THIRD DIVISION.
.
TOMASA SARMIENTO,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
141258
April 9, 2003
-versus-
SPS. LUIS &
ROSE
SUN-CABRIDO
AND MARIA LOURDES
SUN,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,
J.:
This appeal by
Certiorari
stems from the Decision[1]
of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on November 26, 1999 in
CA-G.R.
SP No. 47431 declaring the private respondents not liable for damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner, Tomasa Sarmiento,
states that sometime in April 1994, a friend, Dra. Virginia Lao,
requested
her to find somebody to reset a pair of diamond earrings into two gold
rings.[2]
Accordingly, petitioner sent a certain Tita Payag with the pair of
earrings
to Dingding’s Jewelry Shop, owned and managed by respondent spouses
Luis
and Rose Cabrido,[3]
which accepted the job order for P400.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner provided
12 grams of gold to be used in crafting the pair of ring settings.[5]
After 3 days, Tita Payag delivered to the jewelry shop one of Dra.
Lao’s
diamond earrings which was earlier appraised as worth .33 carat and
almost
perfect in cut and clarity.[6]
Respondent Ma. Lourdes (Marilou) Sun went on to dismount the diamond
from
its original setting. Unsuccessful, she asked their goldsmith, Zenon
Santos,
to do it. Santos removed the diamond by twisting the setting with a
pair
of pliers, breaking the gem in the process.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner required
the respondents to replace the diamond with the same size and
quality.
When they refused, the petitioner was forced to buy a replacement in
the
amount of P30,000.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Rose Cabrido,
manager of Dingding’s Jewelry Shop, denied having entered into any
transaction
with Tita Payag whom she met only after the latter came to the jewelry
shop to seek compensation from Santos for the broken piece of jewelry.[9]
However, it was possible that Payag may have availed of their services
as she could not have known every customer who came to their shop. Rose
disclosed that she usually arrived at 11:00 a.m. When she was not
around, her mother and sister tended the shop.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Marilou admitted knowing
Payag who came to Dingding’s Jewelry Shop to avail of their services
regarding
a certain piece of jewelry. After a short conversation, Payag went
inside
the shop to see Santos. When the precious stone was broken by
Santos,
Payag demanded P15,000 from him. As the latter had no money, she
turned to Marilou for reimbursement apparently thinking that Marilou
was
the owner of the shop.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For his part, Santos
recalled that Payag requested him to dismount what appeared to him was
a sapphire. While clipping the setting with the use of a small
pair
of pliers, the stone accidentally broke. Santos denied being an
employee
of Dingding’s Jewelry Shop.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Attempts to settle the
controversy before the barangay lupon proved futile.[13]
Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint for damages on June 28, 1994
with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tagbilaran City
docketed
as Civil Case No. 2339 which rendered a decision[14]
in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, Decision
is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Tomasa Sarmiento and against
defendants
Spouses Luis and Rose Sun-Cabrido, ordering defendants to pay jointly
and
severally the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as actual or
compensatory damages; Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) as moral
damages;
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees; Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) as litigation expenses, with legal interest of 6% per annum
from the date of this decision and 12% per annum from the date when
this
decision becomes final until the amounts shall have been fully paid and
to pay the costs.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This case as against
defendant Maria Lourdes Sun as well as defendants’ counterclaim are
dismissed
for lack of merit.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
On appeal, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, reversed the decision
of
the MTCC, thus absolving the respondents of any responsibility arising
from breach of contract.[15]
Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
judgment
of the RTC in its Decision promulgated on November 26, 1999.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Unable to accept the
decision, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review with the
following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN MAINTAINING AND SO HOLDING THAT ZENON SANTOS IS NOT AN
EMPLOYEE
OF DEFENDANT (herein respondent) ROSE SUN-CABRIDO, AND IS THEREFORE
ANSWERABLE
FOR HIS OWN ACTS OR OMISSIONSchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S
PRONOUNCEMENTS
THAT THERE EXISTS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS
THAT
THE LATTER WOULD ANSWER FOR ANY LIABILITY SHOULD THE DIAMOND BE DAMAGED
IN THE PROCESS OF DISMOUNTING THEM FROM THE EARRINGS.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Essentially, petitioner
claims that the dismounting of the diamond from its original setting
was
part of the obligation assumed by the private respondents under the
contract
of service. Thus, they should be held liable for damages arising
from its breakage. On the other hand, the version of the private
respondents, upheld by the RTC and the CA, is that their agreement with
the petitioner was for crafting two gold rings mounted with diamonds
only
and did not include the dismounting of the said diamonds from their
original
setting.[17]
Consequently, the crux of the instant controversy is the scope of the
obligation
assumed by the private respondents under the verbal contract of service
with the petitioner. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court notes that,
during the trial, private respondents vigorously denied any transaction
between Dingdings’ Jewelry Shop and the petitioner, through Tita
Payag.
Rose Cabrido, for instance, denied having ever met Payag before the
latter
came to seek reimbursement for the value of the broken diamond.
Likewise,
while Marilou acknowledged acquaintance with Payag, she nevertheless
denied
accepting any job order from her. Debunking their protestations,
however, the MTCC of Tagbilaran City rendered its decision on November
26, 1999 in favor of herein petitioner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Apparently realizing
the weakness and futility of their position, private respondents
conceded,
on appeal, the existence of an agreement with the petitioner for
crafting
a pair of gold rings mounted with diamonds. This apparent
concession
by the private respondents, however, was really nothing but an
ingenious
maneuver, designed to preclude, just the same, any recovery for damages
by the petitioner. Thus, while ostensibly admitting the existence of
the
said agreement, private respondents, nonetheless denied assuming any
obligation
to dismount the diamonds from their original settings.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The inconsistent position
of the private respondents impugns their credibility. They cannot be
permitted
to adopt a certain stance, only to vacillate later to suit their
interest.
We are therefore inclined to agree with the MTCC in giving credence to
the version of the petitioner. The MTCC had the unique opportunity to
actually
observe the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses as they
testified during the trial.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At any rate, the
contemporaneous
and subsequent acts of the parties[20]
support the version of the petitioner. Thus, when Tita Payag
asked
Marilou of Dingding’s Jewelry Shop to reset a pair of diamond earrings,
she brought with her the said pieces of jewelry so that the diamonds
which
were still mounted could be measured and the new ring settings crafted
accordingly. On the said occasion, Marilou expressed no reservation
regarding
the dismounting of the diamonds which, after all, was an integral part
of petitioner’s job order. She should have instructed Payag to have
them
dismounted first if Marilou had actually intended to spare the jewelry
shop of the task but she did not. Instead, petitioner was
charged
P400 for the job order which was readily accepted. Thus, a
perfected
contract to reset the pair of diamond earrings arose between the
petitioner,
through Payag, and Dingding’s Jewelry Shop, through Marilou.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Marilou’s subsequent
actuations were even more revealing as regards the scope of obligation
assumed by the jewelry shop. After the new settings were completed in
3
days, she called up the petitioner to bring the diamond earrings to be
reset.[21]
Having initially examined one of them, Marilou went on to dismount the
diamond from its original setting. Unsuccessful, she then
delegated
the task to their goldsmith, Zenon Santos. Having acted the way she
did,
Marilou cannot now deny the shop’s obligation to reset the pair of
earrings.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Obligations arising
from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties.[22]
Corollarily, those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty
of fraud, negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene
the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.[23]
The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.[24]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
it is beyond doubt that Santos acted negligently in dismounting the
diamond
from its original setting. It appears to be the practice of the
trade
to use a miniature wire saw in dismounting precious gems, such as
diamonds,
from their original settings.[25]
However, Santos employed a pair of pliers in clipping the original
setting,
thus resulting in breakage of the diamond. The jewelry shop
failed
to perform its obligation with the ordinary diligence required by the
circumstances.
It should be pointed out that Marilou examined the diamond before
dismounting
it from the original setting and found the same to be in order.
Its
subsequent breakage in the hands of Santos could only have been caused
by his negligence in using the wrong equipment. Res ipsa
loquitur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Private respondents
seek to avoid liability by passing the buck to Santos who claimed to be
an independent worker. They also claim, rather lamely, that
Marilou
simply happened to drop by at Dingding’s Jewelry Shop when Payag
arrived
to place her job order.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We do not think so.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts show that
Santos had been working at Dingding’s Jewelry Shop as goldsmith for
about
6 months accepting job orders through referrals from private
respondents.[27]
On the other hand, Payag stated that she had transacted with Dingding’s
Jewelry Shop on at least 10 previews occasions, always through Marilou.[28]
The preponderance of evidence supports the view that Marilou and Zenon
Santos were employed at Dingding’s Jewelry Shop in order to perform
activities
which were usually necessary or desirable in its business.[29]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We therefore hold that
an obligation to pay actual damages arose in favor of the petitioner
against
the respondents spouses who admittedly owned and managed Dingding’s
Jewelry
Shop. It was proven that petitioner replaced the damaged jewelry
in the amount of P30,000.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts of the case
also justify the award of moral damages. As a general rule, moral
damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach
of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Article
2219
of the Civil Code.[31]
Moral damages may be awarded in a breach of contract only when there is
proof that defendant acted in bad faith, or was guilty of gross
negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation.[32]
Santos was a goldsmith for more than 40 years.[33]
Given his long experience in the trade, he should have known that using
a pair of pliers instead of a miniature wire saw in dismounting a
precious
stone like a diamond would have entailed an unnecessary risk of
breakage.
He went on with it anyway. Hence, respondent spouses are liable
for
P10,000 as moral damages due to the gross negligence of their employee.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, private respondent’s
refusal to pay the value of the damaged jewelry emanated from an honest
belief that they were not responsible therefor, hence, negating any
basis
for the award of attorney’s fees.[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated
November 26, 1999 is hereby reversed and set aside. Private
respondents
Luis Cabrido and Rose Sun-Cabrido are hereby ordered to pay, jointly
and
severally, the amount of P30,000 as actual damages and P10,000 as moral
damages in favor of the petitioner. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
No costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and concurred
in
by Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and Presbitero J.
Velasco,
Jr., Rollo, pp. 17-23.
[2]
TSN, December 14, 1994, pp. 7-8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Exhibit "I"; TSN, February 7, 1995, p. 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Exhibit "1"; TSN, November 8, 1994, pp. 3-4.
[5]
Exhibit "C".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
TSN, December 14, 1995, p. 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
TSN, November 8, 1994, pp. 6-7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Exhibit "B"; TSN, December 14, 1994, pp. 12-14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
TSN, February 7, 1995, p.p. 4-5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id., p. 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
TSN, August 18, 1995, pp. 3-4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
TSN, June 8, 1995, pp. 2-5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Exhibit "D".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Petition, Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 29-36. Penned by Judge Emma
Eronico-Supremo.
[15]
Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 24-28. Penned by Judge Pacito A. Yape.
[16]
See footnote no. 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Comment, Rollo, p. 57.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Appellant’s Brief, Original Records, pp. 97-101.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
People vs. Lacsa, 339 SCRA 178, 190 [2000]; People vs.
Continente,
339 SCRA 1, 29 [2000]; People vs. Barro, Sr. 338 SCRA 312, 322 [2000].
[20]
Tangquilig vs. CA, 334 Phil. 68, 74 [1997].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
TSN, December 14, 1994, p. 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Article 1159, Civil Code of the Philippines.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Article 1170, Civil Code of the Philippines.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Article 1173, Civil Code of the Philippines.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
TSN, January 20, 1995, p. 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
TSN, August 18, 1995, p. 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
TSN, June 8, 1995, pp. 6-7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
TSN, November 8, 1994, p. 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Article 280 of the Labor Code pertinently provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art.
280. Regular and Casual Employment. - The provisions of
written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement
of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee
has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer xxx.
[30]
Exhibits "B"; "F"; "G".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 356 [2000].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Magat, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 337 SCRA 298, 308 [2000]; Integrated
Packaging
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 170 [2000].
[33]
TSN, June 8, 1995, p. 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 413, 432 [1997].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |