SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
127492
January 16, 2004
-versus-
DIONISIO SANTOS,
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appellant Dionisio Santos
was charged with Murder, along with Emmanuel Santos, Emilio Santos and
Elizabeth Santos-Guerrero, in an Information reading:
That on or about October
22, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to
kill,
and by means of treachery and with the aid of armed men, did then and
there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, and use
personal
violence upon the person of VALENTINO A. GUEVARRA by then and there
hacking
and stabbing him with jungle bolos and samurais on the different parts
of his body, thereby inflicting upon said Valentino A. Guevarra
multiple
hack and stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death
thereafter.[1]
Of the four accused,
only Dionisio Santos was arraigned and tried. Emmanuel Santos, Emilio
Santos
and Elizabeth Santos-Guerrero remain at large.cralaw:red
In the afternoon of
October 22, 1989, Lucita Guevarra was walking towards Pepin Street to
look
for her son Valentino.[2]
Earlier, someone came to her house asking for Valentino and Lucita
volunteered
to find him. She proceeded to Miguelin Street, which Valentino
frequented
but upon arriving there, she was told that her son was at Pepin Street.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Some distance away from
Pepin Street, Lucita saw his son with a companion standing on the
corner
of the street.[4]
Suddenly, a samurai-wielding Dionisio Santos approached Valentino from
behind and hacked him in his right thigh.[5]
Lucita’s eyes were focused on Valentino but several other persons were
standing near her son, holding something.[6]
Lucita tried to go to her son but suddenly felt dizzy.[7]
Somebody held her from behind and told her not to go near Valentino
anymore,
assuring her that someone had already called the police.[8]
A commotion had ensued and the person holding Lucita brought her home.[9]
Lucita thought Valentino was still alive when she got home, only to be
told later that her son was dead.[10]
About two or three meters
away, Rodelio Dipana also witnessed the killing of his neighbor,
Valentino
Guevarra.[11]
He said Valentino was walking with a certain Francisco along Laong-Laan
and M. dela Fuente Streets in Sampaloc, Manila when two men alighted
from
a tricycle, one brandishing a samurai and the other, a bolo.[12]
Dionisio Santos hacked Valentino from behind with his samurai, causing
Valentino to fall on his hands.[13]
Valentino crawled for a while but the man with the bolo started hacking
him.[14]
Francisco tried to help
Valentino, but caught the ire of the attackers.[15]
Dionisio hacked Francisco, hitting him on his left hand.[16]
Francisco then ran and boarded a passing jeep.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Valentino was not as
lucky. After Francisco fled, two other persons arrived, turned
Valentino
face up and stabbed him repeatedly.[18]
Another neighbor, Ernesto
del Rosario, testified that Valentino was standing at the corner when
he
was hacked by the accused at the back and on the right leg.[19]
Ernesto then rode to the residence of Lucita Guevarra and reported the
incident to her.[20]
Lucita then rushed to the scene of the hacking.[21]
As a result of the attack,
Valentino sustained, aside from two abrasions, five stab wounds two of
which were fatal, and five hack wounds of which three were fatal.[22]
According to Dr. Florante Baltazar, former Chief of the Philippine
National
Police Crime Laboratory, National Capital Region, who conducted the
autopsy
on the victim, it is possible that, based on the wounds of the victim,
more than one bladed weapon was involved.[23]
A samurai could have been one of the weapons.[24]
Only accused Dionisio
Santos testified for the defense.cralaw:red
The accused invoked
alibi, claiming that when tragedy struck on October 22, 1989, he was in
Balut, Tondo, where he worked as a plumber, far from the place of the
killing.[25]
He admitted, however, that he started work only on October 24, 1989,
and
returned to their house in Pepin Street, Sampaloc, Manila on October 29.[26]
He claimed that prosecution witness Rodelio Dipana pointed to him
because
they once had a quarrel during a drinking spree.[27]
After trial, Dionisio
was found guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the trial
court’s
decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, accused Dionisio Santos is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and is therefore sentenced to serve the
penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the family/heirs of victim Valentino
A. Guevarra the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.cralaw:red
Atty. Viterbo Tagarda
is awarded an honorarium of P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees, subject to
the
availability of funds.cralaw:red
The case as against
the other accused Emmanuel Santos, Emilio Santos and Elizabeth
Santos-Guerrero
is hereby ordered archived pending their arrest. In the meantime, issue
alias warrants of arrest against the said three remaining accused.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[28]
There is ample evidence
of the attack perpetrated by the appellant and his co-accused on the
victim
which led to the latter’s death. Appellant, however, questions the
credibility
of the prosecution witnesses and their respective testimonies.cralaw:red
Appellant points out
that after witnessing her son’s hacking, Lucita Guevarra willingly
accepted
someone’s offer to take her home. She did not call for help, or inform
the authorities or anyone in her household of the incident. Appellant
contends
that Lucita’s reaction is unnatural as a mother’s instinct is to
protect
her young, even at the cost of her own life. To leave the scene of a
crime
while her son is being hacked to death without even attempting to save
her child, appellant claims, is highly improbable. Moreover, not only
did
Lucita not help Valentino or shout for help, she did not even ascertain
what happened to her son.cralaw:red
Appellant also cites
an inconsistency between the testimonies of Lucita and the other
prosecution
witnesses. When asked what time the incident happened, Lucita mentioned
noontime. The two other witnesses, however, testified that the incident
occurred late in the afternoon.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Ernesto del Rosario
also testified that immediately after seeing Valentino being hacked,
Ernesto
went to Valentino’s house and informed Lucita of the incident.
Appellant
theorizes that only then did Lucita learn of her son’s killing.
Appellant
concludes that Lucita could not have been present at the scene of the
crime,
and that she must have merely adopted as her own the account of others.cralaw:red
Contrary to appellant’s
claim, there is nothing improbable about Lucita Guevarra’s testimony.cralaw:red
Lucita Guevarra’s testimony
shows that she did try to approach her son but could not do so because
she was overcome by dizziness. It is not unusual for a sexagenarian
mother
to feel faintish upon seeing her son attacked. As the Solicitor General
points out, Lucita was not in a position to help her son and, when she
was led home, there was already a commotion over him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q And after the first
thrust was made hitting the thigh of your son, what did you see further?
A At that time, I attempted
to approach my son, but I felt dizzy and somebody held me from behind
and
told me not to approach my son anymore and he just called a mobile.
Q When you became
dizzy,
who were with you?
A There was this person
who was assisting me.cralaw:red
Q And what did he do
to you when you felt dizzy?
A That person wanted
to bring me home, but because I felt really bad at that time and I
noticed
that there was already a commotion about my son and that person wanted
to bring me home and I also wanted to approach my son, but that person
wanted to bring me home instead.cralaw:red
Q And then where were
you brought?
A I was brought at our
house.[29]
As to the time of the
incident, the claim that Lucita Guevarra categorically mentioned
noontime
is not borne by the evidence. She testified that the hacking happened
about
noontime, thus:
Q And this happened
about noontime?
A Yes, sir.[30]
[Underscoring supplied]
The Solicitor General
correctly observes that Lucita even testified that she was at home
between
noon and afternoon.cralaw:red
Q On October 22, 1988,
where were you then?
A We were at our place.cralaw:red
Q What time was that?
A I cannot remember
anymore the exact time but I am sure that it was between noon and
afternoon.cralaw:red
Q And what were you
doing at that time?
A I was just inside
the house cleaning.[31]
In any case, the purported
inconsistencies in the time of the killing are minor ones that bear
little
significance to the outcome of the case. Inconsistencies as to minor
details
and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses
nor
the veracity of the weight of their testimonies.[32]
The fact that, immediately
after the hacking, Ernesto del Rosario went to the victim’s house and
informed
Lucita of the incident, does not lead to the conclusion that she was
not
present at the scene of the crime. It is entirely possible that a
well-meaning
person may inform another of an incident not knowing that the latter
already
had prior knowledge of the same.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Indeed, there is no
reason why the victim’s mother would fabricate a story to accuse an
innocent
person of such grave a crime. The natural interest of the witness, who
is a relative of the victim in securing the convictions of the guilty
would
deter her from implicating a person other than the true culprit.[33]
It is therefore highly unlikely for her to lie as to the identity of
one
of her son’s assailants.cralaw:red
Moreover, the defense
did not present any evidence of ill motive on the part of the victim’s
mother. In the absence of any evidence tending to question her motive
and
integrity, her testimony should be given full credit. The absence of
improper
or evil motive for a prosecution witness to make false imputations
against
the accused strengthens her credibility.[34]
Appellant next questions
the ability of Rodelio Dipana to identify appellant as one of the
perpetrators
of the killing. Rodelio stated that he was not familiar with or he did
not know any of the assailants. He did not mention having had a good
look
at any of the assailants. He did not even report the incident to the
authorities.
When asked how he could have known the name of the accused, the witness
replied that he learned it from the victim’s mother. Rodelio allegedly
even misrepresented the time when he first identified appellant at the
police precinct. Rodelio said that he identified appellant three days
after
the incident. Appellant, however, was apprehended only five (5) years
after
the commission of the crime.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant’s contentions
have no merit. The Solicitor General rightly argues that neither law
nor
jurisprudence requires that a prosecution witness be familiar with the
perpetrator of a crime for such witness to make a positive
identification.[35]
The evidence shows that Rodelio Dipana was able to observe the
incident,
as well as the perpetrators thereof, as he stood only two meters away
from
where it took place.[36]
It is true that Rodelio
testified on cross-examination that Lucita asked him to identify
Valentino’s
assailant after the latter was supposedly arrested three days after the
incident when in fact appellant was arrested only after five years, in
1994. On re-direct examination, however, Rodelio clarified:
FISCAL CABANGON TO WITNESS:
Q: When Virgilio (sic)
Guevarra was killed[,] it took place on October 22, 1989. My question
is,
do you know when you were called by the mother to identify a person if
you could recognize him if he could be part of the killing of Virgilio
(sic) Guevarra, was that this year 1995 or last year 1994?
ATTY. TAGARDA:
Leading your honor.cralaw:red
COURT:
Sustained.cralaw:red
FISCAL CABANGON:
Q: When was that? What
year was that?
A: 1994.[37]
At any rate, the date
when Rodelio identified appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
attack
is not crucial to the prosecution’s case.cralaw:red
Appellant also claims
that Ernesto del Rosario never identified appellant as Guevarra’s
killer.
He merely mentioned that he saw the victim being hacked. The public
prosecutor
did not ask the witness to identify the supposed assailant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The transcript of Ernesto’s
testimony, however, contains references to "the accused," who can be no
other than appellant Dionisio Santos, the only person on trial. Thus:
Q: When you saw the
accused hacked (sic) Valentino Guevarra, was he with some other persons?
A: He was with one person.cralaw:red
Q: Did you recognize
the weapon used?
A: Samurai sir.cralaw:red
Q: You said the accused
hacked the victim at the back and the right leg, what did you do when
you
saw this?
A: I ride to (sic) an
owner type jeepney and I went home and told the mother of the victim.[38]
At all events, Ernesto’s
testimony is merely corroborative to those of Lucita’s and Rodelio’s
and
could have been dispensed with without weakening the prosecution’s
cause.cralaw:red
In the face of the prosecution
witnesses’ positive identification, the trial court correctly rejected
appellant’s alibi:
It has been said many
times and it is only appropriate to be stated again that alibi is the
weakest
form of defense, and without concrete evidence to back up the alibi put
up by the accused, the same cannot be given consideration at all.
The alibi of [the] accused
that he was not in the place of the crime on the date and time in
question
is self-serving with no one to corroborate, not even a family member, a
friend, a co-worker in Balut or whoever contracted his services as
plumber
there.[39]
The defense of alibi
may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has
been established by witnesses.[40]
Furthermore, to establish
alibi, the appellant must show that it was impossible for him to have
been
at the place where the crime was committed.[41]
Appellant admitted that he started his work in Tondo only on October
24,
1989, without giving any reason why he had to go to his place of work
two
days before he even began work or if, at all, what he did in the two
days
in between. As the trial court noted, there was nothing that could have
prevented him from going home in Sampaloc and be at the place of the
crime
in the evening of October 22, 1989.[42]
Appellant assails as
contradictory the conclusions of Dr. Baltazar, who conducted the
autopsy
on the victim, and the testimonies of the eyewitnesses regarding the
type
of weapon appellant allegedly used to attack the victim. While the
latter
testified that appellant hacked the victim with a samurai, Dr. Baltazar
supposedly stated that a samurai was used to stab him.cralaw:red
Appellant’s claim is
inaccurate for Dr. Baltazar did not rule out the possibility that a
samurai
was used in hacking the victim. The pertinent excerpts from his
testimony
read as follows:
Q Doctor, from the nature
of the penetrating stab wounds and hacking wounds sustained by the
victim
eventually causing his death, what could be the possible instruments
used
in inflicting such injures?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A As far as hacking
wounds are concerned, it will be consistent with a bolo of the same
size
and as far as the stab wounds is (sic) concerned, it will be consistent
with pointed and bladed instrument.cralaw:red
Q In layman’s term (sic)
doctor, what does it mean, what is that? May I withdraw that question?.Is it possible doctor as you have described that that particular
instrument which have (sic) caused the several stab wounds would be
commensurate
to a samurai?
ATTY. TAGARDA:
Leading, your [H]onor.cralaw:red
FISCAL FALLER:
He is an expert witness,
your [H]onor.cralaw:red
COURT:
May answer.cralaw:red
WITNESS:
Samurai may be used
also in stabbing, that will be possible.[43]
Dr. Baltazar did not
say that a samurai could only be used for hacking. Rather, what he said
is that a samurai "may also be used for stabbing."
From the evidence, it
is clear that treachery attended the killing of the victim. Apart from
Lucita Guevarra, Rodelio Dipana and Ernesto del Rosario who narrated
the
appellant’s and other accused’s sudden attack of the victim from behind.[44]
Dr. Baltazar testified as to the nature of the victim wounds, thus:
Q Dr. in your post mortem
findings which is (sic) already been admitted, there are indicated
several
mentioned (sic) of external injury and internal injury thereon. Your
[H]onor,
before we proceed, may I move that this post mortem findings be mark
(sic)
as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution and the external injury and
extension
mentioned by bracketed and mark (sic) as Exhibit "A-1" and the cause of
death multiple stab and hacking wounds be bracketed and mark (sic) as
Exhibit
"A-2" and the signature over the above the name Florante F. Baltazar be
mark (sic) as Exhibit "A-3". Dr. Baltazar, in Exhibit "A-1" wherein it
is indicated the injury sustained by the victim and the cause of death
as multiple stab and hacking wounds, is it possible doctor in layman’s
term doctor, is it possible that this (sic) stab wounds could be found
in all the parts of the body of the victim?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A There were injuries
located in front of the body and there were also injuries at the back.cralaw:red
Q What about in the
lower extremities of the body?
A Can I have my drawing?
There was (sic) also hacking wounds at the lower right extremities.cralaw:red
FISCAL FALLER:
Witness referring to
Medico Legal sketch of the male person and may I request that this
Medico
Legal Sketch be mark (sic) as Exhibit "B" for the prosecution.cralaw:red
Q Alright, doctor you
said that it is possible that there would be three or more bladed
weapons
that could have been used, is that correct?
A I told [you] before
Ma’am that it will be more than one and it will be more than two.cralaw:red
Q Is it possible doctor
that the victim from the nature (sic) of the wounds that he sustained
would
have given a resistance of whatever time and nature?
A Your [H]onor, the
injuries of the extremities, the upper and lower extremities, we
considered
that defense wounds. In this particular case, your honor, there were
injuries
in the upper extremities and also in the lower extremities and also
defense
wounds.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
INTERPRETER:
Witness referring to
Exhibit "B."
Q From the nature of
the wound, would that be what you call defense wounds could be more or
as we should be given extra effort to sustain in his defense, was there
an exertion of extra effort?
COURT:
That is quite vague.cralaw:red
FISCAL FALLER:
What I mean to express
is that, as the doctor had said, there were defense wounds. In the
actual
act of defending himself, is it possible that the victim could have
really
exerted too much effort in his defense?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
COURT:
I don’t think the doctor
can say that.cralaw:red
COURT (to Witness):
Q Can you?
A What can I say is
courage on the part of the deceased.cralaw:red
Q There was courage
to say the least?
A Yes, sir.cralaw:red
COURT (to Witness):
Q At the back, did you
find any injury?
A There were injuries
at the back.cralaw:red
Q Is it a fatal wound?
A They were not fatal.cralaw:red
Q So all fatal wounds
where you found in this surface (sic) by the very nature of these
so-called
fatal wounds when inflicted, can a victim still offer so-called
defenses
like you found in defense wounds given a situation that the fatal
wounds
were inflicted first, can the victim still offer some resistance?
A My findings, your
honor, suggest that the fatal wound will be the last to be sustained by
the victim, otherwise if this will be the first to be sustained, the
victim
cannot offer that courage to parry or to defend himself.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
CROSS-EXAMINATION:
ATTY. TAGARDA:
Q You said that this
back portion of the injury sustained by the victim was more or less
superficial?
A It was not superficial
but those were not fatal.cralaw:red
Q In short, could this
wound sustained by the victim be caused by his fall?
A No, sir, these were
hacking wounds, by falling, you cannot sustain hacking wounds.[45]
A sudden and unexpected
attack under circumstances which render the victim unable to defend
himself
by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack constitutes
alevosia.[46]
In the instant case, the attack on the victim was deliberate, sudden
and
unexpected. The victim was totally unaware of the impending attack,
sustaining
wounds on his back. All these indicate that the accused employed means
and methods which tended directly and specially to insure the execution
of the offense without risk to the offenders arising from the defense
which
the offended party might have made.[47]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the time of the commission
of the offense, Murder was punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to
death.[48]
As there are no mitigating or generic aggravating circumstance, the
medium
of the penalty, i.e., reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed.[49]
While the heirs of the victim did not present evidence of actual
damages,
they are nonetheless entitled to an award of temperate damages in the
amount
of P25,000.00.[50]
Lucita Guevarra is entitled
to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00[51]
for the mental anguish and serious anxiety she suffered.[52]
Lucita testified that as she witnessed the attack against her son, she
became dizzy and "felt really bad."[53]
Upon learning of her son’s death, she cried.[54]
In accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,[55]
appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as
civil
indemnity. Exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should also be
awarded to said heirs because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance
of treachery.[56]
WHEREFORE, the appealed
judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Dionisio Santos is
found
GUILTY of the crime of Murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
Valentino
Guevarra the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Records, p. 1.
[2]
TSN, September 13, 1994, p. 3.
[3]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
TSN, September 13, 1994, p. 4.
[5]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
TSN, September 13, 1994, p. 5.
[7]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
TSN, September 13, 1994, pp. 5-6.
[9]
Id., at 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id., at 7.
[11]
TSN, February 15, 1995, pp. 4-5.
[12]
Id., at 2-3, 5.
[13]
Id., at 5.
[14]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
TSN, February 15, 1995, p. 6.
[16]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
TSN, June 7, 1995, p. 3.
[20]
Id., at 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Ibid.
[22]
TSN, August 29, 1995, p. 5.
[23]
Id., at 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Id., at 4.
[25]
TSN, May 25, 1995, p. 2.
[26]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
TSN, May 25, 1995, p. 4.
[28]
Records, p. 193.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
TSN, September 13, 1994, pp. 5-6.
[30]
Id., at 4. Underscoring supplied.
[31]
Id., at 2-3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
People v. Amazan, G.R. No. 136251, 138606-07, 16 January 2001, 349 SCRA
218; People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 129057, 22 January 2001, 350 SCRA 511;
See also People v. Givera, G.R. No. 132159, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA
513;
People v. Abundo, G.R. No. 138233, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA 577.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
People v. Bagcal, G.R. Nos. 107529-30, 29 January 2001, 350 SCRA 402.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
People v. De la Piedra, G.R. No. 128777, 24 January 2001, 350 SCRA 163.
[35]
Rollo, p. 72, citing People v. Bracamonte, G.R. No. 95939, 17 June
1996,
257 SCRA 380.
[36]
TSN, February 15, 1995, p. 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
TSN, May 16, 1995, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
TSN, June 7, 1995, pp. 3-4.
[39]
Records, p. 191.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
People v. Manzano, G.R. No. 138303, 26 November 2001, 370 SCRA 515;
People
v. Medios, G.R. Nos. 132066-67, 29 November 2001, 371 SCRA 120.
[41]
People v. Abundo, G.R. No. 138233, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA 577;
People
v. Valdez, G.R. No. 128105, 24 January 2001, 250 SCRA 189.
[42]
Records, p. 191.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
TSN, August 29, 1995, p. 4.
[44]
Supra, notes 4, 5, 12 and 19.
[45]
TSN, August 29, 1995, pp. 3-4, 6-8.
[46]
People v. Basadre, G.R. No. 131851, 22 February 2001, 352 SCRA 573.
[47]
Revised Penal Code, art. 14.16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[48]
Id., art. 248.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
Id., art. 64.3.
[50]
People v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 135919, 9 May 1993.
[51]
People v. Caballero, G.R. Nos. 149028-30, 2 April 2003; People v.
Galvez,
G.R. No. 130397, 17 January 2002.
[52]
New Civil Code, art. 2217.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[53]
TSN, September 13, 1994, p. 6.
[54]
Id., at 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[55]
People v. Callet, G.R. No. 153701, 9 May 2002; People v. Muñez,
G.R. No. 150030, 9 May 2003.
[56]
New Civil Code, art. 2230; People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, 23
August
2001. |