SECOND DIVISION
ROMUALDO C. PEREZ,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
142503
June 20, 2003
-versus-
APOLONIO CRUZ,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Petition for Review
on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals, dated August 21, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No.
34979,
as well as its Resolution[2]
dated March 10, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
That decision had set aside the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 404-M-94, which ruled
that
the Municipal Trial Court of Hagonoy, Bulacan had no jurisdiction to
hear
and try the ejectment case docketed as Civil Case No. 979.chanrobles virtual law library
The factual backdrop
of this case, as drawn from the records, are as follows:
The instant controversy
arose from an ejectment case filed by herein respondent Apolonio Cruz
before
the MTC of Hagonoy in 1991. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 979, alleged that Cruz is the owner of Residential Lot No. 5095
declared
in his name as per Sworn Statement Index No. 14-0248-537, as required
by
Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 464, as amended by P.D. No. 1621.[3]
Cruz averred that he inherited this lot from his mother, Salvestia
Crisostomo[4]
who, in turn, acquired the same from herein petitioner Romualdo Perez,
through a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan."[5]
Cruz claimed that Perez requested his permission to build his house on
a small portion of said property, as Perez had nowhere to erect his
dwelling
on. This request was granted, as they are close relatives.[6]
Unknown to Cruz, however,
Perez filed an application for issuance of title covering the subject
land
with the Land Management Section, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region III, San Fernando City, Pampanga. When
Cruz
learned of Perez’s design, he immediately opposed the
application.
Accordingly, Cruz demanded that Perez remove his house from the land
and
vacate the same. When petitioner failed to heed the demand,
respondent
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against him.[7]
Perez denied Cruz’s
ownership of the property. He claimed to be owner of the lot in
question,
having inherited the same from his grandmother. He asserted that
he had been in continuous possession for many years. To support
his
claim, Perez presented Tax Declaration No. 26682 and official receipts
of tax payments. Perez submitted that the MTC had no jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 979, as the issue involved was one of ownership,
not
mere possession, of the land.cralaw:red
On February 12, 1992,
the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 979 on the ground of want of
jurisdiction,
holding that the main issue is one of ownership, not mere possession de
facto.[8]
Cruz appealed said decision to the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13,
as Civil Case No. 206-M-92.chanrobles virtual law library
Meanwhile, on March
31, 1992, the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Region III,
disapproved
the survey of Lot No. 5075,[9]
Cad. 304-D, submitted by Perez, thereby sustaining Cruz’s
opposition.
Cruz was then directed to file the appropriate public land application
for the land subject of the controversy.[10]
On June 29, 1992, the
RTC of Malolos, Branch 13, rendered its decision in Civil Case No.
206-M-92,
reversing the MTC ruling, and ordering the remand of the records of
Civil
Case No. 979, for trial on the merits.[11]
On remand, the MTC decided
Civil Case No. 979 as follows:
IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING, this Court finds for the plaintiff and against the
defendant
ordering the latter to:
1. remove
his
house and vacate the plaintiff’s lot and deliver the possession thereof
to the plaintiff;
2. pay plaintiff
the
amount of P100.00 a month as rental reckoned from the date of the
filing
of the complaint until the complete possession thereof is delivered to
the plaintiff;
3. pay plaintiff
the
amount of P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
4. pay the costs
of
suit.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Perez seasonably
appealed
the foregoing judgment to the RTC of Malolos, this time in Branch 10,
docketed
as Civil Case No. 404-M-94. On August 1, 1994, the RTC of
Malolos,
Branch 10, decided Civil Case No. 404-M-94 as follows:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the appealed decision.chanrobles virtual law library
Pursuant to
Section
10, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, let the entire record of
this
case be remanded to the court of origin.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The RTC of Malolos,
Branch
10, found that in Civil Case No. 979, the question of ownership was
inextricably
intertwined with the issue of possession. Since the issue of
possession
could not be resolved without first addressing the question of
ownership,
Civil Case No. 979 should have been dismissed, following case law.
Cruz then elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review.
Cruz
theorized that inasmuch as the decision of the RTC of Malolos, Branch
13,
holding that the issue in Civil Case No. 979 was not ownership but
possession
de facto, had become final, it was error for Branch 10 to rule on said
issue and reverse Branch 13’s ruling.cralaw:red
On August 21, 1995,
the appellate court disposed of the controversy as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition for review is GRANTED and the decision of the
public
respondent dated August 1, 1994 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a
new judgment is rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court, dated January 24, 1994, in favor of plaintiff-petitioner.
We make no pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Court of Appeals
held
that the decision of the Regional Director of Lands disapproving the
survey
application of petitioner Perez and affirming the right of respondent
Cruz
to file the application for titling of the subject land rendered moot
and
academic the possessory action in the RTC. Said decision awarding
the land to Cruz gave him a better right of possession over the
disputed
lot as against Perez, a non-awardee.[15]
It likewise held that the RTC of Malolos, Branch 10, erred in reversing
the decision of the RTC of Malolos, Branch 13, because said decision
already
acquired finality. The Court of Appeals agreed with Branch 13
that
the issue involved respondent’s right of prior possession, and
sustained
the ruling of Branch 13 that as early as August 9, 1951,[16]
the predecessor of respondent Cruz already had possession.
Perez then moved for
reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it.cralaw:red
Hence, the instant appeal
by certiorari, with petitioner Perez assigning the following errors:chanrobles virtual law library
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING OR IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER
COURT THAT THIS CASE MUST BE DISMISSED FOR THE INFERIOR COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION
DUE TO:
A.
THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP
WHICH IS CRUCIALLY INTERTWINED WITH POSSESSION; and
B.
THE SUPPOSED TOLERANCE
GIVEN BY RESPONDENT TO PETITIONER, WHICH IS NOT A LEGAL BASIS EITHER
FOR
FORCIBLE ENTRY OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING OR SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER
COURT FOR APPARENTLY, RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EJECTMENT
AGAINST
PETITIONER (DEFENDANT).[17]
The principal question
for resolution now concerns the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and
decide
Civil Case No. 979 for ejectment.cralaw:red
Petitioner Perez contends
that the alleged tolerance given by respondent to him in occupying the
land does not give rise to a cause of action for unlawful detainer but
rather accion publiciana, which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.[18]
Citing Velez v. Avelino,[19]
he insists that where the preponderance of evidence shows that the
occupancy
by the defendant of the lot in question is due to the tolerance of the
owners thereof and against the latter’s will, the case becomes one for
accion publiciana, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial
Court.[20]
Respondent, in his Memorandum,
counters that it is erroneous for petitioner to conclude that the mere
defense of claim of ownership over the lot in question divests the MTC
of jurisdiction over the case for unlawful detainer.[21]
It is hornbook law that
jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the complaint. In
civil cases, if a complaint is filed involving a subject matter within
the jurisdiction of an inferior court, but if after the trial, it
appears
that the subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a
superior
court, the inferior court cannot render judgment but must dismiss the
case.[22]
In the complaint for
ejectment filed before the Hagonoy MTC, it was alleged by plaintiff
Cruz
that defendant (now petitioner) Perez pleaded that he be allowed to
construct
his house as he had no other parcel of land on which to build a
house.
The complaint further alleged that it was by mere tolerance that Cruz,
now respondent herein, allowed Perez to occupy a small portion of the
lot.
Petitioner Perez constructed his house without paying any rent for the
reasonable use and occupancy of said portion of Cruz’s lot.[23]
Taking the allegations
in the complaint as basis, in our view, there is no doubt that the case
is one for unlawful detainer. The Hagonoy MTC had the
jurisdiction
to hear and decide Civil Case No. 979.cralaw:red
Petitioner’s reliance
on Avelino is inappropriate. Decided in 1984, Avelino has been
superseded
by our decision in Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of
Appeals,
promulgated on February 21, 1990. In Banco de Oro, we held that a
person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary
action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.[24]chanrobles virtual law library
Anent petitioner’s claim
that the issue is not one of mere possession but rather of ownership,
Dehesa
v. Macalalag[25]
is instructive. For in Dehesa, we held that in ejectment cases,
the
defendant cannot deprive the court of jurisdiction by simply claiming
ownership
of the property involved. Precisely with the aim of preventing a
possible anomaly, the provisions of the Rules of Court governing
unlawful
detainer and forcible entry were revised. When the defendant
raises
the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of physical
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.[26]
Should the inferior court make any determination on the issue of
ownership,
the same shall not be conclusive and shall be without prejudice to the
right of the parties to ventilate before the proper court their claims
of ownership over the same land.cralaw:red
The controversy in this
case has undergone permutations since March 1991, when Civil Case No.
979
was filed before the MTC of Hagonoy, Bulacan. Both parties claim
ownership over the same parcel, which is yet untitled. Both
parties
have submitted tax declarations to support their respective
claims.
However, in addition to tax declarations, respondent Cruz presented a
notarized
Deed of Sale, which shows that petitioner Perez sold already the
subject
land to respondent’s mother. Before us, however, Perez insists
that
said deed is invalid as his signature thereon is a forgery. Cruz,
in turn, points out that the State Prosecutor assigned to Malolos
dismissed
the criminal case for falsification of public document filed by
petitioner,
docketed as I.S. No. 92-1296, for insufficiency of evidence.[27]
Petitioner Perez is silent on this allegation of Cruz before us, nor is
there any showing in the records that Perez appealed the dismissal of
I.S.
No. 92-1296 to the Department of Justice.cralaw:red
Equally telling is the
factual finding by the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Region
III, that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of regularity
of
the notarized Deed of Sale upon which respondent based his claim of
ownership.
Thus, the DENR likewise disbelieved Perez’s claim of forgery.
Needless
to stress, findings of fact of an administrative agency are binding and
conclusive upon this Court, for as long as substantial evidence
supports
said factual findings. It is not the task of an appellate court
to
weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body
and
to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency
concerning
sufficiency of evidence.[28]
All things considered, we are persuaded that respondent Cruz
successfully
proved his right to retain possession of the disputed parcel of land.chanrobles virtual law library
However, the question
of ownership is yet to be resolved with finality and
conclusiveness.
Although the DENR has disapproved the cadastral survey submitted by
petitioner
Perez, he could contest respondent Cruz’s application for said lot,
which
yet remains to be titled. That administrative agency should be
the
arena where the parties could first tackle the issue of ownership.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision dated August
21,
1995 and the resolution dated March 10, 2000, both by the Court of
Appeals
in CA-GR SP 34979, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J.,
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul, with Associate Justices
Eubulo
G. Verzola, and B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz concurring. Rollo, pp.
23-28.
[2]
Id. at 34.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Records, p. 101.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Also referred to as "Salustia Crisostomo" elsewhere in the records; Id.
at 32.
[5]
CA Rollo, pp. 11, 26; Records, p. 101.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Supra, note 3.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Records, p. 6.
[8]
CA Rollo, p. 4.
[9]
As appearing on page 2, Dispositive portion of the DENR Order; Id. at
14-15.
[10]
Id. at 14-16.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Id. at 22-25.
[12]
Id. at 30.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Rollo, p. 21.
[14]
Id. at 27.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Id. at 65.
[16]
Id. at 63-64.
[17]
Id. at 13.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Id. at 14.
[19]
212 Phil. 556 (1984).chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Sps. Medina and Bernal v. Valdellon, No. L-38510, 25 March 1975, 63
SCRA
278, 282-283.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 54-55.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
See J. FERIA, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED I, 135 (2001).
[23]
Records, p. 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
G.R. No. 85448, 21 February 1990, 182 SCRA 464, 469 citing Dakudao v.
Consolacion,
207 Phil. 750, 756 (1983).
[25]
G.R. No. L-29096, 23 February 1978, 81 SCRA 543, 546.chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 16.chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Rollo, pp. 56-57.chanrobles virtual law library
[28]
Bulilan v. Commission on Audit, 360 Phil. 626, 634 (1998) citing
Villaflor
v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 524, 562 (1997). |