SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
129846
January 18, 2000
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
AND TRADERS ROYAL BANK,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
MENDOZA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a petition for
certiorari seeking to
set aside the resolution,[1]
dated March 17, 1997, of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner’s
appeal
from an order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Manila, which
dismissed
petitioner’s complaint. The appellate court threw out petitioner’s
appeal
on the ground that its notice of appeal had been filed out of time.
Petitioner
urges a relaxation of the rules in applying the period for filing
appeals.
But even its appeal to this Court from the resolution of the appellate
court is late. Hence, the dismissal of the present petition is called
for.
The procedural antecedents
are as follows:
On two occasions in
January 1986, the Office of the President issued four type "B" Treasury
Warrants drawn against the Bureau of Treasury in the aggregate amount
of
P151,645,000.00. The treasury warrants were deposited in private
respondent
Traders Royal Bank for collection.cralaw:red
On January 7, 1986,
private respondent presented the warrants to the Bureau of Treasury for
clearing. The warrants were cleared and private respondent credited the
amounts to the designated payees’ accounts.[2]
Petitioner subsequently
discovered on April 3, 1986 that the payees’ indorsements on the
warrants
had been forged. It demanded reimbursement from private respondent of
the
amounts paid on the warrants but the latter refused to pay.cralaw:red
On October 13, 1987,
petitioner, through the Bureau of Treasury, filed Civil Case No.
87-42752
for collection against private respondent before the Regional Trial
Court,
Branch 19, Manila. Trial then ensued. After petitioner had rested its
case,
private respondent, with prior leave of court, filed a Demurrer to
Evidence
on January 12, 1994. Among others, it was contended:
The plaintiff
does not claim nor alleged that because of the alleged forgery of the
indorsements
of the payees, it (the plaintiff) had to replace the treasury warrants
in question and thus pay the payees all over again. Does not the cause
of action or right to relief, then, if any, properly pertain to the
payees
whose endorsements were allegedly forged? And is not such a cause of
action
or right to relief properly against the forger/s or perpetrator of the
forgery?
In an order dated September
30, 1994, the trial court denied the demurrer to evidence. However, on
motion of private respondent, the trial court, on January 30, 1995,
reconsidered
its order and dismissed petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner received the
order of dismissal on February 7, 1995. Hence, it had up to February
22,
1995 within which to appeal.
On February 20, 1995,
two days before the last day to file an appeal, petitioner filed a
motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal which interrupted the
running
of the period of appeal.cralaw:red
On May 23, 1995, the
trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The order
was
received by petitioner on June 2, 1995, so that it had until June 4,
1995
within which to file the notice of appeal. However, petitioner filed
its
notice of appeal only on June 16, 1995, 12 days beyond the 15-day
reglementary
period. As a consequence, the dismissal became final. For some reason,
this fact was not immediately noticed, so that the records of the case
were elevated to the Court of Appeals and petitioner was required to
file
its appellant’s brief. When it came to its turn to file its brief as an
appellee, private respondent asked for an extension of time. Its motion
was granted, but instead of filing its brief, private respondent asked
the appellate court to dismiss petitioner’s appeal on the ground that
it
was filed out of time. Its motion was granted and petitioner’s appeal
was
dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its
motion
was denied. Petitioner received the appellate court’s resolution
denying
its motion on June 5, 1997, so that it had until June 20, 1997 within
which
to appeal to this Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari
under
Rule 45. Instead, petitioner filed on August 4, 1997, 45 days after the
last day to file an appeal, the present petition for certiorari under
Rule
65, contending that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing its appeal from the order of the RTC which dismissed its
complaint against private respondent.cralaw:red
As earlier stated, this
petition should be dismissed.cralaw:red
First. Petitioner’s
remedy was to appeal to this Court from the resolutions, dated March
17,
1997 and May 20, 1997, of the appellate court by filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, it filed this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 only on August 4, 1997. Apparently, petitioner
resorted to this special civil action because it had failed to take an
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period which expired on June 20,
1997. This, of course, cannot be done. The special civil action of
certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner has lost.
Nor can it be contended that the only question raised in this case is a
jurisdictional question. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
There is no reason why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e.,
whether
the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitions, could not have been raised by it on appeal.cralaw:red
In Bernardo vs. Court
of Appeals,[3]
we dismissed a Rule 65 petition on the ground that the proper remedy
for
petitioner therein should have been an appeal under Rule 45 of the
Rules
of Court, viz.:
At the outset, this
Court notes that the proper remedy of Petitioner Bernardo should have
been
an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We have time and again
reminded
members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 lies only when "there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Certiorari can not be
allowed
when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the
availability
of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal. The
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative
or successive.[4]
Admittedly, this Court,
in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and
in the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for
certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially if filed
within
the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.[5]
In this case, however, we find no reason to justify a liberal
application
of the rules. The petition was filed well beyond the reglementary
period
for filing a petition for review without any reason therefor.cralaw:red
Second. Even on the
grounds invoked by petitioner, we think the present petition should be
dismissed. Time and again, we have emphasized that the perfection of
appeals
in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory
but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders
the
decision of the trial court final and executory.[6]
This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not
part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be
exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.[7]
In this case, we find no reason to depart from this rule.cralaw:red
Petitioner invokes the
judicial policy of allowing appeals, although filed late, when the
interest
of justice so requires. Citing Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi,
Jr.,[8]
it contends that this Court, in meritorious instances, has allowed the
rules on the periods for perfecting appeals to be relaxed.[9]
Unfortunately for petitioner, even a cursory reading of the very case
upon
which it relies for support shows that the policy invoked is qualified
by the requirement that there must be exceptional circumstances to
justify
the relaxation of the rules. The case cited, which involved an appeal
made
five days late, illustrates how questions of this nature have been
resolved
by this Court:
True, in few highly
exceptional instances, we have allowed the relaxing of the rules on the
application of the reglementary periods of appeal. We cite a few
typical
examples: In Ramos vs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, we excused the delay of
four
days in the filing of a notice of appeal because the questioned
decision
of the trial court was served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her
counsel
of record was already dead. Her new counsel could only file the appeal
four days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In
Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453, we allowed the perfection of an
appeal
by the Republic despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross
miscarriage
of justice since the Republic stands to lose hundreds of hectares of
land
already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for
educational
purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA
38,
41, we accepted a tardy appeal considering that the subject matter in
issue
had theretofore been judicially settled, with finality, in another
case.
The dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant
being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The case at bench, given
its own settings, can not come close to those extraordinary
circumstances
that have indeed justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent
rule.
Let it not be overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is a
jurisdictional
caveat that not even this Court can trifle with.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As in Bank of America,
there is no showing in this case of a factual setting which
approximates
any of the extraordinary circumstances which may justify a deviation
from
the rule on timely filing of appeals. Anyone seeking exemption from the
application of this rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally
meritorious
instances exist which warrant such departure. In this case, petitioner
failed to discharge this burden. It offered no explanation at all for
the
12-day delay in filing its notice of appeal. What was said in Videogram
Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals[11]
applies with equal force to this case, as petitioner is likewise
represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, viz.:
And, while we understand
the OSG’s predicament, its oft-repeated excuse of being saddled with a
huge caseload, which is resorted to almost everytime it applies for
extension
of time for appeal and filing of comments/replies/briefs, has already
lost
its flavor, if not gone stale entirely. Certainly, by this time the OSG
must have already developed a system for keeping track of all its
deadlines
and monitoring the progress of work being done on the cases it is
handling.
After all, government service really entails hard work and perennial
unceasing
pressure to meet deadlines. Most assuredly, this is not a ground for
the
liberal interpretation of the rules. Only in exceptionally meritorious
cases should the rules be relaxed. Such has not been shown to be the
situation
in this case.cralaw:red
After its case was dismissed
by the trial court, all that the OSG had to do was to file a notice of
appeal, which is just a brief statement of petitioner’s intention to
appeal
from the court’s decision. There is no reason why the OSG could not
have
done this in two days. Unlike a record on appeal, a notice of appeal
does
not require the extractions of pleadings and documents from the records
pertinent to the subject of the appeal. In the absence of any
satisfactory
explanation, the OSG’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal simply
cannot be excused without defeating private respondent’s right, as a
party-litigant,
to benefit from a decision that has become final and executory.cralaw:red
Nor can petitioner invoke
the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader
interest
of substantial justice.[12]
While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the
proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities,[13]
the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not
a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives
the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.[14]
The failure to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period
is akin to the failure to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed
period.
In both cases, the appeal is not perfected in due time. As we held in
Pedrosa
v. Hill,[15]
the requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of
law or procedure, but an essential requirement without which the
decision
appealed from would become final and executory.[16]
The same can be said about the late filing of a notice of appeal.cralaw:red
The fact is that petitioner
did not only fail to appeal from the main order of the trial court
dismissing
its complaint. It did not only fail to appeal on time from the order
denying
reconsideration. Petitioner likewise failed to make a timely appeal to
this Court from the resolution of the appellate court dismissing its
appeal.
Nonetheless, it is
contended that petitioner has a meritorious claim against private
respondent
and that it stands to lose P151,645,000.00 if it cannot appeal from the
trial court’s order dismissing its complaint against private
respondent.
The finality of the trial court’s order as a consequence of
petitioner’s
failure to appeal on time, first to the Court of Appeals and, later to
this Court, unfortunately, bars further consideration of its case.
There
is simply no explanation offered for such lapses.cralaw:red
Third. There is another
reason why review of the trial court’s order cannot be made. Petitioner
does not dispute the fact that, as observed by the Court of Appeals,
its
notice of appeal referred only to the order of the trial court denying
its Motion for Reconsideration and not the order of dismissal of its
complaint
as well.[17]
Such failure is fatal. Rule 37, Section 9 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure
provides that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not
appealable,
the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order. On the
other
hand, Rule 41, Section 1(a) of the same rules also provides that no
appeal
may be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration. It is
true the present Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on July 1,
1997
whereas this case involves an appeal taken in February 1995. But Rule
37,
Section 9 and Rule 41, Section 1(a) simply codified the rulings in
several
cases to the effect that an order denying a motion for reconsideration
is interlocutory in nature[18]
and, therefore, is not appealable.[19]
These rules, therefore, are not really new.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The outcome of this
petition maybe a bitter lesson for petitioner, but one mainly of its
own
doing. Not only did it file its notice of appeal well beyond the
reglementary
period, it actually failed to appeal from the order dismissing its case
against private respondent. The inevitable consequence of such grave
inadvertence
is to render the trial court’s decision dismissing its case final and
executory.
The Court of Appeals thus acted properly in dismissing petitioner’s
appeal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DISMISSED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Per Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by Justices Emeterio C.
Cui
and Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros.
[2]
The particulars of the warrants are as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
TW
No.Payee..DateAmount
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
B05529511..Leonila
Sioson..1-6-86..P33,044,000.00
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
B05529512..Leonila
Sioson..1-6-86..P17,800,250.00
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
B05529515..Nancy
Concepcion..1-11-86..P39,900,250.00
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
B05529526..Nancy
Concepcion..1-11-86..P40,900,500.00
[3]
275 SCRA 423 (1997)
[4]
Id., at p. 426.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 597 (1997)
[6]
Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., 230 SCRA 9 (1994) citing
Alto Sales Corp. v. IAC, 197 SCRA 618 (1991), Falcon Mfg. v. NLRC, 199
SCRA 814 (1991), Kabushi Kaisha Isetan v. IAC, 203 SCRA 583 (1991)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Bello v. Fernando, 4 SCRA 135 (1962); Borre v. Court of Appeals, 158
SCRA
660 (1988); Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373 (1996); People v. Esparas,
260
SCRA 539 (1996)
[8]
230 SCRA 9 (1994)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 11.
[10]
230 SCRA at 15-16 (Emphasis added)
[11]
265 SCRA 50, 60 (1996)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 13.
[13]
De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 444 (1997), citing Rodriguez
v.
Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 262 (1975)
[14]
Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, 230 SCRA 9 (1994)
[15]
257 SCRA 373 (1996)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id., at 379.
[17]
Rollo, p. 29.
18]
Artuyo v. Gonzalves, 137 Phil. 803 (1969)
[19]
Pagtakhan v. Court of Industrial Relations, 39 SCRA 455 (1971), citing
the former Section 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court; People v. Doriques, 24
SCRA
167 (1968); Ramos v. Ardant Trading Corporation, 23 SCRA 947 (1968); Sy
v. Dalman, 22 SCRA 834 (1968); Chuatoco v. Aragon, 22 SCRA 346 (1968);
People v. Macandog, 7 SCRA 195 (1963); Bautista v. De la Cruz, 9 SCRA
725
(1963); Harrison Foundry & Machinery v. Harrison Foundry Workers
Association,
8 SCRA 430 (1963); Phil. Refining Co., Inc. v. Ponce, 99 Phil. 269
(1956);
PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers Union, 97 Phil. 424
(1955); Sitchon v. Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 80 Phil. 397 (1948) |