Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
129306
March 14, 2003
-versus-
JAMES PATANO Y
MARCAIDA, RAMIL MADRIAGA
Y LAGONOYAND ROSENDO MADRIAGA
Y BANAAG,
Appellants.
D E C I S I
O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For automatic review is
the decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 262 in Criminal Case No. 110089-H convicting
appellants
James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga of the crime of
Kidnapping
for Ransom and imposing upon them the supreme penalty of death.
The Amended Information,
dated May 15, 1996, charged appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and
Rosendo Madriaga as well as Oswaldo Banaag, Manolo Babac, Allan Duarte
and Jose Doe, with the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, committed as
follows:
That on or about March
25, 1996, in Mandaluyong City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused grouping themselves together, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously detain/kidnap and/otherwise deprived VICENTE
UY Y CHUA (NGO LIT POON) of his liberty for the purpose of extorting
ransom,
as in fact demand therefore in the amount of TEN MILLION
(P10,000,000.00)
PESOS had been made by the above-named accused, while detaining said
victim
in Antipolo, Rizal, until his rescue on March 27, 1996.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
All three appellants
together with Oswaldo Banaag pleaded not guilty to the crime as
charged.
Their other co-accused Manolo Babac, Allan Duarte and Jose Doe remain
at
large. Trial ensued.cralaw:red
The prosecution presented
six witnesses.cralaw:red
Kidnap victim Vicente
Uy testified as follows -- On March 25, 1996, at around 10:30 in the
evening,
he was along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, on his way home
driving
his Nissan Sentra when a black Pajero bumped his car on the left door,
driver's side. Both he and the driver of the Pajero got off their
respective vehicles. When he told the driver that they have to
call
a police officer, he was told that the passengers inside the Pajero
were
police officers. He was asked to look inside the Pajero.
When
he did so, the driver suddenly pushed him inside the vehicle while the
four other passengers grabbed him. He was blindfolded and his
feet
and hands were tied. After traveling for about 30 minutes, the
vehicle
stopped and he was transferred to the baggage compartment of another
vehicle.
An object was placed on top of him and he was told that it was an
armalite.
They traveled again for 30 minutes, after which, he was moved, placed
on
a "hard object" and covered with "something". He was asked if he
has ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) to which he replied in the
negative.
They bargained for a while until the ransom money was pegged at five
million
pesos (P5,000,000.00). They asked for his telephone number which
he gave. After some hours, Uy felt somebody lifting him up,
telling
him that he was already safe, removing his blindfold and untying
him.
His daughter Lucy Ngo then entered the room. He was asked if he
wanted
to go to the hospital but he declined.[2]
On cross-examination,
Uy stated that when his blindfold was removed, he saw two handcuffed
men.
He pointed to appellant Rosendo Madriaga who was in the courtroom, but
Uy declared that he is not certain that Rosendo was the one he had seen
handcuffed because the one he saw was wearing a moustache and Rosendo
does
not have one.[3]
Chief Inspector Gilbert
Cruz, in-charge of operations of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission's
(PACC) Task Force Habagat, testified as follows -- On March 27, 1996,
his
superior, Supt. Calinisan instructed him to proceed to the residence of
Uy as the former received a call from Lucy telling him that there was
someone
in the house of Virginia Avelita, Uy's common-law wife, who claims to
know
the location of the victim. He went to the house of Lucy and they
agreed that he will pose as the family's lawyer. They then went
to
the house of Virginia. There, he was introduced to appellant
Ramil
Madriaga who told them that Uy was under the custody of the Antipolo
police
because he was arrested for swimming without authority at the Villa
Cristina
Resort (resort for brevity), Antipolo, Rizal, now Antipolo City.
Upon his instructions, verification was made by a certain Chief Insp.
Quidato[4]
who had gone to the resort and learned that the information was
false.
Together with Lucy and appellant Ramil, Maj. Cruz proceeded to the
resort.
Upon reaching the resort, Ramil "dashed" towards cottage no. 2 but Maj.
Cruz stopped Ramil. In front of the cottage was a certain Richard
Dimal to whom Cruz identified himself as a police officer. He
found
appellant Rosendo and victim Uy inside the cottage. Dimal and
appellant
Rosendo were then arrested, handcuffed and brought to the headquarters
where they identified a certain Oswaldo Banaag as the "tipster" of the
group.[5]
Lucy Ngo's testimony
is as follows -- In the morning of March 26, 1996, she received a call
from Virginia Avelita telling her that a certain Ramil Madriaga was at
her place with information regarding the whereabouts of her father
Vicente
Uy, also known as Ngo Lip Poon. She called Maj. Gilbert Cruz and
together, they went to Virginia's house. There, they met
appellant
Ramil who informed them that he received a beeper message from his
cousin,
appellant Rosendo, telling him that the Antipolo police picked up their
group and Uy was recovered. Maj. Cruz then instructed Maj. Winnie
Quidato to check with the Antipolo police if there was really an arrest
made on that day and it was learned that there was none. Maj.
Cruz
instructed Quidato to proceed to the resort which they also did
together
with Lucy's uncles and aunts. At the resort, appellant Ramil got
off the car and talked to Maj. Cruz who instructed Ramil: "(O)kay
but slowly, do not run or make any move." Halfway towards his
cousin,
appellant Ramil ran and met appellant Rosendo. Maj. Cruz then
ran,
followed by his staff. Lucy and her
companions
were left waiting in the car until Quidato returned and told her
that her father is safe, and they proceeded to the cottage.
Appellant
Ramil approached Lucy and asked her not to include his cousin Rosendo
in
the case because of Ramil's help in the rescue of her father.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Richard Dimal who was
arrested by Maj. Cruz on March 27, 1996, testified as follows -- In the
evening of March 25, 1996, he was renting some VHS tapes at the Star
Gazer
video shop located at Pasig City where he saw his friend Nadel
Francisco.
They chatted until 12 o'clock midnight. Appellant Ramil passed by
in his white Toyota Corolla car between 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock in the
morning of March 26, 1996 and invited Dimal "to go around" to which the
latter acceded. They went to the house of Dimal at Cainta,
Rizal.
Dimal saw a black Nissan Patrol parked in front of his house.
Appellant
Ramil then called up a passenger of the Nissan Patrol on his mobile
phone
and told the latter, "we can't do it here, we must find a darker
place."
Then they proceeded to Taytay, Rizal and stopped behind its new
market.
Appellant Ramil alighted from the car and went to the Nissan
Patrol.
Thereafter, Dimal saw them put something inside the trunk of the car of
Ramil. They left Taytay, Rizal and roamed around, with the Nissan
Patrol tailing them. When they reached Bulacan, they stopped and
Ramil talked to the passengers of the Nissan Patrol. Ramil
returned
to his car and told Dimal that they will go to Antipolo, Rizal.
Upon
reaching Antipolo, the passengers of the Nissan Patrol transferred to
the
car of Ramil. They left the Nissan Patrol behind. Dimal
identified
Manolo Babac as the driver of the Nissan Patrol
and
both appellants Rosendo Madriaga and James Patano as well as the two
co-accused
who are still at-large, Alan Duarte and Jose Doe, as its
passengers.
When they reached the resort located in Antipolo, Rizal, between 5
o'clock
and 6 o'clock in the morning (March 26, 1996), appellant Ramil opened
the
trunk of his car. Jose and appellant Patano lifted a person out of the
trunk and brought him inside cottage no. 2. Dimal asked appellant Ramil
if he could go home but Ramil said that they will all leave
together.
Ramil and Duarte then left the place. Dimal, appellants Rosendo
and
Patano, and Jose were left inside the cottage. They all went to
sleep.
When Dimal woke up, it was between 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock in the
afternoon
(March 26, 1996). He went to the resort's restaurant and stayed
there
for about 30 minutes. When he went back to the cottage, the
others
were not there anymore. While waiting for Ramil and the others to
come back, he took his dinner between 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock in the
evening
of "March 26, 1996" and he laid down up to "1 o'clock early morning" of
"March 27, 1996". When he went out of the cottage to call up
somebody
because he was confused having been left alone, appellant Rosendo
arrived
together with Jose. Jose left again at 6 o'clock in the morning
(March
27, 1996) leaving Dimal and appellant Rosendo inside the cottage.
They took their lunch in front of the cottage and waited until "around
3 o'clock to 4 o'clock in the afternoon" when appellant Ramil arrived
with
several companions who he later learned to be the kin of Uy and some
police
officers. Dimal and appellant Rosendo were left inside the
cottage
together with some police officers to wait for their (Dimal's and
Rosendo's)
other companions. At 7 o'clock in the evening, appellant Patano
arrived.
They stayed in the resort until the afternoon of the next day and they
were brought by the policemen to Camp Crame.[7]
On cross-examination,
Dimal admitted that he was arrested that afternoon of March 27; that he
was wearing a moustache at the time of the arrest and that he was the
one
who fed victim Uy.[8]
Virginia "Virgie" Avelita,
Uy's common-law wife, corroborated the testimony of Lucy and Maj. Cruz
regarding appellant Ramil's contact with her. Virginia further
testified
that appellant Ramil related to her the whole kidnapping scenario; that
Ramil informed her that the kidnappers were demanding one hundred
thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) ransom; that Oswaldo Banaag is the gang's tipster;
and that Ramil requested her not to involve his cousin Rosendo.[9]
The last witness for
the prosecution, Chief Inspector Winnie Quidato, Chief of the
Intelligence
and Operation Division of the Task Force Habagat, corroborated
some
portions of the testimony of Maj. Cruz on the episode at the
resort.
He also testified that appellant Patano arrived at the resort at around
9 o'clock to 10 o'clock in the evening of March 27, 1996 bringing with
him one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) as payment for the cottage rental.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The defense presented
five witnesses.cralaw:red
First to be presented
was accused Oswaldo Banaag, family driver of a certain Beverly
Tan.
He denied any complicity in the crime. Banaag testified that: he
was arrested in White Plains, Quezon City, on March 29, 1996 by Maj.
Cruz
and was brought to Camp Crame; it was only when he was transferred to a
detention cell that he met his co-accused; although he knew victim Uy,
he thought that he was being charged with the killing of his employer,
Reynaldo Tan; he was surprised when he learned that he was being
implicated
in the kidnapping of Uy.[11]
Nadel Francisco, a college
student taking up Management course, testified that at "around 4
o'clock
to 5 o'clock in the afternoon" of March 25, 1996, Richard Dimal visited
him at his house at de Castro, Pasig City. They chatted for about
one hour. Dimal invited him to go swimming in Villa Cristina
Resort
but he declined because he has an examination the following day.
Francisco belied Dimal's statement that they were together until 12
o'clock
midnight as he was already asleep in his house at that time. He further
stated that he did not see appellant Ramil Madriaga on said day.[12]
On cross-examination, Francisco admitted that appellant Ramil's
girlfriend
asked him to testify but he clarified that he was testifying not
because
of such request, but because of the subpoena issued to him.[13]
Appellant Rosendo Madriaga
testified thus -- At around 8 o'clock in the evening of March 25, 1996,
Richard Dimal, together with a certain Nestor, went to his house and
invited
him for a swim in Antipolo, Rizal, as it was Nestor's birthday. They
arrived
at Villa Cristina Resort at around 10 o'clock in the evening and rented
a "cottage table" near the pool. While he and Nestor were swimming, he
saw Dimal talk to some men and then go upstairs. Later, he
noticed
that Nestor was no longer around. Afterwards, Dimal came back and
invited him to drink. They went to a veranda and there, he saw
Nestor
drinking Fundador with the same men he previously saw talking to Dimal.
Appellant Rosendo recalls the names of two of the men as Allan and
Bong.
At around 4 o'clock in the morning (March 26, 1996), Dimal confided to
him that they were going to actually stand guard over a person.
Dimal
pulled him towards a room where Rosendo saw a person with bound feet
and
hands lying on his belly on the floor. When Rosendo told Dimal
that
he wanted to leave, he was told that Bong's group had men posted at the
gate and he might be killed if he left. Scared, he stayed inside
the room. Per instructions of Dimal, Rosendo burned all the
things
belonging to the captive but Rosendo kept a PLDT bill. When Dimal
had gone asleep, Rosendo went to the resort's canteen and called the
number
of Virginia Avelita reflected on the PLDT bill but the person answering
the phone hung up on him several times. He then called up his
cousin,
appellant Ramil Madriaga, and asked for his help. Ramil initially
didn't want to intervene but eventually agreed to help him. He
gave
the number on the phone bill and appellant Ramil assured him that he
will
contact such person. He then went back to the veranda where he
slept.
The next day (March 27, 1996), between 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock in the
afternoon,
he heard somebody calling his name, and saw appellant Ramil who was
with
several armed men, running towards him. Dimal then ran and threw a gun
near the trees.[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant Rosendo further
testified that he saw appellant James Patano for the first time in the
afternoon of March 28 on board a van at the resort,[15]
while he saw Oswaldo Banaag for the first time at the PACC office.[16]
Rosendo avers that Dimal implicated him because the latter thinks he
was
the one who caused his arrest.[17]
Further, Rosendo testified that in the room where he, Patano and Dimal
were brought by Maj. Cruz, victim Uy only pointed to Dimal as the one
who
kidnapped him.[18]
Appellant James Patano
recounted that: on March 28, 1996, after having gone for a swim, Maj.
Quidato
arrested him while he was urinating in one of the corners in the
resort;
he was brought inside a comfort room in one of the cottages where he
was
asked if he knew Dimal or appellant Rosendo; when he was brought out of
the room, he was already unconscious as he was mauled and a plastic bag
was placed on his head; he regained consciousness inside a vehicle;
from
the resort, he was brought to the PACC office; at the PACC office,
Dimal's
kin, particularly Dimal's sister Arlene and her husband Willie Pangan,
asked him to testify against the Madriagas, but he turned them down;
and
he was also asked to sign an affidavit but he likewise refused.
Patano
further denied knowing his co-accused in the case.[19]
Appellant Ramil Madriaga
asserts his innocence of the crime charged. He testified as
follows
-- In the early morning of March 26, 1996, his cousin Rosendo called
him
up asking for his help. Rosendo told Ramil that he was in the
resort
and was unexpectedly mixed up in a kidnapping; that he could not get
out
of the resort because there were "look-outs" posted in the area.
Rosendo gave Ramil a name and a number written in a PLDT bill.
Appellant
Ramil was hesitant because the results of the Bar examinations were
coming
out that day; but nevertheless, he went to see a certain Lt. Capitulo
in
Camp Aguinaldo and told him about his cousin's predicament.[20]
The next day, March 27, 1996, Ramil went to see Virginia Avelita, the
name
given by appellant Rosendo written on the PLDT bill. He showed
her
his school I.D. and asked her if she knows anybody who is missing, and
the latter replied, "si Vicente ko." He was then made to talk
over
the phone to Vicente Uy's daughter, who asked him to wait.
Virginia,
meanwhile, told him that she was going out. After an hour,
Virginia,
Lucy, three old women, their driver, PACC operatives and Maj. Cruz
arrived.
After a short conversation, they left for the resort, leaving Virginia
behind. He asked the latter to look after his white Toyota
Corolla
car which he left in her residence. Upon reaching the resort,
they
were approached by Maj. Quidato who asked him questions. He got
off
the car when he saw his cousin Rosendo near the pool with Dimal.
He pointed the two to Maj. Cruz who instructed his men to
scatter.
He then started walking towards his cousin, and when appellant Rosendo
saw him, he told the latter, "mga kasama natin ito, huwag kang
matakot."
When he got to Rosendo, he pulled him and they leaned on the wall for
fear
that they might get shot. Dimal ran upstairs while Rosendo
pointed
to the place where Uy was being kept. They went inside the
cottage
and Ramil removed the plaster bindings on Uy.[21]
The trial court convicted
appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga of the
crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom, but acquitted their co-accused Oswaldo Banaag.cralaw:red
The dispositive portion
of the assailed decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
With respect to the Criminal Case No. 110090, on the ground of
insufficiency
of evidence, all the accused are ACQUITTED.cralaw:red
2.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 110089-H, on the ground of
insufficiency
of evidence, accused OSWALDO P. BANAAG is hereby ACQUITTED. The
jail
warden of Mandaluyong City is hereby directed to immediately release
his
person unless there are other legal grounds to justify his continued
detention.
However, with respect to accused ROSENDO B. MADRIAGA, JAMES M. PATANO,
and RAMIL L. MADRIAGA, judgment is hereby rendered finding them GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer
the
penalty of death, as provided for under said Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, to suffer the appropriate accessory penalties consequent
thereto,
and to proportionally pay the costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[22]
Appellants insist that
they are innocent of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, arguing that:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
GROSSLY IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WITHOUT BEING IDENTIFIED AS
THE
ABDUCTORS/KIDNAPPERS OR CULPRITS OF THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPING.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE LONE AND
UNCORROBORATED
TESTIMONY OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR.[23]
Bearing in mind that
it devolves upon the State to establish by proof all the essential
elements
of the crime with which appellants are charged and to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that they are guilty of said crime,[24]
the Court, after a meticulous examination of the evidence of the
prosecution,
finds that appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga
should have been acquitted by the trial court. The prosecution
failed
to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
appellants.
It failed to adduce the quantum of proof necessary to convict them.cralaw:red
In convicting appellants,
the trial court gave great weight and evidentiary value to the
uncorroborated
testimony of prosecution witness Richard Dimal on appellants' alleged
participation
in the crime. It stated that Dimal's testimony is "direct,
straightforward
and spontaneous" thus justifying the conclusion that appellants acted
in
concert in carrying into effect the kidnapping of Vicente Uy. The trial
court totally disregarded appellants' testimonies on the ground that
they
failed to support their versions of the incident.cralaw:red
It is well settled that
the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction
so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of evidence by the
trial
court.[25]
It is likewise a settled doctrine that when it comes to credibility of
witnesses, the findings of a trial court on such matter will not be
disturbed
unless the lower court overlooked, ignored, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted
certain facts or circumstances which are so material such as to affect
the outcome of the case.[26]
Although the trial court
described the testimony of Dimal as "direct, straightforward and
spontaneous",
it should not automatically endow outright probative weight to his
testimony
or its veracity, to the exclusion of the testimonies of other
witnesses.
Many witnesses can give testimonies that are blatant lies, even if they
appeared poker-faced and did not bat their eyelashes.cralaw:red
After a careful scrutiny
of the testimony of prosecution witness Dimal, the Court finds that the
trial court failed to consider some significant facts and circumstances
which affect his credibility. His version of the incident is so
incredible
that a complete reversal of the findings of the trial court is
warranted.cralaw:red
To begin with, Dimal
testified that he was with Nadel Francisco on the night of the
kidnapping
when appellant Ramil passed by and invited him "to go around".[27]
Dimal likewise declared in his Sworn Statement dated April 1, 1996 that
he was with Francisco when appellant Ramil Madriaga invited him at
around
12 o'clock midnight, viz.:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SAGOT -
13. Noong ganap na ika-pito ng gabi ng Marso 25, 1996, ako ay
nagpunta
sa Star Gazer Video Shop sa Azucena Street, De Castro, Pasig upang
mag-arkila
ng VHS tapes. Mayamaya ay nagkita kami doon ng kaibigan ko na si
NADEL FRANCISCO at nagkuwentuhan kami doon sa tapat ng nasabing video
shop
hanggang bandang alas-dose ng hatinggabi. Habang nagkukuwentuhan
kami ay napadaan sa harapan namin si kuya Amel na lulan ng isang kotse
at niyaya niya akong sumama sa kanya at sinabing mayroon daw kaming
happenings.[28]
(Emphasis ours)
But defense witness
Francisco categorically denied Dimal's assertions. While he
admitted
that he saw Dimal that day, he testified that they merely chatted for
only
about one and a half (1 ½) hours and parted ways at around 5:30
o'clock in the afternoon. Francisco testified thus:
Q
You said you talked with Richard Dimal for one hour, more or less, will
you tell this Honorable Court what time did Richard and you started to
talk?
A
Approximately 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.cralaw:red
Q
It lasted around 5:30 o'clock?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
What subject matter did you talk with Richard Dimal?
A
I cannot remember anymore, we just chat about the lives of our friends,
sir.cralaw:red
Q
Who among your friends were talked about?
A
I cannot remember anymore, sir.cralaw:red
Q
Before you and Ricard Dimal parted ways, what did Dimal tell you, if
any?
A
He invited me to go with him for swimming, sir.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q
Will you tell this Honorable Court what place he is going to have
swimming?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A
Villa Cristina, sir.cralaw:red
Q
Tell this Honorable Court what was your reaction to the invitation of
Ricahrd
Dimal to go with him at Villa Cristina?
A
I did not go with him, sir.cralaw:red
Q
Why?
A
I have an examination on the following day, sir.cralaw:red
Q
I am showing to you a statement of Mr. Ricard Dimal attached to the
records
of this case found on page 64 consisting of 6 pages, on page 65 or the
second page of the statement of Richard Dimal, question #13 and the
answer
thereto, I'm reading it to you and please listen. "Maaari bang
ikuwento
mo dito kung paano ka nadamay sa nasabing kaso? And the answer,
"Noong
ganap na ika-pito ng gabi ng Marso 25, 1996, ako ay nagpunta sa Star
GazarVideo
Shop sa Azucena St., De Castro, Pasig upang mag-arkila ng VHS
tapes.
Mayamaya ay nagkita kami doon ng kaibigan ko na si Nedel Francisco at
nagkuwentuhan
kami sa tapat ng nasabing video shop hanggang bandang alas-dose ng
hatinggabi.
Habang nagkukuwentuhan kami ay napadaan sa harapan namin si Kuya Amel
na
lulan ng isang kotse at niyaya niya akong sumama sa kanya at sinabing
mayroon
day kaming happenings". Did you hear what I read?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
Did you understand what I read?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
What can you say about what I have read which is the statement of
Richard
Dimal?
A
I do not know about that alleged happening, sir.cralaw:red
Q
On that date, around 12:00 o'clock midnight, where were you?
A
I was already sleeping during that time, sir.cralaw:red
Q
During your conversation with Richard Dimal from 4:00 to 5:30 o'clock
in
the afternoon of March 25, 1996, tell this Honorable Court whether you
saw Kuya Amel?
A
I did not see him that day, sir.[29]
The trial court chose
to ignore Francisco's testimony. It did not explain in its
decision
why it opted not to consider his testimony, why it relied on the
testimony
of Dimal despite Francisco's explicit testimony that he and Dimal
talked
only up to 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon and that it is not true that
he
saw Ramil with his car around midnight or at any time of that
day.
The Court is confounded why the trial court entirely overlooked or
disregarded
the testimony of Francisco who is a disinterested witness and had
nothing
to gain from belying Dimal's claim. Dimal regards Francisco as
his
friend;[30]
and Francisco considers Dimal as a closer friend of his than Ramil's.[31]
Thus, when Francisco repudiated Dimal's testimony, there was no reason
for him to discredit Dimal except to tell the truth. The
credibility
of Dimal is thereby eroded. There is no reason for the trial
court
to discredit the testimony of Francisco. One may assert that
while
it may be true that after Francisco and Dimal parted ways at 5:30
o'clock
in the afternoon, it could have happened that Dimal and appellant Ramil
had met at midnight. But this posture could not be upheld because
of the testimony of Dimal himself that Francisco was present when Ramil
invited him to roam around at about midnight, which could not be
believed
because Francisco was, in fact, not present. In effect, from the
start, Dimal is shown to be concocting his version of the kidnapping
incident.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, the trial
court erred in accepting Dimal's testimony as gospel truth considering
that his account of the events that transpired is replete with
incredible
happenings that should not have been accepted by the trial court as
part
of ordinary human experience and common sense. For example, Dimal
testified that he went with Ramil upon the invitation of the latter and
they went to his (Dimal's) house located at No. 046 Blk. I, PFCI Brgy.
San Andres, Cainta, Rizal;[32]
that through a cellular phone, Ramil told the passengers of the Nissan
Patrol parked in front of Dimal's house that they could not do what
they
have to do in that place and that they have to find a darker place.[33]
Why then did Ramil have to meet the passengers of the Nissan Patrol in
front of Dimal's house when the place is not suitable to his (Ramil's)
plans in the first place? Why did Ramil have to go to Dimal's
house
when he could have used the cellular to tell them the place where he
thought
would be a better place to meet them? There is nothing in Dimal's
testimony to explain said incongruities.cralaw:red
In addition, Dimal testified
that they went to Taytay, Rizal and stopped behind the new market place
where Dimal saw something transferred from the Nissan Patrol to the
trunk
of the Toyota Corolla of Ramil;[34]
that thereafter, from Taytay, Rizal, they roamed around and then went
to
Bulacan with the Nissan Patrol still tailing Ramil's car; that upon
reaching
Bulacan, Ramil alighted from his car and talked with the passengers of
the Nissan Patrol; that Ramil went back to his car and told Dimal that
they will go to Antipolo, Rizal; that upon reaching Antipolo, the
passengers
of the Nissan Patrol transferred to Ramil's car[35]
and then they proceeded to Villa Cristina Resort in Antipolo,
Rizal.
From Taytay, Rizal, why do they have to roam around, go to Bulacan and
then back to Rizal? From past midnight to 6 o'clock in the
morning,
why did Dimal, Ramil and the passengers of the Nissan Patrol have to go
around killing time when the final destination of all of them together
is the resort in Antipolo, Rizal? Why did the Nissan Patrol have
to tail them all the while from Taytay, Rizal to Bulacan after the
victim
was transferred to the car of Ramil only to go to Antipolo, Rizal, a
nearby
town of Taytay, Rizal? Said acts are so preposterous that no
amount
of stretching of imagination could bring the same within the realm of
human
understanding.cralaw:red
The test to determine
the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in
conformity
with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind; whatever
is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of
judicial cognizance.[36]
Further, absent any other evidence to explain or corroborate such
implausible
actuations, the trial court committed a reversible error in considering
the testimony of Dimal credible enough to sustain a conviction of all
appellants.
Evidence to be believed must not only come from the mouth of a credible
witness but must also be credible in itself.[37]
It may be posited that
in the commission of the crime of kidnapping with ransom, the culprits
usually adopt and pursue unfamiliar schemes or strategies not only to
avoid
easy detection or monitoring of their movements, but to confuse the
police
authorities, the victim and the family of the victims; that the
incredible
happenings narrated by Dimal only highlight his knowledge of the
details
of the facts surrounding the kidnapping for ransom. This may be
so
if the credibility of Dimal on the fact that he and Ramil had met that
night of the kidnapping is beyond question.cralaw:red
In any event, if a set
of facts admits of two interpretations, then the one consistent with
the
presumption of innocence and in favor of the accused should prevail.[38]
The trial court declared
that "there was never any positive identification made on any of the
accused,
and that the prosecution presented evidence which are circumstantial in
nature to support the charge."[39]
It is a hornbook doctrine
that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing
evidence.
The prosecution miserably fell short of this requirement.cralaw:red
The trial court explicitly
declared that the prosecution witness is not a co-conspirator and
therefore
his testimony may be taken in evidence against all the appellants
without
running counter to Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[40]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The court a quo seriously
erred in this aspect. Based on Dimal's sworn statement, marked as
Exhibit "A",[41]
and his testimony, Dimal admitted and confessed as to his participation.[42]
In addition, the following
manifestation of Atty. Marcelino Arias, to wit:
Atty. Arias
Before the prosecution starts the direct examination, as per record, I
learned that his Richard Dimal is one of the suspects and he was
arrested
in all these cases but he was not included as one of the suspects, I
want
to put that on record, as far as the record is concern, he is one of
those
who allegedly took the victim, he confessed by means of an affidavit,
now
he is a witness and not one of the accused, your Honor.cralaw:red
Court Everything
you have said will be put on record, and for your own information
defense
counsel, that is the prerogative of the prosecution and no longer of
the
defense.cralaw:red
Atty. Arias
Considering that I noticed that the prosecution is in possession of an
Affidavit of this witness which was not included in the records of this
case, may I ask to be furnished of this affidavit.cralaw:red
Fiscal Abesamis
The purpose of the testimony of Richard Dimal is to show the
circumstances
before, during and after the kidnapping of Mr. Vicente Uy, to show the
conspiracy acts of the accused in this case of said kidnapping and to
identify
some evidence and thereafter to identify the accused in this
case.
With the permission of this Honorable Court.[43]
was not refuted by the
prosecution.cralaw:red
Section 30, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 30. Admission
by conspirator. - The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against
the
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such
act of declaration.cralaw:red
Thus, conspiracy must
be proven by evidence other than the testimony of Dimal.cralaw:red
Proof of conspiracy
need not rest on direct evidence as the felonious covenant itself may
be
inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during, and after the
commission of the crime disclosing a common understanding between them
relative to its commission.[44]
In its assessment, the
trial court declared that the evidence for the prosecution is purely
circumstantial,[45]
on which basis it ruled that appellants conspired in perpetrating the
crime
of kidnapping with ransom.cralaw:red
For circumstantial evidence
to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the
same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with
every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[46]
The following elements must concur: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance;
(2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[47]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the present case,
the totality of the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution is not sufficient to establish the guilt of
appellants.
Not one of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual abduction.
Witness
Dimal admitted during cross-examination that he did not see appellants
actually kidnap or abduct Uy, viz.:
Q
You know that you never saw Ramil kidnapped Vicente Uy?
A
No, sir.cralaw:red
Q
You never saw your Kuya Sendong kidnapped kidnapped (sic) Mr. Uy?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
You never saw Oswaldo Banaag kidnapped Mr. Uy?
A
No. sir.cralaw:red
Q
You never saw James Patano kidnapped Mr. Uy?
A
No, sir.cralaw:red
Q
Never did you see Mr. Ramil Madriaga kidnapped Mr. Uy?
A
Yes, sir.[48]
There could not be any
misinterpretation in the meaning of the above testimonies. If the
testimony
of Dimal is taken in its entirety, it mainly revolved around events
that
allegedly occurred after the abduction was already consummated.
As
such, one would readily conclude that Dimal did not really see the act
of kidnapping and therefore, he did not see any of the appellants
perform
the actual act of kidnapping. Besides, the trial court itself
declared
that "there was never any positive identification made on any of the
accused."[49]
Further, the prosecution
evidence failed to sufficiently prove overt acts on the part of
appellants
that will convincingly show their direct participation or complicity in
the kidnapping.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case of appellant
James Patano, he was condemned to death for his presence in the
resort.
The trial court held that since appellant Patano failed to corroborate
his excuse that he was just there for a swim with friends, then, the
same
must be ignored.[50]
The Court disagrees. If at all, what the prosecution was able to
establish is that appellant Patano knocked on the door of cottage no.
2,
and Maj. Quidato heard him say: "(P)are kaibigan ninyo ito, dala ko ang
pera".[51]
Such alleged statement by Patano, even if true, is equivocal and
ambiguous.
He did not state for what purpose the money is to be used. No
probative
weight may be given to the testimony of Maj. Quidato that the amount of
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) is for the payment of the cottage
because
it is a mere conclusion on his part based on his bare claim that
the security guard and the official of the resort were preventing the
victim
from leaving because the cottage has not been paid yet. Quidato
did
not testify that he heard appellant Patano say that the alleged money
he
had with him was for the rental of the cottage. In other words,
even
if appellant Patano really brought money to the cottage, the
prosecution
failed to connect the participation of Patano in the commission of the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. Absent any other proof of overt
act
necessary or essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping, Patano's
alleged presence and utterance cannot be a valid basis for his
conviction.
The Court cannot accept the trial court's sweeping conclusion against
Patano.
The mere presence of appellant Patano at the resort after the
commission
of the crime does not imply conspiracy. Mere knowledge,
acquiescence
to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a
party
to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of
the
crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[52]
Conspiracy transcends companionship.[53]
Neither can the Court rely on the uncorroborated testimony of Dimal
whose
testimony at the outset had been found not to be credible. The
failure
of appellant Patano to present the friends he was with is not
sufficient
to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An accused
should be found guilty on the basis of the strength of prosecution
evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense.[54]
Settled is the rule
that conviction should rest on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution
and not on the weakness of the defense. The identity of the
offender,
like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Even
though appellant Patano invokes the inherently weak defense of denial,
such defense nonetheless acquired commensurate strength in the instant
case where no positive and proper identification has been made by the
prosecution
witnesses of the offender, as the prosecution still has the onus
probandi
in establishing the guilt of the accused. The weakness of the
defense
does not relieve the prosecution of this responsibility. Besides,
the Court has held that the testimony of witness Dimal is not credible
and not worthy of belief. There is reasonable doubt as to his
guilt
or participation in the commission of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom.
The doubt should therefore be resolved in favor of appellant James
Patano.[55]
As regards appellant
Ramil Madriaga, the trial court refused to accept his testimony and
found
his claim that he was responsible for the rescue of Uy to be "beyond
ordinary
human comprehension deserving of no evidentiary value".[56]
Instead, it banked on the suspicions entertained by the police
operatives
that appellant Ramil's actuations during the rescue were suspect, and
that
the latter failed to present Lts. Capitulo and Lim, often referred to
by
him in his testimony.[57]
The Court does not agree. Mere suspicion, speculation,
relationship,
association and companionship do not prove conspiracy.[58]
The Court scrutinized
the testimony of appellant Ramil Madriaga and there is nothing therein
which is beyond ordinary understanding or which indicates any
suspicious
behavior on his part that would create doubt on his account of what
really
transpired. In fact, appellant Ramil exhibited candor and
sincerity
when he admitted that he was initially ambivalent in helping out his
cousin
Rosendo because of fear and of the fact that the results of the Bar
examinations
were coming out that day.[59]
Also, the victim's daughter, Lucy Ngo, did not sense any suspicious
behavior
on the part of appellant Ramil, and she testified that she even
believed
that the latter was trying to help them, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q
Will you tell us what do you mean by that?
A
‘Nagmamagandang loob is parang tumutulong siya,' sir.cralaw:red
x x
x
Q
The man who was ‘nagmamagandang loob'. Are you referring to Ramil
Madriaga as the one who was ‘nagmamagandang loob'?
A
He is the one who was ‘nagmamagandang loob'. Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
Even before, you knew Ramil Madriaga was incarcerated and one of the
accused
in this case, were you surprised to know that Ramil Madriaga who
according
to you ‘nagmamagandang loob' is now one of the accused in this case?
A
Yes, sir.[60]
It cannot be denied
that appellant Ramil played a major part in the rescue of Vicente
Uy.
The testimonies of Lucy Ngo, Virginia Avelita and Maj. Cruz all show
that
it was through the information given by appellant Ramil that they were
able to locate Vicente Uy. If it were really true that appellant
Ramil was one of the conspirators of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom,
it is absolutely incredible that Ramil would openly go to the house of
the victim's common-law wife and place himself at the risk of being
identified
as one of the conspirators when he could have accomplished the same
purpose
by other means at the same time protect himself from being
identified
by witnesses. Neither did Virginia Avelita nor Lucy Ngo testify
that
Ramil asked for ransom. What then could be the motive of Ramil in
going to the house of Avelita if not to help his cousin out of his
predicament?
Whatever suspicions the police operatives entertained were pure
speculations,
insufficient to warrant the conclusion that appellant Ramil
participated
in the kidnapping. The required quantum of evidence is proof
beyond
reasonable doubt.[61]
"The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it
is without rudder or compass."[62]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Maj. Cruz, Virginia Avelita and Chief Inspector Quidato were
all based on what appellant Ramil had purportedly told them. The
veracity of what they claimed was told them by Ramil is highly dubious
in view of the testimony of prosecution witness Lucy Ngo, daughter of
the
victim, affirming that appellant Ramil was the one who was
"nagmamagandang-loob"
and who told them about the kidnapping of her father and where he could
be found.cralaw:red
The Court went over
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cruz, Avelita and Quidato and
it found that certain portions thereof were tailored to suit the
charges
against appellants.cralaw:red
Both Cruz and Quidato
testified that appellant Ramil rushed to the cottage as soon as they
arrived
at the resort and that they found appellant Rosendo inside the cottage
with victim Uy, giving the impression that appellant Ramil knew exactly
where the victim was and, therefore, appellants Ramil and Rosendo were
two of the kidnappers.[63]
However, Lucy Ngo contradicted their testimonies. Lucy, instead,
confirmed the testimonies of appellants Ramil and Rosendo that the
latter
was outside the cottage and that Ramil rushed to Rosendo only after
getting
instructions from Maj. Cruz.[64]
The Court is likewise
wary of the testimony of Virginia Avelita insinuating appellant Ramil's
complicity for knowing the details of the crime. If it were true
that she suspected Ramil, then there was utterly no reason for her to
tell
Lucy Ngo when she called up the latter that there was a certain person
who was offering his assistance ("nagmamagandang-loob") in locating Uy.[65]
Instead, she would have forewarned Ngo about appellant Ramil.cralaw:red
Consequently, the Court
cannot give much weight to the testimonies of these prosecution
witnesses
as they suffer from infirmities.cralaw:red
Besides, it is a settled
rule that the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone
else
has told him, whether orally or in writing is hearsay and has no
probative
value[66]
under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Neither could
the
same be validly regarded as an exception to the hearsay rule
considering
that the details testified to by said witnesses were directly refuted
by
appellant Ramil when he testified in court and asserted the fact that
appellant
Ramil merely went to Avelita's house to tell her of the location of her
common-law husband, Vicente Uy, and to help his cousin, co-appellant
Rosendo;
which fact is confirmed by prosecution witness Lucy Ngo.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The failure of appellant
Ramil to present Lts. Capitulo and Lim does not denigrate the
credibility
of his own testimony. As stated above, the prosecution must rely
on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of that of
the defense.cralaw:red
Thus, the Court finds
that the prosecution evidence lacks that degree of conclusiveness
required
to convict appellant Ramil Madriaga.cralaw:red
With regard to appellant
Rosendo Madriaga, the Court also finds that there is no sufficient
evidence
proving beyond reasonable doubt that he was involved in the kidnapping
of Vicente Uy. As with appellant Patano, there is lack of
adequate
evidence of conspiracy insofar as appellant Rosendo is concerned.
No proof was adduced by the prosecution to show that Rosendo knew about
the kidnapping and that he had actively participated in its
execution.
When victim Uy identified Rosendo in the courtroom as the person he saw
handcuffed after his blindfold was removed, Uy admitted that he was not
sure of Rosendo's identity as the latter is without a moustache.
The testimony of prosecution witness Dimal in this regard is quite
revealing.
Dimal admitted that he was the one who fed the victim and that he was
wearing
a moustache at the time of his arrest on March 27, 1996.[67]
Appellant Rosendo testified
that he called up his cousin Ramil and asked for his help as he got
unintentionally
mixed up in a kidnapping.[68]
Appellant Rosendo convincingly explained that he could not do anything
because he was afraid.[69]
Such is not far-fetched or improbable. The Court is cognizant of
the fact that fear is an effective anesthetic that can paralyze one
into
inaction. Rosendo's failure to report his predicament with the
police
is not an indicium or positive proof that he actively took part in the
crime and, therefore, it could not be a valid basis for a finding of
guilt
for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. What is clear is that
appellant
Rosendo called up his cousin, appellant Ramil, for help because he was
in a predicament over which he had no control.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
All told, while the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom has been proven, appellants'
participation
therein had not been adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence,
all three appellants must be acquitted.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 262 in Criminal Case
No. 110089-H convicting appellants JAMES PATANO y MARCAIDA, RAMIL
MADRIAGA
y LAGONOY and ROSENDO MADRIAGA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another
is
hereby rendered ACQUITTING them of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
as
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable
doubt.cralaw:red
The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of
appellants,
unless they are being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform
this
Court of the date of their release or the ground for their continued
confinement,
within five (5) days from notice of this decision.cralaw:red
The Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Director- General of the
Philippine
National Police are directed to cause the arrest of accused Manolo
Babac
and Allan Duarte who have remained-at-large as well as other persons
who
appear criminally responsible for herein subject crime. The
prosecution
must exert more diligent efforts next time.cralaw:red
Costs de oficio.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J.,
on leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Original Records, pp. 52-53.
[2]
TSN, August 12, 1996, pp. 4-13.
[3]
Id., pp. 14-16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Interchangeably referred to as "Maj." in the transcripts.
[5]
TSN, August 12, 1996, pp. 30-42.
[6]
TSN, August 19, 1996, pp. 5-21, 31.
[7]
TSN, August 27, 1996, pp. 5-26.
[8]
Id., pp. 38, 46 and 51.
[9]
TSN, August 28, 1996, pp. 4-20.
[10]
TSN, September 9, 1996, pp. 5-25.
[11]
TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 4-21.
[12]
TSN, November 19, 1996, pp. 3-9.
[13]
Id., p. 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
TSN, January 28, 1997, pp. 3-25.
[15]
Id., p. 28.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id., p. 33.
[17]
Id., p. 32.
[18]
Id., pp. 35-36.
[19]
TSN, February 3, 1997, pp. 6-22.
[20]
TSN, March 4, 1997, pp. 11-16.
[21]
Id., pp. 23-32.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Original Records, pp. 501-502.
[23]
Rollo, p. 83.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
People v. Berroya, 283 SCRA 111, 121 [1997].
[25]
People v. Quillosa, 325 SCRA 747 [2000]; People v. Lozada, 334 SCRA 602
[2000].
[26]
People v. Tolibas, 325 SCRA 453 [2000]; People v. Penaso, 326 SCRA 111
[2000].
[27]
TSN, August 27, 1996, p. 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Original Records, p. 65; Exh. "A", p. 293.
[29]
TSN, November 19, 1996, pp. 7-9.
[30]
TSN, August 27, 1996, p. 5.
[31]
TSN, November 19, 1996, p. 9.
[32]
TSN, August 27, 1996, pp. 6 and 7.
[33]
Id., p. 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Id., pp. 8-9.
[35]
TSN, August 22, 1996, pp. 10-11.
[36]
People v. San Juan, 326 SCRA 786.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
People v. Arcilla, 256 SCRA 757; People v. Alba, 256 SCRA 505.
[38]
People v. Abina, 298 SCRA 260, 279 [1998].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
RTC Decision, p. 26.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
RTC decision, p. 27.
[41]
Original Records, pp. 65 and 293.
[42]
TSN, August 27, 1996, p. 39.
[43]
Id., pp. 4-5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 133489 & 143970, January 15, 2002.
[45]
Original Records, p. 496; Decision, p. 26.
[46]
People v. Berroya, supra. at pp. 122-123.
[47]
People v. Maluenda, 288 SCRA 225, 250 [1998].
[48]
TSN, August 27, 1996, p. 35.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
Supra, note no. 25.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[50]
Original Records, p. 499; Decision, p. 29.
[51]
TSN, September 9, 1996, pp. 20-21.
[52]
People v. Quinao, 269 SCRA 495, 510 [1997].
[53]
Id., pp. 510-511.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[54]
People v. Doinog, 332 SCRA 366, 392 [2000].
[55]
People v. Estanislao, 265 SCRA 810, 818 [1996].
[56]
Original Records, p. 500.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[57]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[58]
People v. Noroña, 239 SCRA 502, 509 [2002].
[59]
TSN, March 4, 1997, pp. 12 and 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[60]
TSN, August 19, 1996, p. 24.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[61]
People v. Isla, 278 SCRA 47, 52 [1997]; Darvin v. Court of Appeals, 292
SCRA 534, 543 [1998].
[62]
People v. Marquita, 327 SCRA 41, 51-52 [2000].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[63]
TSN, August 12, 1996, p. 37; TSN, September 9, 1996, pp. 15-16.
[64]
TSN, August 19, 1996, p. 15.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[65]
TSN, August 28, 1996, pp. 11-12.
[66]
People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79, 91 [1998].
[67]
TSN, August 27, 1996, pp. 23-24; pp. 46-47; p. 51.
[68]
See note no. 46, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[69]
TSN of January 28, 1997, pp. 14-15.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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