EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
130586
January 29, 2004
-versus-
FRANCISCO
BLANCAFLOR,
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before us is the
automatic review of the judgment,[1]
dated August 9, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay
(Branch
15) in Criminal Case No. T-2780, finding appellant Francisco Blancaflor
guilty of Rape beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 4, 1996,
an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco,
Albay
(Branch 15), accusing appellant of the crime of rape, thus:
That
sometime
in the later part of July, 1995, at around 3:30 or 4:00 o’ clock in the
morning, more or less, at Barangay Igang, Municipality of Bacacay,
Province
of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste designs and by means of
force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his own stepdaughter,
MYLENE
B. RUEDA, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ACTS
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment,
appellant
pleaded not guilty to the foregoing charge. Trial ensued.
The facts of the case,
as established by the prosecution, are as follows:
Fourteen-year old, high
school student Mylene B. Rueda has been an average student. However,
sometime
in 1996, Mrs. Adelaida Corla, Mylene’s class adviser in high school,
noticed
that Mylene became absent-minded in class and sometimes she even found
her crying. Mylene began to get failing grades in one of her subjects,
and so Mrs. Corla conferred with Mylene, asking her why she was failing
when she used to be good in class. Mylene only cried. Mrs. Corla
prodded
on with more questions and was ultimately shocked to discover the
gravity
of Mylene’s problem.[3]
Mylene revealed to her class adviser that her "stepfather" had raped
her.[4]
Mylene recounted that
one very early morning sometime during the last week of July, 1995, her
mother, a fish vendor who leaves their home at dawn everyday, woke her
up and asked her to transfer from the floor where she (Mylene) was
sleeping,
to the bed where her four-year old brother slept. Mylene then
transferred
and slept on the bed.[5]
At around 3:30 or 4:00 that same morning, she was again roused from
sleep
when she felt appellant on top of her, with his penis already at the
entrance
of her vagina. She could not do anything as her hands were pinned
against
appellant’s chest and he was threatening to kill all of them with a gun
that was then just beside him. Appellant went on to push his penis into
her vagina, continuing to touch her breast and vagina.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For at least a couple
of days after the incident, she did not attend school.[7]
She could not immediately overcome her fear of her stepfather. It took
her three more weeks before she gathered the courage to tell her mother
about the incident. Mylene’s mother and appellant quarreled about the
matter,
but soon after, the two were in talking terms again and the matter was
resolved with a mere promise from appellant that he will not do it
again.
Appellant, however, went on touching or mashing Mylene’s private parts
whenever he had a chance but Mylene no longer reported the incidents to
her mother as she was afraid.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, it was only when
Mylene finally told her class adviser in high school about her
traumatic
experience that something was done about her predicament. When Mrs.
Corla
learned about the rape incident, she referred the problem to the
school’s
guidance counselor, who in turn obtained help from COPE, an
organization
that helps rape victims. They assisted Mylene in reporting the crime to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the case was filed in
court.
Custody over Mylene was also turned over to the Department of Social
Welfare
and Development (DSWD).[9]
Appellant claims that
Mylene is merely fabricating the charge against him out of
vindictiveness;
that she is only making up the story about the rape because she is mad
at him for trying to discipline her.[10]
He testified that when Mylene started going to high school, she began
to
form a habit of going out every evening and returning only at around
11:30
at night. He chastised Mylene about her conduct, but she only answered
back, saying that he is "like a devil."
Both defense witnesses
Antonio Bermundo, formerly the appointed Barangay Captain of the place
where appellant and private complainant reside, and Leovigildo Barron,
a resident of the same barangay and the neighbor of appellant,
testified
that as far as they know, appellant is a good person, with no
derogatory
record whatsoever in the barangay.11
The trial court rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused, FRANCISCO
BLANCAFLOR
(sic), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined
under
Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659 and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty
of
death and to indemnify Mylene Rueda the total amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as actual, moral and exemplary damages and to
finally
pay the costs hereof.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his appeal brief,
appellant assigns the following errors of the trial court:
I
THE LOWER COURT
SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, RANGED AGAINST THE DENIAL OF THE ACCUSED, THE
TESTIMONY
OF THE COMPLAINANT IS DECIDEDLY MORE CONVINCING AND RATIONAL.
II
THE LOWER COURT
SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MYLENE RUEDA’S "FAILURE TO DIVULGE THE BESTIAL
DEED
AND DENOUNCE HER ATTACKER IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT TOOK PLACE IS NOT
CONTRARY
TO NORMAL BEHAVIOR."
III
THE LOWER COURT
SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT MYLENE RUEDA WAS ACTUATED BY
ILL-MOTIVE AND RESENTMENT IN FILING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST APPELLANT.
IV
THE LOWER COURT
LIKEWISE
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "ACCUSED’S DEFENSES OF ALIBI AND DENIAL DO NOT
INSPIRE
THE SLIGHTEST BELIEF AND CONSIDERATION.
Appellant points out
that he never advanced the defense of alibi; that his only defense is
denial;
that there is no truth whatsoever to the claims of Mylene.cralaw:red
Thus, the main issue
here is the credibility of private complainant and her testimony.
Appellant
points to several circumstances purportedly showing that Mylene’s
testimony
is not worthy of belief.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
First, he points out
that there is no evidence that Mylene put up any resistance. In fact,
her
younger brother who was sleeping beside her was not even roused from
sleep
when the alleged rape was taking place. Hence, appellant contends that
it is not true that he had to resort to force, violence and
intimidation
to commit the alleged rape. Second, the delay of fourteen months before
Mylene reported the alleged rape clouds her credibility. Lastly.
Mylene’s
filing of rape charges was merely motivated by her resentment against
appellant’s
efforts to instill discipline in her. Appellant therefore posits that
the
uncorroborated testimony of complainant is weak and cannot be
considered
more convincing and rational than the defense presented by him.cralaw:red
At the outset, we emphasize
the settled rule that the testimony of a rape victim of tender or
immature
age deserves full credit.[13]
At the time Mylene testified, she was a mere fifteen-year old girl.
Furthermore,
reading from the record, her testimony is clear, straightforward and
bereft
of material or significant inconsistencies. Hence, the trial court
correctly
found Mylene’s testimony to be deserving of full faith and credit.cralaw:red
The trial court’s findings
on the credibility of witnesses carry great weight and respect and will
be sustained by the appellate courts unless the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance
which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.[14]
We find nothing on record that would compel us to deviate from such
well-entrenched
rule or to overturn the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
Mylene.cralaw:red
Appellant’s contention
that Mylene’s testimony that she was raped should not be trusted
because
there are no signs whatsoever that she put up any resistance, is
untenable.
In People vs. Rodriguez,[15]
we held that it would be plain fallacy to say that the failure to shout
or offer tenacious resistance makes voluntary the victim’s submission
to
the criminal act of the offender. In People vs. Gutierrez,[16]
we enunciated that:
Physical resistance
need not be proved in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim
and she submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s advances
because
of fear for her life and personal safety. It suffices that the
intimidation
produces
fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not submit to the
bestial
demands of the accused, something worse would befall her at the time
she
was being molested.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, it is
true that Mylene did not put up a struggle, hence, her four-year old
brother
did not even notice what was happening between Mylene and appellant.
However,
it should be noted that Mylene testified that she was thinking of
kicking
and scratching him but she could not do so as the body of appellant
pinned
her down, her hands were pinned against appellant’s chest and appellant
was threatening to kill all of them. She testified thus:
Q: When
Francisco
Blancaflor did what you said he had done to you, what did you do?
A: I was not able
to
do anything.
Q: Why were you
not
able to do anything?
A: He threatened
me,
sir.
PROSECUTOR
BERANGO:
(To witness)
Q: And how did he
threatened
(sic) you?
A: He told me that
he
will kill all of us.
x x
x
x x x x x x
COURT: (To witness)
Q: And when you
discovered
that his sex organ was already inside your sex organ, what immediately
did you do if ever?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A: It occurred to
me
to kick him but I cannot do it because I was pinned by him and at the
same
time he was threatening me.
x x
x
x x x x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q: In your
estimate,
how long did this incident happen from the moment when you discovered
that
this man was on top of you?
A: Fifteen (15) or
twenty
(20) minutes.
Q: In all the
while
what particular thing was he doing to you within fifteen (15) or twenty
(20) minutes?
A: He was moving
his
body.
Q: And all the
while
his sex organ was inside your sex organ?
A: Not actually
inside,
his penis was just at the entrance of my vagina while he was moving.
Q: And all the
while
it was hurting you too much?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were your
hands
then, what was your position?
A: I have my hands
placed
on his chest.
Q: How about his
hands,
if you recall?
A: His hands were
placed
on my vagina.
Q: You did not
even
bother to scratch his face?
A: I was not able
to
scratch his face with my hands because I had my hands on his chest and
it was being pinned.[17]
Mylene strongly
believed appellant could carry out his threat, as there was a gun
beside
him at the time he was raping her.[18]
Moreover, the fact that
Mylene had been living with appellant since she was a very young child
and she considered him as her "stepfather" who had considerable moral
ascendancy
over her, sufficiently explains why she did not offer physical
resistance.
In People vs. Rodriguez,[19]
we held that:
The defense argument
that the accused has not employed force upon his daughter in order to
have
sex with him does not at all persuade. The force or violence necessary
in rape is a relative term that depends not only on the age, size, and
strength of the persons involved but also on their relationship to each
other. In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the
former’s
parental authority and moral ascendancy over the latter substitutes for
violence or intimidation who, expectedly, would just cower in fear and
resign to the father’s wicked deeds.[20]
In this case, appellant,
who had been the common-law husband of Mylene’s mother for fifteen
years,
was practically the one exercising parental authority over Mylene, as
he
himself testified that he took it upon himself to try to discipline
her.
In People vs. Labayne,[21]
we ruled that a child of tender years would blindly follow her
"stepfather"
who not only exercised strong, moral and physical ascendancy over her,
but who made explicit threats on her life should she make any noise.cralaw:red
Thus, we find appellant’s
contention that the delay of fourteen months in reporting the alleged
rape
clouded her credibility, to be unmeritorious. Mylene greatly feared
appellant,
believing him capable of carrying out his threat to kill them all.
Because
of this, it took her three weeks before she could muster the courage to
tell her mother about the incident. But despite having been apprised of
her daughter’s sad fate, Mylene’s mother failed to take any positive
act
to bring appellant to justice for his evil deed. In fact, as related by
Mylene, which was not refuted by the defense, her mother and appellant
fought about it but after a while, they were on speaking terms again.[22]
As a child of fourteen years at the time the crime was committed,
Mylene
could hardly be expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to
authorities without the help of an adult. Verily, we see how Mylene
must
have felt absolutely hopeless, believing that there is nobody who could
help her if her own mother would not even lift a finger to vindicate
her
rights or to ensure that she would not be subjected to similar atrocity
in the future. It took Mylene’s teachers who had enough concern for her
well-being that impelled them to bring the matter to the attention of
law
enforcement agencies. Thus, the delay of fourteen months in reporting
and
filing the case against appellant has been sufficiently explained.cralaw:red
In People vs. De Taza,[23]
the accused therein likewise used the argument that the victim’s delay
in filing the rape case against him casts doubt on the victim’s
credibility,
but we found such argument unmeritorious, and stated thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant posits that
given the traumatic consequences of rape incidents, it is inconceivable
for Jocelyn not to report or confide to anybody what she claims she
went
through, despite the fact that she was already far from his reach and
was
already within the secure confines of her other relatives.cralaw:red
Many victims of rape,
however, never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist for
they prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain rather than reveal
their
shame to the world or risk the offender’s ire and drive him to carry
out
his threats.cralaw:red
To this Court, Jocelyn’s
delay in charging appellant does not infirm her credibility.cralaw:red
In People vs. Gutierrez,[24]
we further held:
Complainant’s failure
to immediately report the rape does not diminish her credibility. The
silence
of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the
authorities
without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is
baseless
and fabricated. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some
time the assault on their virtues because of the rapist’s threat on
their
lives, more so when the offender is someone whom she knew and who was
living
with her. The delay in this case was sufficiently explained and, hence,
did not destroy complainant’s credibility.cralaw:red
Lastly, we find appellant’s
assertion that Mylene falsely testified against him out of revenge as
she
resented his efforts to discipline her, not plausible. We held in
People
vs. Viajedor[25]
that family resentment, revenge or feud had never swayed the Court from
giving full credence to the testimony of a complainant for rape,
especially
a minor who remained steadfast in her testimony, throughout the direct
and cross-examinations, that she was sexually abused. In People vs.
Cariñaga[26]
we further observed that not a few accused convicted of rape have
attributed
the charges filed against them to family feuds, resentment, or revenge.
However, such alleged motives have never swayed us from lending full
credence
to the testimony of a complainant who remained steadfast throughout her
direct and cross-examination.cralaw:red
Thus, we do not believe
that she would willingly go through the traumatic experience of
narrating
the sordid details of a rape just to vex appellant who she considered
as
her stepfather. It is truly inconceivable for a girl of such tender
years
to be able to concoct a story, provide details of a rape and ascribe
such
wickedness to her "stepfather" just because she resents being
disciplined
by him, since by thus charging him, she would also expose herself to
extreme
humiliation, even stigma. Mylene’s credible testimony is unshaken by
appellant’s
weak claim that she was motivated by ill-will in accusing him of rape.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The credibility of complainant
Mylene having been firmly established, the trial court did not err in
finding
appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.cralaw:red
As to the proper penalty
to be imposed on appellant, the applicable provision of the Revised
Penal Code at the time of the commission of the crime was Article
335,
as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993, the pertinent
portions of which read as follows:
Art. 335.
When
and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force
or
intimidation;
x x
x
x x x x x x
The crime of rape
shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x
x
x x x x x x
The death penalty
shall
also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following
attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim
is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
third
civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x
x
x x x x x x
The Information did not
allege the qualifying circumstance of minority of complainant and the
fact
that appellant is the common-law spouse of the mother of the victim.
Evidence
show that the appellant is actually not the stepfather of Mylene as it
was duly proven in the trial court that appellant is merely the
common-law
spouse of Mylene’s mother, not having been legally married[27]
The correct allegation should have been that appellant is the
common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim, as contemplated by law, so that
appellant
may be fully apprised of the exact charge against him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There was also no competent
evidence presented below to establish the age of the victim. In People
vs. Viajedor,[28]
we held:
The minority of the
victim and the offender’s relationship to the victim, which constitute
only one special qualifying circumstance, must be alleged in the
Information
and proved with certainty. Recent rulings of the Court relative to the
rape of minors invariably state that in order to justify the imposition
of the penalty of death, there must be independent evidence proving the
age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
and the absence of denial by the accused. xxx xxx xxx The prosecution
has
the burden of proving all the elements of a crime, including the
qualifying
circumstances, especially in death penalty cases.cralaw:red
For failure of the prosecution
to properly allege in the Information the qualifying circumstance that
the victim is under eighteen years of age and that the offender is a
common-law-spouse
of the parent of the victim, the special qualifying circumstance of
minority
and relationship could not be taken into consideration and appellant
could
only be found guilty of simple rape which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua.
Thus, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death on
appellant.cralaw:red
As to damages, the trial
court erroneously awarded the amount of P50,000.00 only for actual,
moral
and exemplary damages. Our recent ruling in People vs. Viajedor,[29]
should provide guidance to trial courts, as follows:
The trial court correctly
awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. This award is in
the
nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a
conviction
for rape. The trial court, however, erred is not separately awarding
moral
damages, which is distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to rape
victims.
Private complainant is entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00
pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, without the necessity of additional pleading of proof other
than
the fact of rape. Moral damages is granted in recognition of the
victim’s
injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Exemplary damages may
be awarded in criminal cases as part of civil liability if the crime
was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.Hence,
complainant
is entitled to the award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00
in order to defer fathers with perverse tendencies and aberrant sexual
behavior from preying upon their younger daughters.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Herein appellant’s commission
of the crime of rape against Mylene, the daughter of his common-law
spouse,
has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Insofar as the civil
aspect
of the case is concerned, this entitles complainant Mylene to civil
indemnity
and moral damages.cralaw:red
As to exemplary damages,
appellant admitted being the common-law spouse of complainant Mylene’s
mother and that Mylene had lived with them since she was a very young
child.
Appellant was regarded as a stepfather by complainant Mylene.
Furthermore,
appellant raped Mylene in their own home, a place where the latter
should
have been protected and care for. Instead, their home became the most
fearful
place for Mylene. The act was thus committed with abuse of confidence
and
in the dwelling of the offended party, which are aggravating
circumstances
under Article 14, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. Although these circumstances could not be used to
increase
the penalty because the same were not alleged in the Information, they
are sufficient basis to award exemplary damages in the civil aspect of
the case.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay (Branch 15) dated August
9,
1997 in Criminal Case No. T-2780, finding appellant Francisco
Blancaflor
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and ordering him to
pay private complainant Mylene B. Rueda civil indemnity in the amount
of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS
that
the death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua and that
appellant
is further ordered to pay private complainant Mylene B. Rueda, moral
damages
in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary
damages
in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Costs de oficio.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno,
Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga., JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official
leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Judge Arnulfo B. Cabredo.
[2]
Rollo, p. 7.
[3]
TSN, Testimony of Adelaida Corla, January 21, 1997, pp. 6-7.
[4]
Complaint, Exhibit "A"; Sworn Statement, Exhibit "B", Original Records,
pp. 1 and 3; TSN, Testimony of Mylene B. Rueda, January 17, 1997, p. 24.
[5]
TSN, January 17, 1999, pp. 20, 51-53.
[6]
Id., pp. 17-20, 29-32, 45-48, 53-56.
[7]
Id., p. 39.
[8]
Id., pp. 21-24,
[9]
TSN, Testimony of Adelaida Corla, Jan. 21, 1997, pp. 7-9.
[10]
TSN, June 19, 1997, pp. 4-10.
[11]
TSN, March 11, 1997, pp. 5-7, Testimony of Antonio Bermundo; TSN, May
15,
1997, pp. 4-5, Testimony of Leovigildo Barron.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[13]
People vs. Cariñaga, G.R. Nos. 146097-98. August 26, 2003
[14]
People vs. Johnny Viajedor, G.R. No. 148138, April 11, 2003.
[15]
375 SCRA 224, 233 [2002].
[16]
G. R. Nos. 147656-58, May 9, 2003.
[17]
TSN, Jan. 17, 1997, pp. 17-18, 55-56.
[18]
Id., pp. 46-47.
[19]
See Note 15.
[20]
Ibid.
[21]
357 SCRA 184, 199 [2001]
[22]
TSN, Jan. 17, 1997, p. 22
[23]
G. R. Nos. 136286-89, September 11, 2003
[24]
G. R. Nos. 147656-58. May 9, 2003
[25]
Supra.
[26]
Supra.
[27]
TSN, Testimony of Francisco Blancaflor, June 19, 1997, pp. 4-5.
[28]
See Note 14.
[29]
See note 14.. |