SPECIAL SECOND
DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
131966
August 16, 2004
-versus-
HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO,
AS OMBUDSMAN,EDUARDO C.
CONJUANGCO,
JR., JUAN PONCEENRILE, MA. CLARA
S. LOBREGAT, ROLANDODE LA CUESTA, JOSE
C. CONCEPCION, JOSE R.MENDOZA, EMMANUEL
M. ALAMEDA, HERMENEGILDOC. ZAYCO, TEODORA
A. REGALA, AMADO C. MAMURIC,DOUGLAS LU YM, JAIME
GANDIAGA, NARCISO PINEDAAND DANILO S. URSUA,
Respondents.
|
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
R E S O L U T I O
N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This resolves the motions
for reconsideration filed by private respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr.
and petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
The Court’s decision
dated September 23, 2002, granted the petition for certiorari filed by
the Republic of the Philippines, set aside the resolution of the
Ombudsman
in OMB-0-90-2811 dismissing the Republic’s complaint, and ordered the
Ombudsman
to proceed with the preliminary investigation in said case.cralaw:red
Also on record is a
Notice filed by the counsel for the late Maria Clara L. Lobregat
informing
the Court of respondent Lobregat’s demise on January 2, 2004,[1]
and praying for the dismissal of the case against her.cralaw:red
Respondent Cojuangco
contends:
a. It was
because
of lack of evidence or probable cause that the Ombudsman dismissed the
complaint in OMB-0-90-2811, not because the offense has prescribed or
that
LOI 926 and PD Nos. 961 and 1468 precluded prosecution under RA No.
3019
and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the Court in its
decision of September 23, 2002 did not overturn the Ombudsman’s finding
of lack of probable cause, the Ombudsman’s Resolution of June 2, 1997
may
not be nullified.chanrobles virtual law library
b. No evidentiary
basis
exists for the Court’s finding that the offense had not prescribed; it
was, consequently, error for the Court to have found that the offense
charged
had not prescribed.chanrobles virtual law library
c. It was
also
error for the Court to have found that PD Nos. 961 and 1468, LOI No.
926
may not be taken into account in determining whether the respondent
violated
R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code.chanrobles virtual law library
d. The Court,
apparently,
overlooked respondent’s contention that his constitutional right to
speedy
disposition of his case has been violated warranting dismissal of
OMB-0-90-2811.[2]
For its part,
petitioner
Republic of the Philippines assails the ruling of the Court ordering
the
exclusion of respondents Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion as
defendants
in OMB-0-90-2811.[3]chanrobles virtual law library
The Court finds no compelling
reason to reconsider the assailed decision.cralaw:red
While it is true that
the Ombudsman concluded that there is “no sufficient evidence to
engender
a well-founded belief that violation of the Anti-Graft Law was
committed
and that respondents are probably guilty thereof,” it must be pointed
out
that such conclusion is premised on its finding that the acquisition by
UNICOM of the sixteen (16) oil mills was done in accordance with
existing
laws,[4]
and not because there was no evidence that respondent did not commit
the
crime at all. Thus, the Ombudsman stated, “respondents cannot be
made criminally liable for implementing a government policy because
there
is no element of evident bad faith or malice.”[5] But, as
was
stated, in the assailed Decision, the validity of LOI No. 926, and
Presidential
Decree (P.D.) Nos. 961 and 1468 will not protect private respondents
from
criminal prosecution for violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and
Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code.[6]
It is also incorrect
for respondent to say that there is no evidentiary basis for the
Court’s
finding that the offense had not prescribed, as it was resolved in the
assailed Decision that since the ten-year prescriptive period in
violation
of R.A. No. 3019 is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326, and applying
further the ruling in Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan,[7]
the complaint in this case, which was filed on March 2, 1990, was well
within the prescriptive period.[8]chanrobles virtual law library
At pain of being redundant,
we restate our ruling in the assailed Decision that:
x
x
x the fact that the transactions were done pursuant to P.D. Nos. 961
and
1468 will not shield the respondents from being charged considering
that
prosecution for violations of R.A. 3019 involves questions as to
whether
the contracts or transactions entered pursuant thereto by the private
respondents
were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government; whether
they caused undue injury to the government; and whether the private
respondents
were interested for personal gain or had material interests in the
transactions.[9]
In other words, while
P.D.
Nos. 961 and 1468 may have sanctioned UNICOM’s acquisition of the
sixteen
(16) oil mills, it does not detract from the fact that such acquisition
caused undue prejudice, disadvantage and injury to the government, or
that
private respondents had a material and personal interest in the
acquisition
thereof, acts which have already been defined as corrupt practices and
declared unlawful under R.A. No. 3019.
If the Court were to
adhere to private respondent’s argument that valid laws may not be
taken
into account in determining whether there was a violation of R.A. No.
3019
and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, then the validity of laws
would
create a blanket shield and there would be no prosecution for
violations
of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, as all acts
committed by public officers will be beyond reach, despite the undue
damage,
injury and prejudice to the government, and the personal gain and
material
interest of the public officers involved.cralaw:red
As regards respondent’s
contention that the seven-year delay in the disposition of the
preliminary
investigation by the Ombudsman warrants the dismissal of the case
against
him, the Court finds the same wanting in merit.chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Dela
Peña vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court had the occasion to restate
the
doctrine that:
The concept
of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere
mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular
regard
must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that
right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and
balanced
are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4)
the prejudice caused by the delay.[10]
Nevertheless, despite
the
finding that there was a considerable delay by the Sandiganbayan in the
disposition of the petitioners’ case, the
Court did not dismiss its case for the reason that the failure of the
petitioner
therein to assert its right to a speedy disposition of its case amounts
to a waiver of such right. Thus, the Court held:
Moreover,
it
is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case
was set for arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of the delay
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. As stated by
them
in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss, “[o]ther than the counter-affidavits,
[they] did nothing.” Also, in their petition, they averred:
“Aside
from the motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits,
petitioners
in the present case did not file nor send any letter-queries addressed
to the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao which conducted the
preliminary
investigation.” They slept on their right – a situation amounting
to laches. The matter could have taken a different dimension if
during
all those four years, they showed signs of asserting their right to a
speedy
disposition of their cases or at least made some overt acts, like
filing
a motion for early resolution, to show that they were not waiving that
right. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of
such right. As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitioner therein was
“insensitive to the implications and contingencies” of the projected
criminal
prosecution posed against him “by not taking any step whatsoever to
accelerate
the disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the
perception
that the supervening delay seems to have been without his objection,
and
hence impliedly with his acquiescence.”[11]chanrobles virtual law library
In the present case, a
review of the records shows that the last pleading filed prior to the
Ombudsman’s
Resolution dated June 2, 1997 was respondent’s Motion to Suspend Filing
of Counter-Affidavit, which was filed on May 15, 1991.[12]
Between 1991 and 1997, respondent did nothing to assert his right to a
speedy disposition of his case. Clearly, his silence during such
period amounts to a waiver of such right.chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, respondent’s
right to a speedy disposition of his case should not work against and
preclude
the people's equally important right to public justice[13]
considering that the funds used to acquire the sixteen (16) mothballed
oil mills came from the coconut levy funds, which are not only affected
with public interest, but are, in fact, prima facie public funds.[14]
It is noted that the
Court’s decision in the Orosa case,[15]
which we cited in the decision of the present case, was set aside per
Resolution
dated July 7, 2004, on the ground that two (2) of the respondents
therein,
Ma. Clara Lobregat and Jose C. Concepcion, were deprived of their right
to file their comments on the petition, and as such, the case was not
yet
ripe for resolution when the Court rendered its decision. Be that
as it may, said resolution does not bear any consequence on the present
case as the jurisprudence relied upon in the Orosa case are still valid
and binding precedents.cralaw:red
As regards petitioner
Republic’s motion that the assailed Decision be reconsidered insofar as
the exclusion of respondents Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion
as
defendants in OMB-0-90-2811 is concerned, the Court finds the same
bereft
of merit.chanrobles virtual law library
According to petitioner,
respondents Regala and Concepcion should not be excluded as respondents
because they are being charged for illegal acts committed in their
official
capacity as members of the Board of Directors of UNICOM and UCPB, in
conspiracy
with the other private respondents.[16]
Such argument, however, has already been resolved by the Court in both
the Regala[17]
and Castillo[18]
cases, wherein the Court found that the acts complained of were done by
the respondents in connection with the legal services they rendered to
the other respondents. Thus, the Court held in the Castillo case
that:
This was
the
same argument raised by the Republic in the case of Regala. In
overruling
the Republic’s position, this Court ruled:
“An
argument
is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of
attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that
they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as
witnesses
as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their
objection.
But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in
the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have
made
their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing
to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional
right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right
to
maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.”[19]chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, during the
pendency
of this petition, respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat died on January 2,
2004.[20]
The death of an accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.[21]
Consequently, the case should be dismissed with regard to her.
WHEREFORE, the Motions
for Reconsideration filed by private respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr.
and petitioner Republic of the Philippines are hereby DENIED. The
Court’s Decision dated September 23, 2002 is MODIFIED to the effect
that
the charges against deceased respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat in
OMB-0-90-2811,
pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman,
is
ordered dismissed and any criminal as well as civil liability ex
delicto
that might arise from said case is declared extinguished by reason of
her
death.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Quisumbing, J., (Acting Chairman), and Callejo,
Sr., JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, Annex “1,” p. 1137.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 637-638.
[3]
Rollo, p. 693.
[4]
Rollo, p. 81.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 81-82.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Republic vs. Desierto, 389 SCRA 452, 459 [2002].
[7]
G.R. No. 109376, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 655, cited in Republic vs.
Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 585.
[8]
Republic vs. Desierto, supra., note 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
G. R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 478, 485.
[11]
Ibid., at pp. 487-488.
[12]
Records, Vol. 1, p. 672.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107211, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA
703, 716.
[14]
Republic vs. COCOFED, G.R. Nos. 147062-64, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA
462, 481.
[15]
Republic vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 588.
[16]
Rollo, p. 695.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA
122.
[18]
Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138231, February 21, 2002, 377
SCRA
509.
[19]
Ibid., at pp. 514-515.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Rollo, Annex “1,” p. 1137.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code; Benedicto vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R.
No. 125379, September 4, 2001, 364 SCRA 334, 362. |