EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
133436
April 14, 2004
-versus-
CONRADO AYUMAN,
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For automatic review is
the Decision[1]
dated March 4, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de
Oro City in Criminal Case No. 97-1040 finding Conrado Ayuman,
appellant,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and imposing upon him the
supreme
penalty of death. He was also adjudged to pay the heirs of the
victim
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Information charging
appellant with parricide reads:
“That on or about April
22, 1997, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior
strength
and ascendancy over Sugar Ray Ayuman, his legitimate son, maul,
maltreat
and kill the latter by slapping and hitting the latter on his head,
stomach
and other parts of the latter’s young and tender body thereby
inflicting
upon the latter traumatic abdominal injuries, which are fatal injuries
and which caused the latter’s death shortly thereafter, to the damage
and
prejudice of the said Sugar Ray Ayuman and his legal heirs.”
Upon arraignment, appellant,
with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The version of the prosecution
was established through the testimonies of Dr. Tammy Uy, Marino Jalalo,
SPO1 Salome Catulong, Ederico Mariano, Angelito Roluna, Grace Songcuya
and SPO1 Medel Makalino.cralaw:red
On April 22, 1997 at
around 10:15 in the morning, Ermita Ayuman, appellant’s wife, rushed
her
five-year old son Sugar Ray to the Emergency Room of the Northern
Mindanao
Medical Center (NMMC). When Ederico Mariano, a nurse, took the
child’s
vital signs, it appeared that he was dead on arrival.
Ederico
then asked Ermita what happened to the child. She answered that
he
was mauled by his father. Ermita’s statement was noted in
the
emergency room record.[2]
At about 10:45 in the
morning of the same day, SPO1 Salome Catulong of Police Precinct No. 1
of Cagayan de Oro City, received a phone call from the NMMC informing
her
that a child died because he was assaulted by his father. Being
in
charge of cases involving women and children, she immediately proceeded
to the hospital. Angelito Roluna, a newspaper reporter of the Sun
Star, was with her. Ermita refused to answer any query from SPO1
Catulong regarding the death of her son. But when Roluna asked
her
what happened, she told him that Sugar Ray was mauled by his father.[3]
This interview could only be finished the following day when Ermita
admitted
to him that appellant used to hurt the child every time the latter left
the house or made mistake; that before he died, appellant kicked him;
and
that the child informed her he was in pain and vomiting. Roluna
reported
this interview in the “Sun Star.”chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Also on that same day,
April 22, 1997, at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, SPO1 Catulong
went
to the Ayuman residence. That was the start of the wake for Sugar
Ray. When SPO1 Catulong interviewed Ermita, she stated that
appellant
maltreated the boy in order to discipline him and that appellant
started
to hit him at the age of four. Upon suggestion of SPO1
Catulong,
Ermita agreed that the body of the child be autopsied.[4]
On April 23, 1997, Dr.
Tomas L. Uy of the NBI, Region 10, Cagayan de Oro City, performed the
autopsy
on the body of Sugar Ray. Prior thereto, he learned from Ermita
that
the child was maltreated by appellant in their house on April 22, 1997
at about 10:30 in the morning.[5]
Dr. Uy’s Autopsy Report
contains the following findings:
“Pallor, generalized.
Rigor mortis, lower extremities. Livor mortis, generalized, back,
buttocks,
posterior aspects of the neck and extremities. Areas of post-mortem
greenish
discolorations of the abdomen and inferior aspects of the chest are
noted.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ABRASIONS: 0.2X0.4 cms.
And 0.3X0.6 cm., lower thoracic region of the back, mid-aspect; 3X2
cms.,
right iliac region, lateral aspect.cralaw:red
HEMATOMAS, violaceous:
2.2X1 cms. Forehead, right side; 1.5X2 cms., 2.5X2 cms., 1.2X1.6 cms.,
and 3X0.8 cms., left side of the face; (page 2-A, record) 1.8X1.2
cms., right elbow region; 4X2.5 cms., dorsum of right hand; 2.4X1.2
cms.,
left forearm, dorsal aspect, dista third; 2.5X2.2 cms., lower sternal
region
of the chest; 6X3 cms., epigastric region of the abdomen.cralaw:red
HEMATOMA, 6X2 cms.,
surface of the pericardium, anterior aspect, beneath the sternum.cralaw:red
HEMATOMA, stomach, 5X2
cms., lesser curvature region, anterior aspect.cralaw:red
LACERATED WOUND, 1.5
cms. long, with irregular edges, right lobe of the liver, medial
aspect,
overlying the gall bladder, surrounded by a HEMATOMA of 4X3 cms.cralaw:red
RUPTURE, small intestine,
ileal region/portion; with irregular edges.cralaw:red
PERITONITIS, generalized,
aero-purulent; with extensive intestinal and mesenteric adhesions;
serosal
surfaces of the small and large intestines are markedly congested and
covered
with patches of foul-smelling yellowish purulent exudates.
Peritoneal fluid is heavily contaminated with fecal matter.cralaw:red
Heart chambers, contain
smell amount of dark fluid and clotted blood.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Stomach, contains about
1 tbsp. of yellowish-green bilous substance.cralaw:red
Brain, markedly congested.cralaw:red
Other visceral organs,
congested.cralaw:red
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Traumatic abdominal injuries.”
On April 23, 1997, Sugar
Ray was buried. Appellant was nowhere to be found. Neither
did he report for work from April 23 to May 21, 1997.[6]
During the burial, Ermita cried and shouted, “Dong, forgive your
father.
Dong, don’t leave us.” Afterwards, upon invitation of SPO1 Catulong,
Ermita,
with her two children, went to the former’s office and executed the
following
statement quoted as follows:
“01. Q - Do you swear to tell the truth and
nothing
but the whole truth in your statement now?
A - Yes,
I will swear.cralaw:red
02.
Q - Please state your name, age, address and other personal
circumstances?
A - I am
Ermita Ayuman y Mayuela, 36 years of age, married, presently residing
at
Pilgrim Compound, Del Pilar/ Magsaysay Street, Cagayan de Oro City and
originated from Manuikan, Zamboanga del Norte, a mother of 3 children,
2 girls and one boy.cralaw:red
03.
Q - Why are you here at the police Station at OKK Police
Precinct
No. 1?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A - I am
here to file a criminal complaint against my own husband PO3 Conrado
Ayuman
an active member of Cagayan de Oro Central Fire Station, for killing
our
only son Sugar Ray Ayuman, 5 yrs. Old, Kinder 2 at Faith Tabernacle
situated
at Del Pilar/Magsaysay, Cagayan de Oro City.cralaw:red
04.
Q - When and where did this happen?
A - This
happened on April 22, 1997 at 10:30 in the morning more or less from
our
house at Del Pilar/Magsaysay going to Northern Mindanao Medical Center
but died on arrival at the hospital and the mauling which was done by
his
father happened in our house and this the cause of the death of my son.cralaw:red
05.
Q - Please narrate shortly the incident.cralaw:red
A - The
father of Sugar Ray started mauling him when he was then 4 years old
until
the age of 5. His father would kick, box, slap, and beat him even
if he just committed slight mistakes. If Sugar Ray would go out
from
our room to watch TV at our neighbor’s place his father would be
furious
and would beat him. And on Monday, April 21, 1997, at 10:00 a.m.,
more or less, my husband came home from office to get something.
He called Ray because that time Ray went out from our room, and
immediately
slapped him and the head of Ray bumped on the wall. He let Ray
get
inside our room, slapped him again and I saw my husband kick Ray many
times
hitting his abdomen. I tried to stop him but he would not listen
and instead kicked Ray several times because as what he said ‘I must
discipline
my child because he is a boy.’ He easily gets angry even for
slightest
mistakes.cralaw:red
06.
Q - What else can you say?
A - In that
afternoon at past 1:00 o’clock of same day, he came home from his work
to get epoxy to repair his radio, and he saw Ray wiping his hands and
suddenly
hit Ray’s head and said ‘You will go out again as your mother is
sleeping.’
But that time I was not yet asleep and I heard everything that he said
to the child then looked for a chain but there was none; he saw a rope
and tied the neck of my son to the bed, so Ray could not go out and
even
told me not to untie the knot until the child sleeps, then he left
going
back to his office.cralaw:red
07.
Q - What other things happened?
A - The
following day April 22, 1997 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning my husband
was at home from a 24 hours duty before that day. He saw me
wiping
the hands of Ray with wet face towel and asked me by saying ‘Is Ray
having
fever? It’s because he is disobedient.’ He told the child
to
stand up by saying ‘stand up Ray.’ Ray then stood up and felt
nauseated
and was about to vomit and told Ray ‘Pretentious child he’s just
pretending
to vomit.’ Ray lay down again and I continued wiping him and
massage
him with sanitary balm as he felt cold and was sweating and at that
time
seemed to have hard time breathing. I could not determine his way
of breathing, sometimes very fast, and then my husband approached Ray
and
put his clenched fist on Ray’s face and commanded Ray to squat then let
Ray stand up and squat with open hands in front his knees. I told
him to stop Ray from squatting, then Ray lay down again but rose up and
vomited and I saw him vomit with blood and I was so scared so I brought
my child to Northern Mindanao Medical Center, and while on our way on
board
motorela going to said hospital, Ray was able to say ‘Mang, maybe I
will
die now’ and I told him, ‘You won’t die “Do” because we will go to the
hospital.’ At that time I noticed Ray having hard time breathing
and upon arrival at the emergency room of said hospital the nurse
touched
his pulse and declared that my son died on arrival. I could not
believe
that my son was already dead and did not know what to do that
time.
I just embraced him and kept on crying.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
08.
Q - Did your husband know at that time that Sugar Ray is
already
dead?
A - Yes,
because he was informed by his sibling who accompanied us to the
hospital
but my husband that time did not go with us to said hospital and as
what
I knew from his sibling that he told his ‘manong’ (my husband) that
Sugar
Ray is already dead and his response was ‘bury him’ and until now my
husband
has not yet appeared.cralaw:red
09.
Q - I have no more questions, do you have something more to
add?
A - No more
as of now.cralaw:red
10.
Q - Will you sign your statement voluntarily without being
coerced or intimidated by anybody?
A - Yes,
I will sign. (Affidavit as translated, pages 185-186, records).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(Signed) ERMITA MAYUELA
AYUMAN
(Affiant)”[7]
Thereafter, SPO1 Catulong
and Ermita proceeded to the office of Grace Songcuya, Clerk of Court of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City. Ermita
subscribed and sworn to before Songcuya the truth of her statement
given
before SPO1 Catulong.cralaw:red
However, on May 15,
1997, Ermita executed an affidavit retracting what she stated in her
sworn
statements. Nonetheless, the City Prosecutor filed with the court
a quo the corresponding Information and eventually issued a warrant of
arrest against appellant. SPO1 Catulong arrested appellant at the
Central Fire Station, Cagayan de Oro City.[8]
Marino Jalalo, testified
that he and appellant’s family are neighbors. Appellant has
three children, two girls and a boy. But he was particularly
violent
to his son Sugar Ray. Every time the boy committed a mistake,
appellant
would punish him inside a room. About 3 to 4 times a month,
appellant
would hit the child with a belt or a stick and he could only cry.
Once, Marino heard the child gasping for breath as if he was being
drowned
by appellant. At one time, the boy approached Marino and asked
for
something to eat, saying “Tatay, did you hear me a while ago?” At that
moment, Marino noticed that the child’s head was partly swollen.
When asked what happened to him, the child replied, “My face was pushed
down.” In the same month and year, appellant locked the child
inside
a room. Observing that Marino was around, the child begged him
for
help.[9]
The defense presented
as its witnesses appellant and his wife Ermita.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant denied killing
his son Sugar Ray. He testified that on April 22, 1997, when he
came
home at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw his son on
bed.
His wife was rubbing “sanitary balm” on him. While he was having
breakfast, he noticed that his son was pale, had fever and was
vomiting.
So he told his wife to bring the child to the hospital.
Initially,
she was reluctant because they had no money, but he insisted. On
the same day, he went to Pagadian to borrow money from his
relatives.
He returned home on April 27, 1992. Ermita told him that Sugar
Ray
died because an unidentified person slapped and kicked him at the Cogon
market. At that time, his son was already buried. The
couple
then went to the Office of the Prosecutor to “tell the truth.”[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On cross examination,
appellant admitted he was strict with his children and disciplined them
in a military way.[11]
After hearing the case,
the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court
finds accused Conrado Ayuman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime
of parricide committed by killing his minor son, Sugar Ray Ayuman,
aggravated
by treachery, lack of respect due to Sugar Ray’s tender age, cruelty
and
abuse of confidence, and thereby hereby sentences him to death, to
indemnify
the heirs of Sugar Ray Ayuman in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs
of this case.cralaw:red
His custodian is hereby
also ordered to ship him to the National Penitentiary immediately, or
without
delay.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.”
Appellant now raises
the following assignments of error:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“I
THE COURT A QUO
ERRED
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF
EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
II
THE COURT A QUO
ERRED
IN DISMISSING THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE FILED BY THE COMPLAINANT AND
IN DISREGARDING HER TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT.”[12]
Appellant contends that
the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable doubt
that
he is guilty of the crime charged. In fact, there is no evidence
directly pointing to him as the culprit. What the prosecution
presented
are mere hearsay evidence and “assumption.” While SPO1 Catulong
testified
that Ermita executed a sworn statement on September 22, 1997, however,
Ermita denied its veracity. Her affidavit of desistance tells all.cralaw:red
Appellant likewise maintains
that the circumstantial evidence enumerated by the trial court in its
assailed
Decision “do not support any finding of parricide.”
For his part, the Solicitor
General, in the appellee’s brief, maintains that Ermita’s affidavit of
recantation is an afterthought and exceedingly unreliable.
Moreover,
the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court sustains the
conviction of appellant of the crime charged.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, defines and penalizes
parricide as follows:
“Article 246. Parricide.
– Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether
legitimate
or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his
spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of
reclusion
perpetua to death.”
The elements of the
crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased
is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The key element here is
the relationship of the offender with the victim.[13]
All the above elements
were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, specifically on the basis
of circumstantial evidence.cralaw:red
In People vs. Almoguerra
and Aton,[14]
we held:
“Direct evidence of
the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom a
court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. The rules
on
evidence and case law sustain the conviction of appellants through
circumstantial
evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under Section 4, Rule
133 of the Revised Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence, the
following
requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance;
(2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.”
The following circumstances
cited by the trial court led us to conclude that the prosecution proved
by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that appellant killed his son, thus:
1. Appellant has
the propensity in maltreating his son. He himself testified
that he disciplined the victim by inflicting on him serious corporal
punishment
akin to “the military approach;”[15]
2. Marino Jalalo,
appellant’s neighbor, testified that whenever the victim committed a
mistake,
appellant would bring him in a room and punish him. He often
heard
the victim crying as he was being hit by appellant with a belt or a
stick.
This happened about 3 to 4 times a month;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. Appellant was
at home on April 22, 1997 when Ermita rushed the victim to the NMMC
where
he was declared dead on arrival;
4. Appellant immediately
left after his son was rushed to the hospital by his wife;
5. Ermita admitted
to Ederico Mariano, the nurse then on duty when the victim was rushed
to
the hospital, that the latter was mauled by his father. This
declaration
was later entered in the NMMC emergency room record by the same nurse;
6. Ermita, when
interviewed by SPO1 Catulong and Angelito Roluna, a newspaper reporter,
also admitted to them that appellant has been maltreating his son and
mauled
him before he died;
7. Dr. Tomas L.
Uy who physically examined the victim found abrasions and hematomas all
over his body, as well as lacerated wound of the liver and ruptured
intestine,
among others. According to Dr. Uy, Sugar Ray died of “traumatic
abdominal
injuries.” To a layman, Dr. Uy’s findings readily show that the child
suffered
violent blows on his body.cralaw:red
8. During the
interment, Ermita shouted, “Dong, forgive your father.”
9. Although Ermita
advised appellant that the victim was slapped and kicked by an
unidentified
person at the Cogon market on April 21, 1997, however, contrary to a
father’s
natural reaction, appellant failed to take any action to defend a loved
one or report the incident to the police;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
10.
Appellant did not return home immediately. In fact, he was not
present
during the wake and the burial of his own son, conduct so unnatural for
a father like him.cralaw:red
The foregoing circumstances,
when viewed in their entirety, are as convincing as direct evidence and
as such, negate appellant’s innocence. Otherwise stated, the
prosecution
established beyond a shadow of doubt, through circumstantial evidence,
that appellant committed the crime of parricide.cralaw:red
Here is a father who
mercilessly abused his own son and refused to bring him to the
hospital,
although on the verge of death, for prompt medical treatment.
Such
a heartless conduct is condemnable and is extremely contrary to human
nature.
Every father is expected to love his children and shower them with acts
of affection and tenderness. But appellant belongs to a different
breed. Indeed, he is a tyrant without mercy. His intense
apathy
to his dying young son is beyond comprehension.cralaw:red
We have ruled that facts
or circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of the
accused
but also inconsistent with his innocence, constitute evidence which, in
weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its
effect
upon the court.[16]
But appellant discredits
Ermita’s sworn statement because she retracted. It bears emphasis
that mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily
vitiate
the original testimony if credible, as in this case. We look with
disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in
court.
The rationale for the rule is obvious: Affidavits of retraction
can
easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a
monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly
unreliable.
There is always the probability that it will later be repudiated.[17]
Thus, the trial court correctly disregarded Ermita’s affidavit of
desistance.
Obviously, she was influenced by appellant to execute it.
Moreover,
if it were true that an unidentified person killed their son, why did
appellant
fail to report the matter to the proper authorities? There can be
no other conclusion, therefore, than that Ermita’s affidavit of
retraction
is an afterthought, intended to exculpate appellant from criminal
liability.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant, merely denied
the commission of the crime and interposed the defense of
alibi.
Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable, unless corroborated by
disinterested
witnesses. Since he was unable to substantiate his alibi with the
testimony of a credible witness, it is reduced to self-serving evidence
undeserving of any weight in law.[18]
In his desperate attempt
to exculpate himself from any criminal liability, appellant insists
that
the prosecution failed to prove that he is the father of the
victim.
While the prosecution failed to present to the trial court the victim’s
Certificate of Live Birth, however, both appellant and his wife Ermita
admitted during the hearing that the victim is their son. In
People
vs. Malabago,[19]
we ruled that oral evidence of the fact of filial relationship maybe
considered.[20]
We now resolve the issue
of whether the trial court imposed the correct penalty. Under
Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5 of R.A. No.
7659,
the penalty for parricide is composed of two indivisible penalties,
reclusion
perpetua to death. In the case at bar, the trial court
erred
in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of
confidence
and cruelty. Outright, we cannot consider these aggravating
circumstances
in determining the proper penalty because they have not been alleged in
the Information. Also, there are no mitigating circumstances here.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Considering that no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the
crime,
we impose upon the appellant the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.cralaw:red
Regarding damages, the
trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to
the
victim’s mother and sisters. When death occurs as a result of a
crime,
appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00
as
civil indemnity,[21]
without need of any evidence or proof of damages.[22]
We also award them exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000.00
considering
that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this being
a case of parricide.[23]
In People vs. Catubig,[24]
we held that exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 are
recoverable
if there is present an aggravating circumstance (whether qualifying or
ordinary) in the commission of the crime.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision dated March 4, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan
de Oro City, in Criminal Case No. 97-1040, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION
in the sense that appellant CONRADO AYUMAN is sentenced to suffer the
penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and is ordered to pay the victim’s heirs
P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.cralaw:red
Costs de oficio.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno,
Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Judge Anthony E. Santos, Rollo at 23-43.
[2]
Exhibit “G-1-A”.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
TSN, September 22, 1997 at 4-35; TSN, December 2, 1997 at 4-15.
[4]
TSN, September 22, 1997 at 4-35.
[5]
TSN, September 15, 1997 at 3-15.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
TSN, December 3, 1997 at 28-32
[7]
Rollo at 29-32.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
TSN, September 22, 1997 at 4-35.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
TSN, September 16, 1997 at 15-20.
[10]
TSN, February 10, 1998 at 79-97.
[11]
TSN, February 10, 1998 at 95-97chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Rollo at 61.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
See People vs. Dalag, G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003.
[14]
G.R. No. 121177, November 11, 2003 at 15, citing People vs. Edralin
Taboga,
376 SCRA 500 (2002); and People vs. Fegidero, 337 SCRA 274, 282 (2000).
[15]
TSN, February 10, 1998 at 95-97.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
People vs. Taliman, G.R. No. 109143, October 11, 2000, 342 SCRA 534,
544,
citing People vs. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613, 632 (1996); and People vs.
Abitona,
240 SCRA 335 (1995).
[17]
People vs. Abon, G.R. No. 130662, October 14, 2003 at 15, citing
Virgilio
Santos vs. People, G.R. No. 147615, January 20, 2003; People vs. Dulay,
217 SCRA 103 (1993); and Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 562
(1994).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
People vs. Aton and Almoguerra, supra. at 21, citing People vs.
Avendaño,
G.R. No. 137407, January 28, 2003.
[19]
G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996, 265 SCRA 199.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
See People vs. Florendo, G.R. No. 136845, October 8, 2003. See also
People
vs. Velasco, G.R. No. 128089, February 13, 2001, 351 SCRA 539, citing
People
vs. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198 (1996).
[21]
People vs. Velasco, supra., citing People vs. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198
(1996);
and People vs. Lacson, G.R. No. 132512, December 15, 1999.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
People vs. Joey Manlansing y Ambrosio and Mario Manlansing y Ambrosio,
G.R. Nos. 131736-37, March 11, 2002.
[23]
See People vs. Arnate, G.R. No. 148724, October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 155,
161.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621, cited in People vs.
Berdin,
G.R. No. 137598, November 28, 2003 at 19. |