SECOND DIVISION
TRINIDAD
DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
141031
August 31, 2004
-versus-
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a Petition for
Review on
Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
of
the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated January 7, 1999 which reversed the order[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, promulgated
on March 22, 1996, in LRC Case No. NC-455. The Trial Court
granted
the application for registration of a parcel of land situated at Barrio
Zapang, Ternate, Cavite, filed by the petitioner pursuant to Act No.
496,
as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
The facts as culled
from the records of the case show that on April 19, 1975, by virtue of
an extrajudicial partition with absolute sale, the petitioner bought
from
Ricardo Pereña, Remedios Pereña-Panganiban and Celsa
Resplandor,
two parcels of land: one was located at the Sitios of Culit and
Cay-Santol,
Barrio Zapang, Ternate, Cavite, and the other at Sitio Malauyas, Barrio
Pinagsanghan, Maragondon, Cavite.[3]
On December 11, 1992,
the petitioner filed an application for the registration of Lot 277
(Portion
C) Cads. 617-D, described in Plan Swo-04-001079-D,[4]
with an area of 6,917 square meters before the RTC of Naic, Cavite,
Branch
15. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. NC-455.cralaw:red
The petitioner also
filed five other applications for land registration before the same
court,
docketed as LRC Nos. NC-453, 454, 456, 457, and 458. She averred
that the six applications involved parcels of land adjacent and
contiguous
to one another; that they were located in the same area and
municipality;
and that they were covered by one and the same deed of conveyance
executed
by the previous owners, the extrajudicial partition with absolute sale.chanrobles virtual law library
On November 16, 1993,
the respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director
of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the
application on the following grounds:
(1) that
neither
the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended
by P.D. 1073); (2) that the muniments of title and/or tax declarations
and tax payments receipts of the applicant, if any, attached or alleged
in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence
of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of its open,
continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner since
June
12, 1945, or prior thereto…; (3) that the claim of ownership in fee
simple
on the basis of a Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by
the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for
registration
within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976, as required
by Presidential Decree No. 892…; (4) that the parcels applied for
are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines,
not subject to private appropriation.[5]chanrobles virtual law library
For failure of the
Solicitor
General or any of its representatives to appear notwithstanding notice,
the court a quo issued an Order of General Default on March 15, 1994.[6]chanrobles virtual law library
While the case was pending,
the petitioner sold the subject property to Dr. Rebecco E. Panlilio on
September 1, 1994[7]
who, in turn, consigned it to Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) on October
27, 1994 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.[8]
PALI filed a Motion for the Substitution dated October 28, 1994 which
was
granted by the court a quo in its Order[9]
dated March 24, 1995.cralaw:red
The PALI presented Engr.
Angel R. Salvacion, a geodetic engineer of the company, as its sole
witness.
His testimony was offered to prove the applicant’s ownership and
possession
of the subject property for the number of years required by law.
Engr. Salvacion claimed that he was employed by the PALI and that he
had
been the general overseer of the subject property since 1993.[10]
He declared that the land was currently in the possession of PALI whose
employees resided therein. He also testified that the previous
owners
had planted mango and bamboo trees on the property, while PALI had
constructed
some buildings and small houses therein.[11]chanrobles virtual law library
On May 12, 1995, a Motion
to Set Aside Order of General Default was filed by Remedios
Pereña-Panganiban
and Celsa Resplandor-Aure. An Opposition/Application for
Registration
was further filed by the same parties on July 20, 1995,[12]
claiming that the extrajudicial partition with absolute sale was void
ab
initio on the ground of vitiated consent. The parties withdrew
the
same in a Motion dated February 2, 1996.cralaw:red
After trial, the court
a quo granted the application for registration in an Order dated March
22, 1996, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
pursuant to Act No. 496, as amended by P.D. 1529, the application for
registration
of the parcel of land identified as Lot 277 (Portion C) situated at
Barrio
Zapang, Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite, is hereby granted.
Applicant’s title is confirmed. The Land Registration Commission is
hereby
directed to issue the decree of registration and the original
certificate
of title. Upon its finality, the Clerk of Court is directed to furnish
the Land Registration Commissioner a certified copy of this judgment.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.[13]
The court a quo ruled
that
the predecessors-in-interest of PALI were able to prove open and
continuous
possession and title over the land so as to segregate it from the mass
of public land.chanrobles virtual law library
The Republic of the
Philippines appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, contending that
the court a quo erred in granting the application despite lack of proof
that the land sought to be registered was the same land described in
the
application and the lack of documents submitted in support
thereof.
In addition, it asseverated that PALI failed to prove by competent
evidence
that it had a registrable title to the property subject of the
application.cralaw:red
For failing to file
a reply brief within the reglementary period, the case was deemed
submitted
for decision by the CA.[14]
Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled thereon on January 7, 1999 and
reversed
the decision of the RTC. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the Order herein appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and the application
for registration in LRC Case No. 455 of the court a quo is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Forthwith, the
petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16]
of the decision which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
December
14, 1999.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner avers
that the following errors were committed by the appellate court:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE PARCEL OF LAND
SOUGHT
TO BE REGISTERED IS NOT THE SAME OR PART OF THE LAND PURCHASED BY
PETITIONER
FROM THE PEREÑAS DESPITE THE VERY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
TO THE CONTRARY.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE
THAT IT AND ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST WERE IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE
AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND DESPITE THE
NUMEROUS
AND DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PETITIONER.[17]
In its Comment on the
petition, the respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG,
avers that the petitioner is not the real party-in-interest to file the
petition, having been substituted by PALI in the trial court as
party-applicant.
The OSG contends that the petition should be dismissed not only on the
said ground, but also on the ground that the appellate court did not
commit
any reversible error in so ruling.chanrobles virtual law library
As culled from the pleadings
of the parties, the issues are the following: (a) whether or not the
petitioner
is the real party-in-interest in the case at bar; (b) whether or not
the
parcel of land sought to be registered is the same or part of the land
purchased by the petitioner from the Pereñas heirs; and finally
(c) whether or not the petitioner proved that she and her
predecessors-in-interest
were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject
parcel of land for the required number of years so as to render them
the
absolute owners thereof.cralaw:red
On the first issue,
we rule that the petitioner is not the real party-in-interest since she
sold the property subject of the application to PALI as early as
October
27, 1994. The motion for substitution filed by the PALI was
granted
by the court a quo in its Order[18]
dated March 24, 1995, thereby making it the party-applicant. The
petitioner ceased to be a party in the trial court and in the CA.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, a party aggrieved by
the
decision of the RTC or CA may file a petition for review on
certiorari.
In this case, the PALI was the plaintiff-appellee in the CA and the
party
aggrieved by the appellate court’s adverse ruling. Hence, the
proper
party to file the petition in this case assailing the decision of the
CA
is PALI, and not the petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
One who has no right
or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court for
it is jurisprudentially established that every action must be
prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.[19]
A real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured
by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.[20]
Since the petitioner is not the real party-in-interest, the petition
must
forthwith be denied due course.cralaw:red
While the well-entrenched
doctrine is that pure questions of fact may not be the subject of
appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as
this
mode of appeal is generally restricted to questions of law,[21]
such rule is not absolute. There are instances where the Court
admits
of certain exceptions, as when the factual findings of the CA are
contrary
to those of the trial court.[22]
In this case, the CA
ruled that the parcel of land subject of the application is different
from
that sold to the petitioner under the extrajudicial partition with
absolute
sale, which was, thereafter, sold to PALI. The CA, likewise,
ruled
that the petitioner failed to prove its title over the property:
In its Appellant’s Brief,
the Republic, through the Solicitor General, argues first or (sic) all
that parcel of land sought to be registered in this case is apparently
different from the land allegedly purchased by the applicant Trinidad
Diaz-Enriquez
from the heirs of the deceased Spouses Eugenio and Margarita
Pereña.
Thus, the Solicitor General points out that:chanrobles virtual law library
“The parcel
of land sought to be registered in this case is portion-C of Lot 277,
Cads.
617-D consisting of Six Thousand Nine Hundred Seventeen (6,917) square
meters (cf. Exh. “L”), and with the following boundaries:chanrobles virtual law library
NW – Lot 278,
Cad-617-D-Psu-99442
(TCT No. T-75170) – TDE
NE, SE – Cayapas
Riverchanrobles virtual law library
SW – Psd-86692,
Lot
1-TCT No. T-77742 – TDE (Decreed) Lot 472, Cads 617-D
(cf. Exh. “M”)”
On the other hand, the
Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale (Exh. I) executed by the
Pereñas
in favor of Enriquez shows that what was sold by the former to the
latter
were two parcels of land, more particularly described as follows:
“A parcel
of
land as shown on plan Psu-79250, L.R.C. Rec. No. __, situated in the
Barrio
of Zapang, Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite. Bounded
on
the NE., along line 1-2 by property of Jose de Leon; on the SE., S.,
and
NW., along lines
2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-23-24-25-26-27-28
by public land; on the NW., and NE., along lines 28-29-30-31 and 31-1
by
property of Carmen Puga (Lot 1, Psu-31389), x x x containing an area of
ONE MILLION NINETY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE (1,096,433)
Square
Meters.
“A parcel of land
situated
in Sitio Malauyas, Barrio Pinagsanghan, Municipality of Maragondon,
Province
of Cavite. Bounded on the North by properties of Jose Anit,
Anastacia
Antazo, Vicente de Guiz and Rio Kay Apas; on the East by the properties
of Jose de Guia, Sitio Llamado Murangdalig; on the South by Rio
Palikpikan,
Pasong Kalamyas, Mapuso, Kaylimit, Terreno Municipal de Ternate, on the
West by the properties of Ambrosio Arca y Terreno Municipal de Ternate,
containing an area of Eighty (80) Hectares assessed by Tax Declaration
No. 16075 in the name of the late Jose C. Unas, predecessor-in-interest
of Aurai Unas in the declaration of real property of the Municipality
of
Maragondon.”chanrobles virtual law library
As can be readily
gleaned
from the foregoing, the parcel of land sought to be registered in this
case has a different area as well as different boundaries from either
of
the two parcels of land solely by the Pereñas to Enriquez.
Considering, however, that appellee is supposed to be tracing its title
to the subject parcel of land all the way up to the Pereñas, it
is axiomatic that the same parcel of land should have been the subject
of the successive sale transactions from the Pereñas down to
appellee.
Such is not the case here though, and neither has appellee offered any
explanation for this discrepancy. Evidently, therefore, the lower
court erred in granting appellee’s application for registration of
title
notwithstanding the paucity of evidence as to the actual identity of
the
parcel of land sought to be registered. (pp. 36-38, Rollo)
The explanation appears
to lie in the fact that the lands sold by the Pereñas to
Trinidad
Diaz-Enriquez (Exh. “I”) were subsequently subdivided into six (6)
lots,
and a separate application for registration was filed for each
lot.
However, the hearing of the six applications, numbered LRC Cases Nos.
453,
454, 455, 456, 457 and 458 were consolidated in the court a quo.
The technical description marked as Exh. “M” is for only one lot, Lot
277
(Portion C), which is the subject matter of LRC Case No. 455 (see pp.
11-26,
tsn., April 4, 1995.)
Thus, Engineer Angel
Salvacion testified as follows:
“Q. -
The Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale marked as Exhibit M
mentioned
an area of 1,096,433. Is this the same parcel of land subject
matter
of this application for registration the same parcel of land subject
matter
of this Tax Declaration Nos. 1656, 1657 and 1658 and the same parcel of
land covered by the approved plan by the Bureau of Lands?chanrobles virtual law library
A. -
Yes, Sir.cralaw:red
Q. -
Will you please state or explain to the Honorable Court why the area
appearing
the Extrajudicial Partition with Sale is different from the area
appearing
on the approved plan and on the area appearing on the tax
declarations?
Will you explain [to] the satisfaction of this Honorable Court the
discrepancies
appearing on the areas?
A. -
In the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale, there are two
different
lots, different parcels of land I should say being described which is
part
of Psu-997250 which is not a subject of this registration, and a parcel
of land which is now the subject of this registration. The reason
why the area as indicated as a whole that described by this
Extrajudicial
Partition with Absolute Sale is different from the one under the tax
declaration
and as per result of the survey.” (tsn, pp. 22-23, April 11,
1995).cralaw:red
Next, the appellant
argues that the appellee failed to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest
were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject
parcel of land, in the concept of an owner, since time
immemorial.
The appellee’s witness, Engineer Salvacion, had no personal knowledge
of
the nature and length of possession of applicant’s
predecessors-in-interest,
the Pereñas family. Indeed, he only relied on the tax
declarations
dating back to 1961 in the name of Margarita Sarmiento (Exhs. “Q,”
“Q-1,”
“Q-2,” “Q-3,” “Q-4” and “Q-5.” Unfortunately, they are among the
missing exhibits. We have no way of checking their veracity.cralaw:red
In any event, tax declarations
are not sufficient proof of possession, much less vest ownership on the
declarant (Director of Forestry v. Villareal, 170 SCRA 598 [1989]).[23]chanrobles virtual law library
We agree with the appellate
court. There are two facts that the applicant must prove to
support
an application for registration. The first is that the land
sought
to be registered is the same land described in the application; the
second
is that the applicant must be the owner of the land.[24]
It is settled that a
person who seeks registration of title to a piece of land must prove
the
claim by clear and convincing evidence.[25]
The petitioner was then duty bound to identify sufficiently and
satisfactorily
that the lot sought to be registered is the same or part of the lot she
purchased from the Pereña heirs. Otherwise stated, all
facts
must indicate that no other person, including the government, will be
prejudiced
by the adjudication of the land to the petitioner.cralaw:red
The evidence on record
shows that the property subject of the application in LRC Case No.
NC-455
consists of 6,917 square meters with the following boundaries:
NW – Lot
278,
Cad-617-D-Psu-99442 (TCT No. T-75170-TDE)
NE, SE – Cayapas
River
SW – Psd – 86692,
Lot
1 – TCT # T-77742 – TDE (Decreed) Lot 472, Cads 617-D[26]
However, the
extrajudicial
partition with absolute sale shows that the property covered by the
said
land has the following lot description:
A parcel of
land as shown on plan Psu-79250, L.R.C. Rec. No. __, situated in the
Barrio
of Zapang, Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite. Bounded on the
NE., along line 1-2 by property of Jose de Leon; on the SE., S., and
NW.,
along lines 2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-
20-21-23-24-25-26-
27-28 by public land; on the NW., and NE., along lines 28-29-30-31- and
31-1 by property of Carmen Puga (Lot 1, Psu-31389), x
x x containing an area of ONE MILLION NINETY-SIX
THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE (1,096,433) Square Meters.[27]chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner insists
that Lot 277 (Portion C) Cads-617-D is part of the parcels of land
originally
sold by the Pereña heirs to her. However, the evidence
shows
otherwise; the technical descriptions of the two parcels of lands
simply
do not correspond to each other. The petitioner thus failed to
prove
that the property sought to be registered is included in the property
covered
by the said deed of extrajudicial partition with absolute sale.
Section 14(1) of P.D.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:
Sec. 14.
Who
may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally
or through their duly-authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by
themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June
12, 1945, or earlier.[28]
The presumption is that
lands of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a
land grant must be “well-nigh incontrovertible.”[29]
The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the
applicant
who must show that she is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of
the land applied for.[30]
As we ruled in Director, Land Management Bureau v. Court of Appeals:[31]chanrobles virtual law library
x
x
x The phrase “adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in
concept of owner,” by which characteristics private respondent
describes
his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law
requiring
evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on
the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and
convincing
evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature
and
duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do
not
amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to
the oppositor.
In the case at bar, the
petitioner failed to prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest
had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation
of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
Engr. Angel R. Salvacion,
the lone witness for the petitioner, testified as follows:
x
x xHe is employed at the Puerto Azul Land, Inc. as Geodetic
Engineer; that he is assigned as the general overseer of the property
being
applied for registration, and handles the documents pertaining to the
lots;
that he has been connected with the Puerto Azul Land, Inc. since 1993
(TSN,
April 4, 1995, p. 4); that he is authorized to represent the company in
this proceeding by virtue of a Secretary’s Certificate issued by one
Atty.
Paulino Petralba dated 04 October 1994 (Exh. H); that Puerto Azul Land,
Inc. came into ownership of the subject property through purchase, from
Pereña to Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez to (Ternate Development Corp.)
to Puerto Azul Land, Inc., evidenced by an Extrajudicial Partition with
Absolute Sale executed by Remedios Pereña Panganiban, Celsa
Resplandor
and Ricardo Pereña dated April 1975 (TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 7),
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 01 September 1994 executed by Trinidad
Diaz-Enriquez
in favor of Rebecco E. Panlilio and Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27
October
1994 executed by Rebecco E. Panlilio in favor of Puerto Azul Land, Inc.
(TSN, April 4, 1995, pp. 9-10); that this case (LRC Case No. NC-455)
per
Survey plan SWO-04-001075-D covers Lot 277 (portion C) consisting an
area
of 6,917 square meters (TSN, April 4, 1995, pp. 13-14); that the
applicant
is in actual possession of the subject property which is being guarded
by its employees (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 4); that no tenants are
occupying
the same; that there are small houses being occupied by applicant’s
employees
and some mango and bamboo trees introduced by the previous owners, the
Pereñas (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 40); that except the
Government,
no other person is claiming ownership or possession of said property
(TSN,
April 11, 1995, p. 41); that both the previous and present owners are
in
continuous, uninterrupted, and open possession of the subject property;
that Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez is the owner of the adjoining properties of
the subject property (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 26); that Ricardo
Pereña,
Remedios Pereña Panganiban and Celsa Resplandor are the children
of Eugenio Pereña and Margarita Sarmiento (TSN, April 11, 1995,
p. 27); that per available record, the earliest period that taxes were
paid was 1961 (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 29); that no free patent
application
was filed with the office of the DENR, CENRO in connection with the
subject
property per certification issued by one Benjamin Aukay, Records
Officer
I, of the said office (TSN, May 4, 1995, p. 5).[32]chanrobles virtual law library
Engr. Salvacion’s
admission
that he was employed by the PALI only in 1993 and that it was only then
that he saw the property for the first time is fatal to the
petitioner’s
cause. Engr. Salvacion had no personal knowledge that the
predecessors
of the petitioner had been in continuous, open and uninterrupted
possession
of the property since 1945. In fact, he claimed that the earliest
period that taxes were paid thereon was in 1961. Yet, the records
are bereft of such tax declarations, except the one for 1985.
Besides,
case law has it that tax receipts and tax payment receipts themselves
do
not convincingly prove title to the land.[33]
Undeniably, the petitioner
failed to present positive, clear and convincing proof that her
predecessors-in-interest
were in actual, peaceful and adverse possession and occupation of the
subject
lot in the concept of owner for the period required by law.chanrobles virtual law library
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. LRC Case No. NC-455 is
hereby
ordered DISMISSED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez,
J.,
(Acting Chairman), Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman),
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña, with Associate
Justices
Jorge S. Imperial and Omar U. Amin, concurring.
[2]
Penned by Assisting Judge Emerito M. Agcoaili.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Records, p. 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Id. at 5.
[5]
Id. at 42-43.
[6]
Id. at 52.
[7]
TSN, 4 April 1995, p. 9.
[8]
Id. at 10.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Records, p. 78-A.
[10]
TSN, 4 April 1995, p. 4.
[11]
Id. at 40.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Records, p. 101.
[13]
Id. at 125.
[14]
CA Rollo, p. 63.
[15]
Id. at 74.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Id. at 124.
[17]
Rollo, p. 10.
[18]
Records, p. 78-A.
[19]
Borlongan v. Madrideo, 323 SCRA 248 (2000).
[20]
Section 2 of Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[21]
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Wong, 359 SCRA 608 (2001).
[22]
Tando v. Court of Appeals, 372 SCRA 321 (2001).
[23]
Rollo, pp. 21-24.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
Noblejas, Antonio H. and Noblejas, Edilberto H., Registration of Land
Titles
and Deeds, 1992 Revised Edition, pp. 90-91.
[25]
Republic of the Philippines v. Carmencita M. Alconaba, et al., G.R. No.
155012, April 14, 2004.
[26]
Records, p. 14.chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Id. at 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[28]
Emphasis supplied.chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 427 (1992).
[30]
Turquesa v. Valera, 322 SCRA 573 (2000).chanrobles virtual law library
[31]
324 SCRA 757 (2000).chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Records, pp. 120-122.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
Reynaldo, Telesforo, Remedios, Alfredo and Belen, all surnamed Aguirre,
et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004. |