SECOND DIVISION
NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
143230
August 20, 2004
-versus-
PEDRO
BAELLO, AND
HIS HEIRS ERNESTO,WILHELMA, CORAZON,
LETICIA, CONRADO,ALBERTO, FEDERICO,
OFELIA, EDGARDO,JASMINE, ALEJANDRO,
JOSEFINA, ALEJANDRA,REYNALDO, EDITHA,
CYNTHIA, MARISSA,FRANCISCO,
FELICITAS,
ALBERTO, MARITESS,IMELDA, SHIRLEY,
JEANETTE, GLORIA, NOEL,ARNEL, HELEN, ALL
SURNAMED BAELLO; LUZBAELLO MAGAT AND
NICANOR and PEDRO, JR.,BOTH SURNAMED
RODRIGUEZ,
JOHN DOE ANDRICHARD DOE,
Respondents. |
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a Petition for
Review of the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51592 dismissing the Appeal
of
the National Housing Authority (NHA) from the resolution of the
Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128, dismissing the complaint in
Civil
Case No. 16399, as well as the resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration. The Antecedents
Way back in October
23, 1911, a parcel of land with an area of 147,972 square meters
located
in Sitio Talisay, Municipality of Caloocan was surveyed for Esperanza
Baello.
The technical description thereof was shown in Plan Psu-2130, to wit:
A parcel of land (as
shown on plan Psu-2130, G.L.R.O. Record No.), situated in the Sitio of
Talisay, Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. Bounded on
the N., by Estero Palopalo and property of Martin Esguerra; on the NE.,
by property of Francisco Baello y Hermanos; on the E., by Canal and
property
of Francisco Baello y Hermanos; on the SE., by Dagat-dagatan; on the
SW.,
by property of Esperanza Baello; and on the W., by Estero
Palopalo.
Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan, being N. 3 deg. 56’W., 5029.7
m. from Tondo Church x x xchanrobles virtual law library
thence N. 53 deg. 09’
W., 292.8 m. to point 2;chanrobles virtual law library
thence N.
6 deg. 47’ W., 155.0 m. to point 3;
thence N. 79 deg. 53’
E., 37.0 m. to point 4;chanrobles virtual law library
thence N. 83 deg. 01’
E., 247.5 m. to point 5;
thence N. 65 deg. 43’
E., 51.6 m. to point 6;chanrobles virtual law library
thence S. 33 deg. 19’
E., 263.2 m. to point 7;
thence S 49 deg.
42’ N., 29.7 m. to point 8;chanrobles virtual law library
thence S. 11 deg. 12’
E., 22.1 m. to point 9;
thence S. 39 deg.
55’ W., 3.6 m. to point 10;chanrobles virtual law library
thence S. 23 deg. 56’
E., 137.5 m. to point 11;
thence S. 58 deg. 39’
W., 231.9 m. to point l2;chanrobles virtual law library
thence N. 33 deg.
49’ W’ 131.9 m. to the point of
beginning; containing
an area of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-TWO
(147,972) Square Meters, more or less. All points referred to are
indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows: points 1
and 2, by corner of wall; points 4, 5, 6 and 11, by Stones; point 12,
by
Stone Mon.; and the rest, by Old Corners; bearings true; declination 0
deg. 55’ E.; date of survey, Oct. 23, 1911 and that of the approval,
Nov.
14, 1911.[2]
The plan was approved
on November 14, 1911. Esperanza Baello died intestate on March
22,
1929 and was survived by her heirs Pedro Baello and Nicanora
Baello.
Subsequently, the plan was verified anew and approved by the Director
of
Bureau of Lands on April 24, 1951.[3]
On September 21, 1951,
Pedro and Nicanora filed an application with the then Court of First
Instance
of Rizal for the registration of the property under Chapter VIII of
Administrative
Order No. 141. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 520.
They
alleged, inter alia, that the property was developed and used for
fishpond
purposes. Appended to the application was the original plan
covering
the property, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Lands.
The latter filed its Opposition to the application, while the Director
of the Bureau of Forestry did not oppose it. However, during the
hearing on such application, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal appeared
for
and in behalf of the Director of Bureau of Lands, and manifested that
the
latter was withdrawing his opposition thereto. In due course, the
CFI issued an Order of General Default, and since the application was
no
longer opposed, the court authorized the applicants to present their
evidence
ex parte before the branch clerk of court. The applicants
presented
their evidence and on November 2, 1953, the court, thereafter, rendered
a decision granting the application. The fallo of the Decision
reads:
IN VIEW OF
ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby confirms the title of the
applicants
to the land subject of this proceedings, and orders its registration in
the names of the applicants in the following proportion, pro indiviso:
Two-Thirds (2/3)
to
PEDRO T. BAELLO, 68 years, married to Josefa Caiña, Filipino
citizen,
Doctor, and a resident of 350 A. Mabini, Caloocan, Rizal; and
One-Third (1/3) to
NICANORA
T. BAELLO, 62 years, married to Manuel J. Rodriguez, proprietress.
Filipino
citizen, and a resident of 427 Requesens, Sta. Cruz, Manila.chanrobles virtual law library
Upon this decision
becoming
final and executory, let the corresponding decree and title be issued
in
favor of the applicants with the above personal circumstances.chanrobles virtual law library
IT IS SO ORDERED.[4]
The Republic of the
Philippines,
through the Director of Bureau of Lands, did not appeal the
decision.
After the decision became final and executory, the CFI ordered the Land
Registration Commission to issue the appropriate decree. Pursuant to
such
order, Decree No. 13400 was issued on October 27, 1954 in favor of
“Pedro
T. Baello, married to Josefa Caiña,” over the two-thirds (2/3)
portion
of the property, and “Nicanora T. Baello, married to Manuel J.
Rodriguez,”
over the remaining one-third (1/3) undivided portion thereof.[5]
The Register of Deeds thereafter issued Original Certificate of Title
(OCT)
No. (804) 53839 in favor of Pedro and Nicanora. The property was
then subdivided into two (2) parcels: Lot A, with an area of
98,648
square meters covered by TCT No. 181493 in the name of Pedro T. Baello;
and Lot B, with an area of 49,324 square meters in the name of
Nicanora
T. Baello. The subdivision plan was approved by the court on July
27, 1971.[6]
Pedro T. Baello died
intestate on December 3, 1971, leaving thirty-two (32) surviving
heirs.
Nicanora, now surnamed Rodriguez, died intestate on August 22, 1975,
and
her husband Manuel Rodriguez followed on August 30, 1975.cralaw:red
In the meantime, martial
law was declared by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. On
October
30, 1974, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 569 creating
a committee to expropriate the Dagat-Dagatan Lagoon and its adjacent
areas,
including the property of the Baello and Rodriguez heirs. The property
had been identified as a permanent relocation site for families
affected
by the Tondo Foreshore Urban Renewal Project Team, and the government
planned
to develop it into a residential area and an industrial/commercial
complex.
The committee was headed by the Office of the Solicitor General as
chairman
and by General Gaudencio V. Tobias of the National Housing Corporation
(NHC) as its Vice-Chairman. Among the tasks of the committee was to
conduct
negotiations with the Dagat-Dagatan property owners, secure offers to
sell
their properties to the NHC, deliberate upon such offers, and to refer
to the Executive Secretary the manner of payment to landowners who were
willing to negotiate. The committee was also tasked “to initiate and
institute
necessary steps to expropriate certain private properties in the
Dagat-Dagatan
Lagoon not amenable to negotiation, according to the approved plans as
defined by the Tondo Foreshore Urban Renewal Project Team.”
Sometime in 1976, former
First Lady Imelda R. Marcos launched a project dubbed as the
Dagat-Dagatan
Project, a showcase program for the homeless. Among the vast
areas
covered by the project were the properties of the Baello and Rodriguez
heirs. The NHA was tasked to develop the property into a
residential
area, subdivide the same, and award the lots to chosen
beneficiaries.
A truckload of fully armed military personnel entered the Baello
property,
and, at gunpoint, forcibly ejected the caretaker of the Baello
family.
The soldiers then demolished the two-storey residential structure and
destroyed
all the fishpond improvements thereon.[7]
The NHA took possession of the property of the respondents.[8]
The Baello and Rodriguez heirs were completely powerless as the country
was then under martial law. They opted not to complain; they
chose
to remain silent rather than offend the First Lady and President
Marcos,
and risk losing their lives and those of their families.chanrobles virtual law library
The NHA, thereafter,
acquired the properties adjacent to the lagoon, either by purchase or
by
expropriation. These properties, including that of the
respondents’
were developed and subdivided into residential, industrial and
commercial
lands. The NHA later executed separate conditional contracts to
sell
over the subdivision lots in favor of beneficiaries selected by it.[9]
The beneficiaries were awarded 620 lots found in Lot A, the Baello
property,
while 275 lots found in Lot B of the Rodriguez property were awarded to
other grantees.[10]
The community of beneficiaries was called the Kaunlaran Village.cralaw:red
On January 26, 1979,
the Republic of the Philippines signed a Loan Agreement with the
International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development Corporation (IBRDC) in the
amount
of $32,000,000 to finance the development, improvement and resettlement
project of then First Lady Imelda R. Marcos in the Metropolitan Manila,
including the Dagat-Dagatan area and the properties of the Baello and
Rodriguez
heirs. On April 13, 1983, then President Marcos issued
Proclamation
No. 2284 declaring Metropolitan Manila, including the Dagat-Dagatan, as
“areas for priority development” and Urban Land Reform Zones. The
properties of the Baello and the Rodriguez heirs were also included
therein.chanrobles virtual law library
On January 17, 1986,
then Minister of Natural Resources, Rodolfo P. Del Rosario issued BFD
Administrative
Order No. 4-1766 declaring and certifying forestlands in Caloocan City,
Malabon and Navotas with an aggregate area of 6,762 hectares, as
alienable
or disposable for cropland and other purposes, to be administered by
the
Bureau of Lands:
Pursuant to
Section 13 of PD 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of
the
Philippines, as amended, I hereby declare the portion of the
forestlands
containing an aggregate area of 44 hectares for permanent forest
purposes,
as available for fishpond development with an area of 332 hectares
under
the control and management of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources
and further declare and certify an aggregate area of 6,762 hectares as
alienable or disposable for cropland and other purposes under the
administration
and control of the Bureau of Lands for disposition under the Public
Land
Act, located in Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas, Metro Manila shown
and described in BFD Map LC-3111 which is attached hereto and forms an
integral part of this order, subject however to the following
conditions:
x x x[11]
After the Marcos regime
was cut short by the EDSA I upheaval, the Baello heirs executed on
February
23, 1987 an extrajudicial partition of his estate, including the
property
covered by TCT No. 181493.chanrobles virtual law library
On August 18, 1987,
the NHA, herein petitioner, filed a complaint for the expropriation of
the property of the respondents Baello and Rodriguez heirs in the RTC
of
Caloocan City, Branch 120, docketed as Civil Case No. C-169. The NHA
secured
a writ of possession over the property.chanrobles virtual law library
Sometime in February
and May 1988, the respondents demanded the return of their
properties.
They proposed to settle the matter amicably by offering to sell their
properties
to the petitioner, under the following terms:chanrobles virtual law library
(A) P300.00
per square meter, with all expenses for taxes and transfer taxes
chargeable
to the settlers; or
(B) P270.00 per
square
meter, with all expenses and taxes for the account of the NHA.[12]
The petitioner had the
property appraised and learned that the fair market value of the
developed
residential area was P400.00 to P480.00 per square meter, while the
value
of the commercial area ranged from P1,000.00 to P1,200.00 per square
meter.[13]
The Legal Counsel of the respondents pointed out to the NHA Board of
Directors
that the properties of the respondents had been part of the
Dagat-Dagatan
project of Imelda Marcos, but had not been expropriated by
petitioner.
The petitioner then rejected the respondents’ offer.
On July 26, 1989, the
Rodriguez heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the estate of
the
Rodriguez Spouses. On August 7, 1989, the following titles
were issued to their heirs:chanrobles virtual law library
1.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191062, containing 1,222 square
meters
(Exhibit “2”);chanrobles virtual law library
2.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191063, containing 4,559 square
meters
(Exhibit “3”);chanrobles virtual law library
3.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191064, containing 24,019 square
meters
(Exhibit “4”);chanrobles virtual law library
4.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191065, containing 12,495 square
meters
(Exhibit “5”);chanrobles virtual law library
5.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191066, containing 1,205 square
meters
(Exhibit “6”);chanrobles virtual law library
6.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191067, containing 2,518 square
meters
(Exhibit “7”);chanrobles virtual law library
7.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191068, containing 3,306 square
meters
(Exhibits “E” to “K”).[14]
Six (6) titles were
issued
in favor of the Baello heirs on August 7, 1989, viz:
1.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191069, issued on August 7, 1989,
containing
an area of 4,756 square meters;chanrobles virtual law library
2.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191070, issued on August 7, 1989,
containing
an area of 7,090 square meters;chanrobles virtual law library
3.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191071, issued on August 7, 1989,
containing
an area of 11,361 square meters;chanrobles virtual law library
4.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191072, issued on August 7, 1989,
containing
an area of 39,227 square meters;chanrobles virtual law library
5.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191073, issued on August 7, 1989,
containing
an area of 22,188 square meters;
6.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 191074, issued on August 7, 1989,
containing
an area of 14,029 square meters.[15]
On November 17, 1989,
the
petitioner filed an Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. C-169 praying
that,
after due proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows:
(a) After
defendants
shall have been duly served with summons, to immediately set the case
for
hearing to ascertain and fix the provisional value of the parcel of
land
sought to be expropriated herein, and after the deposit requirement of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court had been duly complied with, a writ of
possession,
control and disposition be promptly issued in favor of the plaintiff to
enable it to enter and take immediate possession, control and
disposition
of the aforementioned parcels of land;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) After hearing
the
objections and defenses interposed by the defendants in their
respective
responsive pleading/motion to dismiss, an order of condemnation of the
aforementioned parcels of land be issued in favor of the plaintiff;chanrobles virtual law library
(c) After hearing
the
case on the merits, the just compensation of the parcels of land sought
to be expropriated be determined and fixed in accordance with Rule 67
of
the Rules of Court;chanrobles virtual law library
(d) Upon transfer
and
conveyance of the ownership and titles of the said parcels of land and
improvements thereon from the defendants to the plaintiff, free from
liens
and encumbrances whatsoever, an Order be issued directing the plaintiff
to pay the just compensation of the aforementioned parcels of land to
defendants.
Plaintiff further prays
for such other relief and remedies which may be just and equitable
under
the premises.[16]
Meanwhile, the respondent
heirs filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No.
C-169 on the following grounds:
1. That the
expropriation runs counter to the provisions of Article XIII, Section 9
of the 1987 Constitution, which provide, among others, that: “x x
x x the State shall respect the rights of small property owners;”
2. That plaintiff
took
possession of the property in question in 1976, WITHOUT FIRST filing a
complaint of eminent domain and WITHOUT order of condemnation and
WITHOUT
paying just compensation to the registered owners since 1976 up to the
present;chanrobles virtual law library
3. Plaintiff is
barred
by estoppel and laches;chanrobles virtual law library
4. Plaintiff has
no
cause of action;chanrobles virtual law library
5. Plaintiff
violated
the equal protection clause;chanrobles virtual law library
6. Res judicata;
7. Plaintiff, in
assessing
the market value of the land at P2,000.00 per square meter, seeks to
confiscate,
not expropriate, the property;
8. The purpose for
which
the property in question is being conducted is not for public use in
that
it does not inure the welfare of the community at large but is intended
to benefit a mere handful of people who could acquire the lots by
direct
purchase.[17]
On September 5, 1990,
the
trial court issued an Order granting the motion and dismissed the
complaint
on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action.[18]
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 29042. On August 21, 1992, the appellate court rendered a
Decision[19]
affirming the Order of the RTC.
The petitioner then
filed a petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court,
docketed
as G.R. No. 107582. The Court issued a Resolution on May 3, 1993,
denying due course to the petition on the ground that the CA committed
no reversible error. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration,
which was, likewise, denied by the Court per its Resolution dated June
16, 1993. Entry of Judgment was, thereafter, made by the Clerk of
Court.[20]chanrobles virtual law library
But the petitioner was
undaunted. On November 5, 1993, it filed a complaint against the
respondent heirs in the RTC of Caloocan City, this time, for
declaration
of nullity of OCT No. (804) 53839 which was issued to Pedro T. Baello
and
his sister Nicanora Baello-Rodriguez, based on the decision of the CFI
in LRC Case No. 520. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
C-16399
and raffled to Branch 128 of the court.cralaw:red
The petitioner alleged
the following therein:
13.
Recently,
however, plaintiff discovered that the titles of defendants are null
and
void, OCT No. (804) 53839 which is the source of all their claims being
false and fraudulent. For one, subject property was declared
alienable
and disposable by the government only lately, i.e., on 17 January 1986,
and thus the said OCT could not have been validly issued in 1954.
A copy of BFD Administrative Order No. 4-1766 declaring on 17 January
1986
certain tracts of land which include subject property as alienable and
disposable is hereto attached as Annex “A.” A certification from
the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority identifying
subject
property to be within the area declared alienable and disposable only
on
17 January 1986 is also hereto attached as Annex “B;”[21]
The NHA prayed that,
after
due trial, judgment be rendered in its favor:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE
OF ACTION
Declaring
Original
Certificate of Title No. (804) 53839 and its derivative Transfer
Certificate
of Title Nos. 181493/T-903; 191069; 191070; 191071; 191072; 191073;
191074;
191062; 191063; 191064; 191065; 191066; 191067 and 191068, including
any
and all other titles subsequently issued or derived therefrom and
covering
subject property or any portions thereof, null and void;chanrobles virtual law library
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION
Permanently
enjoining defendants from taking possession of, or otherwise occupying,
the subject property or any portion thereof; if any portion/s of the
property
has in fact come into possession of defendants, ordering defendants to
vacate the same or to otherwise return possession thereof to plaintiff;
ON THE THIRD CAUSE OF
ACTION
In the
event
that defendants are adjudged entitled to the ownership and/or
possession
of subject property, ordering defendants to refund and pay plaintiff
the
sum of P45.237 Million representing the necessary and useful expenses
on
the property which payment has to be made before defendants may get
actual
possession of the property.
ON THE FOURTH CAUSE OF
ACTION
Ordering
defendants
to pay plaintiff:
a. Exemplary
damages
in the sum of P5 Million;
b. Attorney’s fees
in
the sum of P5 Million and litigation expenses in the sum of P1 Million;
and
c. The cost of
suit.
Other or further
relief
or remedy just and equitable in the premises is likewise prayed for.[22]
The respondent heirs
filed
separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: A.
THE CAUSE OF ACTION
IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT.
B.
THE CLAIM OR DEMAND
SET FORTH IN THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT HAS PRESCRIBED AND THAT THE
PLAINTIFF
IS ESTOPPED TO QUESTION THE TITLE HEREIN INVOLVED.
C.
THE PLAINTIFF
HAS ENGAGED IN FORUM SHOPPING.[23]
I. PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE
OF ACTION IS BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION.
II. PLAINTIFF IS
BARRED
BY RES JUDICATA OR BY ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT.
III. PLAINTIFF HAS
NO
LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE.
IV. THE COMPLAINT
STATES
NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
V. COMPLAINT MUST BE
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE OF PLAINTIFF TO PAY THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES.[24]
The respondents alleged
that the complaint was barred by the decision of the trial court in LRC
Case No. 520. They also alleged that the petitioner was estopped from
assailing
their respective titles, as they were based on the CFI Decision in
Civil
Case No. C-169, the CA decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 29042 and the
resolution
of the Court in G.R. No. 107582.cralaw:red
On October 17, 1995,
the trial court issued a Resolution dismissing the complaint on the
grounds
of estoppel and res judicata.chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner appealed
the decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51592. The
appellate
court rendered a Decision on January 26, 2000,
affirming the assailed
resolution of the RTC, ruling that the petitioner’s complaint was
barred
by res judicata. It also held that the Republic of the
Philippines
and the petitioner, by their own acts, had admitted that the properties
titled to the respondents were private lands, even long before
Administrative
Order No. 4-1766 was issued by then Minister of Agriculture Rodolfo del
Rosario during Martial Law. The motion for reconsideration
thereon
was likewise denied by the appellate court.
The Present
Petition
The petitioner forthwith
filed its petition for review on certiorari, contending as follows: A. THE
HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF LAND TITLES OF
RESPONDENTS
DESPITE POSITIVE PROOF OF THEIR NULLITY.
B. THE HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT: “FOR JUDGMENT
TO
BE ANNULLED OR, A DECREE OF REGISTRATION (TITLE) TO BE RE-OPENED AND
REVIEWED,
THERE MUST BE ACTUAL OR EXTRINSIC FRAUD COMMITTED BY THE APPLICANT
THERETO”
IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO.
C. THE HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF THE INSTANT CASE ON
[THE]
GROUND OF RES JUDICATA.
D. THE HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER NHA WAS A BUILDER IN
BAD FAITH AND THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE
IMPROVEMENTS
IT INTRODUCED ON [THE] SUBJECT PROPERTY.
E. THE HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER NHA IS GUILTY OF FORUM
SHOPPING
IN THE FILING OF THE INSTANT CASE (DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TITLES).[25]
The issues for the Court’s
resolution are as follows: (1) whether the action of the petitioner was
barred by res judicata; (2) whether the petitioner is guilty of forum
shopping;
(3) whether the decision of the then Court of First Instance in LRC
Case
No. 520, G.R.L.O. No. 4815 and the consequent issuance of OCT No. (804)
53839 is valid; (4) whether the petitioner is estopped from assailing
OCT
No. (804) 53839; and (5) whether the petitioner is a builder in good
faith.cralaw:red
Inextricably interwoven
with the foregoing issues is the threshold issue of whether or not the
trial court had jurisdiction over the petitioner’s action, based on the
material allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for
therein.
It is settled that courts have ample authority to rule on matters not
raised
by the parties in their pleadings, if such issues are indispensable or
necessary to the just and final resolution of pleaded issues.[26]chanrobles virtual law library
The Trial Court
Had No Jurisdiction Over the Action of the Petitioner To Nullify
OCT No. (804)
53839 And the Decision of the CFI In LRC Case No. 520
It is axiomatic that
the nature of an action is determined by the material allegations
thereof
and the reliefs prayed for therein, whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled
to such reliefs or only to some of them.[27]
The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of an
action.cralaw:red
After a careful review
of the material averments of the complaint in this case, it is clear
that
it is one for the nullification of the Decision of the CFI in LRC Case
No. 520 and the nullification of OCT No. (804) 53839, which was
issued
on the basis of the said decision. The ground relied upon by the
petitioner
in its complaint was the lack of jurisdiction over the subject, on its
claim that the said properties were forestland; hence, inalienable and
not disposable. Indeed, the petitioner did not expressly assail
or
pray for the nullification of the CFI Decision, as it prayed for the
nullification
of OCT No. (804) 53839 on the ground that the property was inalienable
when such title was issued. However, for all intents and purposes, the
petitioner sought the nullification of such decision. This is so
because
the issuance of OCT No. (804) 53839 was based on the decision of the
CFI,
and such title cannot be nullified unless and until such decision is
first
declared null and void. Such complaint should have been filed in
the CA which had exclusive jurisdiction over the action, not in the
trial
court. This is conformably to Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
(otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), which provides that:chanrobles virtual law library
Section 9.
Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive
original
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts;
Consequently, the trial
court should have dismissed outright the petitioner’s complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The Petitioner’s
Action Is Barred by the Decision of the CFI in LRC Case No. 520
Even if we assume, for
the nonce, that the trial court had jurisdiction over the action of the
petitioner, nonetheless, we agree with the ruling of the trial and
appellate
courts that the petitioner’s action to annul OCT No. (804) 53839 was
barred
by the decision in LRC Case No. 520. It must be stressed that the issue
of the legal nature of the property subject of the application and the
ownership thereof was litigated and resolved by the court in such
case.
A former judgment would bar a subsequent action when the following
requirements
concur: (a) the first judgment must be a final one; (b) the court
rendering
judgment on the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the parties; (c) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
(d) there must be between the two cases, identity of parties, identity
of subject matter and identity of action.cralaw:red
In Lopez vs. Reyes,[28]
we held that the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. The
first,
known as “bar by prior judgment,” is the effect of a judgment as a bar
to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or
cause
of action. The second, known as “conclusiveness of judgment,”
precludes
the relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action
between
the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
Elucidating
on the second aspect of the doctrine, we stated in the said case:chanrobles virtual law library
The general rule precluding
the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and
adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially
connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends
to
questions “necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily
adjudicated,
or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific
finding
may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were
directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally
presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial
shows
that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the
particular
matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all
future
actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes
certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.
Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all the
matters which are essential to support it, and that every proposition
assumed
or decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion and upon
which
such conclusion is based is as effectually passed upon as the ultimate
question which is finally solved.[29]
In the earlier case
of Kidpalos vs. Baguio Gold Mining Co.,[30]
we reiterated the ruling of the State Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
Burlen vs. Shannon,[31]
that when a fact has been once determined in the course of a judicial
proceeding,
and a final judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it
cannot
be again litigated between the same parties without virtually
impeaching
the correctness of the former decision, which, from motives of public
policy,
the law does not permit to be done. Explaining further, the Court
stated:
The
estoppel
is not confined to the judgment, but extends to all facts involved in
it
as necessary steps, or the groundwork upon which it must have been
founded.
It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it
stands, upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion is
indisputable,
and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the premises are
equally indisputable with the conclusion.[32]
In this case, there is
no identity of causes of action between LRC Case No. 520, on the one
hand,
and the complaint and the amended complaint in the court a quo, as well
as Civil Case No. C-169, on the other. However, the issues in the
action of the petitioner in the court a quo had long been resolved with
finality in LRC Case No. 520 and Civil Case No. C-169 by the Court of
Appeals
and this Court.chanrobles virtual law library
In its Decision in LRC
Case No. 520, the CFI resolved the issue of whether the property
subject
of the application of the respondent Baello siblings was alienable, and
the issue of the lawful ownership of the same. The trial court
declared
that, on the basis of the evidence of the applicants therein, the
property
subject matter thereof was alienable, and that the latter had acquired
ownership of the said property; consequently, the property was decreed
in their favor. Such decision has long since become final and
executory.
The proceeding being in rem, the decision of the CFI is binding on the
whole world, including the petitioner. Conformably to the
principle
of conclusiveness of judgment, the issues resolved by the CFI can no
longer
be relitigated by the Republic of the Philippines and by the petitioner.cralaw:red
It bears stressing that
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Director of Bureau of
Lands
or the Director of the Bureau of Forestry, did not oppose the
application
in LRC Case No. 520. Neither did they appeal the
decision.
Even when OCT No. (804) 53839 was issued by the Register of Deeds in
1959,
the Republic of the Philippines did not file any action to nullify the
CFI decision. It was only on February 17, 1994, or after
the
lapse of almost forty (40) years that the petitioner, claiming to be
the
administrator/owner of the respondents’ land, filed a complaint in the
RTC to nullify the CFI decision and OCT No. (804) 53839, on the sole
ground
that the property subject of the application therein filed was,
contrary
to the findings of the CFI, inalienable land of the public
domain.
Patently then, the petitioner, which merely stepped into the shoes of
the
Republic of the Philippines, is estopped from asserting that the
properties
were inalienable forestland. As the District Court of Alabama
ruled:
In accordance
with law, the equities involved, and with justice, the government and
the
State of Alabama are both now estopped from asserting a claim of title
and ownership to the area involved, the claim of ownership of at least
a part of the original southern end of the island, and the fill thereon
made after 1906, having been regarded as the claimant’s property by
both
sovereigns for so many years.[33]
Petitioner is
Barred From Assailing OCT No. (804) 53839 and its Derivative Titles
Based
on Judicial Estoppel[34]
First. The petitioner
admitted in its complaint in Civil Case No. C-169
that
the respondents were the lawful owners of the properties therein sought
to be expropriated, and that it was ready to pay just compensation, but
that the respondents refused its offer:
1.
The
Defendants are the heirs of deceased Spouses Pedro T. Baello and Josefa
Caiña and Spouses Nicanora T. Baello and Manuel J. Rodriguez,
and
are the owners of that certain parcel of land located in Caloocan City
and registered in the names of their deceased parents under “Original
Certificate
of Title No. (804) 53839.” The defendant heirs are all of legal
age,
with capacity to sue and be sued, are now the parties in
interest/claimants
of the aforesaid property.[35]chanrobles virtual law library
x
x
x
6. Plaintiff
is
authorized by its charter, PD 757 to exercise the right of eminent
domain
or to acquire by purchase private lands for housing development and
related
services and facilities, including provision for and development of
settlement
and resettlement site.chanrobles virtual law library
7. Plaintiff
seeks
to expropriate the aforementioned parcels of land for the purpose of
developing
the aforesaid sites and services project, and which purpose is for
public
use as defined in PD 1259.chanrobles virtual law library
8. Plaintiff
has
no knowledge of any person or persons claiming ownership of the
afore-mentioned
parcels of land other than the defendants herein.
9. Plaintiff
is
willing and ready to pay the defendants the just compensation of the
said
parcel of land sought to be expropriated.
CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT
10. The
subject
parcels of land sought to be hereby expropriated have not heretofore
been
condemned nor reserved for any public use or purpose.
11. While
plaintiff
has offered to purchase from the defendants the said parcels of land on
a voluntary basis, no settlement has been concluded between plaintiff
and
defendants, as the latter demanded exhorbitant price for the lands.[36]
In its Order dated
September
5, 1990, the trial court declared that the respondents were the owners
of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings
of the RTC in its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 29042. This Court,
in
its Resolution in G.R. No. 107582 dated May 3, 1993, denied due course
to the petition for the petitioner’s failure to sufficiently show that
the CA committed any substantial error in its decision. The
resolution
of the Court has long since become final and executory. The
admissions
made by the petitioner in its complaint are judicial admissions and
cannot
be contradicted by it.[37]
Moreover, the theory of the petitioner’s action in Civil Case No.
C-169,
which was acted upon by this Court in G.R. No 107582, cannot now be
repudiated.[38]
An election of a specific theory for relief operates as bar to the
subsequent
adoption of a different and wholly inconsistent theory.[39]chanrobles virtual law library
Under the principle
of judicial estoppel, a party is bound by his judicial declarations and
may not contradict them in a subsequent action or
proceeding
involving the same properties.[40]
The raison d’etre of the principle is to suppress or prohibit fraud and
the deliberate shifting of position to suit the exigencies of each
particular
case that may arise concerning the subject matter of the controversy.[41]
That the petitioner is a government agency tasked to administer the
property
does not bar the application of the principle.[42]
This is so because when a sovereignty submits itself to the
jurisdiction
of the court and participates therein, its claims and rights are
justiceable
by every other principle and rule applicable to the claims and rights
of
the private parties under similar circumstances. The government,
when it comes to the Court to litigate with one of its citizens, must
submit
to the rules of procedure and its rights and privileges at every stage
of the proceedings are substantially in every respect the same as those
of its citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage.[43]
Second. No less
than former President Marcos declared in P.D. No. 569 that a large
percentage
of the areas adjacent to the Dagat-Dagatan Lagoon are owned by private
individuals, and tasked the Tondo Foreshore Development Committee to
conduct
negotiations with the landowners who were willing to sell their
properties,
including the respondents. The decree of the former President is
a confirmation of the validity of the respondents’ titles, which were
based
on the CFI decision decreeing the properties in favor of their
predecessors.
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the legal nature of the
property
subject of this case only because the Vice-Chairman of the committee
created
under the decree was General Gaudencio V. Tobias, then NHC President.
It
must be stressed that the Bureau of Lands, which withdrew its
opposition
to the application of the Baello siblings in LRC Case No. 520, was
represented
in the same committee. Furthermore, the records fail to show that the
petitioner
and the Bureau of Lands sought the reconsideration of the issuance of
the
decree from the President. The Bureau of Lands did not likewise claim
that
a large percentage of the adjacent areas of the lagoon, including that
portion owned by the respondents, was classified as inalienable forest
land.cralaw:red
Third. The petitioner
cannot rely on BFD Administrative Order No. 61-1766 issued by the
Minister
of Agriculture, because even before the said Order was issued on July
17,
1986, the petitioner had caused the subdivision of the properties
adjacent
to the Dagat-Dagatan project and awarded the same to the beneficiaries
chosen by it. The petitioner could not have caused the
subdivision
of the property if it was still inalienable forest land.
Moreover,
the petitioner, nine (9) years after the issuance of the aforesaid
decree
in LRC Case No. 520, and one (1) year after the said order of the
Minister
were issued, filed its complaint and amended complaint for eminent
domain
against the respondents, wherein it expressly admitted that the latter
were the lawful owners of the properties. Such administrative
order
of the Minister of Agriculture could not nullify the CFI Decision in
LRC
Case No. 520, which had long become final and executory, and OCT No.
(804)
53839 and its derivative titles, nor override P.D. No. 569 issued by
the
former President of the Philippines who had supervision and control
over
the Ministry of Agriculture, nor reverse the Order of the RTC in Civil
Case No. C-169, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, no
less.chanrobles virtual law library
The respondents had
long suffered during Martial Law when the government confiscated their
properties. Armed soldiers destroyed the houses of the Baello
heirs.
For years, the respondents were deprived of the possession and
enjoyment
of their properties. Even as the petitioner had the properties of
the respondents subdivided and awarded to beneficiaries chosen by it,
the
respondents were not paid a single centavo therefor, although the IBRDC
granted a loan of $320,000,000.00 to the Philippines for the
development
of the project. In the wake of the EDSA upheaval, the respondent heirs
were even willing to settle the matter amicably with the petitioner by
offering the property for sale, but the latter rebuffed the respondents
and opted to expropriate the property. Even after this Court declared
illegal
the expropriation made by the petitioner of the respondents’
properties,
the petitioner yet again filed its complaint with the trial court to
nullify
the respondents’ respective titles. For decades, the respondents
sought justice, only to be blocked by the successive suits instituted
by
the petitioner.cralaw:red
We are convinced that
the action in the court a quo was but a device and a technique resorted
by the petitioner to afford it a fresh opportunity to acquire the
respondents’
properties after failing in its complaint for eminent domain; yet
again,
prolonging the agony of the respondents on their long and arduous quest
for justice. The petitioner played “fast-and-loose” with the
trial
and appellate courts, and even this Court. This scheme of the
petitioner
is a blatant misuse of judicial processes which merits
condemnation.
It trifled with the settled rule in case law that:chanrobles virtual law library
x
x
x A judgment properly rendered by a court vested with
jurisdiction,
like the RTC, and which has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable,
hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct
clerical errors or mistakes. Judgments of courts become final at
some definite time fixed by law and that parties, like the petitioners,
should not be permitted to litigate the same issue/s over again.[44]
We echo the
pronouncement
of the appellate court in Massaglia v. Commissioner of Internal Audit:[45]
“We will not allow the government to deal dishonorably or capriciously
with its citizens. It must not play an ignoble part or do a
shabby
thing.” The Court cannot allow the petitioner to continually
deprive
the respondents of their property for decades without due process of
law.
On the last issue, the
petitioner avers that the trial and appellate courts erred in not
holding
that it was a builder in good faith and the respondents as having acted
in bad faith. The petitioner avers that it believed in good faith
that respondents’ property was part and parcel of the Dagat-Dagatan
Lagoon
owned by the government, and acting on that belief, it took possession
of the property in 1976, caused the subdivision of the property and
awarded
the same to its beneficiaries, in the process spending
P45,237,000.00.
It was only in 1988 when it learned, for the first time, that the
respondents
owned the property and forthwith petitioner filed its complaint for
eminent
domain against them. The petitioner further avers that even
assuming
that it was a builder in bad faith, since the respondents likewise
acted
in bad faith, the rights of the parties shall be determined in
accordance
with Article 448 of the New Civil Code, and they shall be considered as
both being in good faith. The petitioner, however, posits that any
award
in its favor as builder in good faith would be premature because
its complaint was dismissed by the court a quo, and its consequent
failure
to present evidence to prove the improvements it had made on the
property
and the value thereof.chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner’s arguments
do not persuade. In light of our foregoing disquisitions, it is
evident
that the petitioner acted in gross bad faith when it took possession of
the property in 1976, introduced improvements thereon and disposed of
said
property despite knowledge that the ownership thereof pertained to the
respondents.cralaw:red
In determining whether
a builder acted in good faith, the rule stated in Article 526 of the
New
Civil Code shall apply.[46]
Article
526.
He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there
exists
in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a
possessor
in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
In this case, no less
than the trial court in Civil Case No. C-169 declared that the
petitioner
not only acted in bad faith, but also violated the Constitution:
And the Court cannot
disregard the fact that despite persistent urging by the defendants for
a negotiated settlement of the properties taken by plaintiff before the
present action was filed, plaintiff failed to give even the remaining
UNAWARDED
lots for the benefit of herein defendants who are still the registered
owners. Instead, plaintiff opted to expropriate them after having
taken possession of said properties for almost fourteen (14) years.cralaw:red
The callous disregard
of the Rules and the Constitutional mandate that private property shall
not be taken without just compensation and unless it is for public use,
is UNSURPRISING, considering the catenna (sic) of repressive acts and
wanton
assaults committed by the Marcos Regime against human rights and the
Constitutional
rights of the people which have become a legendary part of history and
mankind.cralaw:red
True it is, that the
plaintiff may have a laudable purpose in the expropriation of the land
in question, as set forth in the plaintiff’s cause of action that –
“The
parcel of land as described in the paragraph immediately preceding,
together
with the adjoining areas encompassed within plaintiff’s Dagat-Dagatan
Development
Project, are designed to be developed pursuant to the Zonal
Improvement
Program (ZIP) of the Government, as a site and services project, a
vital
component of the Urban III loan package of the International Bank for
Rehabilitation
and Development (World Bank), which is envisioned to provide affordable
solution to the urban problems of shelter, environmental sanitation and
poverty and to absorb and ease the impact of immigration from rural
areas
to over-crowded population centers of Metro Manila and resident middle
income families who do not have homelots of their own with the Metro
Manila
area. x x x.”chanrobles virtual law library
But the reprehensible
and scary manner of the taking of defendants’ property in 1976, which,
in a manner of speaking, was seizure by the barrel of the gun, is more
aptly described by the defendants in the following scenario of 1976, to
wit:
1.01.
Sometime
in the mid-seventies, a truckload of fully-armed military personnel
entered
the Baello property in Caloocan City [then covered by OCT No. (804)
55839]
(sic) and, at gunpoint, forcibly ejected the family’s caretaker.
The soldiers, thereafter, demolished a two-storey residence and
destroyed
all fishpond improvements found inside the property.chanrobles virtual law library
1.02. From this
period
up till the end of the Marcos misrule, no decree, no court order, no
ordinance
was shown or made known to the defendants to justify the invasion,
assault,
and occupation of their property. Worse, defendants were not even
granted the courtesy of a letter or memorandum that would explain the
government’s
intention on the subject property.
1.03. The
military’s
action, coming as it does at the height of martial law, elicited the
expected
response from the defendants. Prudence dictated silence.
From
government news reports, defendants gathered that their land was seized
to complement the erstwhile First Lady’s Dagat-Dagatan project.
Being
a pet program of the dictator’s wife, defendants realized that a legal
battle was both dangerous and pointless.
1.04. Defendants’
property
thus came under the control and possession of the plaintiff. The
NHA went on to award portions of the subject property to dubious
beneficiaries
who quickly fenced their designated lots and/or erected permanent
structures
therein. During all this time, no formal communication from the NHA was
received by the defendants. The plaintiff acted as if the
registered
owners or their heirs did not exist at all.
1.05. The
celebrated
departure of the conjugal dictators in February 1986 kindled hopes that
justice may at least come to the Baellos. Verbal inquiries were made on
how just compensation can be obtained from the NHA considering its
confiscation
of the subject property. The representations proved fruitless.chanrobles virtual law library
x
x
x
Evidently, plaintiff’s
seizure of defendants’ property is an audacious infringement of their
rights
to DUE PROCESS.
The immediate taking
of possession, control and disposition of property without due notice
and
hearing is violative of due process (Sumulong vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA
461).cralaw:red
On the matter of issuance
of writ of possession, the ruling in the Ignacio case as reiterated in
Sumulong vs. Guerrero states:
"It is
imperative
that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in
expropriation
proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must
be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance;
(2)
A provisional determination of just compensation for the properties
sought
to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of
judicial
(not legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The deposit
requirement
under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with.”chanrobles virtual law library
Here, it is even
pointless
to take up the matter of said requisites for the issuance of writ of
possession
considering that, as stated, NO complaint was ever filed in Court AT
THE
TIME of the seizure of defendants’ properties.chanrobles virtual law library
Recapitulating – that
the plaintiff’s unlawful taking of defendants’ properties is
irretrievably
characterized by BAD FAITH, patent ARBITRARINESS and grave abuse of
discretion,
is non-arguable.[47]
The aforequoted findings
of the trial court were affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this
Court
in G.R. No. 107582.cralaw:red
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING,
the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno., J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate
Justices
Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring.
[2]
Records, p. 49.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Id. at 76.
[5]
Id. at 81-82.
[6]
Id. at 113.
[7]
Id. at 110.
[8]
Id. at 346.
[9]
Id. at 256-296.
[10]
Id. at 373.
[11]
Id. at 394.
[12]
Id. at 110.
[13]
Id. at 111.
[14]
Id. at 98.
[15]
Id. at 97-98.
[16]
Id. at 344.
[17]
Id. at 95-96.
[18]
Id. at 95-108.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (now an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court), with Associate Justices
Arturo
B. Buena and Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (both retired), concurring.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Records, p. 126.
[21]
Id. at 5.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
Id. at 9-10.
[23]
Id. at 35-36.
[24]
Id. at 197.
[25]
Rollo, p. 17.chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Logronio v. Talesco, et al., 312 SCRA 52 (1999).
[27]
International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.), Inc. v. Argos, 364 SCRA
792 (2001).
[28]
76 SCRA 179 (1977).chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
Id. at 186-187.chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
14 SCRA 913 (1965).
[31]
99 Mass. 200, 96 (1868).
[32]
Supra note 30 at 918.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
U.S. v. Property on Pinto Island, 74 F. Supp. 92, 102
(1947).
[34]
The principle states that a party, during the course of the judicial
proceedings
who has deliberately and knowingly assumed a particular position, is
estopped
to assume a position in the same proceeding or in a subsequent
proceeding
between the same parties and questions (31 C. J. S.
Estoppel,
§119, p. 381).
[35]
Records, pp. 88-89.chanrobles virtual law library
[36]
Id. at 91-92.chanrobles virtual law library
[37]
Rule 129, Section 4, Rules of Court
[38]
Admiral Hillscrest Corporation v. Paramount Films Corporation,
140
Federal Reporter 686 (1955).
[39]
Emporia Wholesale Coffee Co. v. Rehrig, 252 P.2d 590 (1953).chanrobles virtual law library
[40]
Martin v. Wood, 229 P. 2d 710 (1951).chanrobles virtual law library
[41]
31 CJS 2d, Estoppel, p. 650.chanrobles virtual law library
[42]
Iowa v. Carr, 191 Federal Reporter 257.
[43]
Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433 (1878).
[44]
Ybañez v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 540 (1996).
[45]
286 Federal Reporter 2d 259 (1961).chanrobles virtual law library
[46]
Tolentino, New Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II, 1987 ed., p.
103.
[47]
Records, pp. 105-107. |