EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R.
No.
142556
February 5, 2003 -versus-
JESUS PEREZ Y
SEBUNGA,
Accused-Appellant. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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D E C I S I O N
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PER
CURIAM:
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For automatic review is
the Decision[1]
dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
Branch
69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez
("appellant"
for brevity), guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca ("Mayia" for brevity)
and
imposing on appellant the death penalty.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On January 22, 1997,
the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor[2]
of Zambales filed an Information[3]
charging appellant with the crime of rape "penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610," committed as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"That on or about the
17th day of January, 1997 at 12:00 noon at Sitio Baco, Brgy. Macarang,
in the Municipality of Palauig, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
lewd design and by means of coercion, inducement and other
consideration,
did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual
intercourse with one Mayia P. Ponseca, a minor of 6 years old, without
her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter."
Upon arraignment, appellant,
assisted by counsel de officio Atty. Genaro N. Montefalcon, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.[4]
Subsequently, the trial court allowed the withdrawal of Atty.
Montefalcon
as counsel for health reasons. The trial court appointed Atty. Roberto
Blanco as appellant’s counsel de oficio.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the pre-trial, the
prosecution and defense stipulated on the following facts:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"1. The
identity of the accused;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. The
accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity thereof;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. The
victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca, was born on 23 May 1990 as
evidenced
by her birth certificate;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. That
after the incident, the child was subjected to a medico-legal
examination
to which a medico-legal certificate was issued by Dr. Editha Divino.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The prosecution marked
in evidence the birth certificate of the victim Mayia O. Ponseca as
Exhibit
‘A’, and the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Editha Divino as
Exhibit
‘B’."[6]
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: the victim, Mayia
Ponseca;
the victim’s mother, Hermie Ponseca; the victim’s father, Osias
Ponseca;
Virginia Espejo Giron; and Dr. Editha dela Cruz Divino. On the other
hand,
the defense presented appellant and his employer, Bartolome Tolentino.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Office of the Solicitor
General ("OSG" for brevity) summarized the prosecution’s version of the
incident in the appellee’s brief, to wit:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On January 17, 1997,
about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay Macarang, Palauig, Zambales,
six-year
old Mayia Ponseca was walking along Sulok on her way to her house in
Sitio
Camiling when appellant Jesus Sebunga Perez approached her (pp. 7-8,
TSN,
December 15, 1998). Appellant introduced himself as "Johnny" and
immediately
afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen (p. 10, TSN,
December
15, 1998). Still in shock, Mayia fell down (id.). At that point, a dog
arrived and barked at them.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant then proceeded
to lower his black denim pants while simultaneously removing Mayia’s
panty.
He then inserted his penis inside Mayia’s vagina (p. 11, id.). Mayia
felt
excruciating pain in her private parts (sic) but was not able to repel
her aggressor whose strength and weight totally engulfed her. Her only
recourse was to cry while her young body was being ravished (p. 13,
id.).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After satisfying his
beastly desires, appellant raised his pants and ran away (p. 14, id.).
Notwithstanding that her vagina was bleeding profusely and her dress
now
covered with her own blood, Mayia managed to stand up and seek help.
She
ran to the house of Virginia Giron, which was only fifty (50) meters
away
from the scene of the crime. In fact, Giron was outside when she heard
her dog barking (apparently, it was the same dog barking at appellant
while
he was consummating his lust on Mayia, pp. 2-3, TSN, January 12, 1999;
p. 11, TSN, December 15, 1998). Looking at the direction of the noise,
she saw a confused Mayia approaching her with blood dripping from her
private
parts and thighs. When Giron asked Mayia what happened, the latter
shouted
"ni-rape ako, ni-rape ako" (p. 4, TSN, January 4, 1999). Giron then
summoned
her husband and other companions to look for Mayia’s attacker but was
unable
to find him. Giron then proceeded to Hermie Ponseca and Osias Ponseca,
Mayia’s parents, to inform them of what happened (p. 5, TSN, January 5,
1999; p. 2, TSN, January 19, 1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When her parents asked
Mayia if she knew her assailant, the latter answered the name "Johnny."
(id.) The couple brought their daughter to the President Ramon
Magsaysay
Memorial Hospital for medical examination (p. 2, TSN, February 24,
1999).
She was examined by Dra. Editha Dela Cruz Divino, who issued a
medico-legal
certificate dated January 23, 1997 stating the following:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a. Bleeding
of genitalia coming from median laceration at the vaginal floor around
four (4) centimeters in size. Possible cause, a fall and then hitting a
sharp object and also an alleged sexual assault (p. 4, TSN, February
24,
1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
b. Genitalia
had hymenal lacerations at 3, 6, 9 and 12 o’clock positions.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(pp. 4-6
id.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Because of the extent
of the damage on her genitals, Mayia undertook an IV sedation operation
to repair her lacerations (p. 6, id.) During her confinement at the
hospital,
the Ponseca couple reported the incident to the Palauig PNP Police
Station
and recounted their daughter’s narration including the name of the
culprit
as "Johnny" who, according to their neighbors, was a worker at the
fishpond
of Bartolome Tolentino (pp. 11-12, TSN, January 5, 1999). Police
operatives
then proceeded to the said fishpond and arrested appellant. After her
discharge
from the hospital, Mayia learned that appellant was already apprehended
(pp. 3-8, TSN, January 5, 1999). In the police station, she was able to
positively identify the appellant as the person who sexually assaulted
her (p. 18, TSN, December 15, 1998).[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant denied raping
Mayia. Appellant testified that on the date of the alleged rape
incident,
he was working at a fishpond at Macarang, Zambales. He heard of the
rape
of a young girl from his manager, Bartolome Tolentino ("Tolentino" for
brevity).[8]
Appellant further testified that on January 25, 1997, policemen went to
the fishpond where he worked. The policemen arrested appellant and
brought
him to the police station at Palauig. Later, the policemen took him to
the municipal jail of Palauig.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On cross-examination,
appellant testified that his nickname is not "Johnny" but "Jessie."[9]
He testified that on January 17, 1997, at around 12 o’clock noon, he
left
the fishpond and walked home to Barangay Alwa which was about thirty
meters
from the fishpond.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The defense formally
offered the testimony of witness Tolentino to prove that appellant was
employed as caretaker of Tolentino’s fishpond for almost two years
before
the alleged rape incident. Appellant was purportedly of good moral
character
while employed as a fishpond caretaker. The prosecution admitted the
offer
of testimony. Hence, the trial court dispensed with the testimony of
Tolentino
in open court.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After trial, the court
a quo rendered judgment[12]
on October 26, 1999, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE, foregoing
considered, accused Jesus Perez y Sabung (SIC) is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable
doubt of the crime of Statutore Rape, defined and penalized under
Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance that the
victim was only 6 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense,
in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III, Republic Act 7610, and is
sentenced
to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Jesus Perez is directed to pay to the
private
complainant the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as
and
by way of civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as and by way
of moral damages."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this automatic
review.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his brief, appellant
raises the following lone assignment of error:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT."
Appellant contends that
his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular.
Appellant
points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man
wearing
an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her
alleged
rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia identified him in open
court,
she referred to him as a man named "Johnny" and did not give any
description
or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the
cell when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant
bewails that the identification was not done with the usual police
line-up.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant’s contention
is untenable.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As a rule, leading questions
are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the
witness
is a child of tender years[13]
as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without
prompting
or suggestion.[14]
Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their
reluctant
lips.[15]
In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading
questions
to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall
of
events difficult, if not uncertain.[16]
As explained in People v. Rodito Dagamos:[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The trend in procedural
law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over
the
questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule
on Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15,
2000,
namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure
that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental
level
of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue
embarrassment,
and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of
examination
of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of
justice."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court has repeatedly
stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of tender age,
inexperienced
in the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo
a medical examination of her private part, subject herself to public
trial,
and tarnish her family’s honor and reputation, unless she was motivated
by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Mayia recounted her
harrowing experience, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Q What time was this
when Johnny introduced himself to you?
A I do not recall,
ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Was it in the morning,
noontime or in the afternoon or in the evening?
A Noontime, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q So, when Johnny said,
‘Ako si Johnny,’ what did you do?
A None, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q After that when Johnny
said, ‘Ako si Johnny’, what happened?
A He strangled
(sinakal)
me.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Were there persons
around in the place when Johnny strangled you?
A None, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q So, what did he do
then after he strangled you?
A He boxed me on my
stomach, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q When he boxed you
on your stomach, what happened to you?
A I was shocked, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Did you fall down?
A Before that, I was
already lying down, so when he boxed me, I was shocked.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q You said that you
were already lying down. Who made you lie down?
A The person, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Why were you shocked,
Mayia?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A Because he strangled
me and boxed me.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q After he boxed you
on your abdomen, what happened? What else did he do to you?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A There was a dog that
arrived in the place and it barked at us. Then Johnny moved in a hurry
by penetrating my private part and after he dressing (SIC) me, he ran
away.cralaw:red
Q You said that Johnny
penetrated your private part. With what instrument did he use in
penetrating
your private part?
A His penis, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q What was he wearing
at that time?
A A black denim, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q When he used his penis
in entering your private part, did he remove his pants?
A No, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q What did he do with
his pants?
A He brought out his
penis, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q You mean to say Mayia,
he lowered his pants?
A Yes, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q What about you, were
you wearing any panty?
A Yes, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q What was your clothes
at that time?
A A dress, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q When his penis entered
your vagina Mayia, did he remove your panty?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A Yes, ma’m."[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The identity of appellant
as the rapist has been established by the clear, convincing and
straightforward
testimony of Mayia. During the trial, she testified as follows:
"Q Mayia, there is a
man sitting wearing orange t-shirt, do you know this man?
A Yes, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Do you know his name?
A Yes, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q What is his name?
A Johnny, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Why do you know him?
A Because he introduced
himself to me.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Where did he introduced
himself to you?
A At Sulok, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Sulok is a place?
A Yes, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Do you have any companion
when this man introduced himself to you?
A None, ma’m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q How did he introduce
himself to you?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A The man introduced
himself to me by saying, ‘Kilala mo ba ako? Hindi po. Ako si Johnny.’"[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court further
asked Mayia:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Q You were talking
of a certain Johnny. is this Johnny in court now?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A Yes, sir.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Can you point to him?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A Yes, sir.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Point to him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A (Witness pointing
to the person sitting at the accused bench and when asked of his name
answered
Jesus Perez)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Q Is this Johnny whom
you point to the person whom you saw in that ‘Sulok?’chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A Yes, sir."[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Mayia’s simple, positive
and straightforward recounting on the witness stand of her harrowing
experience
lends credence to her accusation. Her tender age belies any allegation
that her accusation was a mere invention impelled by some ill-motive.
As
the Court has stressed in numerous cases, when a woman or a child
victim
says that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary
to show that rape was indeed committed.[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Mayia had a clear sight
of appellant’s face since the rape occurred at "noontime."[23]
Her proximity to appellant during the sexual assault leaves no doubt as
to the correctness of her identification for a man and woman cannot be
physically closer to each other than during the sexual act.[24]
Thus, even if Mayia did not give the identifying marks of appellant,
her
positive identification of appellant sufficed to establish clearly the
identity of her sexual assailant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant’s claim that
the police improperly suggested to Mayia to identify appellant is
without
basis. True, Mayia did not identify appellant in a police line-up when
Mayia identified appellant in his cell. However, appellant, in his
testimony
admitted that he had two other companions in his cell.[25]
Moreover, the Court has held that there is no law requiring a police
line-up
as essential to a proper identification. Even without a police line-up,
there could still be a proper identification as long as the police did
not suggest such identification to the witnesses.[26]
The records are bereft of any indication that the police suggested to
Mayia
to identify appellant as the rapist.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Mayia’s identification
in open court of appellant as her rapist dispels any doubt as to the
proper
identification of appellant. Mayia positively identified and pointed to
appellant as her rapist. We are satisfied that her testimony, by
itself,
is sufficient identification of her rapist. As held in People v.
Marquez:[27]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"xxx. Indeed, the revelation
of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit, as
the willingness of complainant to face police investigation and to
undergo
the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of
the truth of her complaint. Stated differently, it is most improbable
for
a five-year old girl of tender years, so innocent and so guileless as
the
herein offended party, to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to
any man if it were not true."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his Reply Brief,
appellant contends that even assuming that the guilt of appellant has
been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the
death
penalty. Appellant maintains that the death penalty cannot be imposed
on
him for failure of the prosecution to prove Mayia’s age by independent
evidence. Appellant points out that while Mayia’s birth certificate was
duly marked during the pre-trial, it was not presented and identified
during
the trial. Appellant asserts that Mayia’s minority must not only be
specifically
alleged in the Information but must also be established beyond
reasonable
doubt during the trial.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant’s argument
deserves scant consideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the pre-trial, the
parties mutually worked out a satisfactory disposition of the criminal
case. Appellant, assisted by counsel, signed a Pre-Trial Agreement[28]
which, as incorporated in the Pre-Trial Order, stated that:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"x x x.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. The victim in this
case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her
birth
certificate;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x x."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
During the pre-trial,
the prosecution marked in evidence Mayia’s birth certificate as Exhibit
'A'.[29]
The prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence[30]
which included Exhibit 'A', a certified true copy of Mayia’s birth
certificate.
The trial court admitted Exhibit 'A'[31]
without any objection from the defense.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The purpose of pre-trial
is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of
facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver
of
objections to admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of the order
of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes lawful
defenses;
and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of
the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.[32]
Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the
parties.
Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[33]
provides:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"SEC. 4. Pre-trial order.
- After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order
reciting
the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such
order
shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and
control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by
the
court to prevent manifest injustice."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, Mayia herself
testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15,
1998, which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident
occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia testified on cross-examination that
she was "8 years old last May 23."[34]
Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as shown in
her
birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and seven (7) months old
on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule that the
prosecution
has indisputably proven that Mayia was below seven years old at the
time
appellant raped her.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, the trial court
was correct in imposing the death penalty on appellant. Under Article
335[35]
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659,[36]
the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
against
a child below seven (7) years old. Mayia was six (6) years and seven
(7)
months old when appellant raped her.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
If rape is qualified
by any of the circumstances[37]
warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for
actual or compensatory damages is mandatory.[38]
Following prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity is fixed at
P75,000.00.
In addition, moral damages of P50,000.00 should also be awarded to the
rape victim without need for pleading or proving it.[39]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the Decision
dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
Branch
69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez
guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, sentencing him
to suffer the death penalty,[40]
and ordering him to pay the victim Mayia P. Ponseca the amount of
P75,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED in
toto.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In accordance with Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of the Republic
Act No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of
this
case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President of the
Philippines
for possible exercise of the pardoning power.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna,
JJ.,
concur.
Ynares-Santiago,
J., on leave. chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Judge Rodolfo V. Toledano.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Ramon S. Villa.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Records of Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, docketed as I.S. No. 97-38-I,
p. 2.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Ibid., p. 13, Order of February 11, 1997.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Ibid., p. 22, Order of February 18, 1997.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Ibid., p. 97, Pre-Trial Order of December 8,1998.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Rollo, pp. 98-101, Appellee’s Brief, pp. 2-5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
TSN, April 14, 1999, pp. 3-4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Ibid., p. 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Ibid., p. 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
TSN, May 12, 1999, pp. 2-4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Records of Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, pp. 204-222.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Section 10, Rule 132 (as amended effective July 1, 1989) of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"SEC.
10. Leading and misleading questions. - A question which suggests to
the
witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading
question.
It is not allowed, except:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(a)
xxxchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b)
xxxchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(c)
When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers
from
a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble
mind, or a deaf-mute; x x x."
[14]
People v. Losano, 310 SCRA 707 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
People v. Esmeraldo Cana y del Valle, G.R. No. 139229, April 22, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
G.R. No. 137385, January 23, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Supra, see note 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
TSN, December 15, 1998, pp. 9-12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Ibid., pp. 7-8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Ibid., 21.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
People v. Padilla, 355 SCRA 741 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Ibid.; TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
People v. Gener Agoncillo, 358 SCRA 178 (2001); People v. Nestor Munta,
G.R. No. 142606, November 29, 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
TSN, April 14, 1999, pp. 5-7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
People v. Andres Lubong, 332 SCRA 672 (2000) citing People v. Salguero,
198 SCRA 357 (1991).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
347 SCRA 510 (2000).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Records of Criminal Case NO. RTC-2116-I, p. 96.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Ibid., pp. 97 & 154.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Ibid., pp. 152-153.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Ibid., p. 159, Order of April 20, 1999.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Section 1, rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
Effective December 1, 2000. This section was formerly Section 3 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
TSN, December 15, 1998, pp. 3-4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659,
provides:"“When
and how rape is committed. - x x x.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any
of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered
permanent physical mutilation." [36] Further amended by Republic Act
No.
8353, otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law," which took effect on
October
22, 1997 (People v. Ugang, G.R. No. 144036, May 7, 2002). Under the new
law, rape is no longer a private crime but has been reclassified as a
crime
against persons in Article 266-A (Rape, When and How Committed) and
Article
266-B (Penalties) under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code. Article
266-B reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Article
266-B. Penalties. - xxx.
The
death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with
any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim;
2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities
or any law enforcement or penal institution;
3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any
of
the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious
vocation
or calling or and is personally known to be such by the offender before
or at the time of the commission of the crime;
5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Human
Immune-Deficiency
Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other
sexually
transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the
victim;
7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or para-military units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any
law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender took
advantage
of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered
permanent physical mutilation or disability;
9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the
time of the commission of the crime; and
10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the
commission
of crime."
[37]
See
notes 35 & 36.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
People v. Banago, 309 SCRA 417 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
People v. Salustiano Callos, G.R. No. 133478, January 16, 2002; People
v. Felino Llanita, G.R. No. 134101, September 5, 2001; People v.
Torejos,
326 SCRA 75 (2000); People v. Balgos, 323 SCRA 372 (2000); People v.
Alba,
305 SCRA 811 (1999); People v. Ambray, 303 SCRA 697 (1999); People v.
Bolatete,
303 SCRA 709 (1999); People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
Three members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act
No.
7659, insofar as it prescribed the death penalty, is unconstitutional
(People
v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682 [1997]). Nevertheless, they submit to the
ruling
of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty
should be imposed in this case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |