SECOND DIVISION
CRISELDA F. JOSE,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
128646
March 14, 2003
-versus-
HON. COURT OF
APPEALS
AND DANILO OMEGA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a petition
erroneously entitled as a "Petition for Review on
Certiorari" which
should
be a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The factual background
of the case is as follows:
On November 14, 1994,
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 22) rendered a decision
in
Civil Case No. CEO-15709, entitled "Danilo Omega, Plaintiff, versus,
Criselda
F. Jose, Defendant.", the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE, based on
the evidence thus presented, this Court finds for the plaintiff.
Judgment is hereby rendered declaring the March 3, 1981 marriage
between
plaintiff Danilo Omega and Criselda F. Jose, null and void ab
initio.
Custody over the three children Joselyn, Danilo, Jr. and Jordan, all
surnamed
Omega shall be entrusted to plaintiff Danilo Omega.cralaw:red
"Furnish the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila with a copy of this judgment. No costs.cralaw:red
"SO ORDERED."[1]
The ground for declaring
the marriage null and void is psychological incapacity on the part of
defendant
Criselda under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
During the trial, the counsel on record of defendant Criselda was Atty.
Margarito D. Yap of the Cebu City District Office of the Public
Attorney's
Office (PAO). However, defendant Criselda filed a Notice of
Appeal,
dated December 7, 1994, on her own, without the assistance of Atty. Yap.[2]
The Judicial Records
Division (JRD) of the Court of Appeals sent a notice to pay docket fee,
dated August 3, 1995 to Atty. Yap which was received by him.[3]
On October 24, 1995, the appellate court, through the Former Sixteenth
Division,[4]
promulgated a Resolution which reads as follows:
"For failure of the
defendant-appellant to pay the docketing fee in this case within the
reglementary
period which expired on August 25, 1995, despite receipt by his counsel
on August 10, 1995 of this Court's notice dated August 3, 1995, this
appeal
is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED."[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On May 9, 1996, the
Division Clerk of Court issued the Entry of Judgment certifying that
the
above-quoted Resolution had become final and executory as of December
1,
1995.[6]
It is indicated at the bottom of said Entry of Judgment that Atty. Yap
and the Special and Appealed Cases Division of the PAO were sent copies
of the Entry of Judgment.cralaw:red
On May 13, 1996, the
appellate court received a letter of even date from defendant-appellant
Criselda addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals
inquiring
about the status of her appeal and claiming that she has not received
any
notice from the appellate court.[7]
The appellate court
noted the explanation of the clerk in the Civil Cases Section of the
Judicial
Records Division (JRD) of said court that Atty. Yap was sent the notice
to pay docket fee because Criselda had sent a copy of her Notice of
Appeal
to Atty. Yap and that per the records of the case, Atty. Yap was
earlier
sent a copy of the formal offer of exhibits and duly received in his
behalf,
he filed the comments and objections to the exhibits for the plaintiff;
he appeared at the hearings conducted by the trial court.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 28, 1996,
Criselda through counsel filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File
Omnibus
Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal.[9]
On December 16, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued the following
Resolution:
"Considering that the
Resolution dismissing this appeal has become final on December 1, 1995
and an Entry of Judgment has in fact been made on May 9, 1996, the
Motion
for Leave of Court to File Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal
and
the Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal are hereby denied.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED."[10]
Criselda's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
Hence, the present petition
on the following ground:
"The public respondent
Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error in denying the
petitioner's
Motion for Leave of Court to file Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate
Appeal
and the Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal which if not
corrected,
would deprive petitioner of her constitutional right to due process and
injustice would be done to her."[11]
on which basis, petitioner
Criselda raises the following issues:
"I.
"WHETHER OR NOT THE
PETITIONER WHO APPEALED HER CASE BY HERSELF WITHOUT COUNSEL WAS VALIDLY
SERVED WITH NOTICE TO PAY THE DOCKETING FEE AND NOTICE OF THE
RESOLUTION
DISMISSING HER APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE DOCKETING FEE.
"II.
"WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE OMNIBUS MOTIONS/MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL AND
THE
OMNIBUS MOTIONS/MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL."[12]
After private respondent
filed his Comment, parties filed their respective Memoranda in
compliance
with the Resolution of the Court dated December 14, 1998.cralaw:red
We find the petition
devoid of merit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Based on the records,
it appears that the PAO, through Atty. Victor C. Laborte and Atty. Yap,
represented petitioner during the trial of the case. Although
petitioner
herself personally filed the Notice of Appeal, the fact remains that
Atty.
Yap or the PAO has not filed any formal notice of withdrawal of
appearance
in the trial court. Therefore, insofar as the appellate court is
concerned, Atty. Yap is the counsel of record. As such, the
appellate
court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's
motion for leave of court to file omnibus motions or motion to
reinstate
appeal.cralaw:red
Section 22, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, provides:
"Section 22. Attorney
who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. - An
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be
presumed
to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal
petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court."
Payment of the docket
and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional, and failure of the appellant to conform with the rules
on appeal renders the judgment final and executory.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Indeed, the Court, in
some instances, had allowed liberal construction of the Rules of Court
with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals
on equitable consideration.[14]
In Buenaflor vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has enunciated the
following:
"The established rule
is that the payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed
period
is mandatory. Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified, to wit:
First, the failure to pay appellate court docket fee within the
reglementary
period allows only discretionary dismissal, not automatic dismissal, of
the appeal; Second, such power should be used in the exercise of the
Courts'
sound discretion ‘in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
"play
and with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant
circumstances.cralaw:red
"Admittedly, this Court
has allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases where a stringent
application
of the rules would have denied it, only when to do so would serve the
demands
of justice and in the exercise of the Court's equity
jurisdiction.
This is based on the rule of liberality in the interpretation of the
Rules
to achieve substantial justice. It may be recalled that the
general
rule is that the Rules of Court are rules of procedure and whenever
called
for they should be so construed as to give effect rather than defeat
their
essence.cralaw:red
"Section 6, Rule 1 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
‘SEC. 6. Construction
- These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective
of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.'chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Rules of procedures
are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and,
therefore,
they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.
The
exception is that, while the Rules are liberally construed, the
provisions
with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals
are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these
rules
have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in
some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal
perfected
out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have
denied
it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial
justice,
and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.cralaw:red
"The underlying consideration
in this petition is that the act of dismissing the notice of appeal, if
done in excess of the trial court's jurisdiction, amounts to an undue
denial
of the petitioner's right to appeal. The importance and real
purpose
of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of
Appeals
where this Court ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our
judicial
system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not
to
deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every
party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition
of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities."[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, the Court finds
no cogent reason to be liberal in the present case for the following
reasons:
Petitioner's counsel,
Atty. Margarito Yap of the PAO was properly sent by the appellate court
a notice to pay the docket fees. Atty. Yap or the PAO did not
file
any formal withdrawal of appearance and therefore, for all intents and
purposes, the appellate court correctly sent the notice to Atty.
Yap.
It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and
omission
of their counsel.[16]
Moreover, under Section
21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney is presumed to be
properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears. Under
Section
22 of the same Rule, an attorney who appears de parte in a case before
a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on
appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in
the appellate court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner failed to
pursue her appeal for almost two years. She herself filed the
notice
of appeal on December 4, 1994 but thought of inquiring from the Court
of
Appeals about her appeal only on May 13, 1996 (or after the lapse of
one
year and five months) as to the status of her appeal.cralaw:red
Petitioner failed to
show that her appeal is extremely meritorious that to deprive her of an
appeal would unduly affect her substantial rights.cralaw:red
In other words, petitioner
failed to show any compelling reason to warrant the issuance of the
writ
of certiorari. The Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion
in denying petitioner's Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus
Motions/Motion
to Reinstate Appeal. Its Resolution dated October 24, 1995
dismissing
petitioner's appeal had become final and executory as of December 1,
1995.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J.,
(Chairman),
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Original Records, p. 47.
[2]
Id., at p. 51.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, p. 11.
[4]
Composed of Justices Salome A. Montoya, Godardo A. Jacinto and Oswaldo
D. Agcaoili.
[5]
CA Rollo, p. 24.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Ibid, at p. 24.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 17-18; TSN of hearings held on July 8, 1994 and September
28,
1994.
[9]
Annex "A-1", rollo, pp. 40-44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Annex "B", rollo, p. 49.
[11]
Rollo, p. 17.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Id., at p. 18.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Lazaro vs. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 208, 213 (2000).
[14]
Buenaflor vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 563, 567 (2000).
[15]
Id., at pp. 567-569.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Yu vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 181, 190 (1985). |