FIRST DIVISION
PROCOPIO
VILLANUEVA,
NICOLAS RETUYA
AND PACITA
VILLANUEVA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
143286
April 14, 2004
-versus-
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COURT OF APPEALSAND THE HEIRS OF
EUSEBIA
NAPISA RETUYA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Petition for Review
on
Certiorari[1]
seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 31 January
2000
as well as its Resolution dated 25 April 2000 in CA-G.R. No. CV-46716.
The assailed Decision dismissed petitioners’ appeal of the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Mandaue City ("trial court").
On 13 October 1988,
Eusebia Napisa Retuya ("Eusebia") filed a complaint before the trial
court
against her husband Nicolas Retuya ("Nicolas"), Pacita Villanueva
("Pacita"),
and Nicolas’ son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva ("Procopio"). Eusebia
sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties
listed
in paragraph 2 of the complaint ("subject properties"), claiming the
subject
properties are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Eusebia also
prayed
for accounting, damages and the delivery of rent and other income from
the subject properties.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Antecedent Facts
The facts as found by
the trial court are as follows:
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa
Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been
married
to the latter on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot
five (5) children, namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Salome, and
Roberta.
Spouses Retuya resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage
they
acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City,
and Consolacion, Cebu, more particularly described as follows:
‘1. A parcel of land
located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24951;
2. A parcel of land
located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24952;
3. A parcel of land
located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24953;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. A parcel of land
located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24954;
5. A parcel of land
located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24956;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
6. A parcel of land
located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24957;
7. A parcel of land
located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec. No. 24958;
8. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec. No. 01042;
9. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec. No. 01043;
10. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec. No. 01046;
11. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec. No. 01041;
12. A parcel of land
located at Nawanao-Subangdaku, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No.
01488;
13. A parcel of land
located at Baklid, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec. No. 00492;
14. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01044;
15. A residential house
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01050;
16. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01048;
17. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01051;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
18. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01047;
19. A parcel of land
located at Banilad, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 02381;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
20. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01049;
21. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01045;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
22. A parcel of land
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec. No. 01450 (in the
name
of Pacita Villanueva).’
Also, defendant, Nicolas
Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which
he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well
as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8)
parcels
of land in Mandaue City.cralaw:red
Some of these properties
above-mentioned earn income from coconuts and the other lands/houses
are
leased to the following:
a) Mandaue Food Products
Company – for Lot 121-F, Lot 121-G and Lot 121-H under TCT No. 11300 at
an annual rental of P10,800.00;
b) Barben Wood Industries,
Inc. – for Lot 148 covered by TCT No. l731 for an annual rental of
P21,600.00;
c) Metaphil, Inc. –
parcel of land consisting of 2,790.51 sq. meters at the rate of
P2,700.00
annually for the first five (5) years, and P3,240.00 for the second
years;
d) Benedicto Development
Corp. – for a portion of Lot 148 covered by TCT No. 1731 for a period
of
20 years at an annual rate of P3,500.00 renewable for another 20 years
after April 1, 1995 at an annual rate of P4,000.00;
e) Benedicto Development
Corporation – for a portion of Lot No. 148 covered by Certificate of
Title
No. 1731 over an area of 6,000 sq. meters for an annual rental of
P9,500.00
for a period of 2 years from June 1, 1982;
f) Visayan Timber and
Machinery Corp. – over a parcel of land at Nawanaw, Mandaue City, for a
period of 2 years from June 1, 1987 and renewable for another 12 years
at an annual income of P4,000.00;
g) House lessees listed
in Exhibit "13" with total monthly rentals of P1,975.00 a month for the
24 lessees or P24,700.00 annually. (Exhs. "7" to "13")
In 1945, defendant Nicolas
Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant,
Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their
illegitimate
son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the
above-mentioned properties.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Defendant, Pacita Villanueva,
from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation,
she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income.cralaw:red
In 1985, Nicolas suffered
a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot walk anymore and they have to
raise him up in order to walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical
condition
of her father because they visited him at the hospital. From the time
defendant
Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on January 27, 1985 and until the
present,
it is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas’ illegitimate
children
who has been receiving the income of these properties. Witness
Natividad
Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their father
Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. She told
defendant,
Procopio that their father was already incapacitated and they had to
talk
things over and the latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk
about the matter.cralaw:red
Plaintiff, then, complained
to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement
was reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file
action.
Written demands were made by plaintiff, through her counsel, to the
defendants,
including the illegitimate family asking for settlement but no
settlement
was reached by the parties.cralaw:red
Further, plaintiff’s
witness, Natividad Retuya, testified that the parcel of land covered by
tax declaration marked Exhibit "T" was the property bought by her
father
from Adriano Marababol for at the time of purchase of the property,
defendant
Pacita Villanueva had no means of livelihood (TSN, p. 6).cralaw:red
The trial court rendered
its Decision on 16 February 1994 in favor of Eusebia. The dispositive
portion
of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing considerations, judgment is rendered in favor of the
plaintiff
Eusebia Napisa Retuya and against defendants Procopio Villanueva,
Nicolas
Retuya and Pacita Villanueva:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. Declaring the properties
listed in paragraph 2 of the amended complaint as conjugal properties
of
the spouses plaintiff Eusebia Retuya and the defendant Nicolas Retuya;
2. Ordering the transfer
of the sole administration of conjugal properties of the spouses
Eusebia
Retuya and Nicolas Retuya in accordance with Art. 124 of the Family
Code
to the plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya;
3. Ordering defendant
Procopio Villanueva to account and turnover all proceeds or rentals or
income of the conjugal properties from January 27, 1985 when he took
over
as ‘administrator’ thereof and until he shall have ceased administering
the same in accordance with the judgment of this Court;
4. Ordering defendants
jointly and severally to reconvey the parcel of land situated at
Tipolo,
Mandaue City now in the name of defendant Pacita Villanueva under Tax
Dec.
No. 01450 and transfer the same into the names of the conjugal partners
Eusebia N. Retuya and Nicolas Retuya;
5. Ordering the City
Assessor’s Office of Mandaue City to cancel tax declaration No. 01450
in
the name of Pacita Villanueva and direct the issuance of a new title
and
tax declaration in the names of Eusebia Napisa Retuya and Nicolas
Retuya;
6. Ordering defendants
jointly and severally to reconvey that certain building of strong
materials
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City under tax dec. No. 01450 into the names
of Eusebia Retuya and Nicolas Retuya;
7. Ordering defendants
jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation in the sum of P5,000.00 plus
the costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners appealed
the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals. Eusebia died on 23
November 1996. Thereafter, Eusebia’s heirs substituted her pursuant to
the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 7 April 1997. The Court of
Appeals eventually upheld the Decision of the trial court but deleted
the
award of attorney’s fees, ruling in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision
dated February 16, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
award
of attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 is deleted.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on 23 February 2000 which the Court of
Appeals
denied in a Resolution dated 11 May 2000.cralaw:red
Hence, this petition.
The Trial Court’s
Ruling
The trial court applied
Article 116 of the Family Code, which reads:
Art. 116. All property
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.cralaw:red
The trial court ruled
that the documents and other evidence Eusebia presented constitute
"solid
evidence" which proved that the subject properties were acquired during
her marriage with Nicolas. This made the presumption in Article 116
applicable
to the subject properties. Thus, the trial court ruled that Eusebia had
proved that the subject properties are conjugal in nature. On the other
hand, the trial court found that petitioners failed to meet the
standard
of proof required to maintain their claim that the subject properties
are
paraphernal properties of Nicolas. The trial court added that Pacita
presented
no "factual solidity" to support her claim that she bought Lot No. 152[2]
exclusively with her own money.
The Court of
Appeals’
Ruling
The Court of Appeals
concurred with the findings of the trial court. The appellate court
found
that Pacita failed to rebut the presumption under Article 116 of the
Family
Code that the subject properties are conjugal. The appellate court
dismissed
Pacita’s defense of prescription and laches since she failed to have
the
issue included in the pre-trial order after raising it in her answer
with
her co-petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Issues
Petitioners Nicolas,
Pacita and Procopio contend that both the trial and appellate courts
erred
in ruling in favor of Eusebia. They seek a reversal and raise the
following
issues for resolution:
1.
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE DECLARATION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
PROPERTIES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE COMPLAINT ARE CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES
OF NICOLAS RETUYA AND EUSEBIA RETUYA ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT ONE OF THE
CAUSES
OF ACTION IN EUSEBIA’S COMPLAINT.
2.
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION THAT PROPERTIES ACQUIRED
DURING
THE EXISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE OF NICOLAS RETUYA AND EUSEBIA RETUYA ARE
CONJUGAL.
3.
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING INSTEAD THE PRESUMPTION UNDER ARTICLE 148
OF THE FAMILY CODE IN FAVOR OF CO-OWNERSHIP BETWEEN NICOLAS RETUYA AND
PACITA VILLANUEVA.
4.
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OVER
LOT
NO. 152 IS ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES.[3]
The Ruling of the
Court
The petition lacks merit.cralaw:red
First Issue: On
the Alleged FailureTo Claim that
the Properties are Conjugal
Petitioners’ contention
that Eusebia’s complaint failed to state that the subject properties
are
conjugal is absolutely without basis. A cursory reading of the
complaint
readily shows that the complaint maintains that the subject properties
are conjugal.[4]
The first sentence of the second paragraph of the complaint states:
2. The plaintiff Eusebia
Retuya and defendant Nicolas Retuya are husband and wife and conjugal
owners
of real properties and all improvements thereon situated in Mandaue
City
and Consolacion, Cebu more particularly described as follows: (Emphasis
added)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The same claim is restated
and repleaded throughout the complaint. Petitioners should know better
than to clutter their appeal with useless arguments such as this.cralaw:red
The other issues petitioners
raise contest in essence the finding that the subject properties are
conjugal
in nature. Apart from this, the only other issue raised is whether
prescription
or laches bars Eusebia’s complaint. We shall resolve first the issue of
prescription and laches.cralaw:red
Second Issue:
Prescription and Laches
We agree with the Court
of Appeals’ observation that while petitioners did raise the issue of
prescription
and laches in their Answer,[5]
they failed to have the same included in the pre-trial order for
consideration
during the trial. Now, petitioners wish to raise the issue on appeal by
relying on Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Defenses
and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded
either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However,
when
it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action
is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court
shall
dismiss the claim.cralaw:red
Petitioners are mistaken.cralaw:red
The determination of
issues during the pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other
questions, whether during trial or on appeal.[6]Section 1 of Rule 9 covers situations where a defense or objection is
not
raised in a motion to dismiss or an answer. What we have before us is
the
exact opposite. Here, petitioners in fact raised in their answer the
defense
of prescription and laches. However, despite raising the defense of
prescription
and laches in their answer, petitioners failed to include this defense
among the issues for consideration during the trial. The non-inclusion
of this defense in the pre-trial order barred its consideration during
the trial. Clearly, Section 1 of Rule 9 does not apply to the present
case.cralaw:red
Pre-trial is primarily
intended to insure that the parties properly raise all issues necessary
to dispose of a case.[7]
The parties must disclose during pre-trial all issues they intend to
raise
during the trial, except those involving privileged or impeaching
matters.[8]
Although a pre-trial order is not meant to catalogue each issue that
the
parties may take up during the trial, issues not included in the
pre-trial
order may be considered only if they are impliedly included in the
issues
raised or inferable from the issues raised by necessary implication.[9]
The basis of the rule is simple. Petitioners are bound by the
delimitation
of the issues during the pre-trial because they themselves agreed to
the
same.[10]
Petitioners argue that
in past instances we have reviewed matters raised for the first time
during
appeal. True, but we have done so only by way of exception involving
clearly
meritorious situations.[11]
This case does not fall under any of those exceptions. The fact that
the
case proceeded to trial, with the petitioners actively participating
without
raising the necessary objection, all the more requires that they be
bound
by the stipulations they made at the pre-trial.[12]
Petitioners were well aware that they raised the defense of
prescription
and laches since they included it in their answer. However, for reasons
of their own, they did not include this defense in the pre-trial.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Able counsels represented
both parties. We see no claim that either counsel erred or was
negligent.
This could only mean that petitioners’ counsel chose to waive, or did
not
consider important, the defense of prescription and laches. Petitioners
are bound by their counsel’s choice. Other than arguing that it is
allowable
to raise the issue for the first time on appeal, we have no explanation
from petitioners why they suddenly decided to change their mind.
Parties
are not allowed to flip-flop. Courts have neither the time nor the
resources
to accommodate parties who choose to go to trial haphazardly. Moreover,
it would be grossly unfair to allow petitioners the luxury of changing
their mind to the detriment of private respondents at this late stage.
To put it simply, since petitioners did not raise the defense of
prescription
and laches during the trial, they cannot now raise this defense for the
first time on appeal.[13]
Third Issue: Whether
the Subject Properties Are Conjugal
We proceed to the crux
of this petition.cralaw:red
We reiterate the basic
rule that a petition for review should only cover questions of law.[14]
Questions of fact are not reviewable. The exceptions apply only in the
presence of extremely meritorious circumstances.[15]
None exists in this case. We note with disfavor that most of the issues
raised in this petition are factual. We caution the petitioners that
this
practice of deluging the Court with factual issues in defiance of
well-settled
rule, in the hope of having them reviewed, is unacceptable.cralaw:red
The only issue proper
for resolution is the question of whether the subject properties are
conjugal.
Petitioners claim that the subject properties[16]
are exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No. 152, which they
claim is Pacita’s exclusive property. This issue is easily resolved.
The
Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property
relations
between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the
effectivity
of Family Code.[17]
Article 105[18]
of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply
to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without
prejudice
to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus,
under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the
marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal.[19]
The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.[20]
This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must
first
be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are
presumed
conjugal.[21]
Petitioners argue that Eusebia failed to prove this pre-requisite. We
disagree.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The question of whether
the subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia is a factual issue. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed
that the subject properties were in fact acquired during the marriage
of
Nicolas and Eusebia.[22]
The tax declarations[23]
covering the subject properties, along with the unrebutted testimony of
Eusebia’s witnesses, establish this fact. We give due deference to
factual
findings of trial courts,[24]
especially when affirmed by the appellate court. A reversal of this
finding
can only occur if petitioners show sufficient reason for us to doubt
its
correctness. Petitioners in the present case have not.cralaw:red
Moreover, on whether
Lot No. 152 is conjugal or not, the answer came from petitioners
themselves.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita
started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita
and
Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit
that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957.[25]
The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage
of
Nicolas and Eusebia.cralaw:red
Since the subject properties,
including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that
all
these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on
petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. The
presumption in Article 116, which subsists "unless the contrary is
proved,"
stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The burden
of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on
the
party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and
convincing.[26]
Petitioners failed to meet this standard.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners point out
that the deed of sale, the transfer certificate of title and the tax
declaration
of Lot No. 152 are all in the name of Pacita. Petitioners maintain that
this can only mean that Pacita is the real owner of Lot No. 152. We
disagree.
The totality of the evidence reveals that this was merely just one of
the
several schemes Nicolas employed to deprive Eusebia of their conjugal
property.
Ironically, petitioners themselves submitted in evidence a decision
rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch IV, in Civil Case No. R-9602[27]
involving the acquisition of Lot No. 152.cralaw:red
The decision in Civil
Case No. R-9602 stated that Tranquiliana Marababol Remulta testified
that
the one who offered to buy the lot from her was none other than Nicolas
Retuya.[28]
Tranquiliana narrated that at first she refused to sign the deed of
sale
because the buyer placed in the deed was Pacita and not Nicolas, her
understanding
being that the buyer was Nicolas. We find that the trial court in the
present
case correctly took into consideration the decision in Civil Case No.
R-9602.[29]
Considering that the decision in Civil Case No. R-9602 has become final
and executory, its findings of fact involving the sale of Lot No. 152
to
Nicolas and Pacita are conclusive and binding on petitioners who
introduced
in evidence the decision.cralaw:red
Petitioners also point
out that all the other tax declarations presented before the trial
court
are in the name of Nicolas alone. Petitioners argue that this serves as
proof of Nicolas’ exclusive ownership of these properties. Petitioners
are mistaken. The tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome
the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All property
acquired
by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the
property
is registered, is presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise.[30]
The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate
of
title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of
the
spouses only.[31]
Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides that the presumption
remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both
of the spouses."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In some of the documents
that petitioners presented, Nicolas misrepresented his civil status by
claiming that he was single. Petitioners point to this as proof of
Nicolas’
desire to exclude Eusebia from the properties covered by the documents.[32]
Petitioners further claim that this supports their stand that the
subject
properties are not conjugal. This argument is baseless. Whether a
property
is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of one of
the
spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the
character
of conjugal property. The clear intent of Nicolas in placing his status
as single is to exclude Eusebia from her lawful share in the conjugal
property.
The law does not allow this.cralaw:red
Petitioners point out
that Pacita had the means to buy Lot No. 152. Even if Pacita had the
financial
capacity, this does not prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her
own
money. To rebut the presumption that Lot No. 152 is conjugal,
petitioners
must prove that Pacita used her own money to pay for Lot No. 152.
Petitioners
failed to prove this.cralaw:red
Petitioners further
argue that since Nicolas and Pacita were already cohabiting when Lot
No.
152 was acquired, the lot cannot be deemed conjugal property of Nicolas
and Eusebia. Petitioners keep belaboring this point in their petition
and
memorandum.cralaw:red
Petitioners’ argument
is flawed.cralaw:red
The cohabitation of
a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever
the
tie of a subsisting previous marriage.[33]
Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that
is
both illegal and immoral. What petitioners fail to grasp is that
Nicolas
and Pacita’s cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia, the
legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist
regardless
of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all
property
acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and Eusebia’s
marriage,
until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebia’s death, are still presumed
conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the
subject
properties was acquired outside or beyond this period.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, petitioners’
reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code[34]
is misplaced. A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be
proof of "actual joint contribution" by both the live-in partners
before
the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their
contribution.
The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence
of proof of
their proportionate
contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution
is proven first. Simply put, proof of actual contribution by both
parties
is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal
sharing. Petitioners failed to show proof of actual contribution by
Pacita
in the acquisition of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners failed to
prove
that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money, or that she actually
contributed her own money to acquire it.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, we DENY the
petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2000 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 46716 is AFFIRMED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., Panganiban,
Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
This is the parcel of land situated at Tipolo, Mandaue City in the name
of Pacita Villanueva under Tax Declaration No. 01450.
[3]
Rollo, p. 120.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
RTC Records, p. 1.
[5]
Ibid., p. 19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Macaraeg v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48008, 20 January 1989, 169 SCRA
259.
[7]
Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, 135 Phil. 364 (1968).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Caltex, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97753, 10 August 1992, 212
SCRA
448.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Velasco v. Apostol, G.R. No. 44588, 9 May 1989, 173 SCRA 228.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Munasque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39780, 11 November 1985, 139
SCRA
533.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Some instances where we reviewed matters raised for the first time on
appeal
involved the presence of at least one of the following circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.
that the issues are closely related to one properly assigned (PCIB v.
CA
et al., L-34931, 18 March 1988, 159 SCRA 24);
2.
that the determination of an issue properly assigned is dependent upon
the one being raised for the first time (Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa
German
Airlines, L-28773, 30 June 1975, 64 SCRA 610);
3.
if in avoiding the issue, the Court would be sacrificing substance for
technicality (Dilag v. Heirs of Resurreccion, 76 Phil. 649 [1946]).
[12]
Supra note 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 155 (1997).
[14]
Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
As laid out in Ramos, et al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co, 125 Phil. 701
(1967):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(a)
when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises
and conjectures;
(b)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(c)
where there is grave abuse of discretion;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(d)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(e)
when the findings of fact of the trial court and the appellate court
are
conflicting;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(f)
where the appellate court manifestly overlooked relevant facts which
would
have justified a different conclusion;
(g)
where the findings of fact are contradicted by the evidence of record.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Which consist of the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1.
A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec.
No. 24951;
2.
A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec.
No. 24952;
3.
A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec.
No. 24953;
4.
A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec.
No. 24954;
5.
A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec.
No. 24956;
6.
A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec.
No. 24957;
7.
A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under tax dec.
No. 24958;
8.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec.
No.
01042;
9.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec.
No.
01043;
10.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec.
No.
01046;
11.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec.
No.
01041;
12.
A parcel of land located at Nawanao-Subangdaku, Mandaue City covered by
tax dec.
No.
01488;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
13.
A parcel of land located at Baklid, Mandaue City, covered by tax dec.
No.
00492;
14.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec.
No.
01044;
15.
A residential house located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec.
No. 01050;
16.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec.
No.
01048;
17.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec.
No.
01051;
18.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec.
No.
01047;
19.
A parcel of land located at Banilad, Mandaue City covered by tax dec.
No.
02381;
20.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec.
No.
01049;
21.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec.
No.
01045;
22.
A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by tax dec.
No.
01450 (in the name
of
Pacita Villanueva).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
The Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988.
[18]
The second paragraph of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships
already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the
Civil
Code or other laws, as provided in Article 255.
[19]
Article 116, E.O. 209, The Family Code of the Philippines.
[20]
Lim v. Garcia, 7 Phil. 320 (1907).
[21]
Perez v. Lantin, 132 Phil. 219 (1968).
[22]
Rollo, p. 60.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
RTC Records, pp. 52 to 75.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
People v. Cordero, G.R. No. 136894-96, 7 February 2001, 351 SCRA 383.
[25]
Rollo, p. 135.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Ahern v. Julian, 39 Phil. 607 (1919).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Exhibit 6-A, Civil Case No. R- 9602 of Branch IV, Regional Trial Court
of Cebu.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
"Third-party defendant Tranquiliana declared: (sic) that when Nicolas
Retuya
offered to buy the lot, she told him that she already owned a portion
thereof
and that even after the deed of sale was prepared, she refused to sign
it at the very beginning because the sale was in favor of Pacita
Villanueva
and not in Nicolas as she was made to believe. When she signed the deed
of sale because of the insistence of her uncle Nicolas Retuya, she
reminded
him that she was selling her share, but Nicolas Retuya told her that he
will take care of his brothers and sisters." (Emphasis added)
[29]
RTC Decision, p. 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Diancin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119991, 20 November 2000, 345
SCRA
117.
[31]
Mendoza v. Reyes, 209 Phil. 120 (1983).
[32]
Rollo, p. 129.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA
1.
[34]
The pertinent portion of which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Art.
148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares
are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. xxx" (Emphasis
supplied) |