SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
133541
April 14, 2004
-versus-
RICKY QUIMZON,
Appellant.
D E C I S
I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the decision[1]
dated December 17, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City,
Branch
16, in Criminal Case No. Bn-92-7-2924, finding appellant Ricky Quimzon[2]
guilty of murder and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
In an Information dated
July 28, 1992, appellant and three other persons, namely Salvacion
Lacsarom,
Canoto Cabero[3]
and Edgardo Detona[4]
were charged with the crime of murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the
7th day of March, 1992, in the Municipality of Burauen, Province of
Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with
treachery
and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill, did, then and
there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, strike, stab
and
wound one Marlo Casiong with short bolos locally known as ‘pisao’ which
accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and
inflicting
upon the said Marlo Casiong with fatal wounds on the different parts of
his body which caused his death shortly thereafter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Contrary to law.[5]
Appellant “surrendered”
to the police authorities on August 18, 1994[6]
while his other co-accused remain at-large. When arraigned on
September
28, 1994, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty to the crime charged.[7]
Thereafter, trial ensued.cralaw:red
The evidence for the
prosecution established the following facts:
On the night of March
7, 1992, victim Marlo Casiong, his sister Emolyn Casiong, and one
Rommel
Redoña were at the social hall of Burauen, Leyte attending a
benefit
dance. Around 11:30 of the same evening, while dancing with one
Salvacion
Lacsarom, Marlo accidentally bumped his cousin, herein appellant Ricky
Quimzon. Emolyn and Rommel, who were then dancing with each other
and were about one meter away from Marlo and Salvacion, witnessed the
incident.
Thereafter, while the dance continued, Salvacion held Marlo’s hand and
invited him to go outside the dance hall as she had something important
to tell him. Thereupon, Marlo asked Emolyn to stay put because he
was coming back. Feeling apprehensions about it, Emolyn and
Rommel
followed Salvacion and Marlo as they went out of the dance hall.
Emolyn noticed that Canoto Cabero, Edgardo Detona and appellant Ricky
also
went out of the hall in a hurried manner thereby overtaking them
(Emolyn
and Rommel). Outside the social hall, Emolyn heard Salvacion say
“ito na” then saw her push Marlo towards the group of Canoto, Edgardo
and
Ricky. Canoto then grabbed Marlo by the wrist and repeatedly
stabbed
him with a short bolo locally known as pisao. Edgardo followed
suit
by stabbing Marlo twice at the back. Despite being wounded, Marlo
was able to get away from Canoto and Edgardo and walked fast towards
the
nearby health center. Marlo was about to reach the gate of the
health
center when Ricky, who was behind Marlo, held the latter’s hands.
Marlo tried to free himself from the clutches of Ricky but in the
course
of his struggle he fell down. Thereupon, Ricky rode on the back of
Marlo
and repeatedly stabbed him on his back. Emolyn and Rommel shouted
for help prompting an unidentified person to throw stones and utter,
“that
is enough”. Thereafter, Canoto, Edgardo and Ricky fled.
With
the help of some persons, Emolyn brought Marlo to the Burauen General
Hospital
but Marlo died before reaching the hospital.[8]
In denying criminal
liability,
appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He claims that he does not
know
Salvacion Lacsarom, Canoto Cabero and Edgardo Detona. He denies
that
he stabbed Marlo Casiong. Appellant testified, as follows:
He could not have been at the scene of the crime when the incident
happened
as he was in Barangay Patag attending another benefit dance. He
arrived
at Barangay Patag around 7 o’clock in the evening of March 7, 1992 and
stayed there until 7 o’clock of the following morning. Barangay
Patag
is 18 kilometers away from the poblacion of Burauen where Marlo was
killed
and can only be reached by riding a horse or a carabao or by hiking for
five hours. He only came to know of the death of Marlo when he
went
to the poblacion of Burauen. He was included as one of the
accused
because he refused to testify in favor of the prosecution.[9]
Alfredo Rellesiva, then
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Patag, Burauen, Leyte; and Mauro
Lobriquinto,
then second Barangay Councilor of Barangay Candag-on, corroborated
appellant’s
alibi.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After trial, the court
a quo rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the evidence of the prosecution having proven the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby renders the
conviction
of the accused Ricky Quimzon of the crime of Murder punished under
Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime currently is punishable by RA
7659 classifying Murder as heinous crime to which the death penalty is
to be imposed.cralaw:red
However, the crime was
committed on March 7, 1992 and the effectivity of RA 7659 is January
1994.
This act therefore cannot apply in the case at bench.cralaw:red
Two qualifying circumstances
are alleged in the Information; namely, treachery and abuse of superior
strength. However, the latter circumstance is absorbed by the former.cralaw:red
There is no other aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance. The penalty therefore to be applied is
reclusion
perpetua being the medium of the penalty from minimum which is the
maximum
of reclusion temporal to death.cralaw:red
The accused is therefore
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.cralaw:red
On the civil aspect,
the defense admitted the expenses incurred for the wake and burial of
the
victim and neither did he controvert the moral damages suffered by the
mother of the victim. The accused is ordered to pay the sum of
P53,000.00
as actual expenses for the wake and burial, and P75,000.00 as moral
damages
payable to the mother of the victim Erlinda Casiong.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Philippine National
Police and the NBI are urged to exert efforts to bring the at large
co-accused
to justice for their complicity in the crime. Furnish them a copy.
Meanwhile,
until they are placed under the custody of the law, archived the case.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, the present petition
with the following Assignment of Errors.
I
IT IS SUBMITTED BY
THE
APPELLANT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BURAUEN, LEYTE ERRED IN
FINDING
THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITHOUT A CORPUS DELICTI.
II
IT IS SUBMITTED BY
THE
APPELLANT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BURAUEN, LEYTE ERRED IN
GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF EMOLYN CASIONG THE LONE PROSECUTION EYE
WITNESS,
LEADING TO THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT ON THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE
ABOVE
ENTITLED CASE.[12]
In support of his first
assigned error, appellant contends that the testimony of prosecution
witness
Dr. Adelaida Asperin on the report of the autopsy conducted on the body
of the victim Marlo Casiong was designed to prove the corpus
delicti.
Appellant, however, claims that Dr. Asperin is incompetent to testify,
as she was not the one who personally examined the body. Instead,
it was a certain Dr. Amparo Villanueva who conducted the autopsy on the
body of Marlo Casiong. Appellant asserts that the trial court
should
have regarded the testimony of Dr. Asperin as inadmissible for being
hearsay;
and, in the absence of such testimony, the prosecution would not have
been
able to prove the corpus delicti.cralaw:red
A review of the oral
and documentary evidence presented before the trial court reveals that
it was indeed Dr. Amparo Villanueva, not Dr. Adelaida Asperin, who
conducted
the autopsy taken on the body of Marlo Casiong. As the attending
physician, Dr. Villanueva was the one who signed the autopsy report.[13]
In fact, Dr. Asperin herself admitted in her testimony that she never
saw
the victim, Marlo Casiong, and that it was Dr. Villanueva who conducted
the autopsy and was the one who prepared the autopsy report.[14]
However, Dr. Villanueva died before the prosecution was able to present
her as witness.cralaw:red
Nonetheless, even if
Dr. Asperin is an incompetent witness as to the autopsy report and her
testimony could not have probative value for being hearsay, we still
find
that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish by competent
evidence
the corpus delicti in the instant case.cralaw:red
Corpus delicti is defined
as the body, foundation or substance upon which a crime has been
committed,
e.g. the corpse of a murdered man.[15]
It refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed.[16]
Corpus delicti does not refer to the autopsy report evidencing the
nature
of the wounds sustained by the victim nor the testimony of the
physician
who conducted the autopsy or medical examination.[17]
It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been
proved,
for example, a man has died and (b) that some person is criminally
responsible
for the act.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Proof of corpus delicti
is indispensable in prosecutions for felonies and offenses.[19]
While the autopsy report of a medico legal expert in cases of murder or
homicide is preferably accepted to show the extent of the injuries
suffered
by the victim, it is not the only competent evidence to prove the
injuries
and the fact of death.[20]
It may be proved by the testimonies of credible witnesses. Even a
single witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to
prove
it and warrant a conviction therefor.[21]
Based on the foregoing
jurisprudence, it is clear that the testimony of Dr. Asperin is not
indispensable
in proving the corpus delicti. Even without her testimony, the
prosecution
was still be able to prove the corpus delicti by establishing the fact
that the victim died and that such death occurred after he was stabbed
by appellant and his co-accused. These facts were established by
the testimony of prosecution witness Emolyn Casiong.[22]
The question that remains,
therefore, is whether the trial court erred in giving credence to
Emolyn’s
testimony over and above the testimonies of the defense witnesses.cralaw:red
In his second assigned
error, appellant questions Emolyn’s credibility as a witness by
pointing
out that Emolyn did not execute an affidavit regarding the events that
she allegedly witnessed on March 7, 1992; that she did not present
herself
as a witness during the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Municipal
Trial Court of Burauen, and that she only appeared as a witness when
the
case was already being tried before the trial court. Appellant
posits
that Emolyn’s delay, which consisted in her failure to execute an
affidavit
and her belated appearance as a witness, puts the trustworthiness of
her
testimony in serious doubt.cralaw:red
We are not persuaded
by appellant’s arguments.cralaw:red
When the credibility
of witnesses is in issue, appellatte courts generally defer to the
findings
of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position
to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[23]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is doctrinally settled
that the assessment of the credibility of a witness is a function that
is best discharged by the trial judge whose conclusion thereon is
accorded
much weight and respect that will not be disturbed on appeal unless a
material
or substantial fact has been overlooked or misappreciated which if
properly
taken into account could alter the outcome of the case.[24]
After going over the
records of the case, we find no compelling reason to disturb the
findings
of the trial court with respect to the credibility of Emolyn.
