THIRD DIVISION.
.
RICARDO B.
GONZALES,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
129090
April 30, 2003
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALSAND THE HEIRS OF
CONSOLACION C. DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,
J.:
Before Us is a Petition
for Certiorari of the Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner’s Motion for Extension of
Time
to File Appellant’s Brief and, ultimately, dismissing petitioner’s
appeal
from the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXIV, in
Civil
Case No. 91-57572. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution was denied on March 31, 1997.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The undisputed facts
follow.cralaw:red
Dr. Consolacion C. de
Guzman, who died while this case was pending appeal before this Court
and
is now substituted by respondent heirs,[4]
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Dr. Ricardo B.
Gonzales
based on five causes of action. The trial court enumerated the same as
follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The first cause
consists
in the act of the defendant in issuing and implementing Hospital Order
No. 4, Series of 1990, which allegedly removed the defendant (sic) from
a position as Head of the Department of Obstetrics &
Gynecology
in the Fabella Hospital which was issued unwarrantedly, maliciously and
in wanton disregard of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and is a
forced
demotion in rank, function and status, and subjected plaintiff to
social
humiliation and embarrassment before all doctors, and members of all
hospital
staff and employees of Fabella Hospital, and caused plaintiff mental
anguish,
anxiety and sleepless nights. The second cause of action is the
allegation
in the complaint that the filing by the defendant of the P6 Million
libel
case against the plaintiff in the Quezon City Fiscal’s Office which
likewise
caused plaintiff to suffer damages and incur attorney’s fees. The third
cause of action consists in the filing by the defendant of the
administrative
case with the Department of Health for ‘grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.’ And the fourth cause of action is
the filing by the defendant of the complaint with the Philippine
Obstetrics
& Gynocology Society for cancellation of the plaintiff’s membership
as ‘fellow.’ And the last cause of action is the filing by the
defendant
of the administrative case with the Philippine Regulatory Commission,
to
cancel plaintiff’s license to practice her profession as a Doctor of
Medicine.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On April 7, 1995, the
trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the deceased plaintiff. The
dispositive portion of the said decision read:
Accordingly,
the Court awards to the plaintiff and against the defendant the amount
of P290,000.00 representing attorney’s fees and costs of litigation, by
way of actual damages and to compensate plaintiff for the pain,
suffering
and mental anguish she underwent by reason of the unwarranted filing of
the administrative cases against her by the defendant, the Court orders
defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000,000 (sic) as moral
damages and likewise orders the defendant to pay the amount of
P100,000.00
as exemplary damages. All amounts awarded to the plaintiff to bear
interest
at the legal rate from the date of this decision up to the time of
actual
payment.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner appealed the
said Decision to the Court of Appeals. On February 21, 1996, the
appellate
court sent by registered mail to Atty. Ruben Almadro, petitioner’s
counsel,
a notice requiring him to file the appellant’s brief within 45 days
from
receipt thereof. According to the postmaster’s certification, the
notice
was received on February 26, 1996 by a certain Vicente Mendoza at the
residence
of Atty. Almadro. The petitioner therefore had 45 days from February
26,
1996 or up to April 11, 1996 to file the appellant’s brief.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Three months after
the expiration of the 45-day period, on July 12, 1996, Atty. Almadro
filed
a motion for extension of time to file the appellant’s brief. He
alleged
that it was only on July 11, 1996, while in the process of transferring
his case records and files from his old office to a new one, that he
found
the unopened letter-envelope sent by the appellate court requiring him
to file the appellant’s brief within 45 days from receipt of the
notice.
Atty. Almadro surmised that the letter-envelope must have been received
by a former househelp who failed to bring it to his attention. He also
alleged that there was no indication by his househelp of the exact date
of receipt of the said letter. He thus prayed that he be given another
period of 30 days from July 12, 1996 or until August 11, 1996 within
which
to file the appellant’s brief.
On July 23, 1996, Dr.
de Guzman moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
petitioner’s
motion for extension of time for filing the brief was filed after the
lapse
of the original period.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On August 12, 1996,
Atty. Almadro filed a manifestation stating that, since August 11, 1996
was a Sunday, he filed thru registered mail two copies of the
appellant’s
brief on August 10, 1996. He also manifested that he was filing seven
other
copies of the appellant’s brief to complete a total of nine copies,
together
with the affidavit of service to counsel for then respondent Dr. de
Guzman.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 10, 1996,
respondent Dr. de Guzman filed another motion reiterating her previous
motions to dismiss, to expunge the appeal from the records and for the
issuance of an entry of judgment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 13, 1996,
the appellate court issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of
which
read:
WHEREFORE,
motion for time to file appellant’s brief is hereby DENIED, for lack of
merit, and the appeal is DISMISSED. The appellant’s brief filed out of
time is ordered expunged from the record of the case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
In dismissing the
appeal,
the appellate court held that:
Section 15, Rule 46
of the Rules of Court states that ‘Extension of time for the filing of
briefs will not be allowed, except for good and sufficient cause, and
only
if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of time
sought
to be extended.’ Defendant-appellant may secure several extensions to
file
brief provided each extension is predicated on good and sufficient
cause
and application for extension is filed before the time sought to be
extended
expires (Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 120-121 cited in
Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Volume 2, 1979 Edition, p. 489). When
defendant-appellant
filed a motion for time to file appellant’s brief on July 12, 1996, 92
days had elapsed since the last day to file appellant’s brief. Hence,
this
motion cannot be allowed.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Defendant-appellant’s
reason for not filing his motion for extension of time to file
appellant’s
brief seasonably is flimsy and puerile, to say the least. For one,
counsel
for defendant-appellant alleged in his motion that he discovered that
unopened
letter envelope containing the notice, only on July 11, 1996, while he
was in the process of transferring his various case records and files
from
his present office/residence to a new office. Up to this very day,
however,
this Court has not received any notice of change of address from
counsel.
Counsel further contends that the letter envelope must have been
received
by one of his previous househelps who must have inadvertently failed to
bring said mail matter to his attention. The court has no way of
knowing
whether this is true as counsel himself was merely speculating. Even
granting
this to be true, this negligence is simply inexcusable. It is the duty
of counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a system that efficiently
takes
into account all court notices sent to him and not simply allow a
househelp,
without counsel’s diligent supervision, to receive important court
notices.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court based on the
following
assignments of error:
I
THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER
TO FILE HIS APPELLANT’S BRIEF WITHIN THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY THE COURT
OF
APPEALS AND/OR TO SEEK AN EXTENSION WITHIN SAID PERIOD WAS DUE TO
EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II
THE SETTLED RULE IS
THAT LITIGATIONS SHOULD, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, BE DECIDED ON THEIR
MERITS
AND NOT ON TECHNICALITIES; and
III
RULES OF PROCEDURE SHOULD
NOT BE APPLIED IN A VERY RIGID, TECHNICAL SENSE ESPECIALLY WHERE, AS IN
THE CASE AT BAR, THE APPEAL IS VERY MERITORIOUS.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner imputes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction to the
appellate
court for denying his appeal purely on technical grounds. He argues
that
the failure of his counsel to get hold of the letter-notice of the
appellate
court for the filing of the brief was due to excusable neglect.
Petitioner
likewise contends that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion
in not allowing the extension sought by the petitioner and in not
admitting
the appellant’s brief inspite of the fact that the respondent heirs’
substantial
rights will not be violated by a contrary ruling. Litigations,
according
to the petitioner, should as much as possible be decided on their
merits
and not on technicalities. Rules of procedure should not be
applied
in a very rigid and technical manner as they are intended to promote,
not
to defeat, substantial justice.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The crucial issue for
consideration is whether the negligence of petitioner’s counsel was
inexcusable,
thus rendering his plea for equity unmeritorious.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 12, Rule 44
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Sec. 12.
Extension
of time for filing briefs. Extension of time for the filing of briefs
will
not be allowed, except for good and sufficient cause, and only if the
motion
for extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be
extended. (Underscoring supplied) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Clearly, petitioner’s
counsel
was negligent in not filing the motion for extension of time to file
the
appellant’s brief within the 45-day period from the date of receipt of
notice as required by Section 7, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Petitioner’s counsel, however, blames his househelp who allegedly
forgot
to give him the said notice or to call his attention to it. Said
counsel allegedly discovered the same only when he was arranging his
files
after transferring to his new office.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We hold that an attorney
owes it to himself and to his clients to adopt an efficient and orderly
system of receiving and attending promptly to all judicial
notices.
He and his client must suffer the consequences of his failure to do so
particularly where such negligence is not excusable as in the case at
bar.[10]
A lawyer can adopt an efficient way of handling court mail matters even
if his residence also serves as his office. If petitioner’s counsel was
not informed by his house-help of the notice which eventually got
misplaced
in his office files, said counsel has only himself to blame for
entrusting
the matter to an incompetent or irresponsible person.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Aside from his failure
to adopt an organized and efficient system of managing his files and
court
notices, we also note that petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Almadro, allowed
one year to lapse before he again acted on the appeal of his client.
The
trial court rendered the decision against the petitioner on April 7,
1995.
Petitioner must have appealed the same either in June or July of the
same
year. Subsequently, the notice to file the appellant’s brief was
received by the househelp of Atty. Almadro, petitioner’s counsel, on
February
21, 1996. It was only on July 11, 1996 that Atty. Almadro claims to
have
discovered the notice. From the time he must have filed his appeal
sometime
in June or July of 1995 up to the time of the alleged discovery on July
11, 1996, Atty. Almadro apparently never bothered to check why he had
not
received any notice for the filing of his client’s (appellant’s) brief.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The legal profession
demands of a lawyer that degree of vigilance and attention expected of
a good father of a family and should adopt the norm of practice
expected
of men of good intentions. In other words, a lawyer must always be
protective
of the interests of his clients as a good father would be protective of
his own family.[11]
Atty. Almadro’s actuation evidently shows his lack of interest in
protecting
and fighting for his client’s interests. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition for certiorari of the resolutions of the Court
of Appeals is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.
chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jaime Lantin and concurred in by Associate
Justices Corona Ibay-Somera and Salvador Valdez of the 8th Division;
Rollo,
pp. 57-58.
[2]
Penned by Judge Sergio D. Mabunay, Rollo, pp. 61-75.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, p. 60.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Respondents Adelaida de Guzman-Santos, Florentina de Guzman-Frogoso,
Ricardo
Cruz de Guzman, and Zenaida de Guzman-Caluag; Rollo, pp. 250-251.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 123-124.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id., pp. 74-75.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Rollo, p. 58.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Rollo, p. 33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Javier vs. Madamba, Jr., 174 SCRA 495, 499-500 [1989]; Enriquez vs.
Bautista,
79 Phil, 220, 222 [1949].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
E. Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 201 (Central Professional Books,
Inc., 1995) citing PBC vs. Aruego, CA-G.R. # 28274, June 18, 1965 and
Blaza
vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 461 (1988). |