SECOND DIVISION
TEODORA
A.
RIOFERIO,
VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA,ASSISTED
BY HER
HUSBAND, ZALDY EVANGELISTA,ALBERTO
ORFINADA,
AND ROWENA O. UNGOS,ASSISTED
BY HER
HUSBAND, BEDA UNGOS,
Petitioners, |
G.R.
No.
129008
January 13, 2004
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS,
ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA,LOURDES P. ORFINADA,
ALFONSO ORFINADA,NANCY P. ORFINADA,
ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA,CHRISTOPHER P.
ORFINADA
AND ANGELO P. ORFINADA,
Respondents. |
D E C I S I
O N
TINGA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whether the heirs may bring
suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an
administrator
is the issue in this case.
This Petition for Review
on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside
the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated January 31, 1997,
as well as its Resolution[2]
dated March 26, 1997, denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.cralaw:red
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso
P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several
personal
and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan
City.[3]
He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married
on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada,
Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P.
Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Apart from the respondents,
the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their
children.
They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when
he entered into an extra-marital relationship with her during the
subsistence
of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners
Veronica,[5]
Alberto and Rowena.[6]
On November 14, 1995,
respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June
29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an
Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and
that
accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of
Titles
Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio,
Veronica
Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos.
Respondents
also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of
P700,000.00
from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate
Mortgage
over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.[7]
On December 1, 1995,
respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional
Trial
Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of administration
encompassing
the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.[8]
On December 4, 1995,
respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra
Judicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate
Mortgage
and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983,
63985
and 63984 and Other Related Documents with Damages against petitioners,
the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan
City before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.[9]
On February 5, 1996,
petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing
the
defense that the property subject of the contested deed of
extra-judicial
settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the
parents
of Teodora Riofero[10]
and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance
inheritance
but the decedent had managed to register them in his name.[11]
Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are
not
the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.
Orfinada,
Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.[12]
On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative
Defenses
for Hearing[13]
on the aforesaid ground.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The lower court denied
the motion in its Order[14]
dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the
real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator
who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for
its reconsideration[15]
but the motion was likewise denied.[16]
This prompted petitioners
to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. 42053.[17]
Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case on
the
ground that the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased is the
estate
of the decedent and not the respondents.[18]
The Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed Decision[19]
dated January 31, 1997, stating that it discerned no grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent
judge
when he denied petitioners’ motion to set affirmative defenses for
hearing
in view of its discretionary nature.cralaw:red
A Motion for Reconsideration
was filed by petitioners but it was denied.[20]
Hence, the petition before this Court.cralaw:red
The issue presented
by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal
standing
to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the
commencement
of the administration proceedings.[21]
Petitioners vehemently
fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for
preliminary
hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the
action is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. It must
be
stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative
defense
lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear from the Rules of
Court,
thus:
SEC. 5.
Pleadings
grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal
provided
for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an
affirmative
defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to
dismiss had been filed.[22]
(Emphasis supplied)
Certainly, the
incorporation
of the word "may" in the provision is clearly indicative of the
optional
character of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes discretion and
cannot
be construed as having a mandatory effect.[23]
Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond
cavil
by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase
"in
the discretion of the Court", apart from the retention of the word
"may"
in Section 6,[24]
in Rule 16 thereof.
Just as no blame of
abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower court’s doorstep for not
hearing
petitioners’ affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for
recognizing
the legal standing of the respondents as heirs to bring the suit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Pending the filing of
administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality
to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance
with
the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights
to
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent."
The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
property,
rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his
will
or by operation of law.[25]
Even if administration
proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper
modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules
on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3[26]
and Section 2, Rule 87[27]
of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,[28]
this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the
rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the
appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules,[29]
while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring
suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from
representing
the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an
administrator
has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the
situation
in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have
already
been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such
instances,
the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an
administrator;
then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care
enough
to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased;
and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of
the
decedent are violated or dissipated.cralaw:red
Even if there is an
appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz:
(1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring
suit;[30]
and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the
act
complained of[31]
and he is made a party defendant.[32]
Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to
recover
property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed
administrator,
if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is
either
disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.cralaw:red
All told, therefore,
the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery
of property of the estate during the pendency of administration
proceedings
has three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed
administrator
such as in this case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As the appellate court
did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower
court,
recourse to this Court is not warranted.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 17-20.
[2]
Id, at 21-22.
[3]
Id. at 95.
[4]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
The Complaint for Annulment/Rescission of the Extrajudicial Settlement
of the Estate of a Deceased Person dated December 2, 1995 contains an
allegation
under paragraph 9 that Veronica is not one of the illegitimate children
of the decedent Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. by Teodora Riofero but of one
Alonzo Orfinada.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Rollo, p. 95.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id. at 95-96.
[8]
Id. at 96.
[9]
Id. at 28-37.
[10]
CA Rollo, p. 38.
[11]
Id. at 10.
[12]
Id. at 38.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Rollo, pp. 107-108.
[14]
CA Rollo, pp. 113-116.
[15]
Id. at 32-34.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id. at 39-40.
[17]
Id. at 1-12.
[18]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Rollo, pp. 17-20.
[20]
Id. at 21-22.
[21]
Id. at 124.
[22]
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It is Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules
of Civil Procedure which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section
6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. – If no motion to dismiss
has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this
Rule
may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the
discretion
of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion
to
dismiss had been filed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without
prejudice
to the prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim
pleaded
in the answer. (Emphasis supplied)
[23]
Republic Planters Bank v. Agana, Sr., G.R. No. 51765, 269 SCRA 1, 12
(1997).
[24]
Supra note 22.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Coronel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996, 263 SCRA
15.
[26]
Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec.
3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted
or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity,
the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a
trustee
of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a
party
authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and
for
the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining
the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal.
[27]
Section 2 of Rule 87:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec.
2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive.
— For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the
deceased,
an executor or administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the
deceased,
actions for causes which survive."
[28]
G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 207.
[29]
Supra, note 26.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 (1942).
[31]
Velasquez v. George, G.R. No. L-62376, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 456.
[32]
Borromeo v. Borromeo, 98 Phil 432 (1956).
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |