SECOND DIVISION.
.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
138612
November 11, 2003
-versus-
PERCIVAL GONZA Y
BORRAL,
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
Before us on appeal
is the decision[1]
dated December 14, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan,
Sorsogon,
Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 116, finding appellant Percival Gonza
guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder for the killing of Virgilio Mortega,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim P50,000 as actual damages, P50,000 as
indemnity, and P50,000 as moral damages.
It was August 16, 1996,
and Virgilio Mortega was attending the second day of the wake of his
kin,
Ramil Mortega. Singing all night long, Virgilio had no inkling that it
would be his last. Mercilessly stabbed to death by Percival Gonza, he
breathed
his last at the age of forty-two, leaving behind a wife and six
children.
The prosecution cries murder; Percival says it was a desperate act of
self-preservation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Information filed
on October 7, 1996, charged Percival with murder committed as follows:
That on or
about the 16th day of August, 1996 at around 11:00 o'clock in the
evening
or thereafter, at Barangay Caditaan, Municipality of Magallanes,
Province
of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a fan knife, with intent to
kill and with treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, attack, assault and stab one Virgilio Mortega y Villa,
inflicting
upon the latter serious injuries which caused his instantaneous death,
to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on
December
9, 1996, Percival, with the assistance of a counsel de oficio, pleaded
not guilty to the indictment.[3]
Trial thereafter ensued. The Evidence of
the
Prosecution[4]
In the evening of August
16, 1996, Percival Gonza, Virgilio Mortega, and other condolers were at
the house of Catalino Mortega in Barangay Caditaan, Magallanes,
Sorsogon,[5]
attending the wake of Catalino's son, Ramil.[6]
To while away their time, Percival, Virgilio's third cousin and
Catalino's
brother-in-law, and a handful of condolers, engaged themselves in
drinking
and singing in a makeshift tent just outside Catalino's house, and a
kapihan
(coffee shop).[7]
When the condolers finished
drinking at around 11:00 p.m., they transferred to the kitchen in the
kapihan
where Catalino and his sister Edina Dimaano served them coffee.[8]
Virgilio continued singing.[9]
Not long after, Percival decided to go home[10]
Before leaving, however, he bade Catalino goodnight. Catalino was then
at the kapihan fixing an electric fan.[11]
Virgilio also decided to leave. As Percival exited from the kapihan,
Virgilio
followed him.[12]
Suddenly, Percival turned around and repeatedly stabbed Virgilio with
his
fan knife.[13]
Virgilio backed away, towards the entrance of the kapihan, but Percival
pursued him and there finished him off with three more successive stabs.[14]
Virgilio fell to the ground and died shortly thereafter.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Catalino and Edina could
only watch the ghastly incident in horror. Catalino pulled himself
together
and lunged at Percival, in an effort to subdue him. They fell to the
ground,
with Catalino on top of Percival. As they grappled for the possession
of
the knife, Catalino shouted for help. Pedro Golloso and Joseph Hental
responded
and wrested the knife from Percival. Thereafter, they released Percival
and allowed him to stay at the kapihan's kitchen. In the meantime,
Catalino
reported the incident to their barangay captain, Apolinario Gentolizo,
who, upon arrival at the scene of the crime, took custody of Percival.[16]
The next morning, Dr.
Irene V. Ella, Municipal Health Officer of Magallanes, Sorsogon,
performed
an autopsy on the body of the victim and submitted a postmortem report
on her findings, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. Stab
wound
left mid laterals 2 cm. from the sternum at the level of the nipple 2 x
2.5 cms.
2. Stab wound left
thorax 2 cms. below the nipple 2 x 5 cms.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. Stab wound right
mid lateral 2 cms. from the sternum 2 x 1 cms.
4. Stab wound at the
left hypochondrium 3 x 3 cms.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
5. Lacerated wound
at the right arm mid postero-lateral 5 x 6 cms.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Cause of
death-irreversible
shock secondary to massive internal bleeding due to fatal stab wound in
the chest.[17]
Dr. Ella said that when
she autopsied the cadaver of the victim, the same was already in the
state
of rigor mortis.[18]
Dr. Ella considered the stab wound on the thorax as the most fatal.[19]
She opined that the said wound could have been inflicted on the victim
when the latter had already fallen down.[20]
She added that the other injuries sustained by the victim could have
been
inflicted while he was in the act of evading the attack or defending
himself.[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On August 19, 1996,
Catalino and Edina executed sworn statements at the Magallanes Police
Station.
Both pointed to Percival as the culprit in the killing of Virgilio.[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Zenaida Mortega, wife
of the victim, testified that she suffered damages as a result of her
husband's
death. Mercy Mortega, her sister-in-law, spent P7,200 for the funeral
services.
She paid P250 to Mt. Carmel-Magallanes for a five-year rental of the
niche.
She also spent a total amount of P58,015 for the ten-day wake. Save for
the funeral services and the niche rentals, no receipt for all the
other
expenses was presented. The victim's widow further testified that her
grief
over the death of her husband could not be quantified in terms of
money.
She left it to the court to fix the award for moral damages. She
further
alleged that her husband was earning an average of P5,000 a month, and
that he was forty-two years old at the time of his death.[23]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Defense of
the
Accused[24]
Percival admitted stabbing
Virgilio but claimed that he only acted in self-defense. He declared
that
on August 16, 1996, he arrived early at his nephew's wake at around
4:00
p.m., where he helped in the food preparation for the guests. When he
finished
cooking at about 8:00 p.m., his brother-in-law, Catalino Mortega,
suggested
that he join the merrymaking outside the house. At around 10:30 p.m., a
drunk Virgilio Mortega arrived. He was invited to join the condolers.
However,
Virgilio resented the invitation and uttered invectives against a
certain
Adelardo, who was drinking with the group. Percival intervened to
pacify
Virgilio and admonished the latter to watch his language, but Virgilio
vented his ire on Percival, screaming, "Son of a whore!" At that point,
to prevent the tension from escalating, Percival backed down and went
inside
Catalino's house to inform Catalino that he was leaving. As Percival
stepped
out of the house, Virgilio suddenly, without provocation, punched him
on
the left eye, blurring his vision. Instead of retaliating, Percival
retreated
to the house. But Virgilio followed him and boxed him. Percival managed
to evade the blows. His back to the wall and fearing for his life, he
picked
up an open fan knife idly lying on top of the kitchen table and stabbed
Virgilio once with it. Despite his wound, Virgilio still wrestled with
him until they got separated and went there opposite ways. He rushed to
the office of the barangay captain to whom he surrendered.[25]
On August 19, 1986, Dr. Irene Ella treated his contusion on the left
eye,
for which the latter issued a medical certificate.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Verdict of
the
Trial Court
On December 14, 1999,
the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing premises, we find the accused PERCIVAL GONZA Y
BORRAL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER defined and penalized
in
Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7659, and hereby sentences him to a single indivisible penalty of
RECLUSION
PERPETUA (in
accordance with par. 3, Art. 63, R.P.C.
there being a mitigating circumstance of VOLUNTARY SURRENDER with no
aggravating
circumstance with all the accessory penalties attendant thereto, and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Virgilio Mortega, as follows:
a)
P50,000.00
for actual damages;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
b) P50,000.00 for
compensatory
damages by reason of his death; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
c) another
P50,000.00
by way of moral damages, with no subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency,
and to pay the costs. The number of days, months, or years of
confinement
of the herein accused shall be credited in his favor for purposes of
the
execution of the sentence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[27]
In his brief, Percival,
now the appellant, asserts that:
I
THE COURT A QUO
COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RELIED SOLELY ON THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES'
ACCOUNT
OF THE INCIDENT AND DISREGARDED COMPLETELY THE TESTIMONY OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
THAT HE MERELY ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE. II
GRANTING ARGUENDO
THAT
THERE WAS NO COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE, THE COURT A QUO STILL ERRED IN
FINDING
THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MURDER INSTEAD OF THE LESSER OFFENSE OF HOMICIDE.[28]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellant insists
that
he acted in self-defense. He asserts that it was the victim who started
the fight. He faults the trial court for giving full probative weight
and
credence to the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Catalino
Mortega
and Edina Dimaano, despite their implausibility and unreliability. He
points
out that Catalino and Edina only testified on the actual killing, and
that
nothing was said regarding events prior thereto, which would show that
it was the victim who was in fact the unlawful aggressor.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The contention of the
appellant is barren of merit.cralaw:red
Where an accused invokes
self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove that he
killed the victim to save his life. For this reason, he must rely on
his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
prosecution,
for such can no longer be disbelieved after the accused admits the
killing.[29]
He must prove with clear and convincing evidence the presence of all
the
requisites of self-defense, namely, (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent
or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.[30]
Of these requisites, the most decisive is that the victim was guilty of
unlawful aggression. This is because the theory of self-defense is
based
on the necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or
repel the aggression. Hence, absent evidence of a prior unlawful and
unprovoked
attack by the victim, the claim of self-defense whether complete or
incomplete
cannot prosper.[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To meet this burden,
the appellant offered his testimony as well as a medical certificate[32]
stating that he suffered contusions on the night of the incident. These
pieces of evidence, however, are not enough.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
First. The
appellant failed to corroborate his claim of self-defense with evidence
other than his own testimony, despite the fact that there were other
persons
in the locus criminis when the stabbing incident happened and who,
therefore,
may have witnessed the same. In People v. Calabroso,[33]
we said that self-defense to be successfully invoked must be
established
with certainty and proved with sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part
of
the person invoking it. It may not be justifiably entertained when it
is
uncorroborated by separate competent evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Second.
