FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
131377
February 11, 2003
-versus-
HONORABLE NAZAR
U. CHAVES, JUDGE,
RTC-CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY, BR. 18 AND
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA,
Respondents. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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D E C I S I O N
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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This is a petition
for review of the decision dated November 7, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals,[1]
which dismissed the petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated
June 3, 1993; July 15, 1993; and September 23, 1993 of the Regional
Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18 in Criminal Case No. 86-39.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sometime in October
1986, Informations for Multiple Murder for the killing of members of
the
Bucag family in Gingoog City were filed against Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and
Richard Doe, with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City.[2]
Venue of the case was moved to Cagayan de Oro City by virtue of
Administrative
Order No. 87-2-244. Thus, Criminal Case No. 86-39 was transferred to
the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, presided by
respondent
Judge Nazar U. Chaves.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Only Felipe Galarion
was tried and convicted. All the other accused were at large.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Two years later, in
October 1988, Felizardo Roxas, also known as "Ely Roxas", "Fely Roxas"
and "Lolong Roxas," was identified as another member of the group who
was
responsible for the slaying of the Bucag family. An amended information
was filed on October 6, 1988 to implead Roxas as a co-accused. He
engaged
the services of private respondent Miguel Paderanga as his counsel. In
order to give Roxas the opportunity to adduce evidence in support of
his
defense, a preliminary investigation was conducted. In his
counter-affidavit,
Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga as the mastermind of the killings.
Consequently,
the amended information was again amended to include private respondent
Paderanga as one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Trial of the case ensued.
At the hearing on May 18, 1993, the prosecution called Felizardo Roxas
as its first witness. Private respondent objected to the presentation
of
Roxas’ testimony. The trial court took the matter under advisement. The
following day, May 19, 1993, it sustained private respondent’s
objection
on the ground that the presentation of Roxas’ testimony will violate
his
right against self-incrimination. The trial court ruled further that
before
Roxas can be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he must first
be discharged as a state witness. Otherwise put, the prosecution cannot
present Roxas as a hostile witness.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The prosecution filed
a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to discharge Roxas
as a state witness. It also manifested its intention to present Julito
Ampo as another state witness or ordinary prosecution witness.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On June 3, 1993, the
trial court issued an Order denying the prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration
but setting the motion for the discharge of Roxas as state witness for
hearing, to wit:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court believes that
it has amply heard the matter at bar referring to whether the Order of
19 May 1993 on the contention, perception and interpretation of what
the
prosecution refers to as "hostile witness." After both sides or both
panels
for that matter extensively argued their respective sides, it is the
considered
view of the Court, considering all points raised by both sides, that
the
ruling of the Court should stand and is in fact reiterated with
particular
reference on the matter on hostile witness. However, with respect to
the
alternative prayer in the Omnibus Motion for reconsideration, the Court
would like to be satisfied as to which contending side is correct on
the
issue whether the proposed witness-accused Felizardo "Ely" Roxas would
satisfy the requirements embodied in Section 9, Rule 119, regarding a
proposed
state witness.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On June 29, 1993, the
trial court issued an Order[4]
allowing the presentation of the testimony of Felizardo Roxas for
purposes
of proving the conditions of Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court
on the discharge of a state witness.[5]
Private respondent interposed an objection, which the trial court
overruled.
The next day, June 30, 1993, he filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing
that the presentation of Roxas’ testimony will be tantamount to
allowing
him to testify as a state witness even before his discharge as such;
that
the qualification of a proposed state witness must be proved by
evidence
other than his own testimony; and that at the hearing for the discharge
of a proposed state witness, only his sworn statement can be presented
and not his oral testimony.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On July 15, 1993, the
trial court issued an Omnibus Order granting private respondent’s
motion
for reconsideration, thus: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
xxx xxx xxx, it is the
considered view of this Court that, at this stage and insofar as the
proposed
state witness is concerned, only his sworn statement may be admitted
and
considered by the Court. The "evidence" contemplated in the
above-quoted
last portion of the first paragraph of Rule 119, Sec. 9, is any
evidence
other than his testimony. Precisely, the rule speaks of "and the sworn
statement of such proposed state witness," thus categorizing and
removing
such statement from the other kind or class of evidence mentioned
therein.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
xxx xxx xxx.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
PREMISES CONSIDERED,
this Court is left with no other legally plausible alternative but to
grant
the subject Motion for Reconsideration of accused Miguel Paderanga
filed
on 30 June 1993. The questioned Order issued on 29 June 1993 is hereby
reconsidered and/or set aside, without prejudice to the prosecution’s
presenting
any other evidence in support of the discharge.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other Motion
for Reconsideration simultaneously filed by the prosecution, it
appearing
that the same does not point to or specify any particular Order on
record
that has to be reconsidered, no ruling or action thereon is necessary.
Whatever matters that have been treated therein are deemed resolved
hereinabove.cralaw:red
Considering the manifestation
of the prosecution to the effect that it is adopting the same move and
stand with respect to the proposed discharge of accused Julito Ampo,
the
ruling herein made likewise applies to accused Ampo.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On August 9, 1993, the
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration. In an Order dated
September
23, 1993, the trial court denied the motion for lack of merit.[7]
On November 17, 1993,
the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals,
docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 32616, assailing the trial court’s Orders of June 3,
1993; July 15, 1993; and September 23, 1993.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 7, 1997,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.[8]
Hence, this petition for review raising the following issues:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CHALLENGED ORDER OF THE
TRIAL
COURT DATED 3 JUNE 1993 (WHICH DENIED PROSECUTION’S MOTION FOR
FELIZARDO
"ELY" ROXAS TO BE PRESENTED AS AN ORDINARY WITNESS) HAS ALREADY BECOME
FINAL SINCE NO APPEAL HAS BEEN PERFECTED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD,
BY LOOSELY CITING THE CASE OF AMARANTE v. COURT OF APPEALS, 232 SCRA
104.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LIMITING THE EVIDENCE THAT NEEDS TO BE
PRESENTED
BY THE PROSECUTION IN ITS MOTION TO DISCHARGE TO THE RESPECTIVE SWORN
STATEMENT
EXECUTED BY ITS PROPOSED WITNESSES AND IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S
DENIAL
OF THE PRESENTATION OF OTHER EVIDENCE.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court of Appeals,
in passing upon the issue of whether or not the prosecution may present
the testimony of Felizardo Roxas as a hostile witness, held that the
trial
court’s Order of June 3, 1993 disallowing the said presentation had
already
become final due to the prosecution’s failure to appeal the same. This
is error. Clearly, the Order dated June 3, 1993 was interlocutory; it
did
not finally dispose of the case on its merits. As such, the Order
cannot
be the proper subject of appeal. It may, however, be assailed in a
special
civil action for certiorari. Under the Rules of Court then governing,
the
petition for certiorari may be filed within a reasonable period.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While there is no showing
in the record that the prosecution moved for a reconsideration of the
June
3, 1993 Order, it nevertheless appears that it filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
of the Omnibus Order dated July 15, 1993, wherein it raised the matter
of presenting Roxas as an ordinary witness, as distinguished from a
state
witness.[11]
This Motion was denied by the trial court on September 23, 1993.
Thereafter,
on November 17, 1993, the prosecution instituted a petition for
certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals. The petition,
clearly,
was filed well within the reasonable period contemplated by the Rules.
It was even filed within sixty days, the reglementary period prescribed
in the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The prosecution, petitioner
herein, also argues that Ely Roxas and Julito Ampo have voluntarily
expressed
their consent to testify as prosecution witnesses. Hence, there is no
need
to first discharge them as state witnesses before they can be presented
on the stand. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petition has merit.
It is true that an accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the
prosecution,
for to do so would compel him to be a witness against himself. However,
he may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so,
with
full knowledge of his right and the consequences of his acts.[12]
It is not necessary that the court discharges him first as state
witness.
There is nothing in the rules that says so. There is a difference
between
testifying as state witness and testifying as a co-accused. In the
first,
the proposed state witness has to qualify as a witness for the state,
after
which he is discharged as an accused and exempted from prosecution.[13]
In the second, the witness remains an accused and can be made liable
should
he be found guilty of the criminal offense.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, we cannot simply
rely on petitioner’s representation that Roxas and Ampo have
volunteered
to testify for the prosecution. This is a matter that the trial court
must
determine with certainty, lest their right against self-incrimination
be
violated.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner also maintains
that it can validly present the testimony of Ely Roxas and Julito Ampo
at the hearing for their discharge as state witnesses. We agree. Rule
119,
Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (formerly Rule
119,
Section 9), provides that the trial court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be
witnesses
for the state "after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in
support
of the discharge". The provision does not make any distinction as to
the
kind of evidence the prosecution may present. What it simply requires,
in addition to the presentation of the sworn statement of the accused
concerned,
is the presentation of such evidence as are necessary to determine if
the
conditions exist for the discharge, so as to meet the object of the
law,
which is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion from the
complaint
of persons guilty of the crime charged.[14]
No exemption from the term evidence is provided by the law as to
exclude
the testimony of the accused. When the law does not distinguish, we
should
not distinguish.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There is no other evidence
more competent than the testimony of the proposed witness himself to
prove
the conditions that his testimony is absolutely necessary in the case;
that there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution
of the offense; that his testimony can be corroborated in its material
points; that he does not appear to be the most guilty; and that he has
not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Further,
the
trial judge will not be able to clarify matters found in the sworn
statements
of the proposed witnesses if they are not allowed to testify.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Private respondent counters
Roxas and Ampo cannot be allowed to testify because their testimony
will
effectively constitute an admission by a conspirator which, under Rule
130, Section 30 of the Rules of Court,[16]
is inadmissible as evidence against a co-conspirator until the
conspiracy
is established by evidence other than said declaration. In this regard,
suffice it to state that private respondent can interpose the proper
objection
during the direct examination of these witnesses, when the prosecution
propounds questions which may touch on the matter of conspiracy.
Indeed,
it is still premature for private respondent to raise this objection in
the instant petition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court
of Appeals dated November 7, 1997 is REVERSED. The Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case No. 86-39, is directed to
determine
the voluntariness of Felizardo Roxas’ and Julito Ampo’s decision to
testify
as prosecution witnesses and, thereafter, to allow the prosecution to
present
said witnesses. In the alternative, the trial court is directed to
allow
Felizardo Roxas and Julito Ampo to testify at the hearing on the motion
for their discharge as state witnesses. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 46-55.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
RTC Records, p. 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
RTC Records, Vol. IV, p. 1358.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Rollo, p. 104.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Section 9. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or
more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense,
upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct
one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state when after requiring the
prosecution
to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness
at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(a)
There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge
is requested;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b)
There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;chan
(c)
The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(d)
Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(e)
Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving
moral turpitude.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Evidence
adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of
the
trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as
state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
RTC Records, pp. 1422-1424.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Rollo, pp. 93-96.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Ibid., p. 54.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Ibid., p. 30.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Santiago, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121908, January
26, 1998.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Rollo, pp. 105-110.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
People v. Trazo and Escartin, 58 Phils. 258, 260 (1933)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 119, Section 18: Discharge of
accused operates as acquittal. The order indicated in the
preceding
section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and
shall
be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused
fails or refuses testify against his co-accused in accordance with his
sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.chan
[14]
Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, pp. 413-414 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545, 550 (1990).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 30, provides: Admission by
conspirator.
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |