SECOND DIVISION
DR.
JESUS
SERIÑA
AND ENRIQUETA SERIÑA (DECEASED),REPRESENTED BY DR.
JESUS SERIÑA, JR., ANTONIO SERIÑA,VIOLETA
SERIÑA
TAN, REYNALDO SERIÑA AND EMMANUEL SERIÑA,
Petitioners, |
G.R.
No.
127382
August 17, 2004
-versus-
VICTOR
CABALLERO,
TEODORO DONELA,OLIVER DONELA, COURT
OF APPEALS,AND THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 20, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL,
Respondents.
|
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a Petition
for Review on
Certiorari of
the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 23, 1996, affirming the
dismissal
of the complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and
damages
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro
City,
in Civil Case No. 8716. The Antecedents
On August 11, 1982,
Dr. Jesus Seriña and his wife, Enriqueta Seriña filed a
Complaint
for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages with a
prayer
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents
Victor
Caballero and his tenants, Teodoro Donela and Oliver Donela. When Dr.
Seriña
died on August 6, 1983, he was substituted by his children, petitioners
Jesus, Jr., Antonio, Violeta, Reynaldo and Emmanuel.[2]
The petitioners alleged
in their complaint that they are the absolute owners and have been in
actual
and constructive possession for thirty-five (35) years of a parcel of
land
described as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
Lot No. 3533-A, Cad-237,
Cagayan Cadastre
Tax Declaration No.
02161chanrobles virtual law library
Location -
Mantadiao, Opol,Misamis Orientalchanrobles virtual law library
Area - 2.5000 has.cralaw:red
Boundaries:
North - Alejo Seriñachanrobles virtual law library
South - T. Sabornidochanrobles virtual law library
East - A. Seriña & T. Sabornido
West - F. Caballero[3]
The petitioners averred
that sometime in March 1982, they discovered that respondent Caballero
was claiming ownership over the said land and offering it for sale or
mortgage
to third parties. They also discovered that the respondents Donelas
were
occupying the land as tenants and caretakers of the land.[4]
The petitioners claimed
that their father, Dr. Seriña, bought the land from Lucia Vda.
de
Marbella who inherited it from her father, Ramon Neri.[5]
They presented a Deed of Sale[6]
dated August 23, 1947 showing that Dr. Seriña bought 5 hectares
of ricefield, bounded on the North by Raymundo Seriña, on the
East
by Teofilo Saburnido, on the South by Obdelio Caballero, on the West by
Obdullo Caballero, from Lucia Vda. de Marbella. Dr. Seriña
was issued Tax Declaration No. 4029 allegedly for the said property. As
indicated in the tax declaration and subsequent tax declarations issued
in the name of Dr. Seriña, they were issued for Cadastral Lot
No.
3533 and covered a 2.5-hectare ricefield with the same boundary owners
as those in the complaint.[7]
The petitioners also averred that they regularly paid taxes thereon
since
1947 up to the present.[8]
In his answer, respondent
Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and had been in actual
physical possession of the disputed land since time immemorial. He
averred
that the disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot No. 3533, C-7 of the
Cagayan
Cadastre and originally owned by his grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero.[9]
The respondents averred
that Eustaquio Caballero declared the entire parcel of land for tax
purposes
even before the war. Tax Declaration No. 2442 was issued in lieu of the
records that were destroyed during the war.cralaw:red
This tax declaration
indicated that the 119,490 square-meter parcel of land was located at
Pontacon,
Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, bounded on North by Rustico Dablio, on the
East by J. Seriña and T. Saburnido, on the South by Victor
Obsioma,
and on the West by Victorino Caballero.[10]
Emiliana Ibarat, respondent
Caballero’s sister, testified that when Eustaquio Caballero died in
1944,
the land was divided among his three children, Vicenta, Benita and
Victorino,
the father of respondent Caballero. Lot A, with an area of 39,625
square
meters, was given to Victorino, which was later inherited by the
respondent.
Lot B, with an area of 71, 450 square meters, was given to Benita; and
Lot C, with only 7,938 square meters was given to Vicenta. Lots B and C
were, thereafter, sold to one Gaga Yasay. Because of the trouble
between
the petitioners and the respondents, Yasay agreed to buy only a portion
of Lot A.[11]chanrobles virtual law library
The land was surveyed
during the trial and it was determined that it now consisted of only
23,373
square meters,[12]
and not 25,000 square meters as claimed by the petitioners. Gliceria
Legaspi,
respondent Caballero’s other sister, also testified that the disputed
land
was now bounded on the North by Seriña and Nangcas, on the East
by Teofilo Saburnido, on the South by Gaga Yasay, and on the West by
Nangcas.[13]
The RTC rendered judgment[14]
on January 21, 1992, dismissing the complaint, and upholding the right
of the respondents over the land. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant Victor Caballero
and against the plaintiffs herein, to wit:
1. Ordering the
dismissal
of the complaint with costs.
2. Ordering the
defendant
Victor Caballero as the absolute and lawful owner and possessor of the
land in question.chanrobles virtual law library
3. Ordering the
plaintiffs,
their heirs, lawyers, servants or privies not to disturb or molest the
possession and ownership of Victor Caballero over the land in question.chanrobles virtual law library
4. Ordering the
plaintiffs
to pay to defendant Victor Caballero, jointly and severally the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) pesos for expenses of litigation, and THREE
THOUSAND
(P3,000.00) pesos for and as attorney's fees having been compelled to
retain
the services of counsel to protect his interest herein.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The trial court ruled
that
it was not clearly shown that the land bought by Dr. Seriña from
Lucia Vda. de Marbella was the same land owned by Victor Caballero, and
that the petitioners failed to show that Lucia Vda. de Marbella bought
the land from Eustaquio Caballero, the original owner and cadastral
claimant
of the land. It also noted that the deed of sale between Lucia Vda. de
Marbella and Dr. Seriña showed that the land had an area of 5
hectares,
whereas, the petitioners only claimed 2.5 hectares. Furthermore, the
boundaries
of the land stated in the complaint did not coincide with what was
stated
in the Deed of Sale, or in Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the name of
Eustaquio
Caballero. The trial court ruled that the petitioners failed to explain
these discrepancies, and that there was no showing that Tax
Declaration
No.
2442 was cancelled by Tax
Declaration
No. 4029 in the name of Dr. Seriña. The trial court
interpreted
this to mean that Eustaquio Caballero's right as owner of the land
remained.chanrobles virtual law library
Dissatisfied, the petitioners
appealed the case to the CA, which rendered a decision[16]
affirming in toto the decision of the RTC. The petitioners filed a
Motion
for Reconsideration on September 30, 1996.[17]
The CA denied the motion.[18]
Hence, the instant petition.cralaw:red
The petitioners assign
the following errors:
1.
THAT IT IS ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO UPHOLD THE
HONORABLE
RTC ON THE ISSUE THAT THE ALLEGED IDENTITY OF THE LAND IN LITIGATION IS
UNESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES-LITIGANTS.
2. THAT IT IS ERROR
FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO FAIL TO APPRECIATE THE 35-YEAR
ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS.[19]
The issues in this petition
are, therefore, the following: (1) whether the petitioners were able to
establish the identity of the land being claimed by them; and (2)
whether
acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in favor of the
petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library
The Ruling of the
Court
The first issue deals
clearly with a question of fact which is beyond the province of this
Court
in a petition for review on certiorari. Well-entrenched is the rule
that
the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to
reviewing
or revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court.
Factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not
reviewable by this Court—and they carry even more weight when the Court
of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court.[20]
The exceptions to this rule are the following:
(1) when the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based
on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different
conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence
on record.[21]chanrobles virtual law library
We find no cogent reason
to reverse the findings of the CA. None of the aforementioned
exceptions
is present in this case. The CA was correct in concluding that the
petitioners
failed to establish that the parcel of land in the possession of the
respondents
is the same as that subject of their complaint.cralaw:red
The CA noted that the
land subject of the complaint has boundaries different from the land in
possession of the respondents. In fact, the land described in the
complaint
appears to be different from the land described in the Deed of Sale
which
the petitioners invoke as the basis of their ownership.cralaw:red
First. The petitioners
alleged in their complaint that the boundaries of their property are as
follows:
North -
Alejo
Seriñachanrobles virtual law library
South - T.
Sabornidochanrobles virtual law library
East -
A.
Seriña & T. Sabornido
West - F.
Caballero[22]
On the other hand, the
Deed of Sale provides that the property sold to them has the following
boundaries:
North
-
Raymundo Seriña
South - Obdullo
Caballerochanrobles virtual law library
East -
Teofilo
Saburnidochanrobles virtual law library
West -
Obdullo
Caballero[23]
Second. The
complaint[24]
of the petitioners states that the property they are claiming has an
area
of 2.5 hectares. On the other hand, the Deed of Sale[25]
provides that the subject property has an area of 5 hectares.
Third. The complaint
alleged that the property is located in “Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis
Oriental,”[26]
while the Deed of Sale shows that the property purchased
is
located in “Puntakon, Igpit, Cagayan Or. Misamis.”[27]chanrobles virtual law library
We agree with the CA
that there was no showing that Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the name of
Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled. Absent any specific statement
therein
to that effect, it cannot be presumed that Tax Declaration No. 4029 in
the name of Dr. Seriña cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2442.cralaw:red
Moreover, the land covered
by Tax Declaration No. 2442 is different from that covered by Tax
Declaration
No. 4029 for the following reasons:
The boundary owners
of the land as indicated in Tax Declaration No. 2442 differ from those
stated in Tax Declaration No. 4029. The boundary owners as indicated in
Tax Declaration No. 2442 are as follows:
North - Rustico Dablio
South -Victor Obsiomachanrobles virtual law library
East - J. Seriña & T. Saburnido
West - Victorino Caballero[28]chanrobles virtual law library
Under Tax Declaration
No. 4029, on the other hand, the boundary owners are as follows:
North - Alejo Seriña
South - Teofilo Saburnido
East - A. Seriña [and] T. Saburnido
West - Eustaquio Caballero[29]
Moreover, Tax Declaration
No. 2442 covers an area of 119,490 square meters[30]
while Tax Declaration No. 4029 covers only 25,000 square meters or 2.5
hectares.[31]
The petitioners argue
that the Deed of Sale and Tax Declaration No. 4029 should not be
compared
to Tax Declaration No. 2442 and the Technical Description of Cadastral
Lot No. 3533 because the former refers only to a portion of the area
referred
to by the latter.[32]
While the petitioners are correct on this point, such mistake would
still
not justify a different conclusion. The fact remains that the
documentary
and testimonial evidence presented by the petitioners did not prove the
identity of the land being claimed. The petitioners did not present
evidence
to prove that the land registered in the name of Eustaquio Caballero
was
sold to Lucia Vda. de Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest from whom
they purchased the land subject of their complaint.chanrobles virtual law library
The failure to establish
the identity of the land is obviously fatal to the petitioners’ case.
In
Beo vs. Court of Appeals,[33]
a case which also involves an action for possession and quieting of
title,
the Court had the occasion to state:
x
x xBecause petitioners failed to explain the discrepancy or
present other evidence to prove with certainty the location and area of
the land they seek to recover, respondent court correctly applied the
invariable
rule that a person who claims ownership of real property is duty-bound
to clearly identify the land being claimed, in accordance with the
title
on which he anchors his right of ownership. When the record does not
show
that the land subject matter of the action for recovery of possession
has
been exactly determined, such action cannot prosper, as in the case of
petitioners. In sum, proof of ownership coupled with identity of the
land
is the basic rule.
Corollarily, the rule
is
likewise well-settled that in order that an action for recovery of
possession
may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully
proves
not
only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed, by
describing
the location, area and boundaries thereof. As the appellate court
succinctly
stated, he who claims to have a better right to the property must
clearly
show that the land possessed by the other party is the very land that
belongs
to him.[34]
On the second issue,
the CA ruled that inasmuch as the petitioners failed to establish that
the parcel of land in possession of the respondents is the same as the
subject of their complaint, their claim of acquisitive prescription is
clearly untenable.chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners argue
that they would not have regularly paid taxes on the land since 1947
had
they not believed that they owned the same.[35]
The respondents, for their part, aver that the petitioners were only
able
to prove seven (7) years of actual possession of the land through
cultivation
by their tenants. They argue that such seven-year period of cultivation
cannot be considered in the petitioners’ favor, since the witness who
testified
on this fact did not personally know the boundaries of the land
cultivated,
or whether it was the same land bought by Dr. Seriña. The
respondents
contend that acquisitive prescription applies only when there is no
dispute
as to the identity of the property.[36]
We agree with the respondents.
Since the property has not been clearly identified by the petitioners,
their claim of acquisitive prescription cannot be considered.
Insufficient
identification of the portion of land claimed in absolute ownership
cannot
ripen into ownership. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership,
while
it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.[37]chanrobles virtual law library
Assuming, however, that
the disputed land has been clearly identified, acquisitive prescription
will still not lie in favor of the petitioners because they were not
able
to prove that they have been in possession of the property for the
requisite
number of years. Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted
and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for
ten
years, in case the possession is in good faith and with just title.[38]
Aside from the testimony
of Leonardo Vacalares that certain tenants of the petitioners
cultivated
the land for a total of seven years, the petitioners did not present
any
other evidence to show that they have been in actual possession of the
property for at least ten years.cralaw:red
The petitioners’ argument
that the payment of taxes on the property since May 31, 1948
constitutes
proof of their possession of the subject land for thirty-five years is
untenable. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership
of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of
actual,
public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes
does not prove ownership.[39]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero (retired), with
Associate
Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Eugenio S. Labitoria, concurring.
[2]
Rollo, p. 11.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Id. at 82-83.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id. at 70.
[6]
Id. at 90.
[7]
Id. at 92-95.
[8]
Id. at 83.
[9]
Id. at 87.
[10]
Id. at 101.
[11]
Id. at 75.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 35.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Penned by Judge Alejandro M. Velez.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 80-81.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Id. at 66.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
CA Rollo, p. 81.
[18]
Rollo, p. 60.
[19]
Id. at 9-10.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 51 (2001).
[21]
Nokom vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 336 SCRA 97 (2000).
[22]
Rollo, p. 83.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Id. at 90.
[24]
Id. at 83.
[25]
Id. at 90.
[26]
Id. at 83.
[27]
Id. at 90.
[28]
Id. at 101.
[29]
Id. at 92.
[30]
Id. at 101.
[31]
Id. at 92.
[32]
Id. at 157.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
200 SCRA 575 (1991).
[34]
Id. at 581-582. (Emphasis supplied)
[35]
Rollo, p. 50.chanrobles virtual law library
[36]
Id. at 146-147.
[37]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 104 (2000).chanrobles virtual law library
[38]
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 267
(2000).
[39]
Cequeña vs. Bolante, 330 SCRA 216 (2000). |