THIRD DIVISION
BPI FAMILY
SAVINGS
BANK, INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
141974
August 9, 2004
-versus-
SPS. JANUARIO
ANTONIO
VELOSO
AND NATIVIDAD VELOSO,
Respondents.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I
O N
CORONA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a petition
for review of the Decision[1]
dated February 14, 2000 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City,[2]
which upheld the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
initiated by Family Bank and Trust Company (Family Bank) on the
mortgaged
properties of respondent spouses Januario Antonio Veloso and Natividad
Veloso but allowed the latter to redeem the same properties.
On January 8, 1983,
respondent spouses obtained a loan of P1,300,000 from petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest
Family Bank and Trust Company. To secure payment of the loan,
respondent
spouses executed in favor of the bank a deed of mortgage over three
parcels
of land, with improvements, registered in their names under TCT Nos.
272227,
272228 and 272229 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On February 9, 1983,
respondents, for value received, executed a promissory note for
P1,300,000.
Subsequently, however, respondents defaulted in the monthly
installments
due on their loan. When efforts to update the account failed, Family
Bank
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on the respondents’
mortgaged
properties.cralaw:red
On July 1, 1985, the
properties were sold at public auction with Family Bank as the highest
bidder for P2,782,554.66.cralaw:red
On August 5, 1985, Family
Bank assigned all its rights and interests in the foreclosed properties
to petitioner BPI Family Bank, Inc. (BPI).cralaw:red
On August 28, 1985,
the sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of
Deeds
of Quezon City.cralaw:red
On July 24, 1986, respondents,
through counsel, wrote BPI offering to redeem the foreclosed properties
for P1,872,935. This was, however, rejected by petitioner.cralaw:red
On August 27, 1986,
respondents filed in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, a
complaint
for annulment of foreclosure, with consignation and prayer for damages.
On motion of respondents, the trial court, in an order dated August 27,
1986, allowed respondents to deposit with the clerk of court the sum of
P1,500,000 representing the redemption price. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.cralaw:red
Meanwhile, in Branch
76 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, BPI was able to secure a
writ of possession over the foreclosed properties. This prompted
respondents
to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with
preliminary
injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 22681. On October 8, 1990, the
Court
of Appeals resolved to grant respondents’ motion for preliminary
mandatory
injunction.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Eventually, however,
in a decision promulgated on May 31, 1991, the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R.
SP No. 22681, resolved the issue of possession in favor of BPI and
accordingly
lifted the preliminary mandatory injunction it had earlier issued,
denying
altogether respondents’ petition. From this decision, respondents came
to this Court via a petition for review which was, however, denied in a
resolution dated January 13, 1992. The resolution affirmed, in
effect,
petitioner’s right to the possession of the subject properties.cralaw:red
On December 16, 1992,
upon motion of respondents and despite the opposition of petitioner,
Branch
94 ordered the release of P1,400,000 of the consigned amount to
respondents,
with the balance of P100,000 to take the place of the injunction bond
to
answer for whatever damages petitioner might suffer because of the
issuance
of the preliminary injunction (previously issued and later lifted) in
favor
of respondents.cralaw:red
Finally, on August 18,
1995, after almost a decade of protracted litigation, the trial court
rendered
a decision declaring the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure of
the mortgaged properties of respondents but allowed the redemption of
the
same at a redemption price of P2,140,000.cralaw:red
BPI elevated the matter
to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision, with
modification:
WHEREFORE, subject to
the modification declaring P2,678,639.80 as the redemption price due
the
appellant, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respects.[3]
Hence, the instant petition
based on the following assigned errors:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT
AFFIRMED
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ALLOWED THE RESPONDENTS TO REDEEM
THE
FORECLOSED PROPERTY.
II
ASSUMING FOR THE
SAKE
OF ARGUMENT, BUT WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, NEVERTHELESS
IT DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT FIXED THE
REDEMPTION
PRICE TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS TO PETITIONER AT ONLY P2,678,639.80 AND
SHALL ONLY EARN 1% PER MONTH UNDER SECTION 28, RULE 39 OF THE 1997
RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
The fact is that, at
the time of the foreclosure sale on July 1, 1985, respondent
spouses
Veloso had already defaulted on their loan to petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest
Family Bank. In a real estate mortgage, when the principal obligation
is
not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose on the
mortgage
and to have the property seized and sold, and to apply the proceeds to
the obligation.[4]
Foreclosure is proper if the debtor is in default in the payment of his
obligation.[5]
And in this case, the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure on
July
1, 1985 was confirmed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
We find no reason to question it.cralaw:red
The sole question therefore
that remains to be resolved is: did respondent spouses comply with all
the requirements for the redemption of the subject properties?
We answer in the negative.cralaw:red
The general rule in
redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person offering to
redeem
manifests his desire to do so. The statement of intention must be
accompanied
by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. This constitutes the
exercise
of the right to repurchase.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In several cases[7]
decided by the Court where the right to repurchase was held to have
been
properly exercised, there was an unequivocal tender of payment for the
full amount of the repurchase price. Otherwise, the offer to redeem is
ineffectual.[8]
Bona fide redemption necessarily implies a reasonable and valid tender
of the entire repurchase price, otherwise the rule on the redemption
period
fixed by law can easily be circumvented. As explained by this Court in
Basbas vs. Entena:[9]
x x x the existence
of the right of redemption operates to depress the market value of the
land until the period expires, and to render that period indefinite by
permitting the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with either party
unable to foresee when final judgment will terminate the action,
would render nugatory the period of two years fixed by the statute for
making the redemption and virtually paralyze any efforts of the
landowner
to realize the value of his land. No buyer can be expected to acquire
it
without any certainty as to the amount for which it may be redeemed, so
that he can recover at least his investment in case of redemption. In
the
meantime, the landowner’s needs and obligations cannot be met. It is
doubtful
if any such result was intended by the statute, absent clear wording to
that effect.cralaw:red
Consequently, in this
case, the offer by respondents on July 24, 1986 to redeem the
foreclosed
properties for P1,872,935 and the subsequent consignation in court of
P1,500,000
on August 27, 1986, while made within the period[10]
of redemption, was ineffective since the amount offered and actually
consigned
not only did not include the interest but was in fact also way below
the
P2,782,554.66 paid by the highest bidder/purchaser of the properties
during
the auction sale.cralaw:red
In Bodiongan vs. Court
of Appeals,[11]
we held:
In order to effect a
redemption, the judgment debtor must pay the purchaser the
redemption
price composed of the following:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(1) the price which
the purchaser paid for the property; (2) interest of 1% per month on
the
purchase price; (3) the amount of any assessments or taxes which the
purchaser
may have paid on the property after the purchase; and (4) interest of
1%
per month on such assessments and taxes x x x.cralaw:red
Furthermore, Article
1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The vendor cannot avail
himself of the right to repurchase without returning to the vendee the
price of the sale x x x.cralaw:red
It is not difficult
to understand why the redemption price should either be fully offered
in
legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can
the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being made in
good faith.cralaw:red
The sum of P1,400,000
consigned by respondents in Branch 94 was subsequently withdrawn by
them,
leaving only P100,000 to take the place of the injunction bond. This
would
have been tantamount to requiring petitioner to accept payment by
installments
as there would have necessarily been an indefinite extension of the
redemption
period.[12]
If a partial payment can bind the winning bidder or purchaser in an
auction
sale, by what rule can the payment of the balance be determined?
Petitioner
could not be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without any
assurance
that respondents could pay the repurchase price immediately. A contrary
rule would leave the buyers at foreclosure sales open to harassment by
expectedly angry debtors and cause unnecessary prolongation of the
redemption
period, contrary to the policy of the law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Whether or not respondents
were diligent in asserting their willingness to pay is irrelevant.
Redemption
within the period allowed by law is not a matter of intent but a
question
of payment or valid tender of the full redemption price within said
period.cralaw:red
The disposition of the
instant case in the trial court unnecessarily dragged for almost a
decade.
Now, it is on its 18th year and still respondents have not tendered the
full redemption price. Nor have they consigned the full amount, if only
to prove their willingness and ability to pay. This would have
evidenced
their good faith.cralaw:red
The law granted respondents
the right of redemption. But in so granting that right, the law
intended
that their offer to redeem be valid and effective, accompanied by an
actual
tender of the redemption price. Fixing a definite term within which the
property should be redeemed is meant to avoid prolonged economic
uncertainty
over the ownership of the thing sold. In the case at bar, the
offer
was not a legal and effective exercise of the right of redemption
contemplated
by law, hence, refusal of the offer by petitioner was completely
justified.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, respondents
cannot argue that the law on equity should prevail. Equity applies only
in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules
of
procedure.[13]
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint filed by respondents, the spouses Veloso, is hereby dismissed.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, J.,
(Chairman),
and Carpio-Morales, J.,
concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J., on leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by then
Associate
Justices Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now
Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court and Court Administrator, respectively) of
the Second Division.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Presided by Judge Romeo F. Zamora.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, p. 53.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Commodity Financing Co., Inc. vs. Jimenez, 91 SCRA 57 [1979].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Bicol Savings and Loan Association vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 630
[1989].
[6]
Angao vs. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152 [1910].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Fructo vs. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362 [1910]; Retes vs. Suelto, 20 Phil. 394
[1911]; Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495 [1913]; Canuto vs.
Mariano,
37 Phil. 840 [1918]; Dela Cruz, et al. vs. Resurreccion, et al., 98
Phil.
975 [1956].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Rumbaoa vs. Argaza, 84 Phil. 812 [1949].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
28 SCRA 665 [1969].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Sec. 28, Rule 39, Rules of Court. “x x x redemptioner may redeem the
property
from the purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of
the
registration of the certificate of sale, by paying the purchaser the
amount
of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in
addition
up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any
assessments
or taxes x x x.”
[11]
248 SCRA 496 [1995].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Conejero, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 775 [1996].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Pilipinas Hino, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 355 [2000]; Smith,
Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997];
David-Chan
vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]. |