FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES ROMEO
GUDA
AND EMILY GUDA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
143675
June 9, 2003
-versus-
ALAN A. LEYNES AND
SPOUSES MANUEL C.
PERALTA
AND HAYDEE L.
PERALTA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
VITUG,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent-Spouses Manuel
and Haydee Peralta were the owners of a residential house and lot
located
at 626 Eduardo Quintos Street, Sampaloc, Manila. On 08 May 1987,
they leased the property over to petitioners, the spouses Romeo and
Emily
Guda, for a monthly rental of two thousand pesos. The contract of
lease stipulated a term of one year and that, thereafter, unless
terminated
by notice to that effect at least thirty days before the expiration
date,
the agreement would be deemed renewed on a month-to-month basis.
Specifically, the agreement provided:chanrobles virtual law library
"1.
This lease agreement shall be for a period of one (1) year commencing
on
May 15, 1987 up to and until May 14, 1988, it may thereafter be renewed
subject to LESSORS discretion, provided however, that if LESSORS do not
exercise their right to terminate this lease at least thirty (30) days
before the said expiration date, this agreement shall be deemed renewed
on a monthly basis."[1]
And in -
"x
x x the event the Lessors shall desire to
sell the leased premises, the LESSEES shall be given the first option
to
buy the said premises, if they could meet the desired price of the
LESSORS,
otherwise, the LESSEES shall vacate the leased premises within thirty
(30)
days upon notice given to them by the new owner."[2]
Upon the expiration of
the agreement on 14 May 1988, petitioners continued to occupy the
premises
and to pay rent. Close to three years later, or on 01 May 1991,
the
Peraltas sold the property to Alan A. Leynes, a brother of Haydee
Peralta,
herein spouses’ co-respondent. Insisting on exercising their
"option
to buy" under the contract of lease and contending that the sale to
Leynes
was void, petitioners refused to vacate the premises. Respondent
Alan C. Leynes was thereupon prompted to file a civil case for
ejectment
before the Municipal Trial Court of Manila. The trial court ruled
in favor of Leynes. Aggrieved, the Guda spouses filed Civil Case
No. 91-58154 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, for
the annulment of the sale to Leynes and for specific performance
pursuant
to the option to buy provision of the contract of lease with the
Peralta
spouses. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
declaring
the sale of the property to Alan A. Leynes void and ordering the
conveyance
of the premises to the plaintiffs.
On appeal to it, the
Court of Appeals, in its judgment of 13 June 2000, reversed the
decision
of the trial court.cralaw:red
In their instant petition,
the spouses Guda would contend that when the lessors did not give
notice
to terminate the contract of lease thirty days at least before its
expiration
date and instead allowed the lessees to occupy the premises, all the
terms
thereof, including the provision granting them the first option to buy
the leased premises, were automatically revived and that, accordingly,
the sale of the property to Leynes without giving them the opportunity
to exercise the option made the sale void.chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals
responded well to the above issue; speaking through Mr. Justice Martin
S. Villarama, Jr., the appellate court expounded:
"It must be
clarified that even if the Contract of Lease was renewed upon the
failure
of the defendants Manuel and Haydee Peralta to exercise their right to
terminate the lease within the period of thirty (30) days prior to the
expiration date, May 14, 1988, such renewal was clearly qualified to be
on a `monthly basis.’ This means that the lease was converted
into
a `month-to-month’ lease, expiring at the end of each month and
renewable
also every month. Otherwise, there is no definite period for the
contract of lease after such expiration date. Thus it has been
ruled
in a number of cases that a lease on a month-to-month basis is, under
Art.
1687 of the Civil Code, a lease with a definite period, upon the
expiration
of which upon demand by the lessor on the lessee to vacate, the
ejectment
of the lessee may be ordered. (Labastida vs. Court of Appeals,
287
SCRA 662; De Vera vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 396.) Clearly,
such
lease is deemed to expire at the end of the month upon notice to vacate
addressed by the lessor to the lessee. (Paterno vs. Court of
Appeals,
272 SCRA 770.)"[3]
The contract of lease
allowed
the lessees to continue with their occupancy of the leased premises on
a month-to-month basis after its termination on 14 May 1988 if no
notice
of such termination were given by the lessor at least thirty days
before
the expiry date. The renewal clause is valid but the contract
itself
is not deemed renewed until after notice or positive act is made to
indicate
its exercise by the parties. Meanwhile, the juridical relation
between
the parties, constrained by the continued enjoyment of the leased
premises,
is one of an implied lease based on the principle of tacita
reconduccion.
Article 1670 of the Civil Code is thus apropos; it provides:chanrobles virtual law library
"If at the
end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing
leased
for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a
notice
to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is
understood
that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original
contract, but for the time established in articles 1682 and 1687.
The other terms of the original contract shall be revived."
The terms of the
original
contract that are carried over to the implied new lease, as so aptly
ruled
in Dizon vs. Magsaysay,[4]
cover only those terms that are germane to the lessees’ enjoyment of
the
premises, such as the rent and terms of payment, a dictum that has been
reiterated in Dizon vs. Court of Appeals[5]
thusly:
"If the
presumed
will of the parties refers to the enjoyment of possession the
presumption
covers the other terms of the contract related to such possession, such
as the amount of rental, the date when it must be paid, the care of the
property, the responsibility for repairs, etc. But no such
presumption
may be indulged in with respect to special agreements which by nature
are
foreign to the right of occupancy or enjoyment inherent in a contract
of
lease."[6]
Quite significantly,
the
option granted to petitioners would appear to have, in fact, been
abrogated
when the 1987 contract of lease was ultimately superseded by an
agreement
executed on 22 April 1991. The Court of Appeals found and
elaborated:chanrobles virtual law library
"We cannot
sustain plaintiffs-appellees’ theory upon the evidence on record
showing
that the terms and conditions of the Contract of Lease dated May 8,
1987
were not even fully complied with and respected by the
plaintiffs-appellees
as lessees. The evidence tends to show that plaintiffs-appellees
were not residing on the leased apartment but in another place which is
their dress shop located at the same street which further gave credence
to defendants-appellants’ claim that the plaintiffs-appellees had
converted
the leased apartment into a boarding house, in violation of the
provisions
of the Contract of Lease. But what is significant is a subsequent
written agreement signed by plaintiff-appellee Emily Guda on April 22,
1991 showing that the stipulated rental of P2,000.00 provided in the
Contract
of Lease was not complied with because as of May 1, 1991, the lessees
were
paying a monthly rental of only P1,500.00 for which reason they
executed
said new agreement providing for an increased rental of P1,800.00
starting
June 1, 1991. Plaintiff-appellee Emily Guda likewise agreed
therein
that in case the property is sold, they will have to vacate the
premises
after a month’s notice. (Exhibit `5-PI’ for Defendant Leynes)
Such
is a clear indication that for all intents and purposes, the parties at
that time no longer considered the Contract of Lease dated May 8, 1987
as still in force and subsisting. The fact that it was
plaintiff-appellee
Emily Guda who alone signed this agreement is of no moment because the
latter and her husband, plaintiff-appellee Romeo Guda, had accepted
benefits
under this new lease agreement, in the form of a lower monthly rental
than
the P2,000.00 stipulated in the previous Contract of Lease.
Besides,
said new agreement merely reiterated the fact that the lease is on a
month-to-month
basis, after the expiration of the term provided under the Contract of
Lease dated May 8, 1987.
"The
written
agreement dated April 22, 1991 is a new lease agreement and not a
renewal
of the original Contract of Lease between the parties. It is also
a clear evidence of plaintiffs-appellees’ knowledge about the expected
sale of the property to a third party. Indeed,
plaintiffs-appellees
cannot close their eyes to the fact that their extended stay in the
premises
was allowed by the lessors with the understanding that they shall
vacate
the premises within a month’s notice upon its sale to a third
party.
Plaintiff-appellee Emily Guda who was actually the one who always dealt
with defendant-appellant Haydee Peralta, expressed her understanding
and
agreement to the lessors’ desire to sell the property to Haydee
Peralta’s
sibling in a letter written shortly after their agreement of April 22,
1991, as follows:
"`Nahihiya
na akong ukupahin ko pa ang apartment ninyo isasauli ko na lang.
`Naintindihan ko
naman
ang paliwanag mo. Isa pa kapatid mo sila na gostong kumuha.
Siguro kung ibang tao puwede pa ako magreklamo e kapatid mo sila yes na
lang ako.
`Mare, papuntahin
mo
na lang ang kapatid mo para magkausap kami tungkol sa pagsauli ko sa
apartment.
`x
x x’ (Exhibit `6-PI’ for
Defendant
Leynes)chanrobles virtual law library
"When
confronted
in court by her declarations in the above-cited letter,
plaintiff-appellee
Emily Guda merely stated that her letter was meant to inform the
defendant-appellant
Haydee Peralta to send her sibling so they can talk about the sale of
the
property to plaintiffs-appellees. (TSN, August 14, 1991, pp.
63-65.)
The clear and unmistakable terms of her letter, however, indicated the
contrary as plaintiff-appellee Emily Guda therein acknowledged,
understood
and accepted the fact that the first option to buy, or rather, the
right
of first refusal granted to them under the Contract of Sale, is no
longer
subsisting or in force at the time when she and Haydee Peralta earlier
agreed in writing for a new extended lease made subject to the
condition
that once the property is sold to another, they will have [to] vacate
the
premises within one (1) month’s notice.
"With the
Contract
of Lease dated May 8, 1987 having been validly terminated and
superseded
by a new written agreement dated April 22, 1991 which also reiterated a
month-to-month lease in force between the parties, the trial court thus
erred in declaring that defendants-appellants Manuel and Haydee Peralta
violated the provisions of the Contract of Lease in selling the leased
property to defendant-appellant Alan A. Leynes."[7]chanrobles virtual law library
All considered, the
Court
finds no sufficient justification to reverse the holding of the
appellate
court.
WHEREFORE, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, p. 17.
[2]
Rollo, p. 86.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[4]
57 SCRA 250.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
302 SCRA 288.
[6]
At. p. 301.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Rollo, pp. 18-19. |