THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R.
No.
137296
June 26, 2003
-versus-
DIONISIO VICENTE
Y QUINTO,
Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Retaliation is different
from self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun
by the injured party already ceased to exist when the accused attacked
him. In self-defense, the aggression was still existing when the
aggressor
was injured by the accused.[1]
The present case is
a clear illustration of retaliation and self-defense.cralaw:red
On appeal is the Decision[2]
dated December 15, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan
City, in Criminal Case No. 98-02266-D finding Dionisio Q. Vicente,
appellant,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing
him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs
of the victim, Manuel C. Quinto, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P88,000.00 as actual damages, P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and costs of suit.cralaw:red
In the Information[3]
dated July 15, 1998, appellant was charged with the crime of murder
committed
as follows:
"That on or
about May 30,1998 in the evening thereof, at barangay Gueguesangen,
municipality
of Mangaldan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed
weapon,
with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack and stab MANUEL
C. QUINTO, JR., causing his death shortly thereafter due to
‘CARDIORESPIRATORY
ARREST SECONDARY TO HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK DUE TO A STAB WOUND’ as per
Certificate
of Death issued by Dr. Ophelia Rivera, M.D., Rural Health Officer,
Mangaldan,
Pangasinan, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said
deceased
Manuel C. Quinto, Jr. and other consequential damages relative thereto.
"CONTRARY to
Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. 7659."
Upon arraignment,
appellant
pleaded not guilty.[4]
He invoked self-defense, thus, a reverse trial ensued.
Appellant,
Hilda Vicente, Linda Vicente and Dr. Ophelia Rivera testified for the
defense.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Jose Noe, Sr., Ronald Terte,
and Juliana Quinto.
The version of the defense
is as follows:
On May 30, 1998, at
8:30 o’ clock in the evening, while appellant was having supper in his
house at Gueguesangen, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, his brothers-in-law, Anoy
and Sonny, quarreled. Anoy was abrasively scolding Sonny for
smoking
and gambling. This caused the latter to howl at the top of his
voice.
The victim, then Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, responded to
Sonny’s
unusual cry. He entered appellant’s house and suddenly pushed
Anoy,
causing him to fall to the floor. Appellant pacified the victim
saying,
"don’t mind them because they are brothers and Anoy is only advising
Sonny."[5]
The victim felt insulted by such remark and said, "Is that it? I am
insulted.
I regret coming here."[6]
Thus, he went home and got a steel pipe. Upon his return, he hit
appellant at his upper left arm[7]
and shouted at him, "You are shit, vulva of your mother, I will kill
you
today."[8]
But appellant was able to seize the steel pipe from the victim,
prompting
the latter to retreat and go home.cralaw:red
Present during the squabble
were appellant’s wife Linda and sister Hilda. Linda advised
appellant
not to mind the victim, while Hilda called Kagawad Elias
Fernandez.
Appellant reported to the latter the unpleasant incident. While
they
were talking outside the house,[9]
the victim passed by.[10]
He approached Kagawad Fernandez and invited him to go to the dance hall.[11]
Then he tapped appellant’s right shoulder,[12]
causing him to be pushed a "little bit" backward. Without any warning,
the victim pulled out a knife and tried to stab appellant, shouting, "I
will see to it that I will kill you tonight."[13]
Appellant held the victim’s wrist and they grappled for the possession
of the knife.[14]
While the knife was pointed at the victim, appellant accidentally
stabbed
him.[15]
Appellant surrendered
to Kagawad Fernandez who, in turn, brought him to the police station.cralaw:red
Dr. Ophelia Rivera testified
that two days after the incident, appellant was brought to her clinic
for
medico legal purposes. He had a hematoma on his upper left arm.[16]
He was also complaining of pain in the head although there was no
external
indication of injury.cralaw:red
The witnesses for the
prosecution presented a different story.cralaw:red
Ronald Terte narrated
that on May 30, 1998, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, he was in
the house of the victim at Gueguesangen, Mangaldan, there being a
barrio
fiesta.[17]
They heard unusual cries from the neighborhood. So they proceeded
to appellant’s house and found that his brothers-in-law, Anoy and
Sonny, were quarrelling.[18]
The victim tried to pacify Anoy.[19]
This infuriated appellant, thus, he drew a "rambo knife" and aimed it
at
the victim. Threatened, he and Ronald immediately went home.
Thereafter, appellant
followed the victim to his house and challenged him to a fight.
The
victim could only answer back, "If you want we will rent a box ring and
we will fight."[20]chanrobles virtual law library
At around 9:45 o’ clock
in the evening, the victim and Ronald Terte returned to the house of
appellant
as the former intended to talk to him. On their way, they saw
appellant
conversing with Kagawad Fernandez. The victim greeted[21]
Kagawad Fernandez who inquired, "Are we going to the dance hall?"[22]
The victim answered in the affirmative. Then as a gesture of
reconciliation,
he extended his hand to appellant. However, appellant suddenly
drew
a knife and stabbed the victim in the chest.[23]
The victim uttered, "Pare, I was hit."[24]
Ronald immediately brought him to the hospital but he was pronounced
dead
on arrival.cralaw:red
Jose Noe, Sr., a 64-year
old resident of Gueguesangen, Mangaldan, testified that on the same
date
and time, he saw appellant and Kagawad Fernandez engaged in a serious
conversation.[25]
He heard appellant saying, he would kill the victim.[26]
At that time, the victim and his companion passed by. Upon seeing
Kagawad Fernandez, the victim greeted him, "Kagawad, you are here."[27]
Kagawad Fernandez then answered "yes." Then the victim advised
appellant
to "forget what had happened."[28]
At this point, appellant abruptly drew his knife and stabbed the victim
in the chest.[29]
Juliana C. Quinto, the
victim’s mother, testified that she spent P20,500.00 for his funeral
services,[30]
P14,000.00 for his tomb,[31]
P50,000.00 for his internment,[32]
and P2,000.00 for his autopsy.[33]
When asked what she felt over the death of her son, she said that she
always
cried and suffered anxiety.[34]
On December 15, 1998,
the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the accused DIONISIO VICENTE is hereby found
guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as charged and he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he has
to indemnify the private offended party the amount of P50,000.00 for
the
death of Manuel Quinto, Jr. He is likewise ordered to pay
P20,500.00
for funeral services, P10,000.00 for the construction of the tomb,
P4,000.00
for the washed out of the tomb, P50,000.00 for the amount spent for the
vigil, P2,000.00 for the autopsy of the cadaver of Manuel Quinto, Jr.,
P500.00 for the funeral mass, and P1,000.00 for the cemetery lot, or a
total of P88,000.00 as actual damages, P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees,
and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs of suit. The period under
which the accused has been placed under detention is to be deducted
against
his sentence since reclusion perpetua, under RA 7659, has a
range of 20 years and 1 day to 40 years.
"SO ORDERED."[35]
In finding the presence
of treachery, the trial court ratiocinated:
"It is an oft-repeated
rule that treachery to be considered as a qualifying circumstance as
charged
in the information should be present at the inception of the
incident.
This rule, however, admits of an exception. When there is a
second
stage of the incident as in this case, treachery should be considered
as
a qualifying aggravating circumstance if used as a means to insure the
success of an attack against a fellow protagonist during the said
second
stage of the incident. Therefore, the public prosecutor who
charged
the accused with murder was correct in contrast to the recommendation
of
the Investigating Judge of the lower court who conducted the
preliminary
investigation x x x."[36]chanrobles virtual law library
Unable to accept the
verdict, appellant comes before us interposing the following
assignments
of error:
"I
THE COURT A QUO
ERRED
IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE ACCUSED’S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE;
II
THE COURT A QUO
ERRED
IN FINDING THE PRESENCE OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN
THIS CASE; AND
III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO
THAT
THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR THE KILLING OF THE VICTIM, THE COURT A QUO
ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF HOMICIDE ONLY AND NOT OF MURDER."[37]
Appellant argues that
his claim of self-defense is buttressed by the fact that he immediately
surrendered to the authorities after the incident and that the victim
sustained
only one stab wound. Also, he stresses that if a crime was indeed
committed, it is only homicide because the attack was frontal and that
a heated altercation preceded the stabbing. Lastly, he contends
that
since he sustained an injury in his upper left arm, as confirmed by Dr.
Rivera, it follows that he is not the unlawful aggressor.
The Solicitor General
counters that appellant’s claim of self-defense is weak and unfounded
because:
first, as between appellant and the victim, it was the former who had
more
reason to harbor ill-feelings; second, the victim’s gesture of tapping
appellant’s shoulder was a sign of goodwill; third, the victim was
stabbed
in the chest indicating an intent to kill on the part of appellant;
fourth,
appellant did not claim self-defense when he surrendered to Kagawad
Fernandez
and the police; and fifth, he failed to present the knife to the
authorities.
The Solicitor General likewise maintains that treachery was present
because
there was an element of surprise in the attack.cralaw:red
When the accused interposes
self-defense, he must prove that: (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;
(2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he
employed
reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression.[38]
Although all these elements must concur, self- defense is perched on
proof
of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Without it,
there
can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.cralaw:red
Under the circumstances
here, we are convinced that appellant is the unlawful aggressor.
As maybe gleaned from the narrations of the witnesses, the incident has
two stages. The first stage took place in appellant’s house where
the victim felt insulted when rebuked by the appellant for interfering
in a family squabble. This prompted the victim to hit appellant’s
upper left arm with a steel pipe. Afterwards, the victim left.cralaw:red
The second stage began
when the victim met appellant and Kagawad Fernandez along the
road.
At this time, the victim wanted to reconcile with the appellant.
In fact, he offered appellant a handshake, telling him to forget what
happened.
Unfortunately, appellant, who had not yet shaken off his ire against
the
victim, stabbed the latter.chanrobles virtual law library
While admittedly, the
victim was the unlawful aggressor during the first stage of the
incident,
however, he ceased to be in the second stage. The lapse of an
appreciable
time interval had cooled off his head as shown by the fact that he was
trying to shake appellant’s hand and telling him, "forget what
happened."
Unlawful aggression
presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger
thereof.[39]
For one to be considered the unlawful aggressor, he must be shown to
have
exhibited external acts clearly showing his intent to cause and commit
harm to the other.[40]
In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses belied any act of
aggression
on the part of the victim. The evidence shows he was unarmed and
had no idea of the impending attack against him.cralaw:red
Certainly, the victim’s
act of aggression during the first stage of the incident does not
justify
appellant’s conduct during the second stage. Settled is the rule that
when
unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no longer any right to
kill
or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation, and not
self-defense
is committed.[41]
Appellant implores us
to give credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. We
are not swayed. It is a well-settled principle that when it comes
to the matter of credibility, the appellate courts generally do not
overturn
the findings of the trial courts. The latter are in a best
position
to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses
through
their actual observation of the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
demeanor
and behavior in court.[42]
We see no reason to deviate from this principle.cralaw:red
With marked significance
is the fact that there appears no motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses Ronald Terte and Jose Noe, Sr. to falsely testify against
appellant.
On his part, appellant proffered no explanation why these witnesses
implicated
him. Worse, while the prosecution presented disinterested
witnesses,
the defense called to the witness stand only appellant’s wife and
sister.
Though there is no presumption that a testimony of a relative is
tainted,
we cannot but cast an eye of suspicion on the testimonies of
appellant’s
close relatives. It is the natural tendency of a person to
testify
for and not against his relatives. In People vs. Ching,[43]
We ruled:
"It is but natural,
although morally unfair, for a close relative to give weight to blood
ties
and close relationship in times of dire needs especially when a
criminal
case is involved."
We quote the clear and
straightforward account of the incident by prosecution witnesses Jose
Noe,
Sr. and Ronald Terte. Jose testified:
"ATTY. ESTEPA
Q
You just stated what you saw, but the accused claimed that it was the
deceased
Manny Quinto who tried to stab Dionisio Vicente, is that correct?
A
No, because I have seen with my own eyes that he was the one who made
the
thrust against Manny Quinto and in fact I saw his knife.cralaw:red
COURT
Q
The accused testified that it was the victim who first stabbed the
accused,
what can you say about that?
A
It is not true, sir.cralaw:red
Q
What is true, what took place?chanrobles virtual law library
A
The one I saw that Dionisio Vicente drew his knife and immediately made
thrust against Manny Quinto and then he returned to his back and went
away.cralaw:red
Q
Where is the knife?
A
I don’t know where is that knife but at the time of the incident I saw
him returned at his back after he stabbed Manny Quinto, sir.cralaw:red
Q
The accused testified that he was stabbed initially by the victim with
the victim’s knife, what can you say about that?
A
No, sir, that’s not true because I was there and I saw it with my own
eyes
and my distance from him was only one arm length away.cralaw:red
Q
About the knife, was it the knife of the victim that was used by the
accused
to stab the victim or what?
A
The knife was owned by the accused.cralaw:red
Q
The accused testified that when the victim stabbed him, the accused
wrestled
the weapon from the victim and then stabbed the victim and returned, is
that what took place?
A
How could he get that knife from the victim since I saw it with my own
eyes that he was the one who drew the knife and stabbed Manny Quinto."[44]
Ronald Terte corroborated
the foregoing testimony when he candidly narrated:
"ATTY. ESTEPA
x x
x
x x xchanrobles virtual law library
Q
You have just stated, Mr. witness, that you and the deceased were
instructors
of martial arts especially on self-defense and you said that Manuel
Quinto
will not need a knife to defend himself; my question is considering
that
you were an eyewitness, did he or did he not make a thrust towards the
direction of the accused?
A
It was not Manny Quinto who made a thrust against Dionisio Vicente but
it was Dionisio Vicente who made a thrust against Manny Quinto, sir.cralaw:red
Q
According to the accused, when Manny Quinto made that attempt to thrust
the knife, Dionisio Vicente twisted and grabbed and forced it right to
the breast of Manny Quinto; as an eyewitness, what can you say to that?
A
That is not true, sir, because again it was not Manny Quinto who drew
the
knife and stabbed Dionisio Vicente but it was Dionisio Vicente who drew
his knife and unexpectedly made a thrust against Manny Quinto which
caused
his death.cralaw:red
Q
When the deceased Manny Quinto extended his hand towards the accused,
did
Manny Quinto say anything to the accused?
A
Manny Quinto did not utter any word but as I understood since Kgd.
Fernandez
was there, he gave respect to Kgd. Fernandez who was settling the
dispute
between him and Dionisio Vicente so Manny Quinto extended his hand to
Dionisio
Vicente for a handshake, sir.cralaw:red
x x
x
x x x
Q
After Manny Quinto was stabbed by Dionisio Vicente, what happened next?
A
When Manny Quinto was stabbed , he uttered the following
‘Pare,
I was hit’ and he immediately ran home.cralaw:red
Q
Will you tell the Honorable Court where in your body was Manny Quinto
specifically
hit?
A
Here, sir. (Witness pointing to his left chest)chanrobles virtual law library
Q
Did you see the weapon that was used by Dionisio Vicente in stabbing
Manuel
Quinto?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
How does it look like?
A
The rambo knife which I saw when we were in the house of Dionisio
Vicente,
sir.cralaw:red
Q
How many stabs were made by Dionisio Vicente against Manny Quinto?
A
Only one stab, sir.chanrobles virtual law library
Q
When Manny Quinto was hit and he ran towards their house, were you
still
at the scene of the incident?
A
I was just there, sir. In fact, I even saw Dionisio Vicente when he
returned
the Rambo knife to the scabbard then speedily walked towards the east."[45]
Notwithstanding the
grueling cross-examination by the defense counsel, both witnesses were
able to survive the ordeal without deviating from their direct
testimonies.
Their testimonies meet the test of credibility because of their being
corroborated
on material points. They were one in saying that (a) the victim
was
not in a hostile mood when he approached appellant; (b) it was
appellant
who stabbed the victim; (c) the weapon used was a knife; and (d) there
was no struggle between the parties over the possession of the
knife.
Their testimony that the victim was stabbed once in his chest was
further
corroborated by Dr. Rivera who testified that his death was due to
"Cardiorespiratory
arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock due to a stab wound."[46]
But above all, what
convinces us to affirm the trial court’s finding is the presence of
badges
of guilt that renders appellant’s claim of self-defense dubious and
unworthy
of belief. First, the victim suffered a fatal wound at the
chest.
It lacerated his vital organs. The location of the wound belies
and
negates the claim of self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal
mind
resolved to end the life of the victim. Second, appellant failed
to inform the authorities that he acted in self-defense. And
third,
he failed to surrender the knife to the authorities. We have
ruled
that failure to inform the authorities of the unlawful aggression on
the
part of the victim and to surrender the knife used in stabbing him
militates
against the claim of self-defense.[47]
In People vs. Mier,[48]
we also held that the non-presentation of the weapon which was
allegedly
used by the victim in attacking the accused and the failure of the
defense
to account for its non-presentation are fatal to the accused’s plea of
self-defense.cralaw:red
In self-defense, the
burden of proof rests upon the accused. His duty is to establish
self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise conviction
would
follow from his admission that he killed the victim.[49]
Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge such burden.cralaw:red
The trial court also
held that the crime committed by appellant is qualified by
treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to
himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[50]chanrobles virtual law library
Treachery is present
in this case. The fact that the attack is frontal does not negate
the finding of treachery. Even a frontal attack can be
treacherous
if sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.[51]
Here, the victim was suddenly stabbed when he was extending his hand to
the appellant. With his mindset, the victim could not have any
inkling
that there was danger to his life when he approached appellant.cralaw:red
In People vs. Tobias[52]
we held that what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. In
this
case, the suddenness of the attack deprived the victim of the
opportunity
to repel it or defend his person. There being treachery,
appellant’s
conviction of murder is in order.cralaw:red
Significantly, the trial
court should have appreciated in favor of appellant the mitigating
circumstance
of voluntary surrender under Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code.
For voluntary surrender to be considered as a mitigating circumstance,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender has not been
actually
arrested; (2) he surrenders himself to a person in authority; and (3)
the
surrender is voluntary. Here, appellant, after the commission of
the crime, immediately placed himself in the disposition of Kagawad
Fernandez
who, in turn, brought him to the police station. Under Section
388
of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160),[53]
for purposes of the Revised Penal Code, Kagawad Fernandez is a person
in
authority. Clearly, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender
is present here.cralaw:red
Under Article 248[54]
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua
to death. Article 63 of the same Code provides that the lesser of
the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed, there being a
mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the crime and there being no
aggravating
circumstance.cralaw:red
In keeping with the
current jurisprudence, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the
amount
of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto.[55]
As regards the actual damages, it appears that out of the P88,000.00
awarded
by the trial court, only P36,000.00[56]
was actually supported by receipts. The rest was based solely on
a list prepared by the victim’s mother. To be entitled to actual
damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence
obtainable to the injured party.[57]
We therefore find it appropriate to reduce the award of actual damages
to P36,000.00. The moral damages awarded in the amount of
P50,000.00
is affirmed, there being evidence that because of the victim’s death,
his
heirs suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar
injury.[58]
Considering that a qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery is
present here, exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000.00 are likewise
awarded
to the victim’s heirs.[59]chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the appealed
Decision finding appellant Dionisio Q. Vicente guilty of the crime of
murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in the sense that he is ordered to pay the heirs of
the
late Manny C. Quinto, Jr. the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P36,0000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00
as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.cralaw:red
Costs de oficio.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Panganiban,
Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Fourteenth Edition, 1998, Book I at 151.
[2]
Rollo at 16-34, penned by Judge Luis M. Fontanilla.
[3]
Id. at 5.
[4]
Records at 50.
[5]
TSN, September 24, 1998 at 9.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 11-12.
[8]
Id. at 10.
[9]
Id. at 15-16.
[10]
Id. at 25-26.
[11]
Id. at 27.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id.
[14]
Id. at 28.
[15]
Id. at 29.
[16]
TSN, September 3, 1998 at 7.
[17]
TSN, November 9, 1998 at 2-3.
[18]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Id. at 4.
[20]
Id. at 6.
[21]
Id. at 7.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Id. at 8.
[24]
Id. at 9.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
TSN, October 29, 1998 at 16 and 21.
[26]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Id. at 23.
[28]
Id.
[29]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
Id. at 5.
[31]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
Id. at 6.
[34]
Id. at 13.
[35]
Rollo at 33-34.
[36]
Id. at 16.
[37]
Id. at 55.
[38]
People vs. Rabanal, G.R. No. 119542, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 655.
[39]
People vs. Boniao, G.R. No. 100800, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 653.
[40]
People vs. Cueto, G.R. No. 147764, January 16, 2003.chanrobles virtual law library
[41]
People vs. Cotas, G.R. No. 132043, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 627.
[42]
People vs. Ave, G.R. Nos. 137274-75, October 18, 2002; People vs.
Alfanta,
378 Phil. 95 (1999).
[43]
310 Phil. 269 (1995).chanrobles virtual law library
[44]
TSN, October 29, 1998 at 24-26.
[45]
TSN, November 9, 1998 at 8-10.
[46]
Records at 11.chanrobles virtual law library
[47]
People vs. Figuracion, 415 Phil. 12 (2001); Ingles vs. Court of
Appeals,
336 Phil. 118 (1997).
[48]
G.R. No. 130598, February 3, 2000, 324 SCRA 628.chanrobles virtual law library
[49]
People vs. Clemente, G.R. No. L-23463, September 28, 1967, 21
SCRA
261; People vs. Corecor, G.R. No. L-63155, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 84.
[50]
People vs. Almendras, G.R. No. 137277, December 20, 2001, 372 SCRA 737.chanrobles virtual law library
[51]
People vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 121682, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 497.
[52]
334 Phil. 881 (1997).chanrobles virtual law library
[53]
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the
Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members,
and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed
as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay
officials
and members who maybe designated by law or ordinance and charged with
the
maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and
property,
or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any
barangay
member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed
agents
of persons in authority.chanrobles virtual law library
[54]
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"ART.
248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the
provisions
of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death x x x."
[55]
People vs. Ilo, G.R. No. 140731, November 21, 2002.chanrobles virtual law library
[56]
Records at 98-101 and 109.chanrobles virtual law library
[57]
People vs. Acosta, G.R. No. 140386, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 181;
People
vs. Suelto, 381 Phil. 851 (2000); People vs. Samolde, G.R. No. 128551,
July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 632.
[58]
People vs. Manlansing, G.R. No. 131736, March 11, 2002.chanrobles virtual law library
[59]
People vs. Catubig, 363 SCRA 636 (2001).chanrobles virtual law library |