SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R.
No.
132167
January 8, 2002
-versus-
ARMANDO QUENING Y
VERSOZA,
Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
On appeal is the decision[1]
dated October 9, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch
46,
in Criminal Case No. 7737, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant was charged
under the following Information:
That on or about March
12, 1995, in the afternoon thereof, at sitio Siwayan, barangay Bangon,
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and hack with a bolo one Antonio dela
Cruz
y Rebesi, hitting the latter on the different parts of the body
therefore
inflicting wounds which cause[d] his instantaneous death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Appellant pleaded not
guilty when arraigned. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The
facts
of the case, as culled from the testimonies of the prosecution and
defense
witnesses, are as follows:
BERNADETH DELA CRUZ,[3]
widow of the victim and the first witness for the prosecution,
testified
that on March 12, 1995, her husband, Antonio dela Cruz, attended a
birthday
party. In the afternoon of that same day, she saw him walking towards
their
house but stopped at appellant's house, which was about 10 to 15 meters
from theirs. There was a rumor in their sitio that her husband and
appellant's
wife were having an affair. She saw her husband talking to appellant's
wife just outside the latter's house. Seeing this, she went over to
join
them. She overheard her husband telling appellant's wife that should
appellant
die, he would take the latter's place. She interrupted them and said
that
this could not be true. She and her husband were about to leave when
suddenly
appellant arrived. She then tried to explain to appellant that her
husband
was just joking. Piqued, appellant immediately boxed her husband. She
said
she tried to hold on to appellant to stop him from further hurting her
husband, but instead both fell to the ground. She recalled that
appellant's
brother-in-law, nicknamed Egoy, appeared and tried to hit her as well.
However, her husband hit Egoy first, and the latter fell. The spouses
hurriedly
went home. Upon reaching their house, her husband remained and sat by
the
gate, facing the house, with his back to the road. She was standing
about
4 to 5 meters away from him, just outside their gate, when she saw
appellant,
who was armed with a bolo, walking towards her husband. She recalled
that
she tried to shout and warn him but to no avail as no sound came out of
her throat. She saw appellant hack her husband to death. She said
appellant
killed her husband because appellant might have envied her family.[4]
On cross-examination,
Bernadeth admitted that when her husband left, she stayed behind and
talked
to appellant's wife who apologized for the rumor. According to her,
when
she neared her home, Egoy arrived and engaged her husband in a
fistfight
in the middle of the road. She reiterated what she narrated in her
direct
testimony.[5]
The second witness for
the prosecution was JULITO RABINO,[6]
a neighbor of the victim and the appellant. He testified that on March
12, 1995, at around 3:30 P.M., while he was riding his bicycle, he saw
appellant hacking at Antonio, near the gate infront of the latter's
house.
He shouted for appellant to stop but appellant only looked back at him
and continued to hack Antonio. The victim sustained wounds on his head
and shoulder. Julito said he was just three (3) arms length away. He
saw
appellant leave and go to the house of Rafael Mendoza, a barangay
kagawad,
to surrender. Meanwhile, he saw Bernadeth faint by the side of the
road.
He then brought her to her parents' house.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
DR. ARTEMIO G. CAPELLAN,
Municipal Health Officer of Masbate, testified and interpreted the
medico-legal
findings of Dr. Noel Jazul, who conducted the autopsy and prepared the
autopsy report, as follows: (1) Hacking type of wound located at the
left
side of the head. (2) Hacking wound, 11 cm. x 5 cm., parieto occipital
right. (3) Hack wound 5 cm. x 3 cm., extended from maxillary area,
located
at the right cheek up to the back passing through the right ear. (4)
Hacking
wound, 11 cm. x 2 cm., right postero lateral aspect, at the right side
of the neck through his back. (5) Hacking wound, 8 cm. x 4 cm., with
complete
fracture at the right shoulder. (6) Hacking wound, 10 cm. x 10 cm.,
right
scapula, at the right side of the back. (7) Hacking wound at 17 cm. x
2.5
c.m., scapular area posterior chest, at the left side of the back. Dr.
Capellan clarified that of the seven wounds, nos. 6 and 7 were at the
back.
All the wounds were fatal. However, he was not certain which of the
wounds
caused the actual death of the victim.[8]
For the defense, witness
ORLANDO BARTOLAY CABILES testified that on March 12, 1995, while
standing
six (6) meters away from the house of appellant, he saw Antonio, armed
with a bolo, running towards the direction of appellant's residence.
Antonio
then found appellant in his yard. Antonio tried to hit appellant with
the
bolo but missed. They grappled for the bolo and appellant, after
getting
the weapon, hacked Antonio. Appellant then went up his house while
Antonio
ran towards the middle of the road where he fell. Cabiles also noticed
that there were other people who saw the incident but were too afraid
to
come forward. When cross-examined, he admitted that he resided in Sitio
Bangon while the incident was in Sitio Siwayan; that he was in the
vicinity
of the crime because there was a shorter road in the area leading to
his
house; and that when he ran for councilor in the local elections,
appellant
and he were political allies. He likewise admitted that had he not been
asked by appellant, he would not have testified for him. He claimed
that
he never saw what or how the incident started and that he witnessed
only
the part when Antonio armed with a bolo rushed towards appellant.[9]
The final witness was
appellant himself. In his own defense, ARMANDO QUENING recounted that
on
March 12, 1995, at around 3:30 P.M., he was awakened by a commotion
near
the gate of his house. When he looked out the window, he saw Antonio
boxing
his brother-in-law, Egoy. He went down to pacify them but to no avail.
When Antonio saw him, Antonio was uttering "It is good that you came
here.",
while lunging at him with a twelve (12) inch-knife. Antonio missed.
They
grappled for the knife and he managed to get hold of it then he thrust
the knife at Antonio. He explained that perhaps out of blind rage, he
hit
the victim four (4) times. At this point, he claimed, he no longer knew
where Egoy was. He surrendered to Councilor Rafael Mendoza who brought
him to the Municipal Building of Aroroy.[10]
In its decision, the
trial court found appellant guilty for the murder of Antonio dela Cruz.
The fallo reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the accused
Armando Quening y Versoza is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of Antonio dela Cruz y
Rebesi the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages.
The accused is further ordered to be transferred to the National
Penitentiary.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[11]
In this appeal, he avers
that the trial court erred:
I. … IN APPRECIATING
THE PRESENCE OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.[12]
II. … IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARMANDO QUENING GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.[13]
Appellant seeks the
reversal of his conviction and raises principally the issue of
credibility
of the prosecution witnesses as well as the propriety of the trial
court's
appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance in the
commission
of the offense.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the issue of credibility,
appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving full faith and
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. He avers that
the
court a quo merely adopted the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
but wholly disregarded those of the witnesses for the defense.[14]
For the State, the Office
of the Solicitor General posits that the trial court did not err in
finding
appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery. However, the State
moves
for the modification of the trial court's decision insofar as the award
of moral damages is concerned, which according to the State should have
been denominated as indemnity ex delicto and should be increased from
P50,000
to P75,000.cralaw:red
It is well settled that
in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great
respect
to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity
to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment while
testifying.
Such an opportunity is denied the appellate courts, which rely on the
cold
pages of the records of the case.[15]
Only when such assessment is tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
a significant fact or circumstance that could affect the result will
the
appellate court depart from the trial court's factual conclusions.[16]
Appellant claims self-defense.
For self-defense to prosper, the following requirements should be met:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[17]
Appellant avers that
he merely came to the aid of his brother-in-law, Egoy, who was being
attacked
with fistblows by the victim. However, Bernadeth dela Cruz, the
victim's
wife, positively testified that appellant stabbed her husband without
any
provocation on his part.cralaw:red
Between these contradicting
testimonies, we are constrained to uphold the findings of the lower
court.
It found that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.
Appellant claimed he was attacked by the victim with a bolo. We find it
less than credible that the victim who was a bigger man, and armed with
a bolo, could be disarmed by appellant, who was unarmed and of smaller
built. Noteworthy too is the fact that despite appellant's claim that
they
grappled for the possession of the bolo, appellant did not sustain any
wound or bruise. Other than his bare allegation, there is no evidence
on
record, testimonial or documentary, to support appellant's claim that
the
victim was the unlawful aggressor.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Curiously too, as observed
by the trial court, appellant's brother-in-law, Christopher dela
Peña
nicknamed Egoy, was not presented as a witness, when Egoy was the
person
that appellant allegedly aided. Appellant could not even account for
the
whereabouts of Egoy after the stabbing took place. If it is true that
appellant
merely came to Egoy's rescue, it was crucial that Egoy corroborate his
plea of self-defense. But Egoy was not put on the witness stand. There
was no sufficient proof of unlawful aggression on the victim's part.
Thus,
appellant's claim of self-defense could not prosper since unlawful
aggression
is an indispensable element thereof.[18]
Appellant when cross-examined
by the prosecutor testified, thus,
Q: What is the name
of your brother-in-law with a quarrel with Antonio dela Cruz?
A: Christopher dela
Peña.[19]
Q: And according to
you, the victim, Antonio dela Cruz boxed on the face your
brother-in-law?
A: Yes sir.cralaw:red
Q: He boxed your brother-in-law?
A: Yes sir.cralaw:red
Q: And after boxing
your brother-in-law, Antonio dela Cruz stopped boxing your
brother-in-law?
A: Yes sir, because
my brother-in-law fel[l] unconscious.cralaw:red
Q: But when your brother-in-law
fel[l] unconscious, Antonio dela Cruz felt aggressive?
A: Antonio dela Cruz
fell in the perimeter fence.cralaw:red
Q: But is it not that
you said, you pacified the quarrel between Antonio dela Cruz and your
brother-in-law
Charlie dela Peña?
A: Yes sir.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q: At the time Antonio
dela Cruz [was] boxing your brother-in-law, Antonio dela Cruz was not
carrying
any weapon that is why he only boxed your brother-in-law?
A: There was.cralaw:red
Q: You mean that at
the time Antonio dela Cruz boxed your brother-in-law, he was already
carrying
that weapon?
A: Yes sir.cralaw:red
Q: But he did not use
it against your brother-in-law?
A: No sir. He was not
able to use it because it was still [on] his waist.cralaw:red
Q: It was only when
you pacified that Antonio dela Cruz would like to attack you with his
bladed
weapon, is that correct?
A: Yes sir.cralaw:red
x x x
Q: And you were able
to grab into possession that bladed weapon from Antonio dela Cruz?
A: Yes sir.cralaw:red
Q: So after you have
wrestled from Antonio dela Cruz that bladed weapon, Antonio has no
weapon
anymore?
A: Yes sir.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q: Therefore, there
was no more danger in yourself because Antonio's weapon was in your
possession?
A: Yes sir.cralaw:red
x x x
Q: How many times did
you hack Antonio?
A: Four (4) times.cralaw:red
x x x
Q: Actually Mr. Witness,
according to you when you hacked Antonio dela Cruz you lost control of
yourself, you could not really count the number of times you hacked the
victim because according to you, you lost control of yourself?
Atty. Sulat: Misleading,
Your Honor.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A: Yes sir.[20]
Given the afore-cited
circumstances in this case, appellant's plea of self-defense has no leg
to stand on. Further, as shown by the autopsy report, the victim
suffered
seven hack wounds, all of which were deemed fatal by the medico-legal
officer.
The gravity of these hack wounds negates the claim of self-defense. It
is an oft-repeated rule that the presence of a large number of wounds,
their location and their seriousness would negate self-defense.
Instead,
they indicate a determined effort to kill.[21]
Additionally, we note
that the testimony of appellant's corroborating witness, Orlando
Bartolay
Cabiles, is suspect. Cabiles admitted that he was a political ally of
appellant;
that he came forward upon the invitation of the latter; and that
conveniently
he was in the area by chance when he took a shortcut home. Compare this
with the testimony of prosecution witness Julito Rabino. Despite the
grueling
cross-examination by the defense, his testimony was consistent,
straightforward,
and candid. The defense had not imputed any ill-motive against him for
testifying. It is settled that where there is no evidence that the
witness
was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[22]
Was the crime qualified
by treachery? There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[23]
As revealed by witnesses
in their testimony, on the day of the crime, there was a previous
altercation
between appellant and the deceased. Not long after, the stabbing
incident
took place. The victim's wife testified that appellant tapped her
husband's
right shoulder before appellant hacked her husband, a warning that the
latter's life was in danger.[24]
Also, since witness Rabino said he did not see how the incident
commenced,
his testimony could not be utilized to support the allegation of
treachery.
The fatal wounds found at the back of the deceased do not, by
themselves,
indicate treachery.[25]
In the absence of other details that would confirm that indeed
appellant
deliberately adopted the means employed to kill the deceased, the
qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated. Treachery
cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence
or as conclusively as the killing itself.[26]
Hence, the conviction of appellant must be modified so that he is
declared
guilty not of murder but only homicide.cralaw:red
Moreover, we find in
favor of appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
For surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and must show the
intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities,
either: (1) because he acknowledges his guilt; or (2) because he wishes
to save the authorities the trouble and expense incidental to his
search
and capture.[27]
Appellant testified that after the hacking incident he went to the
house
of kagawad Rafael Mendoza who brought him to the Municipal Building of
Aroroy to admit to the killing, albeit in self-defense. This was
effectively
corroborated by the prosecution through witness Julito Rabino.[28]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, the award of
damages needs modification. The trial court improperly awarded P50,000
as moral damages. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient
proof
that the aggrieved party is entitled to it in accordance with Article
2217
of the Civil Code.[29]
Nothing on record shows that the wife asked for moral damages. Since
moral
damages was not prayed for and no evidence to substantiate the award
for
moral damages was presented,[30]
moral damages may not be awarded. Nonetheless, the heirs of the victim
are entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000, pursuant to
prevailing
jurisprudence.[31]
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 46, in Criminal Case No.
7737, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty
only of HOMICIDE, not murder. With the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary
surrender in his favor, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum
period of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum and 12 years
and
1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum in relation to Article 64[32]
of the Revised Penal Code. The award for moral damages in the amount of
P50,000 is deleted for lack of basis. But appellant is ordered to pay
the
heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Costs de oficio.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Buena, J., on official
leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, p.10.
[2]
Id. at 4.
[3]
Also referred to as Bernardita dela Cruz and Bernadette dela Cruz
elsewhere
in the TSN, August 21, 1995, p.12; September 26, 1995, p. 1.
[4]
TSN, August 21, 1995, pp. 2-6.
[5]
TSN, August 21, 1995, pp. 7-12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Also referred to as "Dioleto Rabino" in some part of the records.
[7]
TSN, September 26, 1995, pp. 3-10.
[8]
TSN, July 24, 1996, pp. 2-6.
[9]
TSN, January 7, 1997, pp. 1-5.
[10]
TSN, February 18, 1997, pp. 2-6.
[11]
Rollo, p. 16.
[12]
Id. at 31.
[13]
Id. at 33.
[14]
Id. at 34.
[15]
People vs. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 137379-81, 341 SCRA 502, 509 (2000);
citing
People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 132025, 335 SCRA 100, 111-112 (2000);
People
vs. Babera, G.R. No. 130609, 332 SCRA 257, 266 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 124368, 333 SCRA 269, 280 (2000); People
vs. Balgos, G.R. No. 126115, 323 SCRA 372, 380 (2000).
[17]
Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code.
[18]
People vs. Lascota, G.R. No. 113527, July 17, 1997, 275 SCRA 591, 601
(1997).
[19]
Also referred as "Charlie dela Peña".
[20]
TSN, February 18, 1997, pp. 7-10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
People vs. Rivero, G.R. No. 112721, 242 SCRA 354, 360 (1995), citing
People
vs. Maceda, G.R. No. 91106, 197 SCRA 499 (1991); People vs. Sagadsad,
G.R.
No. 88042, 215 SCRA 641 (1992); People vs. Nuestro, G.R. No. 111288,
240
SCRA 221, 228 (1995), citing People vs. Boniao, G.R. No. 100800, 217
SCRA
653 (1993).
[22]
People vs. Alfeche, G.R. No. 124213, 294 SCRA 352, 376 (1998), citing
People
vs. Simon, G.R. No. 56925, 209 SCRA 148 (1992); People vs. Rostata, 218
SCRA 657 (1993); People vs. Bergante, G.R. Nos. 120369-70, 286 SCRA
629,
642 (1998).
[23]
Art.14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code.
[24]
TSN, August 21, 1995, p. 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
People vs. Maturgo, Sr., G.R. No. 111872, 248 SCRA 519, 531 (1995).
[26]
People vs. Silvestre, G.R. No. 109142, 244 SCRA 479, 494 (1995).
[27]
People vs. Sion, G.R. No. 109617, 277 SCRA 127, 154 (1997).
[28]
TSN, September 26, 1995, p. 5.
[29]
People vs. Manegdeg, G.R. No. 115470, 316 SCRA 689, 709 (1999).
[30]
Citing Kierulf vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114383, 269 SCRA 433, 452
(1997) and People vs. Corea, G.R. No. 114383, 269 SCRA 76, 94 (1997).
[31]
People vs. Verde, G.R. No 119077, 302 SCRA 690, 706 (1999).
[32]
ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three
periods.-
In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three
periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions
of Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of
the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or no
mitigating
or aggravating circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x x
(2)
When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the
act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period. |