FIRST DIVISION
LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
140160
January 13, 2004
-versus-
FELICIANO F.
WYCOCO,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
FELICIANO F.
WYCOCO,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
146733
January 13, 2004
-versus-
THE HONORABLE
RODRIGO
S. CASPILLO,
PAIRING JUDGE
OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,THIRD JUDICIAL
REGION,
BRANCH 23, CABANATUAN CITYAND THE DEPARTMENT
OF
AGRARIAN REFORM,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before the Court are consolidated
petitions, the first seeking the review of the February 9, 1999 Decision[1]
and the September 22, 1999 Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 39913, which modified the
Decision[3]
of Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, acting as a
Special
Agrarian Court in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF); and the second for
mandamus
to compel the said trial court to issue a writ of execution and to
direct
Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo to inhibit himself from Agrarian Case No. 91
(AF).
The undisputed antecedents
show that Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690
hectare
unirrigated and untenanted rice land, covered by Transfer Certificate
of
Title No. NT-206422 and situated in the Sitios of Ablang, Saguingan and
Pinamunghilan, Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija.[4]
In line with the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government, Wycoco voluntarily
offered
to sell the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9
million.[5]
In November 1991, after the DAR’s evaluation of the application and the
determination of the just compensation by the Land Bank of the
Philippines
(LBP), a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the
property
for P1,342,667.46[6]
was sent to Wycoco. The amount offered was later raised to
P2,594,045.39
and, upon review, was modified to P2,280,159.82.[7]
The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river
and
road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to
indorse
the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB)
for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary
administrative
proceeding.[8]
The case was docketed as DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE 93. Thereafter, the
DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and
deposited
the compensation offered by DAR.[9]
In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.cralaw:red
On March 29, 1993, DARAB
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda or position
papers
in support of their claim.[10]
Wycoco, however, decided to forego with the filing of the required
pleadings,
and instead filed on April 13, 1993, the instant case for determination
of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 23, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF).[11]
Impleaded as party-defendants therein were DAR and LBP.cralaw:red
On April 30, 1993, Wycoco
filed a manifestation in VOS Case No. 232 NE 93, informing the DARAB of
the pendency of Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) with the Cabanatuan court,
acting
as a special agrarian court.[12]
On March 9, 1994, the DARAB issued an order dismissing the case to give
way to the determination of just compensation by the Cabanatuan court.
Pertinent portion thereof states:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Admittedly, this Forum
is vested with the jurisdiction to conduct administrative proceeding to
determine compensation. [H]owever, a thorough perusal of petitioner’s
complaint
showed that he did not only raise the issue of valuation but such other
matters which are beyond the competence of the Board. Besides, the
petitioner
has the option to avail the administrative remedies or bring the matter
on just compensation to the Special Agrarian Court for final
determination.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, this case is hereby dismissed.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[13]
Meanwhile, DAR and LBP
filed their respective answers before the special agrarian court in
Agrarian
Case No. 91 (AF), contending that the valuation of Wycoco’s property
was
in accordance with law and that the latter failed to exhaust
administrative
remedies by not participating in the summary administrative proceedings
before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over determination of
land
valuation.[14]
After conducting a pre-trial
on October 3, 1994, the trial court issued a pre-trial order as follows:
The parties manifested
that there is no possibility of amicable settlement, neither are they
willing
to admit or stipulate on facts, except those contained in the pleadings.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The only issue left
is for the determination of just compensation or correct valuation of
the
land owned by the plaintiff subject of this case.cralaw:red
The parties then prayed
to terminate the pre-trial conference.cralaw:red
AS PRAYED FOR, the pre-trial
conference is considered terminated, and instead of trial, the parties
are allowed to submit their respective memoranda.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the parties
are given twenty (20) days from today within which to file their
simultaneous
memoranda, and another ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file their
Reply/Rejoinder, if any, and thereafter, this case shall be deemed
submitted
for decision.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[15]
The evidence presented
by Wycoco in support of his claim were the following: (1) Transfer
Certificate
of Title No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Land Valuation dated June 18,
1992;
and (3) letter dated July 10, 1992 rejecting the counter-offer of LBP
and
DAR.[16]
On the other hand, DAR and LBP presented the Land Valuation Worksheets.[17]
On November 14, 1995,
the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that
there
is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation
inasmuch
as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of
agricultural
lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per
hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the
compensation
for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a
total
of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized
profits plus legal interest. The dispositive portion thereof states:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendants
to pay the amount of P13,419,082.00 to plaintiff as just compensation
for
the property acquired;
2. Ordering the defendants
to pay plaintiff the amount of P29,663,235.00 representing the
unrealized
profits from the time of acquisition of the subject property and the
sum
of P8,475,210.00 for every calendar year, until the amount of
compensation
is fully paid including legal interest which had accrued thereon.cralaw:red
No pronouncement as
to costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[18]
The DAR and the LBP
filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals. The petition
brought
by DAR on jurisdictional and procedural issues, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
SP No. 39234, was dismissed on May 29, 1997.[19]
The dismissal became final and executory on June 26, 1997.[20]
This prompted Wycoco to file a petition for mandamus before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 146733, praying that the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF)
be executed, and that Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo, the now presiding
Judge
of said court, be compelled to inhibit himself from hearing the case.cralaw:red
The petition brought
by LBP on both substantive and procedural grounds, docketed as CA-G.R.
No. SP No. 39913, was likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals on
February
9, 1999.[21]
On September 22, 1999, however, the Court of Appeals modified its
decision
by deducting from the compensation due Wycoco the amount corresponding
to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the 94.1690 hectare land which was
found
to have been previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic, thus –
WHEREFORE, and conformably
with the above, Our decision of February 9, 1999 is hereby MODIFIED in
the sense that the value corresponding to the aforesaid 3.3672 hectares
and all the awards appertaining thereto in the decision a quo are
ordered
deducted from the totality of the awards granted to the private
respondent.
In all other respects, the decision sought to be reconsidered is hereby
RE-AFFIRMED and REITERATED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[22]
In its petition, LBP
contended that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ACTING AS A SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT MAY ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER
AGRARIAN
CASE NO. 91 (AF) AND RENDER JUDGMENT THEREON WITHOUT AN INITIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BY THE DARAB PURSUANT TO SECTION 16
OF RA 6657, OVER THE TIMELY OBJECTION OF THE PETITIONER, AND IN
VIOLATION
OF THE RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND ON FORUM
SHOPPING;
II
THAT THE JUST
COMPENSATION
DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE,
WHEN
IT WAS BASED ONLY ON JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE PREVAILING MARKET VALUE OF
LAND BASED ON THE ALLEGED PRICE OF TRANSFER OF TENURAL RIGHTS, TAKEN
WITHOUT
NOTICE AND HEARING IN VIOLATION OF RULE 129 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT
CAN REQUIRE THE PETITIONER TO COMPENSATE THE PORTIONS OF RESPONDENT’S
PROPERTY
WHICH WERE NOT DECLARED BY THE DAR FOR ACQUISITION, NOR SUITABLE FOR
AGRICULTURE
NOR CAPABLE OF DISTRIBUTION TO FARMER BENEFICIARIES UNDER THE CARP;
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT
CAN AWARD AS PART OF JUST COMPENSATION LEGAL INTEREST ON THE PRINCIPAL
AND ALLEGED UNREALIZED PROFITS OF P29,663,235.00 FROM THE TIME OF
ACQUISITION
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND P8,475,210.00 FOR EVERY CALENDAR YEAR
THEREAFTER,
CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND THAT THE RESPONDENT
RETAINED
THE TITLE TO HIS PROPERTY DESPITE THE DAR’S NOTICE OF ACQUISITION;
V
THAT THE TRIAL COURT
HAD VALIDLY GRANTED EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL ON THE ALLEGEDLY GOOD
REASON
OF THE PETITIONER’S ADVANCED AGE AND WEAK HEALTH, CONTRARY TO THE
APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSIDERING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT DESTITUTE.[23]
The issues for resolution
are as follows: (1) Did the Regional Trial Court, acting as Special
Agrarian
Court, validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant case for
determination
of just compensation? (2) Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, was
the
compensation arrived at supported by evidence? (3) Can Wycoco compel
the
DAR to purchase the entire land subject of the voluntary offer to sell?
(4) Were the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits
valid?
Anent the issue of jurisdiction,
the laws in point are Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) which, in pertinent part, provide:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 50. Quasi-judicial
Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR)….cralaw:red
Section 57. Special
Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and
exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation
to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this
Act.cralaw:red
The Special Agrarian
Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.cralaw:red
In Republic v. Court
of Appeals,[24]
it was held that Special Agrarian Courts are given original and
exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions
for
the determination of just compensation; and (2) the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. Section 50 must be construed in
harmony with Section 57 by considering cases involving the
determination
of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657
as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred to the DAR. Indeed,
there
is a reason for this distinction. The DAR, as an administrative agency,
cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over
criminal
cases. The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a
judicial
function which is vested with the Special Agrarian Courts and cannot be
lodged with administrative agencies.[25]
In fact, Rule XIII, Section 11 of the New Rules of Procedure of the
DARAB
acknowledges this power of the court, thus –
Section 11. Land Valuation
and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The
decision
of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and
payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but
shall
be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice
thereof.
Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
(Emphasis
supplied)
Under Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 405, Series of 1990, the Land Bank of the Philippines is
charged
with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands
placed
under land reform and the just compensation to be paid for their taking.[26]
Through a notice of voluntary offer to sell (VOS) submitted by the
landowner,
accompanied by the required documents, the DAR evaluates the
application
and determines the land’s suitability for agriculture. The LBP likewise
reviews the application and the supporting documents and determines the
valuation of the land. Thereafter, the DAR issues the Notice of Land
Valuation
to the landowner. In both voluntary and compulsory acquisition, where
the
landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of
the
landowner and conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the
landowner
disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the Regional
Trial Court acting as a special agrarian court. This in essence is the
procedure for the determination of just compensation.[27]
In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[28]
the landowner filed an action for determination of just compensation
without
waiting for the completion of DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land. This,
notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial court properly acquired
jurisdiction because of its exclusive and original jurisdiction over
determination
of just compensation, thus –
…It is clear from Sec.
57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction
of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative
officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC
an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus,
although
the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators
to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec.
57
that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is
in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators
and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate
jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void.
Thus, direct resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private
respondent
is valid. (Emphasis supplied)[29]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco’s
complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be stressed
that
although no summary administrative proceeding was held before the
DARAB,
LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining the
value of Wycoco’s land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of
1990.
What is more, DAR and LBP’s conformity to the pre-trial order which
limited
the issue only to the determination of just compensation estopped them
from questioning the jurisdiction of the special agrarian court. The
pre-trial
order limited the issues to those not disposed of by admission or
agreements;
and the entry thereof controlled the subsequent course of action.[30]
Besides, the issue of
whether Wycoco violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies
was rendered moot and academic in view of the DARAB’s dismissal[31]
of the administrative case to give way to and in recognition of the
court’s
power to determine just compensation.[32]
In arriving at the valuation
of Wycoco’s land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged
prevailing
market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without
apprising
the parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Section
3,
Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 3. Judicial Notice,
When
Hearing Necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial
notice
of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.cralaw:red
After trial and before
judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on
request
of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties
to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in
the
case.cralaw:red
Inasmuch as the valuation
of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the
trial
court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon
instead
of practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market value
may
be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot
be
arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be
appreciated
in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of
acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape,
location,
as well as the tax declarations thereon.[33]
Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for
determination
of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is
to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case
involves
a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists;
and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved
in
the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact
is
merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed
with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is
because
the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be
disputed.
But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge
of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action.[34]
Anent the third issue,
the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily
offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of land may
come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
is
essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages by the
DAR’s non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the
entire
land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no
justification
to compel DAR to acquire the whole area.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We find Wycoco’s claim
for payment of interest partly meritorious. In Land Bank of the
Philippines
v. Court of Appeals,[35]
this Court struck down as void DAR Administrative Circular No. 9,
Series
of 1990, which provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of
the
deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16 (e) of RA 6657.cralaw:red
"It is very explicit
…from [Section 16 (e)] that the deposit must be made only in ‘cash’ or
in ‘LBP bonds.’ Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to
include
a ‘trust account’ among the valid modes of deposit, that should have
been
made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from
which it can be fairly deduced that a ‘trust account’ is allowed. In
sum,
there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an
expanded
construction of the term ‘deposit.’
x x
x
x x x x x x
"In the present suit,
the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its powers to enact rules and
regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no
basis
in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner
as
compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section
16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in
‘cash’ or in ‘LBP bonds.’ In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke
LRA
Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations
can
not outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore
did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9
for being null and void."[36]
Pursuant to the forgoing
decision, DAR issued Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1996,
converting
trust accounts in the name of landowners into deposit accounts. The
transitory
provision thereof states –
VI. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
All trust accounts issued
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 1, S. 1993 covering landholdings
not
yet transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines as of
July
5, 1996 shall immediately be converted to deposit accounts in the name
of the landowners concerned.cralaw:red
All Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officers and Regional Directors are directed to immediately
inventory
the claim folders referred to in the preceding paragraph, wherever they
may be found and request the LBP to establish the requisite deposit
under
this Administrative Order and to issue a new certification to that
effect.
The Original Certificate of Trust Deposit previously issued should be
attached
to the request of the DAR in order that the same may be replaced with a
new one.cralaw:red
All previously established
Trust Deposits which served as the basis for the transfer of the
landowner’s
title to the Republic of the Philippines shall likewise be converted to
deposits in cash and in bonds. The Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution
shall coordinate with the LBP for this purpose.cralaw:red
In light of the foregoing,
the trust account opened by LBP in the name of Wycoco as the mode of
payment
of just compensation should be converted to a deposit account. Such
conversion
should be retroactive in application in order to rectify the error
committed
by the DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the
benefits
concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds prior to the ruling of the
Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals. Otherwise,
petitioner’s
right to payment of just and valid compensation for the expropriation
of
his property would be violated.[37]
The interest earnings accruing on the deposit account of landowners
would
suffice to compensate them pending payment of just compensation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In some expropriation
cases, the Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum on the just
compensation
due the landowner. It must be stressed, however, that in these cases,
the
imposition of interest was in the nature of damages for delay in
payment
which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one
of forbearance.[38]
It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied
where
there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Conversely,
where
there was delay in tendering a valid payment of just compensation,
imposition
of interest is in order. This is because the replacement of the trust
account
with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of
compensation;
for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by
lack
of due process.[39]
Accordingly, the just
compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the
time
LBP opened a trust account in his name up to the time said account was
actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts. The basis
of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that would be
determined
by the Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the instant case. In the
same
vein, the amount determined by the Special Agrarian Court would also be
the basis of the interest income on the cash and bond deposits due
Wycoco
from the time of the taking of the property up to the time of actual
payment
of just compensation.cralaw:red
The award of actual
damages for unrealized profits should be deleted. The amount of loss
must
not only be capable of proof, but must be proven with a reasonable
degree
of certainty. The claim must be premised upon competent proof or upon
the
best evidence obtainable, such as receipts or other documentary proof.[40]
None having been presented in the instant case, the claim for
unrealized
profits cannot be granted.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
From the foregoing discussion,
it is clear that Wycoco’s petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733
should
be dismissed. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City,
Branch 23, acting as Special Agrarian Court in Agrarian Case No. 91
(AF),
cannot be enforced because there is a need to remand the case to the
trial
court for determination of just compensation. Likewise, the prayer for
the inhibition of Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo in Agrarian Case No. 91
(AF)
is denied for lack of basis.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, in view of
all the foregoing, the petition in G.R. No. 140160 is PARTIALLY
GRANTED.
Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan
City, Branch 23, for the determination of just compensation. The
petition
for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 is dismissed.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by
Associate
Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Teodoro P. Regino. (Rollo of G.R.
No. 140160, p. 9.)
[2]
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura. (Rollo of G.R. No. 140160,
p.
149.)
[4]
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 258.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id., p. 113.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id., p. 132; Complaint, p. 125.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
LBP’s petition for review before the Court of Appeals, CA Rollo, p. 12;
Land Valuation Worksheet, pp. 71-79.
[8]
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 123.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
CA Rollo, p. 80.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 123.
[11]
Id., p. 124.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
CA Rollo, p. 91.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 140.
[14]
Decision, CA Rollo, p. 40.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 148.
[16]
CA Rollo, pp. 88-90.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Id., p. 71-79.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Id., p. 46.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Rollo of G.R. No. 146733, p. 37; The Decision was penned by Associate
Justice
B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz, and concurred in by Associate Justices Gloria
C. Paras and Ricardo P. Galvez.
[20]
Rollo of G.R. No. 146733, p. 38.
[21]
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 9.
[22]
Id., p. 8.
[23]
Id., pp. 49-50.
[24]
331 Phil. 1071 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Id., p. 1075, citing EPZA v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603, 4 April 1987, 149
SCRA 305; Sumulong v. Guerrero, G.R. No. L- 48685, 30 September 1987,
154
SCRA 461.
[26]
Escano, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 20, 27 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 (Amended DAR Administrative
Order Nos. 12, 14 & 17, Series of 1989)
Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was further amended by DAR A.O. No. 5,
Series
of 1992; DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993; DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of
1996;
and DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1998.
[28]
376 Phil. 252 (1999).
[29]
Id., pp. 262-263.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Rule 18, Section 7, 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure; Caltex Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97753, 10 August 1992, 212 SCRA 448, 462.
[31]
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 140.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Medalla
Jr. v. Sayo, 191 Phil. 170 (1981).
[33]
B. H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89980, 14
December
1992, 216 SCRA 584, 587.
[34]
State Prosecutor v. Judge Muro, A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, 19 September 1994,
236 SCRA 505, 521-522.
[35]
319 Phil. 246 (1995). The Resolution denying LBP and DAR’s motion for
reconsideration
was promulgated on July 5, 1996 (327 Phil. 1084).
[36]
Id., pp. 257-258.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 9.
[38]
Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, 20 January 2003,
citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, 2 July 2002, 383
SCRA 611.
[39]
Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 727, 756 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
Magat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124221, 4 August 2000, 337
SCRA
298, 308. |