FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
138470
April 1, 2003
-versus-
ARTEMIO GARCIA Y
CRUZ, JR.chanrobles virtual law libraryAND REGALADO
BERNABE
Y ORBE,
Accused.
REGALADO BERNABE
YORBE,
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This is an appeal from
the decision[1]
dated March 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch
21, in Criminal Case No. 830-M-98, finding Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr.
and
Regalado Bernabe y Orbe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Carnapping with Homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion
perpetua.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On June 3, 1998,
Artemio
Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe were charged with the crime of
Carnapping
with Homicide as defined in Republic Act No. 6539. The
Information
against them reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That on or about the
21st day of December, 1996, in the municipality of San Rafael, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and
helping with each other, with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of violence and intimidation,
forcibly
take from the driver Wilfredo Elis a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX with
Plate
No. UJL-761 owned by Fernando Ignacio;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That during the
commission
of the offense, or by reason thereof, the said accused, armed with
bladed
weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, did then and
there, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack,
assault and stab Wilfredo Elis in different parts of his body causing
mortal
wounds which directly resulted in his death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Contrary to law.[2]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Upon arraignment, both
accused pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. Thereafter,
the
case was tried on the merits.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It appears from the
record that on December 17, 1996, Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator
based
in Marilao, Bulacan, was approached by Garcia and Bernabe because they
wanted to borrow his brand new Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip to
the
Bicol region. Cortez refused, saying that the van was unavailable.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Instead, he got in
touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just purchased a brand new Toyota
Tamaraw FX for P475,500.00.[3]
Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for two days at the daily
rate of P2,000.00. Bernabe and Garcia, on the other hand, rented
the vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 a day inclusive of the P500.00
driver’s
fee. They agreed to pay the rental fee upon their return from Bicol.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the early morning
of December 18, 1996, Cortez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up
Ignacio’s
Tamaraw FX at his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove
the
same back to Marilao, Bulacan and, at 8:00 a.m., he and the two accused
left for Bicol.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Four days passed
without
a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez began to worry about the vehicle
he had borrowed from Ferdinand Ignacio so he informed the Barangay
Captain
of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. Meanwhile, Elis’ wife, Nancy,
approached
Cortez and asked where her husband was.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the afternoon of
December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of the Moncada, Tarlac Police
notified the Chief of Police that two suspicious looking persons were
seen
selling a vehicle in Anao, Tarlac at the grossly inadequate price of
P50,000.00.
The Chief of Police immediately formed a team,[7]
but when they reached Anao, Tarlac, they found out that the two accused
had already left for Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. The team thereafter
coordinated
with the Nueva Ecija Police. The two accused were seen in front
of
a store in Brgy. Pangayan, Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. When they
failed
to produce documents of ownership over the Tamaraw FX, they were
brought
to the Moncada Police Station for investigation.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Garcia and Bernabe
admitted to the Moncada Police that they attempted to sell the Tamaraw
FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio. In the early morning of December 24,
1996, a joint team of police officers composed of members of the
Moncada
and Marilao Police, together with the Barangay Captain of Saog,
Marilao,
Bulacan, were accompanied by Cortez to Moncada, Tarlac, where the
latter
positively identified Ignacio’s Tamaraw FX.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Cortez went to visit
Garcia and Bernabe in detention. They admitted to him that they
stabbed
Elis and dumped him along the highway near the "sabana" in San Rafael,
Bulacan. They claimed that they were compelled to eliminate Elis
when he refused to join their plan to sell the Tamaraw FX. Garcia
brought
the policemen, together with Cortez and the Barangay Captain, to San
Rafael,
Bulacan where he pointed to the place where they killed Elis. However,
the police were unable to find Elis’ body. After returning to
Moncada,
Cortez immediately inspected the interior of the vehicle and found
bloodstains
on the side and back of the driver’s seat. He also found several
personal items belonging to Elis, such as his clothes and driver’s
license,[9]
as well as Garcia’s bag which contained bonnets, tear gas, the warranty
card and the car registration papers.[10]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 29, 1996,
the Moncada police received information that a male cadaver was found
in
San Rafael, Bulacan, submerged in mud ten meters away from where they
searched
earlier. The cadaver was identified as that of Wilfredo Elis by
his
wife, Nancy.[11]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dr. Benito Caballero,
Municipal Health Officer and Medico-Legal Officer of the province of
Bulacan,
who performed the autopsy, found four stab wounds in the posterior, one
stab wound in the lateral and one on the left side of the thorax.
He opined that the wounds which penetrated the abdomen and lungs were
fatal.[12]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In their defense,
Garcia
and Bernabe alleged that they agreed to rent the subject vehicle for a
period of five days from December 18, 1996; that Garcia and Elis had a
fight because the latter allegedly did not want to go with them to
Nueva
Ecija; that Elis, while driving the Tamaraw FX, bumped a passenger
jeepney
along Baliuag Highway; that they left Elis along the Baliuag Highway at
3:30 a.m. so he can inform Cortez that they were already in Bulacan and
were en route to Nueva Ecija to have the dented portion of the vehicle
fixed.[13]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After trial, the court
a quo rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, all premises
considered, this Court finds and so holds that the prosecution has been
able to establish the accused’s criminal culpability. In view thereof,
Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe y Orbe are hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
Carnapping
with Homicide in violation of Republic Act No. 6539 as amended by
Republic
Act No. 7659. Accordingly, absent any circumstances that will aggravate
the commission thereof, both of them are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Further, both accused are hereby ordered
jointly and severally to indemnify the heirs of Wilfredo Elis, the sum
of P50,000.00; to pay them the amount of P100,000.00 for moral
damages;
P15,290.00 for actual/ compensatory damages; and P250,000.00 for loss
of
earnings.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
With costs against
the accused.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[14]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Both accused appealed
from the decision of the trial court. On March 31, 2000, accused
Garcia filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal,[15]
which was granted in a Resolution dated September 27, 2000.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant Bernabe
raises
the following assignment of errors:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Ichanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE HONORABLE
TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF CARNAPPING AS DEFINED
IN
REPUBLIC ACT 6539 (ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT) AS AMENDED ARE PRESENT AND DULY
PROVEN.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE HONORABLE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE WAS PART OF AN
ALLEGED
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CARNAPPING.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
III
THE HONORABLE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE ON THE BASIS OF HIS
ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE CRIME TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Republic Act No. 6539,
otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping",
defines
"carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging
to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence
against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."[16]
More specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1.
That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2.
That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3.
That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4.
That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that
the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons,
or by using force upon things.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A careful examination
of the evidence presented shows that all the elements of carnapping
were
proved in this case.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Unlawful taking is
the taking of a vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things;
it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of
the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
it cannot be denied that the nature of the appellant’s possession of
the
Tamaraw FX was initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful
killing
of the deceased for the purpose of taking the vehicle radically
transformed
the character of said possession into an unlawful one. Cortez
categorically
stated that during his first visit to the Moncada Police Station where
appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two separately admitted
to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join
their
plan to sell the vehicle. Their confession, having been
freely
and voluntarily given to Cortez, a private individual, is admissible
against
the appellant.[19]
Thus, the duration of the lease of the Tamaraw FX, whether for an
indefinite
period as contended by the defense, or only for 4 days, as claimed by
the
prosecution, has no bearing on the culpability of the
appellant.
It does not matter whether the unlawful taking occurred within the
period
of the lease. What is decisive here is the purpose of appellant
and
his co-accused in killing the victim. Such is the vital point on
which the crime and the nature thereof is to be determined. To
reiterate,
the prosecution was able to establish that appellant and his co-accused
stabbed the victim to death because he refused to join them in their
plan
to appropriate the vehicle. This undoubtedly satisfied the
element
of unlawful taking through violence, rendering appellant liable for the
crime charged.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, it must be
stressed that the acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of
carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not
the
owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of
property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the
person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner
thereof.
What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong to
the
offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed
suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property
from another against the latter's will through violence or
intimidation,
with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging to another
is imputable to the offender.[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, at the
time of their apprehension, appellant Bernabe and Garcia were unable to
give a plausible explanation why they still had the Tamaraw FX in their
possession. Appellant Bernabe claims that he and his co-accused
went
to Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija to have the dent on the vehicle
repaired.
Garcia, on the other hand, testified that there was no such
damage.
A person in possession of a stolen article is presumed guilty of having
illegally and unlawfully taken the same unless he can satisfactorily
explain
his possession of the thing.[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant contends that
he did not conspire with his co-accused to commit the crime of
carnapping.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during
and after the commission of the crime,[22]
which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and
concurrence
of sentiments.[23]
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present
when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the
performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. It may be
deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.[24]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
it was sufficiently proved that Garcia and Bernabe, through Joselito
Cortez,
hired the brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio
for
their trip to Bicol; that at 8:00 a.m. of December 18, 1996, they left
for Bicol on board the Tamaraw FX driven by Elis; that on December 23,
1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of Moncada, Tarlac reported to the Chief of
Police that two suspiciously looking persons, who turned out to be
Garcia
and Bernabe were offering to sell a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX for a
mere
P50,000.00 in Anao, Tarlac; and that the two were finally apprehended
with
the subject vehicle at Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija by elements of the Tarlac
and Nueva Ecija Police.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While there may be
no direct evidence of the commission of the crime, the foregoing
constitute
circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant Garcia’s and Bernabe’s
conviction.
The following requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a
conviction
were met, to wit: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable
doubt.[25]
The circumstances indeed form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
and
reasonable conclusion that Bernabe and Garcia were the perpetrators of
the crime. It has been held that facts and circumstances
consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with innocence constitute evidence which,
in
weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its
effect
upon the court.[26]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The records show that
Garcia and Bernabe admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they were
responsible
for taking the vehicle and killing the victim, Elis. On December
24, 1996, Cortez went to the Moncada Municipal Jail and talked to them
while they were detained. Both admitted to him that they forcibly took
the said vehicle from Elis, stabbed him and thereafter dumped him at
San
Rafael, Bulacan.[27]
Subsequently, on December 26, 1996, Cortez and Ignacio went to Moncada
and confronted the two in their cells. Garcia admitted to Cortez
and Ignacio that they stole the vehicle because they were in dire need
of money, while Bernabe kept quiet.[28]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant Bernabe
maintains
that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his admission to
Cortez
and Ignacio on the grounds that (a) he did not make such admission; (b)
the admission made by Garcia should not prejudice him; and (c) assuming
he made such admission, it should be excluded for having been made
under
duress and intimidation.[29]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In People v. Andan,[30]
it was held that the constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation
do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning
by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant
orally
admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to
preclude
the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, and not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily
telling the truth. Hence, appellant’s voluntary admission to
Cortez
that he and his co-accused conspired in killing the deceased when the
latter
opposed their plan to sell the vehicle is admissible as evidence
against
him.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Anent Garcia’s
extrajudicial
confession implicating appellant in the commission of the offense, it
appears
that the latter did not oppose or affirm Garcia’s statement.
Neither
did he make an attempt to refute the same insofar as his participation
in the commission of the crime was concerned. As correctly observed by
the Office of the Solicitor General, "he cannot invoke his silence
during
this crucial moment as his right. He ought to speak and failing
to
do so, his silence weighs heavily on him. Thus, it was not
accused-appellant’s
Garcia’s admission that prejudiced accused-appellant Bernabe, but his
own
silence when it was ‘such as naturally to call for action or comment if
not true’."[31]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Rule 130, Section 32
of the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in the
presence
and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says
nothing
when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may
be given in evidence against him.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We likewise find no
merit in the allegation that duress was employed on appellant.
Suffice
it to state that such bare allegation of force and duress is not enough
to prove that he was indeed tortured to admit complicity in the offense
charged.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The penalty for
carnapping
is provided in Section 14 of RA 6539, as amended by Section 20 of RA
7659,
to wit:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 14. Penalty
for Carnapping.- Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the
value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less
than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years
and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or
intimidation
of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when
the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[32]
(Emphasis supplied)
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, the trial court
correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appellant
Bernabe
and his co-accused, Garcia.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The award by the trial
court of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim should be
affirmed.
When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to such amount as indemnity for the death, without need of any
evidence of proof of damages.[33]
This is in addition to the actual damages of P15,290.50 which was duly
substantiated by proof.[34]
We, however, reduce the award of moral damages to P50,000.00, in line
with
current jurisprudence.[35]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lastly, we find the
court a quo’s award of P250,000.00 for loss of earning capacity to be
without
basis. Nancy testified that her husband Wilfredo was earning
P600.00
a day prior to his death,[36]
however, she failed to produce evidence to substantiate her
claim.
As held in the case of People v. Panabang,[37]
a self-serving statement is not enough; the indemnification for loss of
earning capacity must be duly proven.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the decision
dated March 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 21, finding appellant Regaldo Bernabe y Orbe guilty of
Carnapping
with Homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua,
and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, the
sums
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,290.00 as actual damages, is
AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS: Appellant is further ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, moral damages in the
reduced
amount of P50,000.00. The award of P250,000.00 for loss of
earnings
is DELETED for lack of factual basis.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Costs de officio.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Judge Cesar M. Solis; Rollo, p. 111.
[2]
Rollo, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
See Exhibits "M, M1 and O".
[4]
TSN, October 14, 1998, pp. 2-4; TSN, October 21, 1998, p. 4.
[5]
TSN, October 14, 1998 (9 a.m.), pp. 4-5; TSN, October 14, 1998 (9:35
a.m.),
p. 4; TSN, October 21, 1998, p. 4; TSN, December 2, 1998, pp. 3-4.
[6]
TSN, October 21, 1998, pp. 5-6; TSN, December 2, 1998, pp. 4-5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
The team was composed of SPO4 Guardin, SPO1 Roberto Calibusan, SPO4
Sergio
Sapon, SPO2 Virgilio Pajarillo, SPO4 Jaime Lagasa, SPO2 Danilo Damaso
and
SPO4 Samuel Aban.
[8]
TSN, October 9, 1998, pp. 4-6.
[9]
Exhibit "D".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
TSN, October 21, 1998, pp. 6-9.
[11]
TSN, September 28, 1998, pp. 5-6.
[12]
TSN, October 9, 1998, pp. 1-2.
[13]
TSN, February 1, 1999, pp. 3-5.
[14]
Rollo, p. 118.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Rollo, p. 42.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
R.A. 6539, Sec. 2; People v. Ellasos, 411 Phil 139 (2001).
[17]
People v. Calabroso, G.R. No. 126368, 14 September 2000, 340 SCRA 332.
[18]
People v. Ellasos, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
People v. Andan, 336 Phil. 91, 112-113 (1997); citing Navallo v.
Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 97214, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 175; People v. Olvis, G.R. No.
L-71092,
30 September 1987, 154 SCRA 513; People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, 18
January
1991, 193 SCRA 57; People v. Maqueda, 312 Phil. 646 (1995); Quinn v.
Buchanan,
298 S.W. 2d 413, 417 [1957], citing Cooley, A Treatise on the
Constitutional
Limitations 93, 358; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 199, pp.
975-976.
[20]
People v. Gavina, 332 Phil. 488, 495-496 (1996), citing U.S. v. Albao,
29 Phil. 86 (1914).
[21]
People v. Zafra, G.R. No. 110079, 19 October 1994, 237 SCRA 664.
[22]
People v. Panida, 369 Phil 311 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
People v. Manes, 362 Phil 569 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
People v. Bato, G.R. No. 127843, 15 December 2000, 348 SCRA 253.
[25]
People v. Gaballo, G.R. No. 133993, 13 October 1999, 316 SCRA 881.
[26]
People v. Dacibar, 382 Phil 618 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
TSN, October 21, 1998, pp. 6-7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
TSN, October 19, 1998, pp. 2-4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Appellee’s Brief, p. 155.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Rollo, pp. 156-157.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Prior to the amendment of Section 14, the last clause of its original
version
read: "x x x and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be
imposed
when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed
in
the commission of the carnapping."chan
robles virtual law
[33]
People v. Española, 338 Phil 403 (1997); People v. Bayang, G.R.
No. 134402, 5 February 2001, 351 SCRA 175.
[34]
Exhibit "C".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
People v. Ereño, G.R. No. 124706, 22 February 2000, 326 SCRA 157.
[36]
TSN, September 28, 1998, p. 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
People v. Panabang, G.R. Nos. 137514-15, 16 January 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |