EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R.
Nos.
140546-47
January 20, 2003 -versus-
MODESTO TEE
a.k.a.
ESTOY TEE,
Accused-Appellant.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
For automatic review
is the consolidated judgment[1]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated
September
17, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, involving
violations
of Section 8, Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs Law.[2]
Since appellant was acquitted in the second case, we focus on the first
case, where appellant has been found guilty and sentenced to death and
fined one million pesos.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The decretal portion
of the trial court’s decision reads: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered, as follows: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. In Crim. Case No.
15800-R, the Court finds the accused Modesto Tee guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of the offense of illegal possession of marijuana of about 591.81
kilos in violation of Section 8, Article II of RA 6425 as amended by
Section
13 of RA 7659 as charged in the Information, seized by virtue of a
search
warrant and sentences him to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a
fine of 1 million pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The 591.81 kilos of
marijuana contained in 26 boxes and one yellow sack (Exhibits U-1 to
U-27)
are ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately
in accordance with law. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. In Crim. Case No.
15822-R, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt
of accused Modesto Tee beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him
of
the charge of illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section
8,
Art. 2 of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged in the
Information since the marijuana confiscated have to be excluded in
evidence
as a product of unreasonable search and seizure. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The 336.93 kilos of
marijuana contained in 13 sacks and four boxes (Exh. B to S and their
component
parts) although excluded in evidence as the product(s) of unreasonable
search and seizure, are nevertheless ordered forfeited in favor of the
State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law considering
that
they are prohibited articles.cralaw:red
The City Jail Warden
is, therefore, directed to release the accused Modesto Tee in
connection
with Crim. Case No. 15822-R unless held on other charges.cralaw:red
COST(S) DE OFFICIO.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant is a Chinese
national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City.
A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at
premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded
huge
quantities of marijuana.cralaw:red
On July 20, 1998, appellant
moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general
and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the
issuance
of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did
not
stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an
information
dated July 24, 1998, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15800-R, the City
Prosecutor
of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias "Estoy Tee," with illegal
possession
of marijuana, allegedly committed as follows: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That on or about the
1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his
possession the following, to wit: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks
of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. One hundred fifty-eight
(158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of
dried
flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a
total
weight of 336.93 kilograms; and chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3 Six hundred two (602)
bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six
(boxes)
and a yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms, all having a grand total
weight of 928.74 kilograms, a prohibited drug, without the authority of
law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On August 7, 1998, the
prosecution moved to "amend" the foregoing charge sheet "considering
that
subject marijuana were seized in two (2) different places."[5]
As a result, the information
in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was amended to read as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That on or about the
1st day of July, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his
possession the following, to wit: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
- Six hundred two (602)
bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (26)
boxes and a yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms a prohibited drug,
without
the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited
provision
of law. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
A separate amended information
docketed as Criminal Case No. 15822-R was likewise filed, the
accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the
1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his
possession the following, to wit: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks
of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. hundred fifty-eight
(158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of
dried
flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a
total
weight of 336.93 kilograms; chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a prohibited drug, without
the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited
provision
of law.cralaw:red
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
On September 4, 1998,
the trial court denied the motion to quash the search warrant and
ordered
appellant’s arraignment. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When arraigned in Criminal
Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, appellant refused to enter a plea. The
trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him.[8]
Trial on the merits then ensued. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts of this case,
as gleaned from the records, are as follows: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Prosecution witness
Danilo Abratique, a Baguio-based taxi driver, and the appellant Modesto
Tee are well acquainted with each other, since Abratique’s wife is the
sister of Tee’s sister-in-law.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sometime in late June
1998, appellant asked Abratique to find him a place for the storage of
smuggled cigarettes.[10]
Abratique brought appellant to his friend, Albert Ballesteros, who had
a house for rent in Bakakeng, Baguio City. After negotiating the terms
and conditions, Ballesteros agreed to rent out his place to appellant.
Appellant then brought several boxes of purported "blue seal"
cigarettes
to the leased premises. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Shortly thereafter,
however, Ballesteros learned that the boxes stored in his place were
not
"blue seal" cigarettes but marijuana. Fearful of being involved,
Ballesteros
informed Abratique. Both later prevailed upon appellant to remove them
from the premises.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant then hired
Abratique’s taxi and transported the boxes of cannabis from the
Ballesteros
place to appellant’s residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto.
Tomas,
Baguio City.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On June 30, 1998, appellant
hired Abratique to drive him to La Trinidad, Benguet on the pretext of
buying and transporting strawberries. Upon reaching La Trinidad,
however,
appellant directed Abratique to proceed to Sablan, Benguet, where
appellant
proceeded to load several sacks of marijuana in Abratique’s taxi. He
then
asked Abratique to find him a place where he could store the contraband.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Abratique brought appellant
to his grandmother’s house at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St., QM
Subdivision,
Baguio City, which was being managed by Abratique’s aunt, Nazarea
Abreau.
Nazarea agreed to rent a room to appellant. Abratique and
appellant
unloaded and stored there the sacks of marijuana brought from Sablan.[14]
Abratique was aware that they were transporting marijuana as some of
the
articles in the sacks became exposed in the process of loading.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Eventually, Abratique
and Nazarea were bothered by the nature of the goods stored in the
rented
room. She confided to her daughter, Alice Abreau Fianza, about their
predicament.
As Alice Fianza’s brother-in-law, Edwin Fianza, was an NBI agent, Alice
and Abratique phoned him and disclosed what had transpired.[16]
On the morning of July
1, 1998, alerted by information that appellant would retrieve the sacks
of prohibited drugs that day, Edwin Fianza and other NBI operatives
conducted
a stake out at No. 27, Dr. Cariño St. While the NBI agents were
conducting their surveillance, they noticed that several PNP NARCOM
personnel
were also watching the place.[17]
The NBI then learned that the PNP NARCOM had received a tip from one of
their informers regarding the presence of a huge amount of drugs in
that
place. The NBI and PNP NARCOM agreed to have a joint operation. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As the day wore on and
appellant did not show up, the NBI agents became apprehensive that the
whole operation could be jeopardized. They sought the permission of
Nazarea
Abreau to enter the room rented by appellant. She acceded and allowed
them
entry. The NBI team then searched the rented premises and found four
(4)
boxes and thirteen (13) sacks of marijuana, totaling 336.93 kilograms.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Later that evening,
NBI Special Agent Darwin Lising, with Abratique as his witness, applied
for a search warrant from RTC Judge Antonio Reyes at his residence.[19]
Judge Reyes ordered the NBI agents to fetch the Branch Clerk of Court,
Atty. Delilah Muñoz, so the proceedings could be properly
recorded.
After Atty. Muñoz arrived, Judge Reyes questioned Lising and
Abratique.
Thereafter, the judge issued a warrant directing the NBI to search
appellant’s
residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Baguio City for marijuana.[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The NBI operatives,
with some PNP NARCOM personnel in tow, proceeded to appellant’s
residence
where they served the warrant upon appellant himself.[21]
The search was witnessed by appellant, members of his family, barangay
officials, and members of the media.[22]
Photographs were taken during the actual search.[23]
The law enforcers found 26 boxes and a sack of dried marijuana[24]
in the water tank, garage, and storeroom of appellant’s residence.[25]
The total weight of the haul was 591.81 kilograms.[26]
Appellant was arrested for illegal possession of marijuana. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The seized items were
then submitted to the NBI laboratory for testing. NBI Forensic Chemist
Maria Carina Madrigal conducted the tests. Detailed microscopic and
chromatographic
examinations of the items taken from appellant’s rented room at No. 27,
Dr. Cariño St., as well as those from his residence at Green
Valley,
showed these to be marijuana.[27]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his defense, appellant
contended that the physical evidence of the prosecution was illegally
obtained,
being the products of an unlawful search, hence inadmissible. Appellant
insisted that the search warrant was too general and the process by
which
said warrant was acquired did not satisfy the constitutional
requirements
for the issuance of a valid search warrant. Moreover, Abratique’s
testimony,
which was heavily relied upon by the judge who issued the warrant, was
hearsay. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Criminal Case No.
15822-R, the trial court agreed with appellant that the taking of the
336.93
kilograms of marijuana was the result of an illegal search and hence,
inadmissible
in evidence against appellant. Appellant was accordingly acquitted of
the
charge. However, the trial court found that the prosecution’s evidence
was more than ample to prove appellant’s guilt in Criminal Case No.
15800-R
and as earlier stated, duly convicted him of illegal possession of
marijuana
and sentenced him to death.cralaw:red
Hence, this automatic
review.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Before us, appellant
submits that the trial court erred in:
1. UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY
OF THE SEARCH WARRANT DESPITE LACK OF COMPLIANCE OF (sic) SEVERAL
REQUIREMENTS
BEFORE IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED AND IT BEING A GENERAL WARRANT;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN REOPENING THE CASE AND ALLOWING ABRITIQUE TO TESTIFY
AGAINST
APPELLANT;
3. GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF ABRITIQUE; chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED IN BOTH CASES AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH DESPITE THE ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE AS FOUND IN THE FIRST CASE.[28]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We find that the pertinent
issues for resolution concern the following: (1) the validity of the
search
conducted at the appellant’s residence; (2) the alleged prejudice
caused
by the reopening of the case and absences of the prosecution witness,
on
appellant’s right to speedy trial; (3) the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s
evidence to sustain a finding of guilt with moral certainty; and (4)
the
propriety of the penalty imposed. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. On the Validity of
the Search Warrant; Its Obtention and Execution chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant initially
contends that the warrant, which directed the peace officers to search
for and seize "an undetermined amount of marijuana," was too general
and
hence, void for vagueness. He insists that Abratique could already
estimate
the amount of marijuana supposed to be found at appellant’s residence
since
Abratique helped to transport the same. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For the appellee, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a search warrant is
issued if a judge finds probable cause that the place to be searched
contains
prohibited drugs, and not that he believes the place contains a
specific
amount of it. The OSG points out that, as the trial court observed, it
is impossible beforehand to determine the exact amount of prohibited
drugs
that a person has on himself. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant avers that
the phrase "an undetermined amount of marijuana" as used in the search
warrant fails to satisfy the requirement of Article III, Section 2[29]
of the Constitution that the things to be seized must be particularly
described.
Appellant’s contention, in our view, has no leg to stand on. The
constitutional
requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to
be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the
warrant
to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent
them
from seizing the wrong items;[30]
and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the
articles
to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.[31]
What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or
general
characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police
officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense.[32]
However, it is not required that technical precision of description be
required,[33]
particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description
must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical
description
would mean that no warrant could issue.[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, it has been held
that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so wanting in particularity
as to create a general warrant.[35]
Nor is the description "any and all narcotics" and "all implements,
paraphernalia,
articles, papers and records pertaining to" the use, possession, or
sale
of narcotics or dangerous drugs so broad as to be unconstitutional.[36]
A search warrant commanding peace officers to seize "a quantity of
loose
heroin" has been held sufficiently particular.[37]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Tested against the foregoing
precedents, the description "an undetermined amount of marijuana" must
be held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search
warrant.
Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is property of a
specified
character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its character
and the circumstances under which it would be found, said article is
illegal.
A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible,
except
as to such character, the place, and the circumstances.[38]
Thus, this Court has held that the description "illegally in possession
of undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalia" particularizes the
things
to be seized.[39]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The search warrant in
the present case, given its nearly similar wording, "undetermined
amount
of marijuana or Indian hemp," in our view, has satisfied the
Constitution’s
requirements on particularity of description. The description therein
is:
(1) as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2)
expresses
a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the peace officers may be
guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to
be
seized to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.[40]
Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be
seized
by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it prevents
exploratory
searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant next assails
the warrant for merely stating that he should be searched, as he could
be guilty of violation of Republic Act No. 6425. Appellant claims that
this is a sweeping statement as said statute lists a number of offenses
with respect to illegal drugs. Hence, he contends, said warrant is a
general
warrant and is thus unconstitutional.cralaw:red
For the appellee, the
OSG points out that the warrant clearly states that appellant has in
his
possession and control marijuana or Indian hemp, in violation of
Section
8 of Republic Act No. 6425. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We have carefully scrutinized
Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98),[41]
and we find that it is captioned "For Violation of R.A. 6425, as
amended."[42]
It is clearly stated in the body of the warrant that "there is probable
cause to believe that a case for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended,
otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A.
7659
has been and is being committed by one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of
Km. 6, Dontogan Bgy., Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City by having
in
his possession and control an UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA or
INDIAN
HEMP in violation of the aforementioned law."[43]
In an earlier case, we held that though the specific section of the
Dangerous
Drugs Law is not pinpointed, "there is no question at all of the
specific
offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of
probable
cause."[44]
Appellant’s averment is, therefore, baseless. Search Warrant No.
415 (7-98) appears clearly issued for one offense, namely, illegal
possession
of marijuana. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant next faults
the Judge who issued Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) for his failure to
exhaustively
examine the applicant and his witness. Appellant points out that said
magistrate
should not have swallowed all of Abratique’s statements - - hook, line,
and sinker. He points out that since Abratique consented to assist in
the
transport of the marijuana, the examining judge should have elicited
from
Abratique his participation in the crime and his motive for squealing
on
appellant. Appellant further points out that the evidence of the NBI
operative
who applied for the warrant is merely hearsay and should not have been
given credit at all by Judge Reyes. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Again, the lack of factual
basis for appellant’s contention is apparent. The OSG points out that
Abratique
personally assisted appellant in loading and transporting the marijuana
to the latter’s house and to appellant’s rented room at No. 27 Dr.
Cariño
St., Baguio City. Definitely, this indicates personal knowledge on
Abratique’s
part. Law enforcers cannot themselves be eyewitnesses to every crime;
they
are allowed to present witnesses before an examining judge. In this
case,
witness Abratique personally saw and handled the marijuana. Hence, the
NBI did not rely on hearsay information in applying for a search
warrant
but on personal knowledge of the witness, Abratique.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Before a valid search
warrant is issued, both the Constitution[45]
and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[46]
require that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses under oath or affirmation. The personal examination must not
be merely routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive.[47]
In the instant case, it is not disputed that Judge Antonio Reyes
personally
examined NBI Special Investigator III Darwin A. Lising, the applicant
for
the search warrant as well as his witness, Danilo G. Abratique. Notes
of
the proceedings were taken by Atty. Delilah Muñoz, Clerk of
Court,
RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61, whom Judge Reyes had ordered to be
summoned.
In the letter of transmittal of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio
City, Branch 61 to Branch 6 of said court, mention is made of "notes"
at
"pages 7-11."[48]
We have thoroughly perused the records of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98)
and nowhere find said "notes." The depositions of Lising and
Abratique
were not attached to Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) as required by the
Rules
of Court. We must stress, however, that the purpose of the Rules in
requiring
depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to
the
existence of probable cause.[49]
The Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that
depositions
be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant.
Hence,
said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is
evidence
on the record showing what testimony was presented.[50]
In the testimony of witness Abratique, Judge Reyes required Abratique
to
confirm the contents of his affidavit;[51]
there were instances when Judge Reyes questioned him extensively.[52]
It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed,[53]
absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of
probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court,[54]
as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.[55]
Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge
brought
out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the
objects
in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
sought
to be searched. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On record, appellant
never raised the want of adequate depositions to support Warrant No.
415
(7-98) in his motion to quash before the trial court. Instead, his
motion
contained vague generalities that Judge Reyes failed to ask searching
questions
of the applicant and his witness. Belatedly, however, he now claims
that
Judge Reyes perfunctorily examined said witness.[56]
But it is settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is filed, all
grounds
and objections then available, existent or known, should be raised in
the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant,
otherwise
they are deemed waived.[57]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, NBI Special
Investigator Lising’s knowledge of the illicit drugs stored in
appellant’s
house was indeed hearsay. But he had a witness, Danilo Abratique, who
had
personal knowledge about said drugs and their particular location.
Abratique’s
statements to the NBI and to Judge Reyes contained credible and
reliable
details. As the NBI’s witness, Abratique was a person on whose
statements
Judge Reyes could rely. His detailed description of appellant’s
activities
with respect to the seized drugs was substantial. In relying on
witness
Abratique, Judge Reyes was not depending on casual rumor circulating in
the underworld, but on personal knowledge Abratique possessed.cralaw:red
In Alvarez vs. Court
of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 44 (1937), we held that:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The true test of sufficiency
of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged
thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.[58]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant argues that
the address indicated in the search warrant did not clearly indicate
the
place to be searched. The OSG points out that the address stated
in the warrant is as specific as can be. The NBI even submitted a
detailed
sketch of the premises prepared by Abratique, thus ensuring that there
would be no mistake.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A description of the
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant
can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended[59]
and distinguish it from other places in the community.[60]
A designation or description that points out the place to be searched
to
the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant finally harps
on the use of unnecessary force during the execution of the search
warrant.
Appellant fails, however, to point to any evidentiary matter in the
record
to support his contention. Defense witness Cipriana Tee, appellant’s
mother,
testified on the search conducted but she said nothing that indicated
the
use of force on the part of the NBI operatives who conducted the search
and seizure.[61]
What the record discloses is that the warrant was served on appellant,[62]
who was given time to read it,[63]
and the search was witnessed by the barangay officials, police
operatives,
members of the media, and appellant’s kith and kin.[64]
No breakage or other damage to the place searched is shown. No
injuries
sustained by appellant, or any witness, appears on record. The
execution
of the warrant, in our view, has been orderly and peaceably performed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. On The Alleged
Violation of Appellant’s Substantive Rights chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant insists that
the prosecution’s unjustified and willful delay in presenting witness
Abratique
unduly delayed the resolution of his case. He points out that a total
of
eight (8) scheduled hearings had to be reset due to the failure or
willful
refusal of Abratique to testify against him. Appellant insists that
said
lapse on the prosecution’s part violated Supreme Court Circular No.
38-98.[65]
Appellant now alleges that the prosecution deliberately resorted to
delaying
the case to cause him untold miseries.cralaw:red
For the appellee, the
OSG points out that the two-month delay in the trial is not such a
great
length of time as to amount to a violation of appellant’s right to a
speedy
trial. A trial is always subject to reasonable delays or postponements,
but absent any showing that these delays are capricious and oppressive,
the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to
prosecute
the criminal action. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On record, the trial
court found that prosecution witness Danilo G. Abratique failed to
appear
in no less than eighteen (18) hearings, namely those set for February
1,
2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 24; March 9, 15, 22, and 23; April 6, 7, 8, 16,
and 19, all in 1999.[66]
No less than four (4) warrants of arrest were issued against him to
compel
him to testify.[67]
The NBI agent who supposedly had him in custody was found guilty of
contempt
of court for failing to produce Abratique at said hearings and
sanctioned.[68]
The prosecution had to write the NBI Regional Director in Baguio City
and
NBI Director in Manila regarding the failure of the Bureau’s agents to
bring Abratique to court.[69]
Nothing on record discloses the reason for Abratique’s aforecited
absences.
On the scheduled hearing of June 7, 1999, he was again absent thus
causing
the trial court to again order his arrest for the fifth time.[70]
He also failed to show up at the hearing of June 8, 1999.[71]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant now stresses
that the failure of Abratique to appear and testify on twenty (20)
hearing
dates violated appellant’s constitutional[72]
and statutory right to a speedy trial.cralaw:red
A speedy trial means
a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the
rules
and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.[73]
In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held
that "where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements
of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable
period
of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is
entitled
to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information,
or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The concept of speedy
trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right
has been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the
length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the
prosecution
and the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his
right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused.[74]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Speedy Trial Act
of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general
shall
be one hundred eighty (180) days.[75]
However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements
of the scheduled hearings of the case.[76]
The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the
proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;[77]
or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured;[78]
or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time
is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.[79]
In the present case,
although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty
(20)
hearing days, there is no showing whatsoever that prosecution
capriciously
caused Abratique’s absences so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny
him his rights. On record, after Abratique repeatedly failed to
show
up for the taking of his testimony, the prosecution went to the extent
of praying that the trial court order the arrest of Abratique to compel
his attendance at trial. The prosecution likewise tried to get the NBI
to produce Abratique as the latter was in the Bureau’s custody, but to
no avail. Eventually, the trial court ordered the prosecution to waive
its right to present Abratique and rest its case on the evidence
already
offered.[80]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nor do we find a delay
of twenty (20) hearing days to be an unreasonable length of time. Delay
of less than two months has been found, in fact, to be not an
unreasonably
lengthy period of time.[81]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, nothing on
record shows that appellant Modesto Tee objected to the inability of
the
prosecution to produce its witness. Under the Rules, appellant
could
have moved the trial court to require that witness Abratique post bail
to ensure that the latter would testify when required.[82]
Appellant could have moved to have Abratique found in contempt and duly
sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is a bit too late in
the day for appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
No persuasive reason
supports appellant’s claim that his constitutional right to speedy
trial
was violated. One must take into account that a trial is always subject
to postponements and other causes of delay. But in the absence of
a showing that delays were unreasonable and capricious, the State
should
not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting an accused.[83]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant next contends
that the trial court gravely abused its discretion, and exhibited
partiality,
when it allowed the reopening of the case after the prosecution had
failed
to present Abratique on several occasions and had been directed to rest
its case. Appellant stresses that the lower court’s order to reopen the
case to receive Abratique’s further testimony is an indication that the
trial court favored the prosecution and unduly prejudiced appellant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On appellee’s behalf,
the Solicitor General points out that the trial court’s order was in
the
interest of substantial justice and hence, cannot be termed as an abuse
of discretion. The OSG points out that the prosecution had not formally
rested its case and had yet to present its formal offer of evidence,
hence,
the submission of additional testimony by the same witness cannot be
prejudicial
to the accused, it being but the mere continuation of an uncompleted
testimony.
Furthermore, appellant did not properly oppose the prosecution’s motion
to reopen the case. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the time Criminal
Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R were being tried, the 1985 Rules of
Criminal
Procedure were in effect. There was no specific provision at that time
governing motions to reopen.[84]
Nonetheless, long and established usage has led to the recognition and
acceptance of a motion to reopen. In view of the absence of a specific
procedural rule, the only controlling guideline governing a motion to
reopen
was the paramount interests of justice. As a rule, the matter of
reopening
of a case for reception of further evidence after either prosecution or
defense has rested its case is within the discretion of the trial court.[85]
However, a concession to a reopening must not prejudice the accused or
deny him the opportunity to introduce counter evidence.[86]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Strictly speaking, however,
there was no reopening of the cases in the proceedings below. A motion
to reopen may properly be presented only after either or both parties
have
formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment.[87]
In the instant case, the records show that on April 19, 1999, the
prosecution
was directed to close its evidence and given 15 days to make its formal
offer of evidence.[88]
This order apparently arose from the manifestation of the prosecution
on
April 16, 1999 that should they fail to produce witness Abratique on
the
next scheduled hearing the prosecution would rest its case.[89]
On April 19, 1999, which was the next scheduled hearing after April 16,
1999, Abratique was absent notwithstanding notices, orders, and
warrants
of arrest. However, on April 27, 1999, or before the prosecution had
formally
offered its evidence, Abratique was brought to the trial court by the
NBI.
In its order of said date, the trial court pointed out that the
prosecution
could move to "reopen" the case for the taking of Abratique’s testimony.[90]
On May 7, 1999, the prosecution so moved, stressing that it had not yet
formally offered its evidence and that the substantial rights of the
accused
would not be prejudiced inasmuch as the latter had yet to present his
evidence.
Appellant filed no opposition to the motion. The trial court granted
the
motion six days later. Plainly, there was nothing to reopen, as the
prosecution
had not formally rested its case. Moreover, the taking of Abratique’s
testimony
was not for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, but more
properly
for the completion of his unfinished testimony. In U.S. vs. Base,[91]
we held that a trial court is not in error, if it opts to reopen the
proceedings
of a case, even after both sides had rested and the case submitted for
decision, by the calling of additional witnesses or recalling of
witnesses
so as to satisfy the judge’s mind with reference to particular facts
involved
in the case. A judge cannot be faulted should he require a material
witness
to complete his testimony, which is what happened in this case. It is
but
proper that the judge’s mind be satisfied on any and all questions
presented
during the trial, in order to serve the cause of justice.cralaw:red
Appellant’s claim that
the trial court’s concession to "reopen" the case unduly prejudiced him
is not well taken. We note that appellant had every opportunity to
present
his evidence to support his case or to refute the prosecution’s
evidence
point-by-point, after the prosecution had rested its case. In short,
appellant
was never deprived of his day in court. A day in court is the
touchstone
of the right to due process in criminal justice.[92]
Thus, we are unable to hold that a grave abuse of discretion was
committed
by the trial court when it ordered the so-called "reopening" in order
to
complete the testimony of a prosecution witness. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. On the Sufficiency
of the Prosecution’s Evidence chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In bidding for acquittal,
appellant assails the credibility of Abratique as a witness.
Appellant
insists that Abratique’s testimony is profuse with lies, contrary to
human
nature, hence incredible. According to appellant, Abratique was
evasive
from the outset with respect to certain questions of the trial
court.
He adds that it appeared the court entertained in particular the
suspicion
that witness Abratique had conspired with appellant in committing the
crime
charged. Appellant questions Abratique’s motive in informing the NBI
about
his activities related to the marijuana taking, transfer, and
warehousing.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The OSG contends that
Abratique’s testimony, taken as a whole, is credible. It points out
that
Abratique testified in a straightforward manner as to his knowledge of
the huge cache of prohibited drugs stashed by appellant in two
different
places. His testimony, said the OSG, when fused with the physical
evidence
consisting of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana found by law enforcers at
appellant’s
residence, inexorably leads to the inculpation of appellant. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is the bounden duty
of the courts to test the prosecution evidence rigorously, so that no
innocent
person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties meted out for
drug
offenses.[93]
Though we scrutinized minutely the testimony of Abratique, we find no
cogent
reason to disbelieve him. From his account, Abratique might appear
aware
treading the thin line between innocence and feeling guilty, with
certain
portions of his story tending to be self-exculpatory.
However,
his whole testimony could not be discredited. The established
rule
is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved
in other parts, depending on the corroborative evidence and the
probabilities
and improbabilities of the case. But it is accepted, as a matter of
common
sense, that if certain parts of a witness’ testimony are found true,
his
testimony cannot be disregarded entirely.[94]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Abratique testified
in open court that appellant rented the taxicab he was driving, and he
helped appellant transport huge amounts of marijuana to appellant’s
rented
room at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St., Baguio City and to appellant’s
residence
at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City. He also
declared
on the witness stand that out of fear of being involved, he decided to
divulge his knowledge of appellant’s possession of large caches of
marijuana
to the NBI. When the places referred to by Abratique were searched by
the
authorities, marijuana in staggering quantities was found and seized by
the law enforcers. Stated plainly, the physical evidence in this case
corroborated
Abratique’s testimony on material points. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant imputes questionable
motives to Abratique in an effort to discredit him. He demands that
Abratique
should likewise be prosecuted. However, by no means is the possible
guilt
of Abratique a tenable defense for appellant. Nor would Abratique’s
prosecution
mean appellant’s absolution. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In a prosecution for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be
proven
with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the
object
identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.[95]
We find the foregoing
elements proven in Criminal Case No. 15800-R beyond reasonable doubt.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In said case, the testimony
of Abratique and the recovery of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana from
appellant’s
residence served to prove appellant’s possession of a prohibited drug.
Tests conducted by the NBI forensic chemist proved the seized articles
to be marijuana. These articles were seized pursuant to a valid search
warrant and hence, fully admissible in evidence. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In People v. de los
Reyes, 239 SCRA 439 (1994), we held that the Dangerous Drugs Act
applies
generally to all persons and proscribes the sale of dangerous drugs by
any person, and no person is authorized to sell such drugs. Said
doctrine is equally applicable with respect to possession of prohibited
drugs. Republic Act No. 6425, which penalizes the possession of
prohibited
drugs, applies equally to all persons in this jurisdiction and no
person
is authorized to possess said articles, without authority of law.cralaw:red
Anent the third element,
we have held that to warrant conviction, possession of illegal drugs
must
be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed
together
with the possession or control of said articles.[96]
Nonetheless, this dictum must be read in consonance with our ruling
that
possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence
of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused
absent
a satisfactory explanation of such possession.[97]
In effect, the onus probandi is shifted to accused to explain the
absence
of knowledge or animus possidendi[98]
in this situation. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant Modesto Tee
opted not to testify in his defense. Instead, he presented his mother
as
his lone witness, who testified on matters totally irrelevant to his
case.
We can only conclude that, failing to discharge the burden of the
evidence
on the possession of prohibited drug, appellant’s guilt in Criminal
Case
No. 15800-R was established beyond reasonable doubt. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. On The Proper
Penalty
Under Republic Act No.
6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00)
to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)[99]
shall be imposed if the quantity of marijuana involved in a conviction
for possession of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or more.[100]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the present case,
the quantity of marijuana involved has been shown by the prosecution to
be far in excess of 750 grams, as stressed by the trial court:
The volume is rather
staggering. It is almost one whole house or one whole room. In fact,
when
they were first brought to the court, it took hours to load them on the
truck and hours also to unload them prompting the court to direct that
the boxes and sack of marijuana be instead kept at the NBI office in
Baguio.
And the identification of said marijuana during the trial was made in
the
NBI premises itself by the witnesses since it was physically cumbersome
and inconvenient to keep bringing them to the court during every trial.[101]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In sentencing appellant
to death, the trial court noted not only the huge quantity of marijuana
bales involved, but also "the acts of accused of hiding them in
different
places and transferring them from place to place and making them appear
as boxes of cigarettes to avoid and evade apprehension and detection."
They showed his being a big supplier, said the trial court, [whose]
criminal
perversity and craft that "deserve the supreme penalty of death."[102]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We are unable to agree,
however, with the penalty imposed by the trial court. The legislature
never
intended that where the quantity involved exceeds those stated in
Section
20 of Republic Act No. 6425 the maximum penalty of death shall
automatically
be imposed.[103]
The statute prescribes two indivisible penalties: reclusion perpetua
and
death. Hence, the penalty to be imposed must conform with Article 63[104]
of the Revised Penal Code. As already held, the death penalty law,
Republic
Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.[105]
The rules in Article 63 apply although the prohibited drugs involved
are
in excess of the quantities provided for in Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 6425.[106]
Thus, finding neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
present
case, appellant’s possession of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana in
Criminal
Case No. 15800-R, does not merit capital punishment but only the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court imposed
a fine on appellant in the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The imposition of
a fine is mandatory in cases of conviction of possession of illegal
drugs.
This being within the limits allowed by the law, the amount of the fine
must be sustained. All these sanctions might not remedy all the
havoc
wrought by prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of our society,
especially
the youth.[107]
But these penalties should warn peddlers of prohibited drugs that they
cannot ply their trade in our streets with impunity. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case
No. 15800-R, convicting appellant MODESTO TEE alias "ESTOY" TEE of
violation
of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of
reclusion perpetua. The fine of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS
imposed on him is sustained. Appellant is likewise directed to
pay
the costs of suit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna,
JJ.,
concur. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Records, pp. 210-234.
[2]
Republic Act No. 6425, SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. -
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person
who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug
subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
[3]
Records, pp. 233-234.
[4]
Id. at 1.
[5]
Id. at 26.
[6]
Id. at 32.
[7]
Rollo, p. 32.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Records, p. 52; TSN, September 8, 1998, p. 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
TSN, March 8, 1999, p. 5.
[10]
Id. at 6.
[11]
Id. at 8-9.
[12]
Id. at 10.
[13]
Id. at 12-13.
[14]
TSN, June 16, 1999, pp. 3-4.
[15]
Supra note 13 at 13.
[16]
TSN, June 16, 1999, p. 15; TSN, February 9, 1999, pp. 4-6.
[17]
TSN, February 9, 1999, p. 9; TSN, February 3, 1999, pp. 5-7; TSN,
February 1, 1999, pp. 5-7.
[18]
TSN, November 17, 1998, p. 20; TSN, February 1, 1999, pp. 9, 11,
14-15; TSN, February 3, 1999, pp. 9-10; Exh. 'A', Folder of Exhibits,
p.
1; Exh. 'V' and sub-markings, Id. at 47.
[19]
TSN, February 10, 1999, pp. 8-9.
[20]
Id. at 11-12; Exh. 'Y,' Folder of Exhibits, p. 73.
[21]
TSN, February 10, 1999, p. 14; TSN, February 9, 1999, pp. 14-15;
TSN, February 3, 1999, pp. 16-17.
[22]
TSN, February 1, 1999, pp. 29-30; TSN, February 9, 1999, pp. 15-16, 26;
TSN, February 10, 1999, pp. 15-17.
[23]
Exh. 'FF' to 'FF-14,' Folder of Exhibits, pp. 87-88; TSN, February 10,
1999, pp. 17-21; TSN, February 3, 1999, pp. 18-20.
[24]
Exh. 'U-1' to 'U-27,' Folder of Exhibits, pp. 20-46.
[25]
Exh. 'U,' Folder of Exhibits, p. 19; TSN, February 9, 1999, pp. 15-17;
TSN, February 10, 1999, pp. 23-24. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Exh. 'W' and sub-markings, Id. at 48; Exhibit 'X-22,' Id. at 72.;
[27]
See TSN, November 5, 1998, pp. 10, 12-13; 15, 16-17, 18; TSN, November
17, 1998, pp. 5-8, 10, 12-15, 18-19; TSN, November 24, 1998, pp. 4-5,
7,
8-9, 11-13, 15-22; TSN, December 2, 1998, pp. 3-13, 15, 17-18; Exh.
'CC,'
Folder of Exhibits, p. 77; Exh. 'W-1,' Id. at 48.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Rollo, p. 79.
[29]
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
[30]
People v. Two Roulette Wheels and Tables, 326 III. App. 143, 61 NE 2d
277,
281 (1945).
[31]
People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626, 650 (1998).
[32]
People v. Del Rosario, 234 SCRA 246, 253 (1994).
[33]
US v. Quantity of Extracts, Bottles, Etc., (DC Fla) 54 F2d 643, 644
(1931).
[34]
People v. Kahn, 256 Ill. App. 415, 419 (1930).
[35]
People v. Henry, 175 Colo 523, 482 P2d 357, 361 (1971).
[36]
People v. Leahy, 175 Colo 339, 484 P2r 778, 781 (1970).
[37]
US v. Tucker, (DC NY) 262 F Supp 305, 308 (1966).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
North v. State, 159 Fla 854, 32 So 2d 915, 917 (1947); State v. Nejin,
140 La 793, 74 So 103, 106 (1917); Lea v. State, 181 Tenn 378, 181 SW
2d
351, 352-353 (1944); Cagle v. State, 180 SW 2d 928, 936 (1944).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
People v. Dichoso, 223 SCRA 174, 184 (1993).
[40]
Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971).
[41]
Exh. "Y," Folder of Exhibits, p. 73.
[42]
Ibid.
[43]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486, 491 (1987).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
Art. III, Sec. 2.
[46]
Rule 126, Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search
warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach
to
the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits
submitted.
[48]
Folder of Exhibits, pp. 79-80.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 45 (1937).
[50]
State v. Sherrick, 98 Ariz 46, 402 P2d 1, 6 (1965), cert den 384 US
1022,
16 L. Ed 2d 1024, 86 S Ct. 1938.
[51]
TSN, June 16, 1999, p. 23 chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[52]
TSN, June 17, 1999, pp. 10-11. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[53]
Rule 131. Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome
by other evidence:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(m)
That official duty has been regularly performed.
[54]
Spinelli v. United States, 393 US 410, 89 S. Ct 584, 21 L. Ed 2d 637,
645
(1969).
[55]
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 12 L. Ed 2d 723, 726 (1964), 84 S Ct.
1509.
[56]
Rollo, pp. 210-212, Reply to Appellee’s Brief.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[57]
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249, 268 (1994).
[58]
Prudencio v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69, 78 (1989)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[59]
People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 180 (1925).
[60]
Ex parte Flores, 452 SW 2d 443, 444 (1970).
[61]
TSN, August 17, 1999, pp. 5, 9-10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[62]
TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 20; TSN, February 3, 1999, p. 16-17; TSN,
February
9, 1999, pp. 14-15; TSN, February 10, 1999, p. 14.-15.
[63]
Exh. 'FF,' Folder of Exhibits, p. 87; Exhs. 'FF-7' and 'FF-8,' Id. at
88.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[64]
TSN, February 10, 1999, pp. 16-17. See also TSN, February 9, 1999, pp.
15-16; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 39.
[65]
The Circular is entitled "Implementing The Provisions Of Republic Act
No.
8493, Entitled ‘AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES
BEFORE
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL
COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.’" chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[66]
Records, p. 158.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[67]
See Id at 125, 137, 140, and 145.
[68]
Id. at 151-152.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[69]
Id. at 144, 146-147.
[70]
Id. at 175.
[71]
Id. at 179.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[72]
Art. III. Sec. 14. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and by counsel, to be informed of the
nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
(underscoring
supplied) impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[73]
Kalaw v. Apostol and Alcazar, 64 Phil. 852, 857 (1937).
[74]
Martin v. Ver, et al., 123 SCRA 745, 751 (1983).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[75]
Republic Act No. 8493, SEC. 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal
cases
involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules
on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed
six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00)
or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or
judge
shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel
for
the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other
short-term
trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy
trial.
In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty
(180)
days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of
the
Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[76]
People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35, 43 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[77]
Que v. Cosico, 177 SCRA 410, 416 (1989), citing Kalaw v. Apostol, et
al,
64 Phil. 852 (1937).
[78]
Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[79]
Andres, et al., v. Cacdac, Jr., et al., 113 SCRA 216, 223 (1982),
citing
Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 26 SCRA 247 (1970).
[80]
Records, p. 157.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[81]
People v. Tampal, 314 Phi. 35 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[82]
Rule 119, Sec. 14. Bail to secure appearance of material witness.
-
When the court is satisfied, upon proof or oath, that a material
witness
will not testify when required, it may, upon motion of either party,
order
the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed proper. Upon
refusal
to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or
is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken.
[83]
Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, 317 SCRA 521, 526 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[84]
This has been remedied under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule
119, Sec. 24 of said Rules now provides that: "At any time before
finality
of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon
motion,
with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a
miscarriage
of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days
from the order granting it."
[85]
People v. Concepcion, 84 Phil. 787, 788 (1949).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[86]
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 363 Phil. 605, 613 (1999).
[87]
Alegre v. Reyes, 161 SCRA 226, 231 (1988).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[88]
Records, p. 157.
[89]
Id. at 152.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[90]
Id. at 158.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[91]
9 Phil. 48, 51 (1907). See also United States v. Cinco, 8 Phil. 388,
390
(1907), citing United States v. Vizquera, et al., 4 Phil. 380 (1905).
[92]
People v. Verra, G.R. No. 134732, May 29, 2002, p. 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[93]
People v. Baccoy, et al., G.R. No. 134002, September 12, 2002, p.
8;
See also People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 596 (1999).
[94]
People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158, 164 (1985).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[95]
People v. Ting Uy, G.R. Nos. 144506-07, April 11, 2002, p. 11, citing
Manalili
v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 (1997).
[96]
United States v. Tin Masa, 17 Phil 463, 465 (1910).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[97]
People v. Baludda, 318 SCRA 503, 511 (1999), citing United States v.
Bandoc,
23 Phil. 14 (1912).
[98]
People v. Burton, 335 Phil. 1003, 1025 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[99]
SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized
by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the
provisions
of Section 20 hereof.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[100]
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds
or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under
Sections
3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article
III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x x
5.
750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana
x
x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Otherwise,
if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
penalty
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending
upon
the quantity.
x
x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[101]
Rollo, p. 51.
[102]
Id. at 55.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[103]
People v. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592, 604-605 (2000); People v.
Montilla,
285 SCRA 703, 725 (1998).
[104]
ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all
cases
in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied
by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In
all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one
aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in
the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
x
x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[105]
People v. Gatward, 335 Phil. 440, 457 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[106]
See for instance, People v. Samson, G.R. Nos. 139377-78, May 29, 2002,
p. 35.
[107]
People v. San Juan, G.R. No. 124525, February 15, 2002, p. 12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |