospital
around 4:30 p.m. with stab wounds on his right stomach and upper lip,
and
a cut across his right cheek.[12]
Shortly thereafter, the victim was transferred to Butuan Doctors’
Hospital,
where he expired. She presented her husband’s death certificate to
prove
his age at the time of death,[13] and his latest income tax
return to
prove his annual gross income of P37,432.[14]
She testified that she spent more than P30,000 for hospital and funeral
expenses, some of which were supported with receipts.[15]
The defense presented
four witnesses, namely, appellant, Nancy Sotis, Delia Peramide, and
SPO4
Bienvenido Capablanca.cralaw:red
Taking the witness stand,
appellant Sergio Caratao admitted stabbing the victim, but interposed
self-defense
to exculpate himself. He testified that on April 27, 1992, at around
4:00
p.m., he was with his wife at the NALCO Commissary
Canteen,
where the victim was then on duty as rice vale issuer. He requested the
victim for his rice vale. The victim told him to wait. Appellant hence
waited nearby for around ten minutes, while the victim issued rice to
others.
Appellant thereafter kept begging the victim for his turn, telling him
"Do, give me my rice because I have nothing to eat for supper," but the
victim made no reply. Despite repeated pleas, he was not given any
rice.
Upon seeing the victim leave the issuing area, he kept silent and
walked
away. He went to his wife and told her that he was unable to get
rice. His wife then left.cralaw:red
Shortly thereafter,
appellant also left to go home. On his way out, he saw the victim
getting
his motorbike. He approached the victim, who at that point was already
mounted on his motorcycle, holding the handle bars, with the engine
already
running. As appellant stood one meter away from the victim, along the
right
side of the motorcycle, he asked, "Do, how about my rice?" The victim
answered,
"That is no longer my problem. Why are you forcing me?" Appellant
persisted
with his pleas, and the victim angrily answered back, "Are you forcing
me?" Immediately thereafter, the victim punched appellant’s face with
his
right fist and said, "You are always like that, you are forcing me."
Appellant
was thrown backward, and the victim moved his motorbike forward,
hitting
appellant’s left thigh near the groin. Appellant then held the victim’s
right hand, and when the victim tried to break free, he twisted
it.
Thereafter, with a knife on his right hand, he stabbed the right
portion
of the victim’s belly. In retaliation, the victim punched
appellant
with his left fist, hitting appellant’s mouth. The victim
thereafter
ran, while appellant remained standing for about ten minutes. He
later followed the victim to the gate, and saw the victim from afar
boarding
a tricycle alone. Appellant went home to get his tricycle and
immediately
drove to the municipal hall, where he voluntarily surrendered.[16]
In his testimony, appellant
denied seeing any guard at the guardhouse at the time of the incident.
He saw Mangmang only, inside the canteen,[17]
and denied hearing anyone shout "Run, Do!"[18]
On his way out of the gate after the stabbing, he noticed only one
person
in the compound, a woman sitting under the jackfruit tree at the corner
by the gate, whom he does not know. He recalled seeing other people
outside
the gate of the canteen, whom he could not identify.[19]
On cross-examination, however, he confirmed the presence of Agudera
outside
the said gate.[20]chanrobles virtual law library
Nancy Sotis, a blackmarketer
who frequented the NALCO canteen, testified that she was seated under a
jackfruit tree by the gate of the canteen the whole day of April 27,
1992.[21]
At about 4:00 p.m., from a distance of four meters, she saw the victim
astride his motorcycle, with its engine already running. Appellant then
approached the victim and stood in front of the latter, a little
obliquely
to the right. She saw appellant utter something to the victim, which
she
did not hear because of the sound of the engine. She looked away, and
when
she glanced back at their direction, she saw the victim punch appellant
in the face with his right hand. Appellant then
thrust
something near the victim’s abdomen. Upon seeing appellant
pull out a knife from the victim’s abdomen, she shouted to the people
outside
the fence of the canteen. When she looked back, he saw the victim raise
his right fist towards appellant’s face. Appellant then stabbed the
victim’s
face with his knife. The victim thereafter alighted from his motorcycle
and walked towards the gate, holding his bleeding abdomen. The people
outside
the fence were about to meet and assist him, but they later turned back
when they saw appellant following the victim.[22]
Sotis testified that
there was nobody near the victim and appellant at the time of the
incident.[23]
She denied seeing Mangmang,[24]
but confirmed that Sugala was then inside the canteen.[25]
She admitted having seen in the morning a security guard at the
guardhouse,
by the name of Felias, but was uncertain as to his presence from
noontime
onwards.[26]
She denied seeing any guard at the gatepost at the time of the
incident,[27]
but admitted seeing Agudera approach the victim when the latter was
about
to go out of the gate.[28]
Delia Peramide, a blackmarketer
like Sotis, testified to rebut the statement of prosecution eyewitness
Mangmang, who declared that he brought the victim to the hospital
aboard
a tricycle. She narrated that in the afternoon of April 27, 1992, while
she was in line for consultation inside St. Christopher Hospital, she
heard
someone shout, "Doctor, there is an emergency." She ran to look
outside,
and saw a tricycle parked outside the hospital, about 20 to 25 meters
away
from where she stood. She saw the driver, and a bloodied person curled
up on the passenger’s seat, whom she later recognized as Tado Bulawin.[29]
She declared that when she saw the victim in the tricycle, Mangmang was
not with him. She saw Mangmang in the hospital only after 15 minutes,
when
he was on his way to the emergency room to visit the victim.[30]
SPO4 Bienvenido Capablanca,
chief of the operations division at Nasipit PNP Station, testified that
at about 4:30 p.m. of April 27, 1992, appellant, looking cool and
composed,
arrived at the station and told him, "Sir, I voluntarily surrender
myself
because I have killed somebody." Appellant identified the victim as a
certain
"Tado," and also surrendered his knife.[31]
For its rebuttal evidence,
the prosecution recalled Roberto Mangmang and presented a new witness,
Clemente Felias.chanrobles virtual law library
Roberto Mangmang, the
prosecution eyewitness who testified earlier, added that the victim
never
boxed appellant, nor did he try to run over the latter with his
motorcycle
prior to the stabbing, contrary to appellant’s claim.[32]
Clemente Felias, the
NALCO security guard whose shift was previous to that of
prosecution
eyewitness Agudera, testified that throughout his tour of duty
from
8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., he never saw defense eyewitness Sotis within
the
compound. He also testified that he, too, witnessed the incident, and
declared
that it was not true that the victim punched appellant before the
stabbing.[33]
The trial court gave
credence to the prosecution’s version of the incident. It found that
the
victim’s indifference to appellant’s repeated pleas for rice must have
angered appellant to the point of attacking the victim upon seeing the
latter about to leave without heeding his request. It rejected the plea
of self-defense for appellant’s failure to prove unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. It upheld the presence of treachery, but ruled
out the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and cruelty,
for lack of evidence.cralaw:red
Hence, this appeal.cralaw:red
In his brief, appellant
submits the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF
THE
DECEASED WAS ATTENDED BY [THE] JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE.
II.
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED
COMMITTED
MURDER BY TREACHERY.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ALSO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[34]
In his first and third
assignment of errors, appellant assails the trial court for giving
credence
to the prosecution’s evidence and disregarding his claim of
self-defense.cralaw:red
The settled rule is
that where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes
self-defense
to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden to establish his
plea
by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would
follow from his admission that he killed the victim.[35]
This is known as a shift in the burden of the evidence, and as a result
thereof the person claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of
his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s.[36]
Furthermore, on appeal, appellant must show that the court below
committed
reversible error in appreciating the evidence.[37]
To prove self-defense,
the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the
victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent
threat
to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) that
there
was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient
provocation
on the part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any
provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the
proximate
and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.[38]
At the heart of the
claim for self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression
committed
against appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not
have
a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not
be appreciated, even if the other elements are present.[39]
Unlawful aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent
threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense.[40]
The admission of appellant in his testimony that he stabbed the victim
makes it incumbent upon him convincingly to prove that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which necessitated the
use
of deadly force.[41]
In the case at bar, appellant tried to prove that the unlawful
aggression
emanated from the victim, who punched him in the face and hit him in
the
thigh with his motorbike, without provocation on his part. This the
trial
court found unconvincing, thus:
Under the situation
where Tado Bulawin was in a riding position on his motorcycle, holding
its handle bars, ready to start the engine, the court finds it
incredible
for him to be the unlawful aggressor. Instead, Sergio Caratao’s being
made
to wait and make repeated requests or pleas for his vale of rice must
have
moved him to be the unlawful aggressor thereby inflicting stab wounds
on
the victim Tado Bulawin. For the circumstance of self-defense to be
appreciated,
it must be shown that the compulsion is of such character that the
accused
is left with no opportunity to escape or self-defense [sic] in equal
combat
(People v. Fronda, 222 SCRA 71). And this is not the set-up in the case
at bar. The prosecution version merits belief and credence beyond
reasonable
doubt.[42]chanrobles virtual law library
We agree with the foregoing
finding of the trial court. Appellant’s account of the circumstances of
the attack does not inspire belief.cralaw:red
First, according to
appellant’s testimony, after an exchange of words, the victim punched
him
in the face, and thereafter hit his left thigh with his motorcycle.
Appellant
held the victim’s hand, twisted it and stabbed the latter in the
abdomen.
The victim then punched appellant in the mouth with his left fist.
After
this, the victim ran away. Noticeably, in this narration, nowhere did
appellant
mention that he stabbed the victim for the second time in the face.
This
is in conflict with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and
even
of the defense witness Sotis, who all narrated that appellant stabbed
the
victim in the mouth. Appellant’s account, moreover, does not jibe with
the physical evidence showing the victim’s injuries below the nose and
across the cheek.[43]
Second, on cross-examination,
appellant missed the part where the victim allegedly hit his left thigh
with the motorcycle, testifying that after the first punch, he
immediately
stabbed the victim.[44]
Interestingly, defense witness Sotis also made no mention of this
important
portion,[45]
rendering it highly dubious.cralaw:red
Third, we agree with
the trial court’s observation that the circumstances of the victim’s
alleged
assault on appellant is not credible, thus:
x x
x x
x
x
x x xchanrobles virtual law library
Further, his contention
that Tado Bulawin while still in that riding position boxed him and
that
Tado Bulawin let run his motorcycle pushing forward hitting accused on
his thigh also do not inspire belief because accused Sergio Caratao was
positioned at the right side of the motorcycle, not in front, and if at
all Tado Bulawin boxed him in that riding position, the motorcycle
could
have probably fallen down. But [there was] no proof that it did fall.[46]
x x
x x
x
x
x x x
We further observe that
in their relative positions, appellant had more freedom of action than
the victim who was riding his motorcycle. Moreover, it is hardly
believable
that the victim in that position would have the strength to punch
appellant
in the face with his left fist, after being stabbed in his right
abdomen.
All the eyewitness accounts showed that, after being stabbed, the
victim
left his motorcycle and walked away while clutching his bleeding
abdomen
with both hands.[47]
Fourth, we note that
as between appellant and the victim, appellant had more hatred to
harbor
arising from the fact that the victim refused to give him his rice
vale.
He thus had more motive to do harm than the victim. On the witness
stand,
he reasoned that he stabbed the victim, not to repel the victim’s
attack,
nor out of fear for his life, but specifically because he "lost his
temper."[48]
Fifth, we note that
appellant’s plea of self-defense is rendered doubtful by the fact that
he invoked it for the first time only upon taking the witness stand for
his defense. When he surrendered at the police station, he only
reported
that he had killed a certain "Tado," but never raised self-defense to
exculpate
himself. Records also show that appellant waived his right to a
preliminary
investigation and submission of counter-affidavits.[49]
We have ruled that an appellant’s failure to inform the police upon his
surrender that he acted in self-defense is fatal to his defense.[50]
A righteous individual will not cower in fear but rather unabashedly
admit
the killing at the earliest opportunity if he were morally justified in
so doing. A belated plea suggests that it is false and only an
afterthought
made as a last-ditch effort to avoid the consequences of the crime.[51]
Appellant tried to obtain
corroboration from Sotis and Peramide to prop up his defense and to
assail
the prosecution’s testimonies. The account of Sotis, however, was put
to
question by the rebuttal testimony of Felias, whom Sotis admitted to
having
seen on the day of the incident. Felias in his testimony denied seeing
her under the jackfruit tree near the guardhouse, or anywhere within
the
compound on that day. Peramide’s testimony, on the other hand, failed
to
cast doubt on the testimony of prosecution witness Mangmang, as it was
established that when she saw the tricycle where Mangmang claimed to
have
ridden going to the hospital, it was already parked. It therefore does
not render false Mangmang’s claim that he brought the victim to the
hospital,
as he could already have alighted from the vehicle by the time Peramide
saw it.cralaw:red
Moreover, appellant
has not shown that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive against
him, which would have moved them falsely to implicate him. On the
contrary,
he admitted on cross-examination that prosecution witness Sugala is his
friend.[52]
Prosecution witness Mangmang further testified that appellant was his
neighbor
in their younger days, and that appellant’s brother is his friend.[53]
It is worth reiterating that where there is no evidence that the
principal
witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motives, their
testimonies
are entitled to full faith and credit.[54]chanrobles virtual law library
All told, no matter
how appellant tried to cast doubt on the veracity of the testimonies of
the prosecution, we find the prosecution witnesses to be more credible
than those of the defense. There may have been inconsistencies in the
narration
of the prosecution witnesses on minor details, but these do not affect
the weight of their testimonies, as these cannot be expected to be
uniform
to the last details.[55]
In fact, a perfectly dovetailing narration by different witnesses
could mean that their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed.[56]
What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material
points.[57]
Furthermore, even assuming
that appellant succeeded in weakening the prosecution’s evidence, such
will not suffice to exculpate him. He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence, and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for
even
if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission
of
responsibility for the killing.[58]
Finally, the question
whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a
question
of fact.[59]
The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution worthy of
belief.
As to who between the prosecution and the defense witnesses are to be
believed,
the trial court’s assessment enjoys a great amount of respect for the
reason
that the trial court has the advantage of observing the demeanor of the
witnesses as they testify, unless found to be clearly arbitrary or
unfounded.[60]
In the present case, appellant failed to point out any arbitrariness on
the part of the trial court.cralaw:red
Thus, we find that the
court a quo was correct in upholding the testimonies of the
prosecution.
The unlawful aggression was convincingly established to have emanated
from
appellant, and not from the victim. Appellant having failed to
discharge
the burden of establishing his defense, his conviction necessarily
follows
on the basis of his admission of the killing.[61]chanrobles virtual law library
This brings us to appellant’s
second assignment of error on the finding of treachery.cralaw:red
Treachery is present
when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and
forms
of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without
danger to his person.[62]
In the case at bar, the first element was established by the fact that
appellant suddenly attacked from behind the unsuspecting and unarmed
victim
who was then astride his motorcycle. However, we find the prosecution’s
evidence insufficient to sustain the finding of the presence of the
second
element, namely, that appellant deliberately adopted the mode of attack.cralaw:red
Repeatedly upheld has
been the rule that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes
committed
at the spur of the moment, or those that were preceded by heated
altercations
are generally not attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the
accused deliberately to employ a treacherous mode of attack.[63]
In the present case, it appears from the evidence that appellant’s
grudge
against the victim was brought about only moments before the attack,
when
the latter ignored his repeated pleas for rice. As observed by the
trial
court, the sight of the victim leaving the compound without heeding
appellant’s
request must have worsened his anger.[64]
In his testimony, appellant admitted that at that moment, he "forgot
himself."[65]
Further, he explained that it was then customary for him to bring a
knife
for his own safety, in defense against lawless elements in their area
at
the time.[66]
It was thus only by chance and not by plan that he attacked the victim
the way he did. The stabbing was evidently a result of a rash and
impetuous
impulse of the moment arising from what appellant perceived to be an
unjust
act of the victim, rather than from a deliberated action.[67]
Hence, as the killing was done at the spur of the moment, treachery
cannot
be appreciated.[68]
Furthermore, we find
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender present in the case
at bar. To benefit an accused, the following requisites of this
circumstance
must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been
arrested;
(2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3)
the surrender was voluntary.[69]
In the present case, based on SPO4 Capablanca’s testimony, appellant’s
surrender at the station immediately after the incident was
spontaneous,
showing his intent to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities.
He expressly acknowledged having killed the victim, surrendered his
knife,
and allowed himself to be detained in prison.cralaw:red
In the absence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed is Homicide,
not Murder.[70]
The penalty therefor, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is
reclusion
temporal. Considering the attendant mitigating circumstance of
voluntary
surrender, the penalty should be imposed in its minimum period,
pursuant
to Article 64 (2) of the aforesaid Code.[71]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant’s sentence will
consist
of a minimum that is anywhere within the full range of prision mayor,
and
a maximum which is anywhere within reclusion temporal in its minimum
period.
We hereby fix it to be from eight (8) years of prision mayor as
minimum,
to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.chanrobles virtual law library
Coming now to the matter
of damages, we affirm the award of actual damages in the amount of
P22,050,
as these are duly substantiated by receipts and appear to have been
genuinely
incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial of the victim.
The
award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 is likewise
sustained,
pursuant to controlling case law.[72]
However, we increase the award of moral damages to a more reasonable
amount
of P30,000, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[73]
Finally, we rule that
the heirs of the victim are also entitled to indemnification for the
loss
of the latter’s earning capacity. In a recent case, we explained how to
arrive at the amount of this indemnity, thus:
The
following
factors should be considered in determining the compensable amount of
lost
earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would have
otherwise
lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased.
Life expectancy is computed using the formula adopted in the American
Combined
Experience Table of Mortality: 2/3 x (80 - age at death).
The
rate of loss is arrived at by multiplying life expectancy by the net
earnings
of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in
the
creation of such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental
expenses. The net earning is ordinarily pegged at fifty percent of the
gross earnings.[74]
Evidence on record
reveals
that the victim died at the age of 41,[75]
and that he was earning an annual gross income of P37,432 from his
employment
with NALCO.[76]
The widow’s testimony regarding the victim’s income from his sideline
cannot
be considered for lack of the necessary unbiased proof.[77]
Thus, applying the above-cited formula, appellant should pay the
victim’s
heirs P486,616 as shown by the following computation:chanrobles virtual law library
2/3
[80-41(age
at the time of death)] = 26 (life expectancy)
26 x [P37,432 x
50%
(annual net income)]= P 486, 616[78]
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the court a quo is MODIFIED. Appellant Sergio A. Caratao is found
GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty
of an indeterminate sentence of from eight (8) years of prision mayor
as
minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Appellant
is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of
P50,000
as death indemnity, P30,000 as moral damages, P22,050 as actual damages
and P486,616 as indemnity for the victim’s loss of earning capacity.
The
decision under review is AFFIRMED in all other respects. Cost de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
RTC Decision, p. 24; RTC Records, p. 191.
[2]
RTC Records, p. 76.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Certificate of Arraignment, RTC Records, p. 82; Order, RTC Records, p.
84.
[4]
TSN, October 7, 1992, pp. 8-12.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Id. at 13-15.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Id. at 37.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
TSN, November 18, 1992, p. 22.
[8]
Id. at 12-16, & 25.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Id. at 32, 36-37.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
TSN, October 2, 1992, pp. 6-11.
[11]
Id. at 12 & 15.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
TSN, November 20, 1992, pp. 12-13.
[13]
TSN, November 20, 1992, p.6; RTC Records, Exhibit "C," p. 102.
[14]
TSN, November 20, 1992, pp. 21-23; RTC Records, Exhibit "K," p. 110.
[15]
TSN, November 20, 1992, pp. 26-30; RTC Records, Exhibits "L, M, N, O
&
P," pp. 112-115.
[16]
TSN, January 12, 1993, pp. 3-17.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Id. at 28.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Id. at 31.
[19]
Id. at 15-16.
[20]
Id. at 27.
[21]
TSN, December 2, 1992, p. 28.
[22]
Id. at 4-18.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Id. at 15.
[24]
Id. at 16.
[25]
Id. at 16, 36-37.
[26]
Id. at 29-30.
[27]
Id. at 18, 29-30.
[28]
Id. at 36.chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
TSN, December 3, 1992, pp. 3-6.chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
Id. at 9-10.chanrobles virtual law library
[31]
TSN, January 21, 1993, pp. 3-5, 8.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
TSN, March 8, 1993, p. 11.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
Id. at 4-5.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Rollo, pp. 86-87.chanrobles virtual law library
[35]
People v. Real, 308 SCRA 244 (1999).
[36]
People v. Belaje, 345 SCRA 604 (2000).
[37]
People v. Saure, G.R. No. 135848, March 12, 2002.
[38]
People v. Enfectana, et al., G.R. No. 132028, April 19, 2002.
[39]
Supra, note 37.chanrobles virtual law library
[40]
Supra, note 38.chanrobles virtual law library
[41]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[42]
RTC Decision, p. 20; RTC Records, p. 187. Citations omitted.
[43]
RTC Records, p. 108, Exhibit "G"; TSN, November 20, 1992, pp. 13, 20-21.
[44]
TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 30.chanrobles virtual law library
[45]
TSN, December 2, 1992, p. 12.chanrobles virtual law library
[46]
RTC Decision, p. 19, RTC Records, p. 186.chanrobles virtual law library
[47]
TSN, October 2, 1992, p. 11; TSN, October 7, 1993, p. 36; TSN, November
18, 1992, p. 15; December 2, 1992, p. 17.
[48]
TSN, January 12, 1993, p.18.chanrobles virtual law library
[49]
RTC Records, p. 62.chanrobles virtual law library
[50]
People v. Saure, supra, note 37.
[51]
People v. Salazar, 221 SCRA 170 (1993).
[52]
TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 26.
[53]
TSN, November 18, 1992, p. 21.
[54]
People v. Milliam, 324 SCRA 155 (2000).
[55]
Supra, note 35.chanrobles virtual law library
[56]
People v. Piedad, et al., G.R. No. 131923, December 5, 2003.
[57]
People v. Delim et al., G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003.
[58]
People v. Cueto, G.R. No. 147764, January 16, 2003; People v. Saure,
supra.
[59]
Arcona v. CA., G.R. No. 134784, December 9, 2002.
[60]
Supra, note 58.chanrobles virtual law library
[61]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[62]
Luces v. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 149492, January 20, 2003.
[63]
People v. Gonzales, Jr., 359 SCRA 352 (2001).chanrobles virtual law library
[64]
RTC Decision, p. 17, RTC Records, p. 184.
[65]
TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 18.chanrobles virtual law library
[66]
Id. at 22.chanrobles virtual law library
[67]
People v. Tugbo, Jr., 196 SCRA 133 (1991).
[68]
People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 (1995).chanrobles virtual law library
[69]
Luces v. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 149492, January 20, 2003.
[70]
People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 134762, July 23, 2002.chanrobles virtual law library
[71]
People v. Zeta, G.R. Nos. 140901-02, May 9, 2002.chanrobles virtual law library
[72]
People v. Rabanal, G.R. No. 146687, August 22, 2002.chanrobles virtual law library
[73]
People v. Mondijar, G.R. No. 141914, November 21, 2002.
[74]
People v. San Pascual, et al., G.R. No. 137746, October 15, 2002.
[75]
Certificate of Death, RTC Records, p. 102.chanrobles virtual law library
[76]
Income Tax Return, RTC Records, p. 110.chanrobles virtual law library
[77]
People v. Panabang, G.R. Nos. 137514-15, January 16, 2002.
[78]
Supra, note 74. |