Contrary
to appellant’s assertion, we find that she took no delay in relating
the
killing of her brother to the police authorities. Emolyn
testified
that shortly after the killing of her brother, she submitted herself
for
investigation before the police authorities of Burauen, Leyte.
However,
the chief of police informed her that she could not execute an
affidavit
because she is a sister of the victim, but if the court would need her,
then she can execute an affidavit. Unschooled on the rules on
evidence,
it is but natural for Emolyn to have readily accepted the explanation
of
the chief of police. In her direct examination, she testified,
thus:
Q
Now, shortly after the killing of your brother were you investigated by
the police in connection with the killing of your brother?
A
We were investigated by the Chief of Police of Burauen, Leyte.cralaw:red
Q
When you said ‘we’, to whom are you referring?
A
Me and Rommel Redoña because we were the companions of my
brother
Marlo Casiong.cralaw:red
Q
It is clear now that only you and Rommel Redoña were the
companions
of Marlo Casiong on that fateful evening?
A
Yes sir.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q
In the course of your investigation by the Chief of Police of Burauen
relative
to the killing of your brother, was that investigation conducted on
your
person reduced into writing?
A
The Chief of Police told me that when needed I might be investigated by
the Court, I was not asked to execute an affidavit, it was only Rommel
Redoña who executed an affidavit.cralaw:red
Q
So no affidavit was made by the police when you were investigated?
A
None because the Chief of Police informed me that Rommel Redoña
would only be the one to execute an affidavit but if the Court would
need
me then I will execute an affidavit because I am a sister of the victim
and I may not be allowed.[25]
And on her cross-examination,
to wit:
Q
Being the witness will you tell us were you the one who reported this
incident
to the police?
A
My mother.cralaw:red
Q
Being an alleged eye witness did you submit yourself for investigation
by the police?
A
My affidavit was not prepared because according to the chief of police
of Burauen, Leyte I cannot have my affidavit because I am the sister of
the victim and only Rommel Redoña was prepared.cralaw:red
Q
Sister of whom?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A
Marlo Casiong.cralaw:red
COURT:
Q
Who is the police who said because you are the sister of the victim you
cannot have an affidavit?
A
The Chief of Police Nuevarez, the one who prepared the affidavit of
Rommel
was sir Juanico.cralaw:red
ATTY SAY:
Q
Will you still insist that Nuevarez refused to take your affidavit
because
you are a sister of the victim?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
Even if we present Nuevarez in the witness stand you will still insist?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
Is it not a fact that your affidavit could not be taken because you
were
still in Manila?
A
I was in Burauen, Leyte when that incident occurred.cralaw:red
Q
But one thing is you have been in Manila?
A
I went to Manila in 1994 already I went after Rommel Redoña.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q
The deceased Marlo Casiong was a very close, aside from being your
brother
you were very closely associated with him?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
And you want to do anything for him?
A
I will do everything because I was there when the incident took place.[26]
As to her apparent delay
in testifying, Emolyn explained that she would not have appeared as a
witness
if Rommel Redoña testified. However, she clarified that
she
only appeared as a witness when the case was being tried by the trial
court
because she was left with no choice but to testify in place of Rommel
Redoña
who told her that he no longer wanted to be a witness because he was
being
threatened by appellant, to wit:
Q
What was your purpose in going after Rommel Redoña in Manila?
A
Because a subpoena reached us informing us that the one who killed my
brother
had already been apprehended and because he was one of the eye witness
I have to fetch him in Manila and I even went there twice and my mother
went there third time, only last November.cralaw:red
Q
Do you know the reason why he went to Manila despite the fact that he
is
one of the witnesses in this case?
A
When I went to Manila I met him and he told me Molin I really cannot
testify
because I have been threatened by Ricky and company.cralaw:red
RE-CROSS BY ATTY. SAY:
Q
Now since Rommel Redoña refused to testify you have to testify
despite
the fact that you were told by the chief of police Nuevarez that you
cannot
testify in this case being a sister of the victim?
A
The chief of police there Nuevarez told me that if ever I will be
needed
by this Court I could testify but only, my affidavit cannot be prepared
then because I was the sister.cralaw:red
Q
Then how did you know that the court needed your testimony?
COURT:
Q
Were you subpoenaed by the Court?
A
No.cralaw:red
ATTY. SAY:
Q
So it was not the court actually required your testimony because you
did
not receive subpoena?
A
I did not receive any subpoena but Rommel Redoña whom I met many
times was firm that he cannot testify because he would be killed by the
accused and because it was only the three of us, Rommel, myself and the
victim who went to the dance.cralaw:red
Q
It is only reason why you testified in this case because Rommel
Redoña
has manifested that he will not testify?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
COURT:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q
So if Rommel Redoña would have testified in Court you do not
need
to testify?
A
I will not anymore because I have no affidavit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q
It was your lawyer Atty. Adaza who adviced you to testify in this case?
A
He did not, because we could not find any other witness I have to
testify.cralaw:red
Q
Your lawyer did not advice you to testify?
A
No, Your Honor.cralaw:red
Q
Your lawyer did not say that you are not qualified to testify in this
case
because you are a sister?
A
No, Your Honor.cralaw:red
Q
So you are testifying to substitute only the testimony of Rommel
Redoña?
A
Yes, your Honor, because Rommel Redoña did not want to testify
anymore
and we could not find any other witness and since I was with them when
the incident occurred, I testified here.[27]
Moreover, we agree with
the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the
apparent
delay in Emolyn’s appearance as a witness is explained by the fact that
while a complaint against appellant and his co-accused was filed as
early
as May 7, 1992, the case was archived because all the accused remained
at-large.[28]
It was only on August 18, 1994 that appellant was arrested, which
sufficiently
explains why Emolyn was only able to appear as a witness on February
21,
1995.cralaw:red
Appellant further attacks
the veracity of Emolyn’s testimony by calling our attention to some
purported
inconsistencies and improbabilities in her account of the events that
took
place prior to and during the stabbing of Marlo. Appellant
contends:
It could not have been possible for Emolyn to overhear the conversation
that took place between Salvacion and Marlo while they were dancing
because
the music was loud, the beat was fast and furious, and Emolyn was
engrossed
in her dancing. It was impossible for Emolyn to hear Edgardo
Detona,
Canoto Cabero and appellant ask permission from their respective
dancing
partners before going out of the dance hall because Emolyn went out of
the dance hall ahead of them. Emolyn failed to accurately recall
the sequence of events that led to the stabbing of Marlo. She
could
not have witnessed Marlo’s stabbing as she admitted that it was dark
where
the incident took place.cralaw:red
We are not convinced
by appellant’s contentions.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
First, it is not improbable
for Emolyn to overhear the conversation between Salvacion and Marlo
while
they were dancing because she (Emolyn) testified that she was just one
meter away from Salvacion and Marlo at that time. The fact that
they
were dancing, that the music is loud and that there is another couple
between
them and her does not discount the possibility that she could have
heard
them talking. Given the above circumstances, it is expected of
Salvacion
and Marlo to have raised their voices in order to hear each other,
which
then enabled Emolyn to hear their conversation.cralaw:red
Second, while Emolyn
admitted that she and Rommel started to go out of the dance hall ahead
of Edgardo, Canoto and appellant, she sufficiently explained that she
was
able to hear the three men talk to their respective partners because
she
was still near them when they asked permission from their
partners.
Emolyn explained thus:
Q
How about Canuto Cavero when he went out together with Ricky Quimson,
Edgardo
Detuna, did Canuto Cavero also leave his partner?
A
He told his partner to wait for a while because he will be going out.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q
How about Edgardo Detuna he also left his partner when he went out?
A
He also told his partner to wait for a while because he will be going
out.cralaw:red
Q
And likewise, Ricky Quimson also told his partner to wait for a while
because
he will be going out?
A
Yes.cralaw:red
Q
So, in other words the three gentlemen Canuto Cavero, Edgardo Detuna
and
Ricky Quimson left their partners because they will be going out for a
while?
A
Yes.cralaw:red
Q
You are sure of that, you cannot be mistaken?
A
I will not be mistaken.cralaw:red
Q
You are very sure because you heard each one of them, Canuto Cavero,
Edgardo
Detuna, and Ricky Quimson left their respective partners and told them,
‘Wait because I am going out for a while’, you cannot be mistaken.cralaw:red
A
Yes because we were close to each other.[29]
As to who went ahead
of whom, Emolyn satisfactorily explained as follows:
Q
In other words it is very clear that after Salvacion Lacsarom and your
brother left you immediately followed because you were were deeply
alarmed
leaving inside the hall Edgardo Detuna, Canuto Cavero and Ricky Quimson?
A
Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero were already outside ahead of us.cralaw:red
Q
Do you mean to tell us that Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero left the
hall
ahead of Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong?
A
The two, Canuto Cavero and Edgardo Detuna were able to reach outside
ahead
of Marlo Casiong and Salvacion Lacsarom because they walked fast.cralaw:red
Q
But the fact is, Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong left the dancing
hall ahead of everybody?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A
They went out ahead but they were overtaken by Canuto Cavero and
Edgardo
Detuna.cralaw:red
Q
So it is not correct to say that you were the one who immediately
followed
Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong because according to you Edgardo
Detuna
and Canuto Cavero followed Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong, you
were
not the one who immediately followed the pair but Edgardo Detuna and
Canuto
Cavero, is that correct?
A
No because Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero were faster and they went
out
the shorter way while I followed Marlo Casiong and Salvacion Lacsarom
who
took a little slower in going out.cralaw:red
Q
How about Ricky Quimson, was he still dancing when you immediately
followed
Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong outside?
A
He was already outside the dancing hall because he followed Canuto
Cavero
and Edgardo Detuna.cralaw:red
Q
But he was behind Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero?
A
Yes.[30]
Third, we find that
the alleged probabilities and inaccuracies committed by Emolyn in
recounting
the events that took place prior to and during the stabbing of Marlo
refers
to trivial matters that do not refer to material points and do not
detract
from Emolyn’s clear and positive testimony that she saw appellant and
the
other accused stab and kill her brother.cralaw:red
Settled is the rule
that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with
respect
to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the
substance
of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.[31]
In fact, such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony,
for
they guard against memorized falsities.[32]
Fourth, while Emolyn
testified that it was dark inside the dance hall, it is also clear from
her testimony that the stabbing took place outside the hall and there
were
fluorescent bulbs near the places where Marlo was stabbed by Canoto,
Edgardo
and appellant. When cross-examined, she testified as follows:
Q
How many times did you meet the accused in dances?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A
Several times because we meet at dances whenever there is one.cralaw:red
Q
This incident happened outside the dancing hall, is that correct?
A
Yes.cralaw:red
Q
But the alleged bumping of Ricky Quimson by Marlo Casiong happened
inside
the dancing hall?
A
Yes.cralaw:red
Q
And it happened while the dance was going on?
A
The dance was in progress but the four of them went out.[33]
Emolyn testified further:
Q
What kind of light was illuminating the dancing hall?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A
Fluorescent bulbs.cralaw:red
Q
How many fluorescent lamps were there?
A
There were two outside and one was at the gate of the health center and
one at the gate of the dancing hall.cralaw:red
Q
How far was the nearest fluorescent lamp where the first stabbing of
the
victim was made?
A
Witness points to a distance which indicated 4 meters when measured.cralaw:red
Q
How high was the fluorescent lamp from the ground?
A
About 2 meters and 35 cms. high from the floor.cralaw:red
Q
At the health center where Marlo Casiong was attacked by Ricky Quimson,
how far was the fluorescent light?
A
Witness points to a distance which indicated 4 meters when measured.cralaw:red
Q
How about the lamp from the ground, how high?
A
The same height, about 2 meters and 35 cms. from the ground.[34]
We have held that kerosene
lamp, flashlight, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper
situations,
be considered sufficient illumination.[35]
In the instant case, the fluorescent bulbs situated near the places
where
appellant and his companions attacked Marlo enabled Emolyn to witness
the
killing of her brother.cralaw:red
Thus, we reiterate the
well-entrenched rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses,
the
factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The
judge
a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of
witnesses,
having personally heard them when they testified and observed their
deportment
and manner of testifying.[36]
Appellant interposes
the defense of alibi. However, alibi, like denial, is an
inherently
weak defense as it is easy to concoct and difficult to prove.[37]
While appellant’s testimony is corroborated by defense witness
Rellesiva
and Lobriquito, the trial court correctly gave more probative weight to
the lone testimony of prosecution witness Emolyn who positively
identified
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime.cralaw:red
Appellant’s defense
of alibi fails in the face of Emolyn’s positive identification of him
as
one of her brother’s killers. Positive identification destroys
the
defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such
identification
is credible and categorical.[38]
The defense of denial is unavailing when placed astride the undisputed
fact that there is positive identification of the felon.[39]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We affirm the trial
court’s finding that there was treachery in the killing of Marlo.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[40]
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor
on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend
himself and thereby ensuring its commission with no risk to the
aggressor.[41]
In the present case, Marlo accepted Salvacion’s invitation for them to
go outside the dance hall on the impression that the latter has
something
important to tell him. He has no inkling of any impending danger
on his life as he even told his sister, Emolyn, to wait for him because
he will be coming back.[42]
Outside the dance hall, as soon as Salvacion pushed Marlo towards them,
Canoto and Edgardo immediately attacked him without warning, inflicting
wounds on the front and back portions of his body with the use of
bolos.
Although this initial assault on Marlo was frontal it may still be
considered
treacherous because the attack was sudden and unprovoked. There
is
no evidence showing that the attack was preceded by any exchange of
words
or any untoward incident between the assailants and Marlo, sufficient
to
warn Marlo of the impending attack on him. The mode of execution
was in such a manner that Marlo was left with no opportunity to repel
the
attack or avoid it. Moreover, he was unarmed while all three
assailants
were carrying deadly weapons. The treachery continued when
appellant
held the hands of Marlo as the latter was running away from the initial
stabbings of Canoto and Edgardo, rode on Marlo’s back when the latter
fell
down and repeatedly stabbed Marlo who had already been rendered weak by
the multiple stab wounds inflicted by Edgardo and Canoto.
Appellant
attacked Marlo from behind and repeatedly stabbed Marlo when he was
already
in a defenseless position.cralaw:red
In any criminal prosecution,
the only requisite is that the prosecution proves the guilt of the
accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean
such a degree of proof that, excluding the possibility of error,
produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[43]
Hence, we uphold the
trial court’s judgment declaring appellant guilty of murder beyond
reasonable
doubt. The attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the
killing
to murder as defined under paragraph 1, Article 248 of the Revised
Penal
Code. Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of superior
strength
alleged in the Information is absorbed by said circumstance.[44]
Aside from abuse of
superior strength, no other aggravating circumstance was alleged and
proved
by the prosecution.cralaw:red
In a criminal case,
an appeal throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the
appellate
court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the
appealed
judgment.[45]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It appears in the Commitment
Order, dated August 14, 1994, issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of
the
Municipal Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, that appellant “voluntarily
surrendered
to SPO1 Josefino Agustin of PNP Burauen, Leyte on August 18, 1994”.[46]
An examination of the records reveals that it can not be considered as
a mitigating circumstance. For the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary
surrender to be appreciated, the accused must satisfactorily comply
with
three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he
surrendered
himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (3) the
surrender
is voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and an
intent
to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the
accused
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them the trouble and
expense
concomitant to his capture.[47]
The “surrender” of appellant
was far from being spontaneous and unconditional. The warrant of
arrest is dated June 17, 1992 and all the accused, including appellant,
remained at-large, which prompted the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial
Court of Palo, Leyte to archive the case.[48]
It took appellant two years before he finally “surrendered” to the
police.
In between said period, appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Fix
Bail Bond[49]
without surrendering his person to the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
Records do not reveal that the motion had been acted upon by the trial
court. This act of appellant may be considered as a condition set
by him before he surrenders to proper authorities, thus preventing his
subsequent act of surrendering from being considered as a mitigating
circumstance.cralaw:red
Moreover, we noted in
the Motion to Fix Bail Bond, filed on July 9, 1992, that counsel for
appellant
alleged that appellant “is barely 15 years of age”. When
appellant
was called to the witness stand on August 2, 1996, or four years
thereafter,
appellant asserted that he was 21 years old. The stabbing
incident
took place on March 7, 1992, thus placing appellant to be 17 years old,
a minor, when he committed the crime. The records do not show
that
the prosecution refuted appellant’s minority; and absent any evidence
to
the contrary, the trial court should have applied in favor of appellant
the benefits under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 68. Penalty
to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. –chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. Upon a person
over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower
than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, the perpetrator of the crime of Murder shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the express
provision
of the aforequoted Article 68 and pursuant to Article 61, paragraph 2,
of the same Code, to wit:
Art. 61. Rules
of graduating penalties. -.cralaw:red
1.
When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that
indivisible
penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of
this
Code.cralaw:red
the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal or 12 years and 1 day to 20 years.cralaw:red
Considering the actual
penalty to be imposed upon appellant, as prescribed by law, is not
reclusion
perpetua or death, appellant is entitled to the application of the
Indeterminate
Sentence Law.[50]
Thus, from the penalty of reclusion temporal, one degree lower is
prision
mayor or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years from which will be drawn the
MINIMUM
period of the indeterminate sentence; while pursuant to paragraph 2,
Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code, in the absence of any modifying
circumstance,
the penalty prescribed by law should be imposed in its medium period,
or
anywhere between 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months,
as the MAXIMUM period of the indeterminate sentence.cralaw:red
We now come to the civil
liability of appellant.cralaw:red
As to actual damages,
we find that the evidence presented by the prosecution do not
adequately
provide a concrete basis for the amount of P53,000.00 awarded by the
trial
court to the victim’s mother, Erlinda Casiong. She testified that
her family incurred expenses amounting to P50,206.00, during the wake
and
burial of her son. As proof, she presented seven official
receipts
amounting to P4,490.00 only.[51]
Other evidence consisting of small pieces of paper which were properly
identified by Erlinda as having been signed by the persons from whom
she
bought the merchandise that were used or consumed during Marlo’s wake
and
burial, amounting to P4,020.00[52]
may be considered competent evidence and admitted under Section 22,
Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.[53]
Thus, the prosecution was able to prove only a total of
P8,510.00.
The other receipts presented were not properly identified and therefore
inadmissible under the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nonetheless, in our
recent rulings, we have held that in cases where the heirs of the
victim
failed to prove their claim for actual damages, but have shown that
they
have suffered pecuniary loss by reason of the death of the victim, an
award
of P25,000.00 by way of temperate damages is justified in lieu of an
award
of actual or compensatory damages.[54]
In People vs. Villanueva,[55]
we held that in cases where actual damages was proven by receipts
during
the trial but said damages amounted to less than P25,000.00, as in the
present case, the award of temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000.00
is justified in lieu of said actual damages. The rationale for
such
an award of temperate damages is that it would be anomalous and unfair
for the heirs of the victim, who by presenting receipts, tried and
succeeded
in proving actual damages but in an amount less than P25,000.00, to be
placed in a worse situation than those who might not have presented any
receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000.00 for temperate
damages.[56]
Erlinda Casiong testified
that her son was single when he died;[57]
that she felt sad when her son was killed.[58]
We find her testimony sufficient to sustain the trial court’s award of
moral damages but we reduce the amount of P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in
line
with current jurisprudence.[59]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Erlinda Casiong further
testified that her son was working as a helper in a passenger bus.[60]
The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature
of actual damages which must be duly proved.[61]
In the absence of competent evidence to prove how much the victim was
earning,
the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto.cralaw:red
The trial court did
not award civil indemnity. In consonance with prevailing
jurisprudence,
we award the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Marlo Casiong as
civil
indemnity for his death. The amount is awarded without need of
proof
other than appellant’s commission of the crime which resulted in the
death
of the victim.[62]
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City (Branch 15) is AFFIRMED
with
MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Ricky Quimzon is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER and after applying The Indeterminate
Sentence
Law, and there being no modifying circumstance, he is sentenced to
suffer
imprisonment, from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
MINIMUM up to fourteen (14) years and ten (10) months of reclusion
temporal
as MAXIMUM. He is ordered to pay Erlinda Casiong, the mother of
the
deceased Marlo Casiong, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for
the victim’s death; P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.cralaw:red
Costs de oficio.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Judge Leocadio H. Ramos, Jr.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Quimson in other portions of the Rollo, Records and TSNs. In
appellant’s
letters addressed to this court, he alternately signed his family name
as Quimson and Quimzon (Rollo, pp. 176, 180 and 183).
[3]
Spelled as Canuto Cavero in other portions of the Rollo and TSNs.
[4]
His family name is spelled as Detuna in other portions of the Rollo and
TSNs.
[5]
Original Records, p. 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Commitment Order, OR, p. 24.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Certificate of Arraignment, OR, p. 32.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
TSN, Testimony of Emolyn Casiong, February 21, 1995, pp. 4-42.
[9]
TSN, Testimony of Ricky Quimzon, August 2, 1996, pp. 3-12.
[10]
TSN, April 12, 1996, pp. 4-21; TNS, April 19, 1996, pp. 3-16.
[11]
OR, p. 329.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Rollo, p. 106.
[13]
Exhibit “A”, Records, pp. 7-8.
[14]
TSN, August 2, 1995, pp. 14-15.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
People vs. Cariño, 390 SCRA 215, 220 (2002).
[16]
People vs. Oliva, 341 SCRA 78, 86-87 (2000).
[17]
People vs. Cariño, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187, 202 (1996).
[19]
People vs. Oliva, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
People vs. Barro, Sr., 338 SCRA 312, 326 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Rimorin, Sr. vs. People, G.R. No. 146481, April 30, 2003; People vs.
Oliva,
supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
TSN, February 21, 1995, pp. 4-42; TSN, June 16, 1995, pp. 3-7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
People vs. Panganiban, 359 SCRA 509, 519 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 138364, October 15, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
TSN, February 21, 1995, pp. 20-21.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
TSN, June 16, 1995, pp. 3-5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
TSN, June 16, 1995, pp. 5-7.
[28]
OR, p. 23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
TSN, February 21, 1995, pp. 29-30.
[30]
Id., pp. 32-33, 37.
[31]
People vs. Nardo, 353 SCRA 339, 356 (2001).
[32]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
TSN, February 21, 1995, pp. 22-23 (emphasis ours).
[34]
Id., pp. 16-17.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
People vs. Mansueto, 336 SCRA 715, 729 (2000).
[36]
Id., supra case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
People vs. Silongan, G.R. No. 137182, April 24, 2003.
[38]
People vs. Casitas, Jr., 397 SCRA 382, 397 (2003).
[39]
Talay vs. Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA 185, 200-201 (2003).
[40]
Art. 14, par. 16 (2), Revised Penal Code.
[41]
People vs. Dijan, 383 SCRA 15, 21(2002).
[42]
TSN, February 21, 1995, p. 31.
[43]
People vs. Jonathan Crisanto y Opin, 358 SCRA 647, 657 (2001).
[44]
People vs. Carriaga, G.R. No. 135029, September 12, 2003; People vs.
Baldogo,
396 SCRA 31, 56 (2003).
[45]
People vs. Feliciano, 365 SCRA 613, 629 (2001).
[46]
Records, p. 24.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
Roca vs. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 414, 425 (2001); People vs.
Casta?eda,
93 SCRA 71 (1979).
[48]
Records, p. 23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
Rollo, p. 19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[50]
People vs. Moises, No. L-32495, Aug. 13, 1975, 66 SCRA 151, 164; People
vs. Cempron, G.R. No. 66324, July 6, 1990, 187 SCRA 248, 256.
[51]
Exhibits “B”, “B-10”, “B-17”, “B-21”, “B-26”, “B-31”, “B-33”, OR, p.
154-A
series.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[52]
Exhibits “B-1” to “B-9”, “B-11” to “B-16”, “B-18” to “B-20”, “B-22” to
“B-25”, “B-27” to “B-30”, “B-32”, OR, p.154-A series.
[53]
SEC. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting
of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting
of such person because he has seen the person write, or has been
writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to
be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[54]
People vs. Bajar. G.R. No. 143817, October 27, 2003; People vs. Reyes,
G.R. No. 142467, June 10, 2003.
[55]
G.R. No. 139177, August 11, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[56]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[57]
TSN, March 19, 1997, p. 4; Exhibit “D”, Records, p. 296.
[58]
TSN, October 12, 1995; p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[59]
People vs. Sayaboc, G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004; People vs.
Latasa,
G.R. No. 144331, August 19, 2003.
[60]
TSN, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[61]
People vs. De Vera, 312 SCRA 640 (1990).
[62]
People vs. Delim, 396 SCRA 386, 419 (2003); People vs. Magalona, G.R.
No.
143294, July 17, 2003. |