The appellant's bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over
the
positive identification of the appellant as the malefactor made by the
two principal witnesses of the prosecution, Edina Dimaano and Catalino
Mortega, the appellant's brother-in-law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Edina testified,
thus:
PROS. PURA
Q How many times
did
the accused stab Virgilio Mortega?
A Six (6) times.
Q Did you see
Virgilio
Mortega hit?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Would you
please describe
to us what kind of weapon was used by the accused in stabbing Virgilio
Mortega?
A Yes, it was a
knife
with green handle.[34]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q And what were
the
victim going when he was stabbed by the accused, if you know?
A The victim was
trying
to go out because Percival Gonza was going home, and the victim wanted
to accompany him home. And as he went out, Percival Gonza stabbed him.
He was following Percival, when Percival Gonza faced him and stabbed
him.[35]
Her testimony
was corroborated
by her brother, Catalino, thus:
Q So, what
happened
after that?
A Afterwards, I
just
saw the victim back into my house and I saw the accused following him
with
a knife.[36]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q What did
Percival
Gonza do with that bladed instrument?
A He stabbed the
victim.
Q How many times
did
you see Percival Gonza stabbed the victim Virgilio Mortega?
A I just saw
three times.
Q What happened
to Virgilio
Mortega?
A He fell down
then.[37]
There is no evidence
to
indicate that Catalino Mortega, the brother-in-law of the appellant,
and
Edina Dimaano, Catalino's sister, were moved by improper motives to
prevaricate
against the appellant. Hence, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses
are entitled to full faith and credit.
The rule is
settled
that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great respect,
since
the trial court is in a much better position than an appellate court to
properly evaluate the evidence and observe directly the witnesses'
deportment
and manner of testifying.[38]
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses
and there is no reason to depart therefrom.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Third.
The mere fact that the appellant suffered an injury does not prove his
claim of self-defense. The mere exhibition of scars by the accused does
not meet the required quantum of proof of unlawful aggression by his
Victim.[39]
Furthermore, the appellant submitted himself for examination three days
after the incident, which engenders doubt as to how and when he
suffered
his alleged injuries.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lastly,
and more importantly, the physical evidence, namely the multiple stab
wounds
sustained by Virgilio Mortega, belies the appellant's testimony that he
stabbed the victim only once. The victim was stabbed five times.
Indeed,
the sheer number of wounds alone on vital parts of the body of the
victim
totally negates the appellant's pretensions at self-defense and, in
fact,
indicates a determined effort on his part to kill and not just defend
himself.[40]
Intent to kill may be deduced from the nature of the wound inflicted
and
the kind of weapon used.[41]
In this case, the appellant was armed with a fan knife.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court is likewise
unconvinced
that just because the victim was drunk at the time of the incident, it
follows that he was the unlawful aggressor. To be regarded as the
unlawful
aggressor, the victim should have manifested an external act clearly
evincing
his intent to cause and commit harm to others. In this case, the
testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses belied any act of aggression on the part
of
the victim. As was pellucidly established at the time of the incident,
the victim was unarmed and was on his way home when the appellant
attacked
and killed him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Crime
Committed
by the Appellant
On the second assignment
of error, the appellant asserts that if found guilty, he should only be
made liable for the crime of homicide and not for murder. He claims
that
the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the qualifying
circumstance
of treachery.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We agree.chanrobles virtual law library
Treachery is not presumed.
The circumstances surrounding the murder must be proved as indubitably
as the crime itself.[42]
The rationale of the principle was explained by the Court in People v.
Ilo,[43]
thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is an
ancient
but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstance
before
being taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree
of the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and
clearness
as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as a
criminal
offense. It is not only the central fact of a killing that must be
shown
beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying and aggravating circumstance
alleged to have been present and to have attended such killing, must
similarly
be shown by the same degree of proof.[44]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense
which the offended party might make.[45]
Two conditions must then concur for treachery to be present, viz.: (1)
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the said means
of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.[46]
The Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated if the assailant
did
not make any preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to
insure
the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the victim to
defend
himself. The prosecution must prove that the killing was premeditated
or
that the assailant chose a method of attack directly and specially to
facilitate
and insure the killing without danger to himself.[47]
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning,
done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution affording the
hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.[48]
To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the offender made
some
preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the
execution
of the crime or to make it impossible or difficult for the person
attacked
to defend himself.[49]
The mode of attack must be planned by the offender and must not spring
from the unexpected turn of events.[50]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On this aspect, the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden. The trial court merely
relied
on the suddenness of the attack on the unarmed victim to justify
treachery.
As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from
behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was deliberately adopted by
him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either
fight
or retreat.[51]
As intimated above, the rule does not apply, however, where the attack
was not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but was triggered by the
sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the victim's
provocative
act. Here, the evidence negates the hypothesis that the appellant
reflected
on the means, method and form of killing the victim. Although the
prosecution's
principal witnesses testified that they actually witnessed the
stabbing,
their testimonies offer no sufficient basis for reasonably inferring
that
treachery attended the commission of the crime. The evidence on record
does not adequately show the manner in which the attack was carried
out.
Edina said that she saw the appellant suddenly stab the victim when the
latter tried to accompany the former as he went out of the kapihan.
Catalino,
on the other hand, only witnessed the events that happened inside the
kapihan.
At this juncture, the aggression was already half underway. Clearly,
Catalino
did not see the commencement of the assault, and there was no way for
him
and Edina to know whether the appellant was able to deliberately adopt
a sudden and unexpected method of attack which deprived the victim of
an
opportunity to defend himself.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Indeed, the gap in the
prosecution's evidence cannot be substituted by mere suppositions, as
what
the trial court did. Again, while the stabbing was sudden and
unexpected
and gave the victim no opportunity to undertake any form of defense or
evasion, this does not necessarily justify a finding of treachery,
absent
any evidence that this mode of assault was consciously and deliberately
adopted to insure the execution of the crime without risk to the
appellant.cralaw:red
Apropos is our ruling
in the case of People v. Guzman,[52]
thus:
It does not
always follow that because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is
tainted
with treachery. Significantly, in treachery, the mode of attack must be
consciously adopted. This means that the accused must make some
preparation
to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the execution of the
crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to
defend
himself or to retaliate. The mode of attack, therefore, must be planned
by the offender, and must not spring from the unexpected turn of
events.
In the case at bar, there is reasonable doubt that the appellant
deliberately
and consciously adopted a mode of attack to kill the victim without
risk
to himself considering that both the appellant and the victim were then
attending a wedding party, and it was the victim who frontally
approached
the appellant who at that time was watching the dance, and asked if
they
could talk outside the dance area. The appellant answered that they
could
talk right then and there, after which the appellant stabbed the
victim,
hitting him on the left chest. It appears that the decision of the
appellant
to stab the victim was sudden. The suddenness of an attack, does not,
of
itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose
was
to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the
victim's
helpless position was accidental. Considering the rule that treachery
cannot
be inferred but must be proven as fully and convincingly as the crime
itself,
any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of
the accused-appellant.
Accordingly, the
crime
at bar should only be considered homicide. The penalty for homicide
under
Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. In view of the presence of one
mitigating
circumstance, i.e., voluntary surrender, the maximum of the
indeterminate
penalty should be taken from the minimum period of reclusion temporal,
pursuant to Article 64(2) of the aforesaid Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Conformably, the
appellant
is hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of eight (8) years of
prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion
temporal, as maximum.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Civil
Liabilities
of the Appellant
The trial court correctly
awarded to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000
which needs no proof other than the death of the victim.[53]
The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is likewise
sustained,
pursuant to controlling case law.[54]
However, the Court cannot sustain the award of actual damages in the
amount
of P50,000 considering that only the amount of P7,450 was properly
receipted.
Nevertheless, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.[55]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, the trial court
was correct in not awarding damages for lost earnings. The prosecution
merely relied on Zenaida Mortega's self-serving statement, that her
husband
was earning P5,000 per month as a farmhand. Compensation for lost
income
is in the nature of damages and requires due proof of the amount of the
damage suffered. For loss of income due to death, there must be
unbiased
proof of the deceased's average income. Also, the award for lost income
refers to the net income of the deceased, that is, his total income
less
average expenses. In this case, Zenaida merely gave a self-serving
testimony
of her husband's income. No proof of the victim's expenses was adduced;
thus, there can be no reliable estimate of his lost income.[56]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, Branch 65, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Percival Gonza is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable
doubt of the felony of homicide, defined and penalized by Article 249
of
the Revised Penal Code, and hereby metes on the said appellant an
indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The
appellant
is directed to pay to the heirs of Virgilio Mortega, the amount of
P50,000
as civil indemnity; the amount of P50,000 as moral damages; and the
amount
of P25,000 as temperate damages. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bellosillo,
Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ.,
concur. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Judge Adolfo G. Fajardo.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Records, p. 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Id. at 35.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
The prosecution presented four witnesses: Edina Dimaano, Dr. Irene
Ella,
Catalino Mortega, and Zenaida Mortega.
[5]
TSN, 29 April 1996, pp. 3–4 (Edina Dimaano).
[6]
TSN, 11 August 1997, p. 5 (Catalino Mortega).
[7]
Id. at 4–5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id. at 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
TSN, 29 April 1996, p. 25 (Edina Dimaano).
[10]
TSN, 11 August 1997, p. 5 (Catalino Mortega).
[11]
Id. at 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
TSN, 29 April 1996, p. 8 (Edina Dimaano).
[13]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
TSN, 11 August 1997, pp. 6–7 (Catalino Mortega).
[15]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id. at 8–9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Records, p. 13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
TSN, 24 June 1997, p. 13 (Dr. Irene Ella).
[19]
Id. at 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Id. at 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Id. at 12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Records, pp. 11–12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
TSN, 23 March 1998, pp. 8–15 (Zenaida Mortega).
[24]
The defense presented as its lone witness the appellant.
[25]
TSN, 22 June 1998, pp. 3–9 (Percival Gonza).
[26]
Exhibits "I" and "I-B."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Records, pp. 122–123.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Rollo, p. 61.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
People v. Gadia, 365 SCRA 557 (2001).
[30]
People v. Zate, 366 SCRA 721 (2001).
[31]
People v. Herrera, 371 SCRA 480 (2001).
[32]
Records, p. 101.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
340 SCRA 332 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
TSN, 29 April 1997, p. 6 (Edina Dimaano).
[35]
Id. at 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
TSN, 11 August 1997, p. 6 (Catalino Mortega).
[37]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
People v. Damitan, 371 SCRA 629 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
People v. Mier, 324 SCRA 628 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
People v. Baniel, 275 SCRA 472 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
People v. Bayod, 351 SCRA 162 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
People v. Geral, 333 SCRA 453 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
G.R. No. 140731, November 21, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Id. at 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
Article 14(6), Revised Penal Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
People v. De Mesa, 354 SCRA 397 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
People v. Bautista, 254 SCRA 621 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[48]
People v. Galano, 327 SCRA 462 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
People v. Albao, 327 SCRA 123 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[50]
People v. Ereño, 326 SCRA 157 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[51]
People v. Tavas, 303 SCRA 86 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[52]
372 SCRA 344 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[53]
People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[54]
People v. Casitas, Jr., G.R. No. 137404, February 14, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[55]
People v. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, February 7, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[56]
People v. Esponilla, G.R. No. 122766, June 20, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |