SECOND DIVISION
UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS
BANK
AND LUIS MA.
ONGSIAPCO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
142668
August 31, 2004
-versus-
RUBEN E. BASCO,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari assailing the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2000, affirming, with
modifications,
the decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 146, which found
the petitioner bank liable for payment of damages and attorney’s fees. The Case for the
Respondent
Respondent Ruben E.
Basco had been employed with the petitioner United Coconut Planters
Bank
(UCPB) for seventeen (17) years.[3]
He was also a stockholder thereof and owned 804 common shares of stock
at the par value of P1.00.[4]
He likewise maintained a checking account with the bank at its Las
Piñas
Branch under Account No. 117-001520-6.[5]
Aside from his employment with the bank, the respondent also worked as
an underwriter at the United Coconut Planters Life Association (Coco
Life),
a subsidiary of UCPB since December, 1992.[6]
The respondent also solicited insurance policies from UCPB employees.cralaw:red
On June 19, 1995, the
respondent received a letter from the UCPB informing him of the
termination
of his employment with the bank for grave abuse of discretion and
authority,
and breach of trust in the conduct of his job as Bank Operations
Manager
of its Olongapo Branch. The respondent thereafter filed a
complaint
for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries, and damages against the
bank in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as
NLRC
Cases Nos. 00-09-05354-92 and 00-09-05354-93. However, the
respondent
still frequented the UCPB main office in Makati City to solicit
insurance
policies from the employees thereat. He also discussed the
complaint
he filed against the bank with the said employees.[7]chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent was also
employed by All-Asia Life Insurance Company as an underwriter. At one
time,
the lawyers of the UCPB had an informal conference with him at the head
office of the bank, during which the respondent was offered money so
that
the case could be amicably settled. The respondent revealed the
incident
to some of the bank employees.[8]chanrobles virtual law library
On November 15, 1995,
Luis Ma. Ongsiapco, UCPB First Vice-President, Human Resource Division,
issued a Memorandum to Jesus Belanio, the Vice-President of the
Security
Department, informing him that the respondent’s employment had been
terminated
as of June 19, 1995, that the latter filed charges against the bank and
that the case was still on-going. Ongsiapco instructed Belanio not to
allow
the respondent access to all bank premises.[9]
Attached to the Memorandum was a passport-size picture of the
respondent.
The next day, the security guards on duty were directed to strictly
impose
the security procedure in conformity with Ongsiapco’s Memorandum.[10]
On December 7, 1995,
the respondent, through counsel, wrote Ongsiapco, requesting that such
Memorandum be reconsidered, and that he be allowed entry into the bank
premises.[11]
His counsel emphasized that:
In the
meantime,
we are more concerned with your denying Mr. Basco “access to all bank
premises.”
As you may know, he is currently connected with Cocolife as insurance
agent.
Given his 17-year tenure with your bank, he has established good
relationships
with many UCPB employees, who comprise the main source of his
solicitations.
In the course of his work as insurance agent, he needs free access to
your
bank premises, within reason, to add the unnecessary. Your
memorandum
has effectively curtailed his livelihood and he is once again becoming
a victim of another “illegal termination,” so to speak. And
Shakespeare
said: “You take his life when you do take the means whereby he lives.”
Mr. Basco’s work as
an insurance agent directly benefits UCPB, Cocolife’s mother
company.
He performs his work in your premises peacefully without causing any
disruption
of bank operations. To deny him access to your premises for no
reason
except the pendency of the labor case, the outcome of which is still in
doubt – his liability, if any, certainly has not been proven – is a
clear
abuse of right in violation of our client’s rights. Denying him
access
to the bank, which is of a quasi-public nature, is an undue restriction
on his freedom of movement and right to make a livelihood,
comprising
gross violations of his basic human rights. (This is Human Rights
Week, ironically).chanrobles virtual law library
We understand that
Mr.
Basco has been a stockholder of record of 804 common shares of the
capital
stock of UCPB since July 1983. As such, he certainly deserves
better
treatment than the one he has been receiving from your office regarding
property he partly owns. He is a particle of corporate
sovereignty.
We doubt that you can impose the functional equivalent of the penalty
of
destierro on our client who really wishes only to keep his small place
in the sun, to survive and breathe. No activity can be more
legitimate
than to toil for a living. Let us live and let live.[12]
In his reply dated
December
12, 1995, Ongsiapco informed the respondent that his request could not
be granted:
As you
understand,
we are a banking institution; and as such, we deal with matters
involving
confidences of clients. This is among the many reasons why we, as a
matter
of policy, do not allow non-employees to have free access to areas
where
our employees work. Of course, there are places where visitors
may
meet our officers and employees to discuss business matters;
unfortunately,
we have limited areas where our officers and employees can entertain
non-official
matters.chanrobles virtual law library
Furthermore, in
keeping
with good business practices, the Bank prohibits solicitation, peddling
and selling of goods, service and other commodities within its premises
as it disrupts the efficient performance and function of the employees.chanrobles virtual law library
Please be assured
that
it is farthest from our intention to discriminate against your
client.
In the same vein, it is highly improper for us to carve exceptions to
our
policies simply to accommodate your client’s business ventures.[13]
The respondent was
undaunted.
At 5:30 p.m. of December 21, 1995, he went to the office of Junne
Cacay,
the Assistant Manager of the Makati Branch. Cacay was then having a
conference
with Bong Braganza, an officer of the UCPB Sucat Branch. Cacay
entertained
the respondent although the latter did have an appointment. Cacay even
informed him that he had a friend who wanted to procure an insurance
policy.[14]
Momentarily, a security guard of the bank approached the respondent and
told him that it was already past office hours. He was also reminded
not
to stay longer than he should in the bank premises.[15]
Cacay told the guard that the respondent would be leaving shortly.[16]
The respondent was embarrassed and told Cacay that he was already
leaving.[17]
At 1:30 p.m. of January
31, 1996, the respondent went to the UCPB Makati Branch to receive a
check
from Rene Jolo, a bank employee, and to deposit money with the bank for
a friend.[18]
He seated himself on a sofa fronting the teller’s booth[19]
where other people were also seated.[20]
Meanwhile, two security guards approached the respondent. The guards
showed
him the Ongsiapco’s Memorandum and told him to leave the bank premises.
The respondent pleaded that he be allowed to finish his transaction
before
leaving. One of the security guards contacted the management and was
told
to allow the respondent to finish his transaction with the bank.chanrobles virtual law library
Momentarily, Jose Regino
Casil, an employee of the bank who was in the 7th floor of the
building,
was asked by Rene Jolo to bring a check to the respondent, who was
waiting
in the lobby in front of the teller’s booth.[21]
Casil agreed and went down to the ground floor of the building, through
the elevator. He was standing in the working area near the
Automated
Teller Machine (ATM) Section[22]
in the ground floor when he saw the respondent standing near the sofa[23]
near the two security guards.[24]
He motioned the respondent to come and get the check, but the security
guard tapped the respondent on the shoulder and prevented the latter
from
approaching Casil. The latter then walked towards the respondent
and handed him the check from Jolo.cralaw:red
Before leaving, the
respondent requested the security guard to log his presence in the
logbook.
The guard did as requested and the respondent’s presence was recorded
in
the logbook.[25]
On March 11, 1996, the
respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners UCPB
and
Ongsiapco in the RTC of Manila, alleging inter alia, that:
12. It is
readily
apparent from this exchange of correspondence that defendant bank'’
acknowledged
reason for barring plaintiff from its premises - the pending labor case
– is a mere pretense for its real vindictive and invidious intent: to
prevent
plaintiff, and plaintiff alone, from carrying out his trade as an
insurance
agent among defendant bank’s employees, a practice openly and commonly
allowed and tolerated (encouraged even, for some favored proverbial
sacred
cows) in the bank premises, now being unjustly denied to plaintiff on
spurious
grounds.chanrobles virtual law library
13. Defendants, to
this
day, have refused to act on plaintiff’s claim to be allowed even in
only
the “limited areas where [the bank’s] officers and employees can
entertain
non-official matters” and have maintained the policy banning plaintiff
from all bank premises. As he had dared exercised his legal right
to question his dismissal, he is being penalized with a variation of
destierro,
available in criminal cases where the standard however, after proper
hearing,
is much more stringent and based on more noble grounds than mere pique
or vindictiveness.
14. This
appallingly
discriminatory policy resulted in an incident on January 31, 1996 at
1:30
p.m. at defendant bank’s branch located at its head office, which
caused
plaintiff tremendous undeserved humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of
face.[26]
15. Defendants’
memorandum
and the consequent acts of defendants’ security guards, together with
defendant
Ongsiapco’s disingenuous letter of December 12, 1995, are suggestive of
malice and bad faith in derogation of plaintiff’s right and dignity as
a human being and citizen of this country, which acts have caused him
considerable
undeserved embarrassment. Even if defendants, for the sake of
argument,
may be acting within their rights, they cannot exercise same abusively,
as they must, always, act with justice and in good faith, and give
plaintiff
his due.[27]
The respondent prayed
that,
after trial, judgment be rendered in his favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE,
it is respectfully prayed that judgment issue ordering defendants:chanrobles virtual law library
1. To rescind the
directive
to its agents barring plaintiff from all bank premises as embodied in
the
memorandum of November 15, 1995, and allow plaintiff access to the
premises
of defendant bank, including all its branches, which are open to
members
of the general public, during reasonable hours, to be able to conduct
lawful
business without being subject to invidious discrimination; andchanrobles virtual law library
2. To pay
plaintiff
P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P50,000.00
by way of attorney’s fees.
Plaintiff likewise
prays
for costs, interest, the disbursements of this action, and such other
further
relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.[28]
In their Answer to the
complaint, the petitioners interposed the following affirmative
defenses:
9.
Plaintiff
had been employed as Branch Operations Officer, Olongapo Branch, of
defendant
United Coconut Planters Bank.
In or about the
period
May to June 1992, he was, together with other fellow officers and
employees,
investigated by the bank in connection with various anomalies. As
a result of the investigation, plaintiff was recommended terminated on
findings of fraud and abuse of discretion in the performance of his
work.
He was found by the bank’s Committee on Employee Discipline to have
been
guilty of committing or taking part in the commission of the following:
a. Abuse
of
discretion in connection with actions taken beyond or outside the
limits
of his authority.chanrobles virtual law library
b. Borrowing
money from
a bank client.chanrobles virtual law library
c. Gross
negligence
or dereliction of duty in the implementation of bank policies or valid
orders from management.
d. Direct
refusal or
willful failure to perform, or delay in performing, an assigned task.
e. Fraud or
willful
breach of trust in the conduct of his work.
f. Falsification
or
forgery of bank records/documents.
10. Plaintiff
thereafter
decided to contest his termination by filing an action for illegal
dismissal
against the bank.
Despite the pendency
of this litigation, plaintiff was reported visiting employees of the
bank
in their place of work during work hours, and circulating false
information
concerning the status of his case against the bank, including alleged
offers
by management of a monetary settlement for his “illegal dismissal.”chanrobles virtual law library
11. Defendants
acted
to protect the bank’s interest by preventing plaintiff’s access to the
bank’s offices, and at the same time informing him of that decision.
Plaintiff
purported
to insist on seeing and talking to the bank’s employees despite this
decision,
claiming he needed to do this in connection with his insurance
solicitation
activities, but the bank has not reconsidered.
12. The complaint
states,
and plaintiff has, no cause of action against defendants.[29]
The petitioners
likewise
interposed compulsory counterclaims for damages. The Case for the
Petitioners
The petitioners adduced
evidence that a day or so before November 15, 1995, petitioner
Ongsiapco
was at the 10th floor of the main office of the bank where the training
room of the Management Development Training Office was
located.
Some of the bank’s management employees were then undergoing training.
The bank also kept important records in the said floor. When
Ongsiapco
passed by, he saw the respondent talking to some of the trainees.
Ongsiapco
was surprised because non-participants in the training were not
supposed
to be in the premises.[30]
Besides, the respondent had been dismissed and had filed complaints
against
the bank with the NLRC. Ongsiapco was worried that bank records
could
be purloined and employees could be hurt.cralaw:red
The next day, Ongsiapco
contacted the training supervisor and inquired why the respondent was
in
the training room the day before. The supervisor replied that he
did not know why.[31]
Thus, on November 15, 1995, Ongsiapco issued a Memorandum to Belanio,
the
Vice-President for Security Services, directing the latter not to allow
the respondent access to the bank premises near the working area.[32]
The said Memorandum was circulated by the Chief of Security to the
security
guards and bank employees.chanrobles virtual law library
At about 12:30 p.m.
on January 31, 1996, Security Guard Raul Caspe, a substitute for the
regular
guard who was on leave, noticed the respondent seated on the sofa in
front
of the teller’s booth.[33]
Caspe notified his superior of the respondent’s presence, and was
instructed
not to confront the respondent if the latter was going to make a
deposit
or withdrawal.[34]
Caspe was also instructed not to allow the respondent to go to the
upper
floors of the building.[35]
The respondent went to the teller’s booth and, after a while, seated
himself
anew on the sofa. Momentarily, Caspe noticed Casil, another
employee
of the bank who was at the working section of the Deposit Service
Department
(DSD), motioning to the respondent to get the check. The latter stood
up
and proceeded in the direction of Casil’s workstation. After the
respondent had taken about six to seven paces from the sofa, Caspe and
the company guard approached him. The guards politely showed
Ongsiapco’s
Memorandum to the respondent and told the latter that he was not
allowed
to enter the DSD working area; it was lunch break and no outsider
was allowed in that area.[36]
The respondent looked at the Memorandum and complied.cralaw:red
On May 29, 1998, the
trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. The
fallo
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, defendants are hereby adjudged liable to plaintiff
and orders them to rescind and set-aside the Memorandum of November 15,
1995 and orders them to pay plaintiff the following:chanrobles virtual law library
(1) the amount of
P100,000.00
as moral damages;
(2) the amount of
P50,000.00
as exemplary damages;
(3) P50,000.00 for
and
as attorney’s fees;
(4) Cost of suit.chanrobles virtual law library
Defendants’
counterclaim
is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[37]
The trial court held
that
the petitioners abused their right; hence, were liable to the
respondent
for damages under Article 19 of the New Civil Code.
The petitioners appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals and raised the following issues:
4.1 Did the
appellants abuse their right when they issued the Memorandum?
4.2 Did the
appellants
abuse their right when Basco was asked to leave the bank premises, in
implementation
of the Memorandum, on 21 December 1995?
4.3. Did the
appellants
abuse their right when Basco was asked to leave the bank premises, in
implementation
of the Memorandum, on 31 January 1995?
4.4. Is Basco
entitled
to moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees?
4.5. Are the
appellants
entitled to their counterclaim?[38]
The CA rendered a
Decision
on March 30, 2000, affirming the decision of the RTC with
modifications.
The CA deleted the awards for moral and exemplary damages, but ordered
the petitioner bank to pay nominal damages on its finding that latter
abused
its right when its security guards stopped the respondent from
proceeding
to the working area near the ATM section to get the check from
Casil.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated May 29, 1998 is hereby
MODIFIED
as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
1. The awards for
moral
and exemplary damages are deleted;chanrobles virtual law library
2. The award for
attorney’s
fees is deleted;chanrobles virtual law library
3. The order
rescinding
Memorandum dated November 15, 1995 is set aside; and
4. UCPB is ordered
to
pay nominal damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to plaintiff-appellee.
Costs de oficio.[39] The Present
Petition
The petitioners now
raise the following issues before this Court:
I. Whether or
not the appellate court erred when it found that UCPB excessively
exercised
its right to self-help to the detriment of Basco as a depositor, when
on
January 31, 1996, its security personnel stopped respondent from
proceeding
to the area restricted to UCPB’s employees.
II. Whether or not
the
appellate court erred when it ruled that respondent is entitled to
nominal
damages.
III. Whether or not
the appellate court erred when it did not award the petitioners’ valid
and lawful counterclaim.[40]
The core issues are
the following: (a) whether or not the petitioner bank abused its right
when it issued, through petitioner Ongsiapco, the Memorandum barring
the
respondent access to all bank premises; (b) whether or not petitioner
bank
is liable for nominal damages in view of the incident involving its
security
guard Caspe, who stopped the respondent from proceeding to the working
area of the ATM section to get the check from Casil; and (c) whether or
not the petitioner bank is entitled to damages on its counterclaim.
The Ruling of the
Court
On the first issue,
the petitioners aver that the petitioner bank has the right to prohibit
the respondent from access to all bank premises under Article 429 of
the
New Civil Code, which provides that:
Art. 429.
The
owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use
such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
The petitioners contend
that the provision which enunciates the principle of self-help applies
when there is a legitimate necessity to personally or through another,
prevent not only an unlawful, actual, but also a threatened unlawful
aggression
or usurpation of its properties and records, and its personnel and
customers/clients
who are in its premises. The petitioners assert that petitioner
Ongsiapco
issued his Memorandum dated November 15, 1995 because the respondent
had
been dismissed from his employment for varied grave offenses; hence,
his
presence in the premises of the bank posed a threat to the integrity of
its records and to the persons of its personnel. Besides, the
petitioners
contend, the respondent, while in the bank premises, conversed with
bank
employees about his complaint for illegal dismissal against the
petitioner
bank then pending before the Labor Arbiter, including negotiations with
the petitioner bank’s counsels for an amicable settlement of the said
case.
The respondent, for
his part, avers that Article 429 of the New Civil Code does not give to
the petitioner bank the absolute right to exclude him, a stockholder
and
a depositor, from having access to the bank premises, absent any clear
and convincing evidence that his presence therein posed an imminent
threat
or peril to its property and records, and the persons of its
customers/clients.chanrobles virtual law library
We agree with the respondent
bank that it has the right to exclude certain individuals from its
premises
or to limit their access thereto as to time, to protect, not only its
premises
and records, but also the persons of its personnel and its
customers/clients
while in the premises. After all, by its very nature, the
business
of the petitioner bank is so impressed with public trust; banks are
mandated
to exercise a higher degree of diligence in the handling of its affairs
than that expected of an ordinary business enterprise.[41]
Banks handle transactions involving millions of pesos and properties
worth
considerable sums of money. The banking business will thrive only
as long as it maintains the trust and confidence of its
customers/clients.
Indeed, the very nature of their work, the degree of responsibility,
care
and trustworthiness expected of officials and employees of the bank is
far greater than those of ordinary officers and employees in the other
business firms.[42]
Hence, no effort must be spared by banks and their officers and
employees
to ensure and preserve
the trust and confidence of the general public and its
customers/clients,
as well as the integrity of its records and the safety and well being
of
its customers/clients while in its premises. For the said
purpose,
banks may impose reasonable conditions or limitations to access by
non-employees
to its premises and records, such as the exclusion of non-employees
from
the working areas for employees, even absent any imminent or actual
unlawful
aggression on or an invasion of its properties or usurpation thereof,
provided
that such limitations are not contrary to the law.[43]
It bears stressing that
property rights must be considered, for many purposes, not as absolute,
unrestricted dominions but as an aggregation of qualified privileges,
the
limits of which are prescribed by the equality of rights, and the
correlation
of rights and obligations necessary for the highest enjoyment of
property
by the entire community of proprietors.[44]
Indeed, in Rellosa vs. Pellosis,[45]
we held that:
Petitioner
might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy and to
exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the
exercise
of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule
established
in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with
justice,
to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When
right
is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage
to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held
accountable.chanrobles virtual law library
Rights of
property,
like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment and to such reasonable restraints
established
by law.[46]
In this case, the
Memorandum
of the petitioner Ongsiapco dated November 15, 1995, reads as follows:
MEMO TO :
MR.
JESUS M. BELANIO
Vice President
Security Department
D A T E : 15
November
1995
R E : MR. RUBEN E.
BASCO
Please be advised
that
Mr. Ruben E. Basco was terminated for a cause by the Bank on 19 June
1992.
He filed charges against the bank and the case is still on-going.
In view of this,
he
should not be allowed access to all bank premises.
(Sgd.) LUIS MA.
ONGSIAPCO
First Vice President
Human Resource
Division
chanrobles virtual law library
chan
robles virtual law library chan robles virtual law library
16 November 1995chanrobles virtual law library
TO:
ALL GUARDS ON DUTY
Strictly
adhere/impose
Security Procedure RE: Admission to Bank premises.
For your
compliance.
(Signature)
11/16/95
JOSE G. TORIAGA[47]
On its face, the
Memorandum
barred the respondent, a stockholder of the petitioner bank and one of
its depositors, from gaining access to all bank premises under all
circumstances.
The said Memorandum is all-embracing and admits of no exceptions
whatsoever.
Moreover, the security guards were enjoined to strictly implement the
same.
We agree that the petitioner
may prohibit non-employees from entering the working area of the ATM
section.
However, under the said Memorandum, even if the respondent wished to go
to the bank to encash a check drawn and issued to him by a depositor of
the petitioner bank in payment of an obligation, or to withdraw from
his
account therein, or to transact business with the said bank and
exercise
his right as a depositor, he could not do so as he was barred from
entry
into the bank. Even if the respondent wanted to go to the
petitioner
bank to confer with the corporate secretary in connection with his
shares
of stock therein, he could not do so, since as stated in the Memorandum
of petitioner Ongsiapco, he would not be allowed access to all the bank
premises. The said Memorandum, as worded, violates the right of the
respondent
as a stockholder or a depositor of the petitioner bank, for being
capricious
and arbitrary.chanrobles virtual law library
The Memorandum even
contravenes Article XII, paragraph 4 (4.1 and 4.2) of the Code of
Ethics
issued by the petitioner bank itself, which provides that one whose
employment
had been terminated by the petitioner bank may, nevertheless, be
allowed
access to bank premises, thus:
4.1 As a client of the
Bank in the transaction of a regular bank-client activity.cralaw:red
4.2 When the offending
party is on official business concerning his employment with the Bank
with
the prior approval and supervision of the Head of HRD or of the
Division
Head, or of the Branch Head in case of branches.[48]
For another, the Memorandum,
as worded, is contrary to the intention of the petitioners.
Evidently,
the petitioners did not intend to bar the respondent from access to all
bank premises under all circumstances. When he testified, petitioner
Ongsiapco
admitted that a bank employee whose services had been terminated may be
allowed to see an employee of the bank and may be allowed access to the
bank premises under certain conditions, viz:
ATTY. R. ALIKPALA
Q So the permission
you are referring to is merely a permission to be granted by the
security
guard?
A No, sir, not the security
guard. The security will call the office where they are
going.
Because this is the same procedure they do for visitors. Anybody
who wants to see anybody in the bank before they are allowed access or
entry, they call up the department or the division.cralaw:red
Q So I want to clarify,
Mr. Witness. Former bank employees are not allowed within the
bank
premises until after the security guard call, which ever department
they
are headed for, and that they give the permission and they tell the
security
guard to allow the person?chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, Sir, that is
the usual procedure.cralaw:red
Q If an employee resigned
from the bank, same treatment?
A Yes, Sir.cralaw:red
Q If an employee was
terminated by the bank for cause, same treatment?
A Yes, Sir.cralaw:red
Q Outsiders who are
not employees or who were never employees of the bank also must ask
permission?
A Yes, Sir. Because
there is a security control at the lobby.cralaw:red
Q You mentioned that
this is a general rule?chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, Sir.cralaw:red
Q Is this rule written
down in black and white anywhere?
A I think this is more
of a security procedure.cralaw:red
Q But being a huge financial
institution, we expect Cocobank has its procedure written down in black
and white?
ATTY. A. BATUHAN
Your Honor, objection.
Argumentative, Your Honor.cralaw:red
There is no question
posed at all, Your Honor.cralaw:red
C O U R T
Answer. Is there
any guideline?
A There must be a guideline
of the security.cralaw:red
Q But you are not very
familiar about the security procedures?
A Yes, Sir.cralaw:red
ATTY. R. ALIKPALA
Q Mr. Ongsiapco, the
agency that you hired follows certain procedures?chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, Sir.chanrobles virtual law library
Q Which of course are
under the direct control and supervision of the bank?
A Yes, Sir.cralaw:red
Q And did the security
agency have any of this procedure written down?
A It will be given to
them by the Security Department, because they are under the Security
Department.cralaw:red
Q But if an employee
is only entering the ground floor bank area, where customers of the
bank
are normally allowed, whether depositors or not, they don’t need to ask
for express permission, is that correct?
A Yes, if they are client.cralaw:red
Q Even if they are not
client, but let us say they have to encash a check paid to them by
someone?chanrobles virtual law library
A He is a client then.cralaw:red
Q But he is not
yet a client when he enters the bank premises. He only
becomes
… you know because you do not all these people, you do not know every
client
of the bank so you just allow them inside the bank?
A Yes, the premises.[49]
Petitioner Ongsiapco
also testified that a former employee who is a customer/client of the
petitioner
bank also has access to the bank premises, except those areas reserved
for its officers and employees, such as the working areas:
ATTY. R. ALIKPALA
Q So Mr. Witness, just
for the sake of clarity. The ground floor area is where the
regular
consumer banking services are held? What do you call this portion?
A That is the Deposit
Servicing Department.cralaw:red
Q Where the ….chanrobles virtual law library
A Where the people transact
business.cralaw:red
ATTY. R. ALIKAPALA
Q They are freely allowed
in this area?
A Yes, Sir.cralaw:red
Q This is the area where
there are counters, Teller, where a person would normally go to
let
us say open a bank account or to request for manager’s check, is that
correct?
A Yes, Sir.cralaw:red
Q So, in this portion,
no, I mean beyond this portion, meaning the working areas and second
floor
up, outsiders will have to ask express permission from the security
guard?chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, Sir.chanrobles virtual law library
Q And you say that the
security guards are instructed to verify the purpose of every person
who
goes into this area?
A As far as I know,
sir.[50]
It behooved the petitioners
to revise such Memorandum to conform to its Code of Ethics and their
intentions
when it was issued, absent facts and circumstances that occurred
pendente
lite which warrant the retention of the Memorandum as presently worded.cralaw:red
On the second issue,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner bank is liable for
nominal
damages to the respondent despite its finding that the petitioners had
the right to issue the Memorandum. The CA ratiocinated that the
petitioner
bank should have allowed the respondent to walk towards the restricted
area of the ATM section until they were sure that he had entered such
area,
and only then could the guards enforce the Memorandum of petitioner
Ongsiapco.
The Court of Appeals ruled that for such failure of the security
guards,
the petitioner bank thereby abused its right of self-help and violated
the respondent's right as one of its depositors:
With respect, however,
to the second incident on January 31, 1996, it appears that although
according
to UCPB security personnel they tried to stop plaintiff-appellee from
proceeding
to the stairs leading to the upper floors, which were limited to bank
personnel
only (TSN, pp. 6-9, June 4, 1997), the said act exposed
plaintiff-appellee
to humiliation considering that it was done in full view of other bank
customers. UCPB security personnel should have waited until they
were sure that plaintiff-appellee had entered the restricted areas and
then implemented the memorandum order by asking him to leave the
premises.
Technically, plaintiff-appellee was still in the depositing area when
UCPB
security personnel approached him. In this case, UCPB’s exercise
of its right to self-help was in excess and abusive to the detriment of
the right of plaintiff-appellee as depositor of said Bank, hence,
warranting
the award of nominal damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee.
Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized
and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him
(Japan Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 19).[51]chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners contend
that the respondent is not entitled to nominal damages and that the
appellate
court erred in so ruling for the following reasons: (a) the respondent
failed to prove that the petitioner bank violated any of his rights;
(b)
the respondent did not suffer any humiliation because of the overt acts
of the security guards; (c) even if the respondent did suffer
humiliation,
there was no breach of duty committed by the petitioner bank since its
security guards politely asked the respondent not to proceed to the
working
area of the ATM section because they merely acted pursuant to the
Memorandum
of petitioner Ongsiapco, and accordingly, under Article 429 of
the
New Civil Code, this is a case of damnum absque injuria;[52]
and (d) the respondent staged the whole incident so that he could
create
evidence to file suit against the petitioners.cralaw:red
We rule in favor of
the petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library
The evidence on record
shows that Casil was in the working area of the ATM section on the
ground
floor when he motioned the respondent to approach him and receive the
check.
The respondent then stood up and walked towards the direction of
Casil.
Indubitably, the respondent was set to enter the working area, where
non-employees
were prohibited entry; from there, the respondent could go up to the
upper
floors of the bank’s premises through the elevator or the
stairway.
Caspe and the company guard had no other recourse but prevent the
respondent
from going to and entering such working area. The security guards
need not have waited for the respondent to actually commence entering
the
working area before stopping the latter. Indeed, it would have
been
more embarrassing for the respondent to have started walking to the
working
area only to be halted by two uniformed security guards and disallowed
entry, in full view of bank customers. It bears stressing
that
the security guards were polite to the respondent and even apologized
for
any inconvenience caused him. The respondent could have just
motioned
to Casil to give him the check at the lobby near the teller’s booth,
instead
of proceeding to and entering the working area himself, which the
respondent
knew to be an area off-limits to non-employees. He did not.cralaw:red
The respondent failed
to adduce evidence other than his testimony that people in the ground
floor
of the petitioner bank saw him being stopped from proceeding to the
working
area of the bank. Evidently, the respondent did not suffer
embarrassment,
inconvenience or discomfort which, however, partakes of the nature of
damnum
absque injuria, i.e. damage without injury or damage inflicted without
injustice, or loss or damage without violation of legal rights, or a
wrong
due to a pain for which the law provides no remedy.[53]
Hence, the award of nominal damages by the Court of Appeals should be
deleted.chanrobles virtual law library
On the third issue,
we now hold that the petitioner bank is not entitled to damages and
attorney’s
fees as its counterclaim. There is no evidence on record that the
respondent acted in bad faith or with malice in filing his complaint
against
the petitioners. Well-settled is the rule that the commencement
of
an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the
action
to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate.cralaw:red
We reiterate case law
that if damages result from a party’s exercise of a right, it is damnum
absque injuria.[54]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the
respondent
in the trial court and the counterclaims of the petitioners are
DISMISSED.cralaw:red
No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez,
J.,
(Acting Chairman), Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman),
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Justice Salome M. Montoya (retired), with Associate Justices
Bernardo Ll. Salas (retired) and Presbitero J. Velasco (now SC Court
Administrator),
concurring.
[2]
Penned by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
TSN, 26 February 1997, p. 5.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Exhibits “I” to “I-3;” Records, pp. 122-123.
[5]
Exhibit “H;” Id. at 121.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
TSN, 26 February 1997, p. 4.
[7]
TSN, 5, March 1997, p. 9.
[8]
TSN, 5 March 1997, pp. 9-10.
[9]
Exhibit “C;” Records, p. 114
[10]
Ibid. (bottom portion).chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Exhibit “D;” Records, pp. 115-116.
[12]
Idem, supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Exhibit “7;” Records, p. 118.
[14]
TSN, 19 March 1995, p. 5.
[15]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
TSN, 26 February 1997, p. 5.
[17]
TSN, 19 March 1997, p. 6.
[18]
TSN, 26 February 1997, p. 15; TSN, 5 March 1997, p. 16.
[19]
Exhibits “K-3,” “K-5” & “K-6;” Records, p. 125.
[20]
Exhibit “K-7;” Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
TSN, 19 March 1997, p. 12.
[22]
Exhibit “K-2;” Records, p. 125.
[23]
Exhibit “K-1;” Id.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
Exhibit “K-3;” Id.
[25]
Exhibit “E-1;” Id. at 117.
[26]
Records, p. 4.
[27]
Id. at 5.
[28]
Id. at 6.
[29]
Records, pp. 22-23.
[30]
TSN, 4 June 1997, pp. 20-24.
[31]
Id. at 37.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
TSN, 4 June 1995, p. 42.
[33]
Id. at 3-4.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Id. at 5.chanrobles virtual law library
[35]
TSN, 4 June 1997, p. 5.
[36]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[37]
Records, pp. 294-295.
[38]
CA Rollo, p. 29.
[39]
Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[40]
Id. at 29.chanrobles virtual law library
[41]
Lim Sio Bio vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 307 (1993).
[42]
Philippine Commercial and International Bank vs. Court of
Appeals,
350 SCRA 446 (2001).
[43]
Tolentino, New Civil Code of the Philippines, 1987 Ed., p. 88.chanrobles virtual law library
[44]
63 American Jurisprudence 2d. Property, p. 97.chanrobles virtual law library
[45]
362 SCRA 486 (2001).chanrobles virtual law library
[46]
State of Washington vs. Dexter, 13 ALR 20, p. 108IC (1949), citing
Story
of the Constitution, Section 1984, Volume 2, 5th Ed.
[47]
Exhibit “C,” Records, p. 114.chanrobles virtual law library
[48]
Exhibit “12;” Records, p. 213.
[49]
TSN, 4 June 1997, pp. 28-31.
[50]
TSN, 4 June 1997, pp. 28-32.
[51]
Rollo, p. 47.
[52]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[53]
Atlas Banking Corporation vs. Williams, 361 SCRA 446 (2001).
[54]
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 572
(1999). |