THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R.
No.
138265
May 29, 2003
-versus-
ROGER LAMASAN,
Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
CARPIO-MORALES,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On appeal is the decision
of October 6, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch
23,
in Criminal Case No. 48021 finding Roger Lamasan (appellant) guilty of
murder for killing Rolando Parreñas, Jr. (the victim).
On August 29, 1997,
appellant was, by Amended Information,[1]
charged with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or
about July 15, 1997, in the Municipality of Mina, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Rolando
Parreñas,
Jr. with the use of an unlicensed firearm he was then provided, hitting
the victim and inflicting upon said Rolando Parreñas, Jr. wounds
in his stomach which caused his death thereafter. (Underscoring in the
original.)
Contrary to law.
The Office of the
Solicitor
General (OSG) presented the prosecution’s version of the facts leading
to the death of the victim as follows:
At around 8:00 o’clock
in the evening of July 15, 1997, Gerardo Pasamanero was in his house at
Del Pilar Street, Mina West, Mina, Iloilo when Rolando Parreñas,
Jr. [the victim], barangay captain of Brgy. Agmanhaphao, Mina, Iloilo,
and Gelacio Aloquiña, a barangay tanod, passed by.
Pasamanero
invited the two to his house to drink beer. They talked about the
forthcoming
seminar of barangay captains and the project they were about to
implement
(pp. 4-5, TSN, October 21, 1997). At that point, appellant.arrived, entered Pasamanero’s house and provoked [the victim] and
Aloquiña.
He shouted at them: "If you are brave in your place, I am also
brave.
If you are brave, you pull out your firearm." To that, [the
victim]
answered: "Pare, we know each other and we did not come here for
trouble." Appellant, however, continued with his provocation and
attempted to pull out his firearm. When he was about to pull out
his firearm, [the victim] immediately hugged him and Aloquiña
grabbed
the .38 caliber revolver from appellant’s waist and then handed it to
Pasamanero
(pp. 6-8, ibid). Pasamanero left [the victim] and Aloquiña
with an instruction not to harm appellant while he went to the police
station
to report the incident. He surrendered the revolver to
P/Inspector
Alex Velez (p. 9, TSN, November 4, 1997).cralaw:red
In a short while, Pasamanero
came back with P/Insp. Velez and his two (2) men who conducted an
investigation.
The dispute, however, was settled with a dialogue between appellant and
[the victim] and the latter agreed that appellant would be detained at
the police station (pp. 9-11, TSN, October 21, 1997). [The victim]
sustained
a wound on his lips after appellant punched him (p. 16, ibid).cralaw:red
The police brought appellant
to the Mina Police Station which was about fifty (50) meters away from
Pasamanero’s house, while [the victim] and Aloquiña proceeded to
the house of one Mariano Parian in the same barangay to attend to the
latter’s
wake (pp. 11-13, ibid). It was already 9:00 o’clock in the
evening
(p. 18, TSN, November 4, 1997). It turned out, however, that
appellant
managed to escape and ran towards the dark while he was being brought
to
the police station. The policemen pursued him but failed to catch
him (pp. 33-35, TSN, December 9, 1997).cralaw:red
That same evening, at
around 11:00 o’clock, Edwin Reyna, a resident of Del Pilar Street, Mina
West, Mina, Iloilo, went to the wake of Mariano Parian and, there, he
met
[the victim] and Gelacio Aloquiña. [The victim] showed to him
his
swollen lips which, according to him, was caused by his wrestling with
appellant. After half an hour, [the victim] and Aloquiña
told
him that they were going home. Shortly after the two (2) walked
out
of the house, Edwin Reyna, who was then standing by the door, heard a
gunshot
and saw [the victim] fell (sic) down. He immediately ran towards
him and cuddled him. [The victim] told him: "Bring me to the
hospital
x x x I’m going to die." He also told him that appellant.shot
him. Reyna shouted for help and carried [the victim’s] body to
the
police patrol car. [The victim] was brought to the Iloilo Provincial
Hospital
at Pototan, Iloilo where he died not long thereafter (pp. 4-10, TSN,
November
25, 1997).cralaw:red
Gelacio Aloquiña,
who was with [the victim] when the shooting took place, saw [appellant]
standing about 4 meters away, facing him and holding a 15½-inch
firearm. When [appellant] saw him, he immediately walked
away.
Aloquiña was able to recognize [appellant] because of the light
coming from the balcony of the house which was only about 5 to 6 meters
away from [appellant] (pp. 14-17, TSN, December 2, 1997).cralaw:red
[On July 15, 2002],
[the victim] died of hemorrhage secondary to multiple pellet wounds (p.
20, TSN, October 14, 1997).[2]
That appellant was "neither
a licensed/registered firearms and ammunition holder of any kind or
caliber
nor ha[d] he applied to possess any firearms, much more an authority to
carry firearms outside residence"[3]
was established by the prosecution.chanrobles virtual law library
Denying the accusation
and proferring alibi, the defense gave the following version, as
related
by the trial court:
[After consuming a glass
of beer inside the house of Pasamanero, (appellant claimed as follows:
He) asked permission to leave but as (the victim) was restraining him
from
leaving, an argument ensued in the course of which he saw
Aloquiña
holding a firearm on his waist. Pasamanero soon left but returned
10 minutes later with P/Insp. Alex Velez and two (2) policemen. Not
long
after, Aloquiña threw his firearm under the table which
Pasamanero
recovered (Exh. "C-1"). The incident between him and [the victim]
was eventually settled by P/Insp. Alex Velez following which he was
conducted
to Sitio Burot by P/Insp. Velez with PO3 Sotelo and PO2 Moises de Pablo
on board a patrol vehicle.]
He thereafter took supper
in his house and slept at about 11:00-11:30 o’clock in the
evening.
Past 12 o’clock midnight, however, [P]/Insp. Velez woke him up and told
him to man the radio room at the police station where he worked as a
radio
man. Upon reaching the police station, he was detained inside the
cell where he was told that he was suspected of killing [the
victim].
He claims that he does not own any firearm and that the testimony of
Brgy.
Captain Pasamanero concerning the recovery from his waist of a firearm
is a big lie. He denies having shot [the victim]. He never
went to the house of Mariano Parian where [the victim] was shot.
On cross-examination, he admitted that there was no previous quarrel
between
him and [the victim] nor Barangay Captain Gerardo Pasamanero.cralaw:red
[O]n his part, Dionisio
Camino, a trisikad driver, averred that he was present at the house of
Mariano Parian attending the wake on July 15, 1997. While playing
"pusoy" at the left side of the house, he heard one (1) gunshot at
about
11:30 o’clock in the evening. He saw [the victim] lying face up
at
the door of the house from a distance of about two (2) armslengths
(sic).
Contrary to the testimony of Gelacio Aloquiña, he did not see
Edwin
Reyna at the crime scene and that nobody came near and talked with the
victim during the time when the incident happened.chanrobles virtual law library
With corroboration,
Pinky Lamasan averred that at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
July
15, 1997, her husband[-appellant] arrived at their house situated at
Sitio
Burot, Mina East, Mina, Iloilo, with P/Insp. Alex Velez and two (2)
other
PNP members. [Appellant] took his supper, rested and slept at
about
11:00 o’clock in the evening. At about 12:30 o’clock in the
morning
of July 16, 1997, [P]/Insp. Alex Velez returned and fetched [appellant]
to man the radio. She woke up at 5:00 o’clock in the morning of
July
16, 1997 and went to the public market at 7:00 o’clock that same
morning.
[Appellant] failed to return home. Then, somebody told her that
[he]
was detained. She went to the municipal jail and [he] told her
that
he is a suspect in the murder of [the victim]. She was stunned
upon
hearing it because he could not have murdered [the victim] as he never
left the house that evening.cralaw:red
Victoria Caños,
Forensic Chemist, National Bureau of Investigation, Regional Office VI,
Iloilo City, conducted a paraffin examination on July 16, 1997 on
[appellant]
upon the request of [P/Insp.] Alex Velez, Chief of Police, PNP, Mina,
Iloilo
(Exh. "3", p. 304, rec.). She prepared Chemistry Report No.
C-97-46
(Exh. "4", p. 305, rec.) which yielded negative results for nitrates on
the left and right hands of [appellant] (Exh. "4-C"). (Emphasis and
underscoring
supplied).[4]
Discrediting appellant’s
denial and alibi in favor of the positive and categorical declaration
of
prosecution witness Aloquiña that he saw appellant standing and
holding a long firearm some four meters away from the victim, as well
as
the victim’s dying declaration, as related by Aloquiña and
Reyna,
that appellant was the one who killed the victim, the trial court
convicted
appellant of murder by Decision of October 6, 1998,[5]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered and in the light of the facts obtaining and
jurisprudence
aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding the accused Roger
Lamasan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and there being
no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission
thereof
hereby sentences said accused to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
pursuant
to Section 6 of Republic Act 7659 amending Article 248 of the Revised
Penal
Code.
The said accused
is
further condemned to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rolando
Parreñas,
Jr. the sum of P129,530.00 by way of actual damages, P30,000.00 moral
damages
and P50,000.00 death compensation.chanrobles virtual law library
The Warden, Iloilo
Rehabilitation
Center, is ordered to commit the person of the accused to the National
Penitentiary at the earliest opportunity.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, the present
appeal
which ascribes the following errors to the trial court: I.
THE LOWER COURT
ERRED
IN RULING THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY ALLEGEDLY
ATTENDED
THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF MURDER. ON THE BASIS OF THE
PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE, THE ALLEGED CRIME COMMITTED IS ONLY HOMICIDE.
II.
THE LOWER COURT
ERRED
IN NOT UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED
AND IN BASING CONVICTION MERELY BY DRAWING STRENGTH FROM THE WEAKNESS
OF
THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
The second assigned
error shall first be dwelt upon for if it is meritorious discussion of
the first is rendered unnecessary.cralaw:red
Contrary to appellant’s
claim, the prosecution prima facie overcame his constitutional
presumption
of innocence. Prosecution witness Reyna clearly pierced such
presumption
as his following testimony shows, quoted verbatim:
[ATTY. ALIM for the
prosecution:]
Q
: So what happened next
after [the victim] asked permission from you to go home?
A
: After he had asked
permission
from me, I told them to just go ahead first.cralaw:red
Q
: And what happened
next
after that?
A
: After a while I heard
the gunshot.cralaw:red
Q
: What did you do after
hearing that fire of the gun?
A
: I saw [the victim] as
if falling down.cralaw:red
Q
: What did you do then?
A
: After that Gelacio
Aloquiña
ran to him and I also ran to him.chanrobles virtual law library
Q
: What did you do in
running
going to the place where [the victim] fell?
A
: We cradled him.cralaw:red
Q
: What was your
distance
from the place where [the victim] fell?
A
: Three (3) or four (4)
meters.cralaw:red
Q
: Now, what happened
next
Mr. Witness after you cradled [the victim]?
A
: He told us, "You
bring
me to the hospital."
x
x
x
x x x
Q
: What did [the victim]
say?
A
: Bring me to the
hospital
as if I’m going to die.chanrobles virtual law library
Q
: Have you seen the
wounds,
if any, of [the victim]?
A
: I saw.cralaw:red
Q
: On what part of his
body?
A
: At the stomach.cralaw:red
Q
: What else did [the
victim]
tell you?
A
: He pointed to
[appellant]
as the one responsible of shooting him.cralaw:red
COURT: What
did he exactly tell you?
A
: I was shot by
[appellant].cralaw:red
Q
: You are sure that
that
is what he said?chanrobles virtual law library
A
: Yes, Your
Honor.
(Emphasis supplied.)[7]
While prosecution witness
Aloquiña did not, like Reyna, see appellant shoot the victim, he
corroborated Reyna’s testimony on material points as his following
testimony
reflects:
[ATTY. ALIM for the
prosecution:]
Q
: What happened next
after
[the victim] asked permission to leave the house?
A
: He went out of the
house.cralaw:red
Q
: What about you?
A
: I followed him.cralaw:red
Q
: How about Edwin
Re[y]na?
A
: He was near the door.cralaw:red
Q
: What happened next
after
[the victim] was already outside of the house?
A
: There was a shot.cralaw:red
Q
: Shot of what?chanrobles virtual law library
A
: 12 gauge.cralaw:red
Q
: What happened next
after
you heard that fire of gun?
A
: I looked where the
shot
emanated and I saw [appellant].cralaw:red
Q
: The same [appellant],
the accused in this case?
A
: Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
: Why do you know that
it was [appellant]?
A
: Because I saw him.cralaw:red
COURT: What
was he doing when you saw him?
A
: Standing, facing me.cralaw:red
Q
: What was his attire?chanrobles virtual law library
A
: I can not recall the
shirt.cralaw:red
Q
: Was he holding any
weapon?
A
: Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
: What firearm?
A
: 12 gauge.cralaw:red
Q
: Is it long or short?
A
: Like this (Witness
demonstrating
the length of 15½ inches.)
ATTY.
ALIM:
How do you know it is a 12 gauge shotgun?
A
: From the appearance
and
from the shot I heard.chanrobles virtual law library
Q
: You saw [appellant]
after
the gun was fired?
A
: Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Court: How
far was he from where the victim was situated?
A
: More or less 4 meters.cralaw:red
ATTY.
ALIM:
What did he do then after that?
A
: When he saw me he
immediately
walked.cralaw:red
Q
: In what part of the
house
of Parian?
A
: If you enter the
house
it is on the right side.cralaw:red
COURT: About
what time was that when you saw him standing?
A
: 11:30 in the evening.chanrobles virtual law library
Q
: How would you have
seen
him at a distance of 4 meters away when it was night time?
A
: Because the light
coming
from the balcony of the house reaches the door.cralaw:red
Q
: How far was the light
in relation to [appellant] when you saw him holding a firearm?
A
: Maybe about 5 or 6
meters,
more or less.cralaw:red
ATTY.
ALIM:
Was that a fluorescent lamp?
A
: One (1) fluorescent
lamp
and the light used in the coffin.cralaw:red
ATTY.
ALIM:
What did you do then after you heard that fire of the gun?
A
: I cuddled [the
victim]
and asked him who shot him and he answered, [appellant].chanrobles virtual law library
Q
: What else did he tell
you?
A
: He asked me to bring
him immediately to the hospital because his wound is fatal.cralaw:red
Q
: What about Edwin
Re[y]na?
A
: Two of us cuddled him.cralaw:red
Q
: What did you do then
after you have [the victim] cuddled? (sic)
A
: He was brought to the
hospital and we followed him.cralaw:red
Q
: To what hospital?
A
: Pototan Provincial
Hospital.cralaw:red
Q
: And what happened to
[the victim] after that?
A
: He died.[8]
(emphasis supplied.)chanrobles virtual law library
No person who knows
of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation,
hence,
a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence. Thus, it
has been held that when a person is at the point of death, every motive
of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
consideration
to speak the truth.[9]
Under Section 37 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for the admissibility of
ante mortem statements are: (1) the statement concerns the crime
and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (2) at the
time it was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an
impending
death; (3) the declarant would have been competent as a witness had he
survived; and (4) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for
homicide,
murder, or parricide in which the declarant was the victim.[10]
All four requisites
are present in the case at bar. Thus, from the evidence of the
prosecution,
it is clear that the victim identified appellant as his killer; and the
victim made the declaration in contemplation of his impending death and
he died shortly as a result of his fatal wounds. Had the victim
survived,
it cannot be gainsaid that he was competent to testify in court.
Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in a criminal prosecution for
murder in which the declarant was the victim.cralaw:red
That Reyna gave an account
of what he witnessed only after ten days from the commission of the
crime
was adequately explained by him when he testified that he was initially
reluctant to get involved in a case but felt that he had to break his
silence
for justice to prevail.[11]
The delay of Reyna in reporting what he had witnessed does not thus
impair
his credibility nor destroy the probative value of his testimony.chanrobles virtual law library
Contrary to appellant’s
claim, there is no discrepancy between Reyna’s testimony and his
declarations
in his sworn statement. While Reyna declared at the witness stand
that the victim had told him that he was punched by appellant, whereas
in his sworn statement no categorical statement about a punching
incident
was mentioned, Reyna did actually refer to such incident in his sworn
statement
when he declared that the victim’s swelling lips "resulted from
grappling
with [appellant] for the possession of a firearm."[12]
In any event, sworn
statements, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and
often
inaccurate for various reasons, sometimes from partial suggestion or
for
want of suggestions and inquiries.[13]
In fine, the prosecution
prima facie established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.cralaw:red
Appellant failed, however,
to rebut the prima facie evidence against him. His alibi is
inherently
weak, he having failed to demonstrate that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime.[14]
That appellant’s house is within the vicinity of Mina East, Iloilo
where
the crime occurred is undisputed, hence, it was not physically
impossible
for him to leave his house and repair to the house of Pari-an, shoot
the
victim, and then return to his house where he was found and later haled
into the local police station.chanrobles virtual law library
It is, however, non
sequitur to conclude, and that brings the discussion to the first
assigned
error, that the attack was tainted with treachery because it was sudden.cralaw:red
For alevosia to be considered
to have attended the killing, it was necessary for the prosecution to
establish
that: (1) the employment of means of execution gave the victim no
opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted.[15]
This, the prosecution failed to do.cralaw:red
Neither did the prosecution
prove that there was evident premeditation, for it failed to prove: (1)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly
indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a
sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will, the essence of premeditation being
that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
during
the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[16]chanrobles virtual law library
The presence of the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation having
been ruled out, the crime for which appellant should be faulted must
thus
be modified from murder to homicide. Accordingly, the penalty to
be imposed on appellant must correspondingly be lowered. There
being
one aggravating circumstance of using an unlicensed firearm in the
commission
of homicide, the proper imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal
in its maximum period.cralaw:red
As to the civil aspect
of the case, the award of actual damages for the funeral expenses in
the
total amount of P129,330.00, itemized as follows: P40,000.00 for
coffin;
P1,530.00 for burial services; P10,000.00 for 12 sacks of rice;
P30,000.00
for 6 pigs; P13,800.00 for 1 truckload of soft drinks; and P34,000.00
for
2 cows, is affirmed, it being supported by undisputed evidence.[17]
The award of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity is also affirmed, as is that of moral damages which
is increased to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the decision
on review is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.cralaw:red
As modified, appellant
Roger Lamasan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide,
aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate sentence of Twelve (12) Years of prision
mayor,
as minimum and Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant is also ORDERED
to pay the heirs of Rolando Parreñas the amount of P129,330.00
as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
and Corona, JJ., on leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, p. 11. This Information amended the August 1, 1997
Information,
Rollo, p. 9.
[2]
Appellee’s Brief, Rollo, pp. 131-135.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
TSN, December 9, 1997, pp. 8-10. See also Exhibit "I," Roll of
Exhibits,
p. 9.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 35-37.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Rollo, pp. 25-44.
[6]
Id. at 43-44.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
TSN, November 25, 1997, pp. 6-8.
[8]
TSN, December 2, 1997, pp. 14-17.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
People v. Molina, G.R. No. 129051, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 517,
525.
[10]
People v. Atrejenio, G.R. No. 120160, July 13, 1999, 310 SCRA 229, 240.
[11]
TSN, November 25, 1997, p. 32.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Exhibit "G," Roll of Exhibits, p. 7.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
People v. Seduco, G.R. No. 130643, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 147, 158.
[14]
Vide People v. Templo, G.R. No. 133569, December 1, 2000, 346 SCRA 626,
639-640.
[15]
People v. Llanda, G.R. No. 133386, November 27, 2002, p. 11.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Vide People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 111149, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA
613,
628.
[17]
TSN, December 9, 1997, pp. 92-107. See also Exhibits "P" to "T"
and
"U-3", Roll of Exhibits, pp. 16-19. |