SECOND DIVISION
YUSUKE FUKUZUMI,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
140630
August 12, 2004
-versus-
SANRITSU GREAT
INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION,
TETSUJI
MARUYAMA,
AKIRA KUBOTA, YUKIO
MATSUZAKA,
Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O
N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the order[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258, dated
August 5, 1999 in Civil Case No. 97-0237 denying the petition of Yusuke
Fukuzumi for relief from the order[2]
of the court dated June 2, 1999 denying his notice of appeal of the
Decision
of the trial court against him and consequently dismissing his appeal.cralaw:red
The records show that
on January 26, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment[3]
in Civil Case No. 97-0237 in favor of the plaintiffs Sanritsu Great
International
Corporation, Tetsuji Maruyama, Akira Kubota and Yukio Matsuzaka,
ordering
defendant Yusuke Fukuzumi to pay to the plaintiffs sums of money.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Sanritsu Great International Corporation and against defendant YUSUKE
FUKUZUMI
who is hereby ordered to pay said plaintiff the following, to wit:
1. The amount of
PhP90,000.00
representing two (2) month’s rental deposit;
2. The amount of
PhP112,500.00
representing unused rental payments for two-and-a-half (2-½)
months;chanrobles virtual law library
3. The amount of
PhP16,500.00
for the cost of the pressure pump and overhead tank;chanrobles virtual law library
4. The amount
of
PhP8,000.00 as cost of hauling;chanrobles virtual law library
5. The amount of
PhP137,148.15
as actual damages representing plaintiffs’ hotel bills at Traders Hotel
and Mount Sea Resort Hotel and Restaurant;
6. The amount
of
PhP50,000.00 as and way of attorney’s fees; and
7. To pay the
costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The defendant received
a copy of the decision on February 9, 1999 and on February 23, 1999,
filed
his motion for reconsideration of the decision. On April 27, 1999, the
trial court issued an Order denying the defendant’s motion. The
latter
received a copy of the order on May 5, 1999. Instead of
perfecting
his appeal on May 6, 1999, he filed his notice of appeal only on May 7,
1999, or one day beyond the reglementary period therefor.
The
court issued an Order on June 2, 1999 denying the defendant’s notice of
appeal. The defendant received the court’s order on June 10,
1999.
On June 22, 1999, the defendant filed a Verified Petition for Relief
from
the order of the trial court denying his notice of appeal.chanrobles virtual law library
In his petition for
relief, the petitioner averred that his counsel suffered a high blood
pressure
on May 6, 1999 which impelled said counsel to rest for three days, upon
the advice of his doctor, thus, hindered him from filing the notice of
appeal on May 6, 1999. The petitioner appended to his petition a
verified Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Lakambini Cruz-Crespo
dated
June 18, 1999, viz:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that
I have seen and examined Atty. Jonathan Polines, from Las Piñas
on May 6, 1999 with the chief complaint of headache of two days
duration.cralaw:red
Impression: Essential
hypertension, moderate.chanrobles virtual law library
The patient was advised
to rest for at least 3 days (May 6-8, 1999). He was given Nifedipine
(Calcibloc).cralaw:red
(Sgd). MA. LAKAMBINI CRUZ-CRESPO, M.D.cralaw:red
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN
to before me this 18th day of June 1999, affiant exhibited to me his
CTC
No. 18652403 issued at Las Piñas City on August 7, 1998.cralaw:red
Doc. No. 3408
Page No. 1075
Book No.
1
(Sgd.) (Illegible) NOTARY PUBLIC
Series of 1999.[5]
On August 5, 1999, the
trial court issued an Order denying the defendant’s petition on the
ground
that Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was not applicable. The
defendant’s
motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by the court per its
Order dated October 22, 1999.cralaw:red
The defendant, now the
petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari with this Court
alleging that:
(A) THE
COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM
DENIAL
OF APPEAL FILED PURSUANT TO SECTION 2, RULE 38 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL
PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE SINCE THE DENIAL OF THE APPEAL WAS BASED ON
SECTION 3, RULE 41 IN RELATION TO SECTION 2, RULE 22 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
(B)
THE COURT A QUO HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN, IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM
DENIAL
OF APPEAL, IT DID NOT RULE ON THE MERIT OF THE
GROUNDS RAISED THEREIN BUT, INSTEAD, SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN SPECULATION BY
SAYING THAT THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM DENIAL OF APPEAL IS ALLEGEDLY
MORE OF AN AFTERTHOUGHT.[6]
In his comment on the
petition, the respondents averred that (a) the petitioner cannot invoke
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which applies only to
negligence
of a party and not of his counsel; (b) by his negligence, the
petitioner
failed to avail of other remedies other than filing his petition for
relief
from the June 22, 1999 Order of the trial court; and (c) the alleged
high
blood pressure of the petitioner’s counsel is merely an afterthought.cralaw:red
The petition is denied.cralaw:red
The remedy of a party
whose notice of appeal is denied by the trial court, although such
notice
is filed within the period therefor, is to file a motion for
reconsideration
of such order and, if the court denies such motion, to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. If the party
is prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from
filing
his notice of appeal within the reglementary period therefor, his
remedy
is to file a petition for relief, in the same case, from the order of
the
trial court denying his notice of appeal. This is provided in
Section
2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:
Section 2.
Petition for relief from denial of appeal.- When a judgment or final
order
is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud,
accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an
appeal,
he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that
the appeal be given due course.chanrobles virtual law library
Such party is not
entitled
to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court if he was not
prevented from filing his notice of appeal by fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence. Such relief will not be granted to a
party
who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss
of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode
of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will
be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost
either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of
procedure
by counsel.[7]
If the petition for
relief is denied by the trial court, the remedy of the petitioner is to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads:
Section 1.
Subject of appeal.- An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable.chanrobles virtual law library
No appeal may be taken from:chanrobles virtual law library
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion
seeking
relief from judgment;chanrobles virtual law library
(c) An interlocutory order;
In all the above instances
where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party
may file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65. (Underscoring
supplied.)
The petitioner’s
failure
to file his notice of appeal within the period therefor is far from
excusable.
It, rather, shows negligence no less. The medical certificate issued to
his counsel shows that he was examined by Dr. Lakambini Cruz-Crespo on
May 6, 1999 and was advised to rest for three days from May 6, 1999 or
until May 8, 1999. The petitioner would like the trial
court
and this Court to believe that his counsel was unable to file the
notice
of appeal on or before May 6, 1999 because he was even advised to take
a rest for three days. But his counsel was able, well enough, to
prepare and file the notice of appeal on May 7, 1999 when he was
supposed
to be resting. The petitioner even failed to allege in his notice
of appeal that the same was filed one day late because his counsel was
suffering from high
blood pressure on May
6, 1999. It was only after the petitioner received the order of
the
trial court denying his notice of appeal and filed his petition for
relief
on June 22, 1999 did he allege that his counsel was suffering from high
blood pressure on May 6, 1999. It was only on June 18, 1999 that
the petitioner secured a medical certificate from Dr. Crespo.cralaw:red
Thus, we are not convinced
by the petitioner’s claim that his counsel was suffering from high
blood
pressure on May 6, 1999, which prevented him from filing said notice of
appeal on said date. Said allegation is a mere afterthought to
cover
up his and his own counsel’s collective negligence. It is settled
that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of
their
counsel.[8]chanrobles virtual law library
It bears stressing that
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed
by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well and failure to
perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment or
resolution
final and executory.[9]
After all, the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.[10]
While we have ruled
that delay in the filing of a notice of appeal does not justify the
dismissal
of the appeal, however, the petitioner has not shown any exceptional
circumstances
justifying a reversal of the assailed order of the trial court and the
reinstatement of his appeal.cralaw:red
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., Chairman,
Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Annex “H,” Rollo, p. 57.
[2]
Annex “E,” Id. at 42.
[3]
Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 20-27.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[5]
Id. at 52.
[6]
Id. at 13.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Ibabao vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 76 (1987).
[8]
Jose vs. Court of Appeals, 399 SCRA 83 (2003).chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Manipor vs. Ricafort, 407 SCRA 298 (2003).
[10]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 81 (2000).
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robles virtual law library |