SECOND DIVISION
MARCELINA VENZON,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
128308
April 14, 2004
-versus-
SPS. SANTOS AND
GLORIA
JUAN,DEPUTY SHERIFF
VINCENT
F. SUGUIAND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS
OF VALENZUELA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before the sale of property
on execution, the Rules of Court[1]
require notices to be sent to the judgment debtor and to be posted in
public
places. In case of real property with an assessed value exceeding
P50,000.00,
publication of the notice is also compulsory. The sale of property on
execution
that does not conform to the requirements of notice and publication is
void.[2]
While the Court finds
that petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence her
assertion
that said requirements were not complied with, respondents’ knowledge
of
petitioner’s claim warrants the granting of the petition.cralaw:red
Petitioner Marcelina
Venzon is the possessor of the Lot 12, Block 3 of the Encarnacion
Gonzales
Subdivision, Barrio Canumay, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, since 1961 by
virtue
of a contract to sell executed between her and Encarnacion Gonzales.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On July 25, 1989, in
Civil Case No. C-9665, Branch 126 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City rendered a money judgment in favor of private respondent
spouses Santos and Gloria Juan against spouses Benjamin and Encarnacion
Gonzales. Subsequently, the court issued a writ of execution directing
the sheriff to satisfy the judgment.cralaw:red
On October 25, 1990,
respondent spouses caused a notice of attachment/levy to be annotated
as
Entry No. 24967 at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
(39674) T-613344, covering said Lot 12, Block 3. On March 30, 1992, the
property was sold at public auction with respondent spouses as the
highest
bidders. A certificate of sale was issued in their favor on April 20,
1992.cralaw:red
On August 13, 1992,
petitioner filed an adverse claim, Entry No. 37879, over the same
property.
On December 29, 1993, petitioner instituted a Complaint for Annulment
of
the sheriff’ sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of
respondent
spouses, with the RTC of Caloocan City, which case was assigned to
Branch
131 thereof. Named defendants in the Complaint were the spouses Juan,
Deputy
Sheriff Vincent F. Sugui and the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela.cralaw:red
Simultaneous with the
complaint, petitioner filed an action for specific performance and
damages
with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) against spouses
Benjamin and Encarnacion Gonzales to compel the latter to execute a
deed
of conveyance over the property in petitioner’s name. Petitioner
alleged
that she and Gonzales executed a contract to sell in 1961 but, despite
petitioner’s willingness to complete her last installment, the latter
refused
to accept payment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 4, 1994,
the Caloocan RTC, Branch 131, rendered a Decision in petitioner’s
favor.
The trial court found meritorious the allegation of petitioner that she
had no knowledge of the auction sale. It held that while petitioner was
not entitled to personal notice of the auction sale since she was not
the
registered owner of the subject property, good faith demanded that
respondent
spouses, who were allegedly aware of petitioner’s purported right to
the
property, inform the latter of the impending auction sale. The trial
court
also faulted respondent spouses for failing to present the sheriff as
witness
or any document to attest to the compliance with the notices required
for
a valid auction sale.cralaw:red
Respondent spouses elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, which, in its Decision dated February
14, 1997, set aside the Decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals held,
inter alia, that the Rules of Court require only notice of the auction
sale to the judgment debtor, Encarnacion Gonzales, not to Marcelina
Venzon,
a mere possessor of the property. Petitioner also failed to overcome
the
presumption of regularity of performance in favor of the sheriff.cralaw:red
The Court of Appeals
also found petitioner guilty of laches, having slept on her rights for
more than three years. The notice of levy was annotated at the back of
the TCT No. (39674) T-61344 on October 25, 1990. Petitioner filed the
complaint
for annulment of the sheriff’s sale and certificate of sale on December
29, 1993.cralaw:red
Petitioner is now before
this Court seeking the reversal of the adverse Decision of the Court of
Appeals and the reinstatement of the Decision of the RTC.[3]
Prior to the revision
of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1997, Section 18, Rule 39[4]
thereof read as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SEC. 18. Notice of sale
of property on execution. – Before the sale of property on execution,
notice
thereof must be given as follows:
(a) In case of perishable
property, by posting written notice of the time and place of the sale
in
three public places in the municipality or city where the sale is to
take
place, for such time as may be reasonable, considering the character
and
condition of the property.cralaw:red
(c) In case of real
property, by posting for twenty (20) days in three public places in the
municipality or city where the property is situated, a similar notice
particularly
describing the property and stating also where the property is to be
sold,
and, if the assessed value of the property exceeds fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), by publishing a copy of the notice once a week for two
consecutive
weeks in some newspaper published or having general circulation in the
province, if there be one. If there are newspapers published in the
province
in English and/or Filipino, then the publication shall be made in one
such
newspaper.cralaw:red
(d) In all cases, written
notice of the sale shall be given to the judgment debtor.cralaw:red
The purpose of the posting
(and the publication) of the notice under Section 18 (c) is to let the
public know of the sale to the end that the best price or a better bid
may be made possible to minimize prejudice to the judgment debtor.[5]
As the plaintiff claiming
lack of notice of the auction sale was posted and published in
accordance
with Section 18 (c), it behooved petitioner to prove such allegation.
Whoever
asserts a right dependent for its existence upon a negative, must
establish
the truth of the negative by a preponderance of the evidence.[6]
This must be the rule, or it must follow that rights, of which a
negative
forms an essential element, may be enforced without proof.[7]
Thus, whenever the petitioner’s right depends upon the truth of a
negative,
upon him is cast the onus probandi, except in cases where the matter is
peculiarly within the knowledge of the adverse party.[8]
It was error, therefore,
for the trial court to hold that:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Defendants did not present
evidence to rebut the "no notice allegation of the plaintiff. Although
in the defendant spouses’ pre-trial brief, there is that general
allegation
that the auction sale was made in accordance with law, however, there
is
no showing in the record that the requirements with respect to
publication/posting
of notices were complied with by the defendants.cralaw:red
Deliberating on the
absence of notice, the fact that the plaintiff did not come to know
that
Lot 12 was being subjected to an auction sale proves two things: one,
that
no notice was posted in the place where the property is located [and,
two,
that] there was no auction sale that took place on March 30, 1992 ….cralaw:red
Further, the defendants,
particularly defendant sheriff, who is the most competent person to
testify
that a written notice of sale was made and posted in accordance with
law,
was not presented to the witness stand. Neither was a document
presented
like Sheriff’s Certificate of Posting to attest to the fact that a
written
notice of sale was posted before the property was allegedly sold at
public
auction. In fact, the record is silent as (to) where the auction sale
was
conducted.[9]
By ruling in the foregoing
manner, the trial court incorrectly shifted the plaintiff’s burden of
proof
to the defendants. It is true that the fact of posting and publication
of the notices is a matter "peculiarly within the knowledge" of the
Deputy
Sheriff. However, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
him,
as he was not served with summons. At the time of the filing of the
complaint,
he was "no longer connected" with the Caloocan RTC, Branch 126, which
issued
the writ of execution.[10]
Hence, he could not testify in his own behalf.cralaw:red
It cannot be said that
the fact of posting and publication is peculiarly within the knowledge
of respondent spouses. The duty imposed by Section 18 (c) is reposed
upon
the sheriff, who is charged with the enforcement of the writ.[11]
Respondent spouses had a right to presume that he had regularly
performed
his duty.[12]
It was not incumbent upon them to present him as a witness for, in the
absence of the sheriff, the burden to prove lack of posting and
publication
remained with petitioner.cralaw:red
Petitioner utterly failed
to meet her burden. Other than her bare testimony that she did not have
knowledge of the impending auction sale, petitioner did not present any
evidence that notices of the sale were not posted and published.
Petitioner
could have taken pains to find the sheriff and present him as a hostile
witness, but did not do so. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence
to the contrary, that presumption prevails.cralaw:red
Petitioner is not entitled
to notice of the sale under Section 18 (d), which plainly requires
notice
only to the judgment debtor, who, by such notice, is given the
opportunity
to prevent the sale by paying the judgment debt sought to be enforced
and
the costs which may have
been incurred pursuant
to Section 20 of Rule 39.[13]
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the judgment debtor is not
petitioner,
but Encarnacion Gonzales. Since petitioner had no right to said notice,
no cause of action could arise from the lack of service thereof to her.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The levy on execution
by respondent spouses, the judgment creditors in Civil Case No. C-9665,
created a lien in their favor over the right, title and interest of the
judgment debtor, Encarnacion Gonzales, in said property at the time of
the levy subject, however, to liens or encumbrances then existing.[14]
The purchaser at the execution sale acquires only such right or
interest
as the judgment debtor had on the property at the execution sale.[15]
At the time of the levy on execution, there was yet no annotation of
petitioner’s
adverse claim appearing at the back of TCT No. (39674) T-613344;
indeed,
the adverse claim was filed only after the auction sale of the property.cralaw:red
The rule is that it
is the act of registration that operates to convey registered land or
affect
title thereto – registration in a public registry creates constructive
notice to the whole world.[16]
In the absence of registration, third persons cannot be charged with
constructive
notice of dealings involving registered land. Thus, a person dealing
with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate
of
title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
behind
the certificate to determine the condition of the property.[17]
Nevertheless, it is
also settled that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts that
should
put a reasonable man on his guard, and then claim that he acted in good
faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor.[18]
The Petition in this
case alleges that:
6. The petitioner had
been in possession of the property since the time of the execution of
the
contract to sell in 1961. She even constructed a fence thereon with the
help of her son, her daughter-in-law, and also of her neighbors – in
the
person of none other than the respondent-spouses JUAN.cralaw:red
7. The respondent-spouses
who were neighbors of the petitioner had actual knowledge of the
interest
of the latter over the lot in question. As a matter of fact, they even
volunteered to oversee the same for her.[19]
Respondent spouses denied
these allegations in their unverified Comment before this Court,
claiming
that they met petitioner only after they "acquired the property at the
auction sale and [after] they started cleaning the area."[20]
Petitioner, however,
adduced sufficient evidence to support her claim that respondent
spouses
had actual knowledge, or at least facts that should have put them on
guard,
that petitioner had a pre-existing claim to the property. Petitioner’s
brother, Atty. Conrado Venzon, testified that respondent spouses "knew
very well that [the subject] lot belongs to [his] sister and that is
why
[his] sister was very angry about" respondent spouses’ levying on the
property.[21]
Atty. Venzon, petitioner, and even the latter’s caretaker also
testified
that respondent spouses, and even their son,[22]
actually helped in constructing the fence around the property.[23]
The caretaker said that the construction of the fence took place
sometime
in 1967,[24]
or long before respondent spouses’ levy on execution in 1990.
Petitioner
even asked respondent spouses to oversee the property.[25]
Respondent spouses did not refute these testimonies during the trial,
having
waived their right to present testimonial evidence.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent spouses’
actual knowledge of petitioner’s interest in the property renders the
lack
of annotation of the adverse claim at the back of the TCT irrelevant.
From
respondent spouses’ perspective, petitioner, at the time of the levy,
had
a claim over the subject lot although the same was actually in the name
of the judgment debtor, Encarnacion Gonzales. Their acquisition of such
property at the execution sale is, therefore, subject to the perfection
of petitioner’s claim to ownership.cralaw:red
The Court of Appeals
found that laches had set in against petitioner. The equitable doctrine
of laches is not available to shield wrongdoing on the part of whoever
would invoke it.[27]
As respondent spouses are guilty of bad faith in levying on the
property
despite actual knowledge of petitioner’s pre-existing claim, the
defense
of laches is not available to them.cralaw:red
Respondent spouses charge
petitioner with violating the rule against forum-shopping by the
simultaneous
institution by the latter of the action before the HLURB with the
action
before the RTC.[28]
Forum-shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court
might look with favor upon the party.[29]
The HLURB Complaint
is grounded upon the alleged refusal of the therein respondent
Encarnacion
Gonzales to accept payment of the balance of the purchase price in
accordance
with the contract to sell between her and petitioner, causing damage to
the latter.[30]
It prayed for, among other things, the conveyance of the subject
property
to, and an award of damages in favor of, petitioner.[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other hand, the
action before the RTC arose from the purported failure of the defendant
deputy sheriff, in connivance with respondent spouses, to notify
petitioner
of the auction sale, for which petitioner suffered damage.[32]
It asked for, among other things, the annulment of the certificate of
said
sale as well as an adjudication of damages.[33]
Plainly, the two actions
spring from different causes arising from different factual
circumstances
and seek different reliefs. The charge of forum-shopping is patently
without
merit.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the Decision
of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Respondent Spouses Santos and
Gloria
Juan are ordered to respect the rights of petitioner Marcelina Venzon’s
to the subject property as stated in the contract to sell executed
between
petitioner and Encarnacion Gonzales.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez,
and Callejo, Jr., JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rule 39, sec. 18 (now sec. 15, per the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure).
[2]
Ago v. Court of Appeals, 116 Phil. 839 (1962).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Petitioner subsequently informed this Court by way of Manifestation
that
the HLURB rendered a Decision, dated October 9, 1997, ordering:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.
Respondents [Benjamin and Encarnacion Gonzales] to execute the deed of
conveyance for Lot 12, Block 3 of the Encarnacion Gonzales Subdivision
in favor of complainant [Marcelina Venzon] immediately after receipt of
the last and full payment of the purchase price; and to cause the
issuance
of title therefor in favor of complainant;
2.
Respondents to pay P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as
exemplary
damages;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3.
Respondents to pay P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4.
Respondents to pay cost of suit. (Rollo, pp. 123-124.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
HLURB decision allegedly became final and executory on April 12, 2000.
[4]
Now Section 15 of the same Rule, providing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SEC.
15. Notice of sale of property on execution. – Before the sale of
property
on execution, notice thereof must be given as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryc
(a)
In case of perishable property, by posting written notice of the time
and
place of the sale in three (3) public places, preferably in conspicuous
areas of the municipal or city hall, post office and public market in
the
municipality or city where the sale is to take place, for such time as
may be reasonable, considering the character and condition of the
property;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b)
In case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in the
three (3) public places above-mentioned for not less than five (5) days;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(c)
In case of real property, by posting for twenty (20) days in the three
(3) public places above-mentioned a similar notice particularly
describing
the property and stating where the property is to be sold, and if the
assessed
value of the property exceeds fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, by
publishing
a copy of the notice once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in one
newspaper
selected by raffle, whether in English, Filipino, or any major regional
language published, edited and circulated or, in the absence thereof,
having
general circulation in the province or city;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(d)
In all cases, written notice of the sale shall be given to the judgment
obligor, at least three (3) days before the sale, except as provided in
paragraph (a) hereof where notice shall be given at any time before the
sale, in the same manner as personal service of pleadings and other
papers
as provided by section 6 of Rule 13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
notice shall specify the place, date and exact time of the sale which
should
not be earlier than nine o’clock in the morning and not later than two
o’clock in the afternoon. The place of the sale may be agreed upon by
the
parties. In the absence of such agreement, the sale of real property or
personal property not capable of manual delivery shall be held in the
office
of the clerk of the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court
which
issued the writ or which was designated by the appellate court. In the
case of personal property capable of manual delivery, the sale shall be
held in the place where the property is located.
[5]
Torres v. Cabling, A.M. No. P-97-1249, July 11, 1997, 275 SCRA 329.
[6]
I Rice, F.S. The General Principles of the Law of Evidence §437.
[7]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[10]
Id. at 40.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Rules of Court, rule 39, sec. 8.
[12]
Id., rule 131, sec. 3 (m).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Torres v. Cabling, supra, note 5. Now Section 18, Rule 39, per the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC.
18. No sale if judgment and costs paid. – At any time before the sale
of
property on execution, the judgment obligor may prevent the sale by
paying
the amount required by the execution and the costs that have been
incurred
therein.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Rules of Court, rule 39, sec. 16 (now sec. 12 of the 1997 Revised Rules
on Civil Procedure).
[15]
China Banking Corporation, 364 SCRA 638; Potenciano v. Dineros, G.R.
No.
L-7614, May 31, 1955.
[16]
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001, 358 SCRA
598; Pres. Dec. No. 1529, secs. 51-52.
[17]
Chu, Sr. v. Benelda Estate Development Corporation, G.R. No. 142313,
March
1, 2001, 353 SCRA 424.
[18]
Spouses Uy v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 788 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Rollo, p. 13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Id. at 140.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
TSN, August 11, 1994, p. 6 (Records, p. 106).
[22]
TSN, August 11, 1994, pp. 13-14 (Records, pp. 112-113).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
TSN, August 9, 1994, p. 5 (Records, p. 77); TSN, August 11, 1994, p. 9
(Records, p. 108).
[24]
TSN, August 11, 1994, p. 15 (Records, p. 114).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
TSN, August 9, 1994, p. 7 (Records, p. 79).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
TSN, September 2, 1994, p. 3 (Records, p. 231); Order dated September
2,
1994 (Records, p. 227).
[27]
Rañeses v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68747, July
13,
1990, 187 SCRA 397.
[28]
Rollo, p. 130.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Bangko Silangan Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110480,
June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 322.
[30]
Rollo, pp. 94-95.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Records, pp. 2-3.
[33]
Id. at 4. |