THIRD DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
REPRESENTED BY
THE NATIONAL
CENTENNIAL
COMMISSION,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
141530
March 18, 2003
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS,
HON. CHRISTOPHER LOCK,IN HIS CAPACITY
AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OFBRANCH 88 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFCAVITE CITY, AND
FE A. MANUEL AND METROBANK,CAVITE CITY BRANCH,
Respondents.
|
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to annul the Resolution dated March 15, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals[1]
which dismissed (1) the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner
Republic of the Philippines for having been filed out of time and (2)
the
subsequent resolution which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts
follow.cralaw:red
In line with the centennial
celebration of Philippine Independence on June 12, 1998, the government
embarked on several commemorative Centennial Freedom Trail (CFT)
projects.
One of these projects was the construction of the Tejeros Convention
Center
and the founding site of the Philippine Army on the 3,497 sq. m.
property
of respondent Fe Manuel located in Tejeros, Rosario, Cavite. The said
property
was declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a historical
landmark in its Resolution No. 2 dated April 19, 1995.[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To carry out the Tejeros
Convention Project, the government, through the National Centennial
Commission
(NCC), filed on December 4, 1997 a complaint for expropriation against
respondents Fe Manuel and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank).[3]
The land was mortgaged by Fe Manuel to Metrobank and was
extrajudicially
foreclosed by the latter on November 20, 1997.[4]
Respondent Fe Manuel interposed no objection to the expropriation as
long
as just compensation was paid.[5]
On May 27, 1998, Presiding
Judge Christopher Lock of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City,
Branch
88, dismissed the complaint for expropriation on the ground of
lack
of cause of action. The trial court ruled that, based on the 1987
Administrative
Code,[6]
there were: (1) no prior determination by the President as to the
necessity
or wisdom of the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and (2) no
prior
written authority for the Solicitor General to institute the
expropriation
case. Without such conditions precedent, the trial court ruled that
plaintiff
had no cause of action to file the expropriation case.[7]
The trial court also ruled that the NCC had no power under Executive
Order
No. 128[8]
to acquire real estate properties through negotiated sale, nor to
recommend
to the President the propriety of taking property through condemnation
proceedings. It explained that since the NCC's life was only up
to
the June 12, 1998 celebrations, the fear of defendant Metrobank that
there
would be no more entity to process its claim for just compensation was
perfectly valid. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint
for
expropriation.[9]
On June 17, 1998, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order
dismissing
its complaint. The trial court denied the motion in its order dated
October
6, 1998, a copy of which was received by the petitioner on October 12,
1998.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 11, 1998,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Christopher
Lock
for summarily dismissing its complaint and denying its motion for
reconsideration.[11]
The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, in its resolution dated March 15, 1999, for
having
been filed out of time. It also denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration
in its January 13, 2000 resolution.[12]
Aggrieved, petitioner
filed the instant petition for review, arguing that the Court of
Appeals
should not have applied to its case the amendment made to Section 4,
Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on September
1, 1998. Procedural rules, petitioner argued, should not be given
retroactive effect where their application would result in injustice.
Petitioner
invoked Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides
that liberality should be observed in construing the Rules of Court in
order to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Petitioner also called the
Court's attention to the case of Solar Team Entertainment vs. Ricafort,[13]
wherein we accorded liberality to the implementation of Section 11,
Rule
13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[14]
We ruled in the said case that strict compliance with Section 11, Rule
13 thereof shall be required 1 month from the promulgation of the
Court's
decision or 2 years from the time the Rules actually took effect.
Petitioner
said that Solar Team and its case were similar in that both arose about
the time when a new amendment was being implemented; hence, its case
should
be accorded the same consideration given in Solar Team.[15]
In its Memorandum dated
September 11, 2001, petitioner invoked A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which took
effect
on September 1, 2000, specifically amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the
1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC was the amendment
reverting
to the original rule that the 60-day period for filing a petition for
certiorari
shall be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Private respondent Fe
Manuel, owner and mortgagor of the land subject of expropriation,
interposed
no objection to the expropriation in her Comment to the petition for
review.[17]
She in fact adopted the arguments of the petitioner in her Memorandum.[18]
On the other hand, Metrobank
asserted that the petition for certiorari was correctly dismissed
because
it was filed out of time. It argued that when petitioner received the
order
of the trial court denying its motion for reconsideration on October
12,
1998, the new Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended by the Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated July
21,
1998 in Bar Matter No. 803, was already in effect. Said amended rule,
effective
as of September 1, 1998, provides that the 60-day period shall be
reckoned
from receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution. Thus, based
on this new rule, the petition for certiorari was filed 14 days late.[19]
The sole issue at hand
is whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of
the Philippines before the Court of Appeals was filed out of time.cralaw:red
The petition is meritorious.cralaw:red
In dismissing the petition
for certiorari for having been filed out of time, the Court of Appeals
applied Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended
by the July 21, 1998 Bar Matter No. 803, effective September 1, 1998,
which
provides:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 4. Where and when
petition to be filed. - The petition may be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed in the Supreme Court, or if it relates to the acts or
omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of
Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in
the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves
the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided
by the law or the Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable
only by the Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
If the petitioner had
filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after
notice
of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be
interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period but which shall not be less than
five
(5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No
extension
of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most
compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis ours)
Strictly speaking, the
Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for having been
filed out of time because the prevailing rule at that time provided
that
the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be
reckoned
from receipt of the assailed decision or order. The period is
interrupted
when a motion for reconsideration is filed but it starts to run again
from
receipt of the denial of the said motion for reconsideration.
Based
on this amendment, respondent Court of Appeals ruled that the filing of
the petition for certiorari was 14 days late. The respondent Court of
Appeals
ruled:
In the petition at bench,
records show that the Office of the Solicitor General received a copy
of
the Court a quo's Order dated May 7, 1998 on June 3, 1998 and that a
motion
for reconsideration was filed on June 17, 1998. Therefore, there was a
lapse of fourteen (14) days from receipt of the assailed Order before
the
OSG filed a motion for reconsideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Considering the material
dates stated above, the Office of the Solicitor General had only
forty-six
46 days left from October 12, 1988 (sic), date when it received the
Order
denying the motion for reconsideration dated October 6, 1998 or until
November
27, 1998 within which to file the instant petition for certiorari.
However,
the petition was filed only on December 11, 1998 by registered mail.
Therefore,
it was filed fourteen (14) days late.[20]
However, Section 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Bar Matter
No.
803 effective September 1, 1998, was recently amended by A.M. No.
00-2-03-SC
effective September 1, 2000. The recent rule no longer provides that
the
60-day period shall be reckoned from receipt of the assailed decision,
order or resolution. Instead, it provides that the 60-day period shall
be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The rule at present reads as follows:
Sec. 4. When and where
petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.cralaw:red
The petition shall be
filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of
a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined
by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether
or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan
if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. It if involves the acts
or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law
or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by
the
Court of Appeals.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
No extension of time
to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and
in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis ours)
The amendment under
A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or remedial in character. It
does not create new or remove vested rights but only operates in
furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is
settled
that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive
law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes.
They
may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a
person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no
vested
rights in rules of procedure.[21]
The retroactive application
of A.M. 00-2-03-SC has, in fact, already been ordered by this Court in
a number of recent cases, such as Systems Factors Corporation vs. NLRC,[22]
Unity Fishing Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[23]
Docena et. al. vs. Lapesura,[24]
Pfizer vs. Galan[25]
and Universal Robina Corporation et. al. vs. Court of Appeals et. al.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, by virtue of this
retroactive application of A.M. 00-2-03-SC, we hold that the instant
petition
for certiorari was filed on time. In fact, there is no dispute that the
petition was filed by petitioner on the 60th day from receipt of the
order
denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner received the denial
on October 12, 1998 and it filed the petition for certiorari on
December
11, 1998. Clearly therefore the petition was filed on time.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is granted. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
March
15, 1999 and January 13, 2000 are hereby set aside and the case is
remanded
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.cralaw:red
No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Panganiban,
Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and concurred in by
Associate
Justice Oswald D. Agcaoili and Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello,
Jr.
Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 35-37.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 13, 51.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, pp. 13, 53.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 110, 120.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 73-79.
[6]
Section 12, Chapter 4, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 39-44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Dated October 4, 1993.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 39-44.
[10]
Rollo, p. 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[12]
Rollo, p. 15.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
293 SCRA [1998].
[14]
A mandatory provision in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
requires
a party to explain his/her failure to effect a personal filing of a
pleading
in court or personal service thereof on an adverse party.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 16-20.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Rollo, pp. 201-204.
[17]
Rollo, pp. 73-79.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 180-188.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 110-112; 235-237.
[20]
Rollo, pp. 35-37.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Systems Factors Corporation vs. NLRC, 346 SCRA 149, 152 [2000], citing
Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil 208 [1953]; Gregorio vs. CA , 26 SCRA 229
[1968];
Tinio vs. Mina, 26 SCRA 512 [1968]; Billones vs. CIR, 14 SCRA 674
[1965].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
346 SCRA 140 [2000].
[23]
351 SCRA 140 [2001].
[24]
G.R. No. 140153, March 23, 2001.
[25]
G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001.
[26]
G.R. No. 144978, January 15, 2002. |