THIRD DIVISION
STA. CATALINA
COLLEGE
AND SR. LORETA
ORANZA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
144483
November 19, 2003
-versus-
NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
AND HILARIA G.
TERCERO,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
From the April 28,
2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1]
affirming that of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
awarding
retirement benefits in the amount of P85,287.72 to private respondent
Hilaria
G. Tercero (Hilaria), petitioners Sta. Catalina College and its former
directress Sr. Loreta Oranza come to this Court on a petition for
review
on certiorari.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In June 1955, Hilaria
was hired as an elementary school teacher at the Sta. Catalina College
(petitioner school) in San Antonio, Biñan, Laguna. In 1970, she
applied for and was granted a one year leave of absence without pay on
account of the illness of her mother. After the expiration in 1971 of
her
leave of absence, she had not been heard from by petitioner school.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the meantime, she
was employed as a teacher at the San Pedro Parochial School during
school
year 1980-1981 and at the Liceo de San Pedro, Biñan, Laguna
during
school year 1981-1982.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In 1982, she applied
anew[2]
at petitioner school which hired her with a monthly salary of P6,567.95.[3]
On March 22, 1997, during
the 51st Commencement Exercises of petitioner school, Hilaria was
awarded
a Plaque of Appreciation for thirty years of service and P12,000.00 as
gratuity pay.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On May 31, 1997, Hilaria
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. Retiring pursuant to
Article
287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act 7641, petitioner
school
pegged her retirement benefits at P59,038.35,[4]
computed on the basis of fifteen years of service from 1982 to 1997.
Her
service from 1955 to 1970 was excluded in the computation, petitioner
school
having asserted that she had, in 1971, abandoned her employment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
From the P59,038.35
retirement benefits was deducted the amount of P28,853.09[5]
representing reimbursement of the employer's contribution to her
retirement
benefits under the Private Education Retirement Annuity Association
(PERAA)
which Hilaria had already received. Deducted too was the amount of
P12,000.00
representing the gratuity pay which was given to her. The remaining
balance
of the retirement benefits due her thus amounted to P18,185.26.[6]
Hilaria insisted, however,
that her retirement benefits should be computed on the basis of her
thirty
years of service, inclusive of the period from 1955 to 1970; and that
the
gratuity pay earlier given to her should not be deducted therefrom. She
thus concluded that she was entitled to P190,539.90, computed as
follows:
Retirement
Benefits = ½ month salary for every year of service
One-half
month
salary
= (15 days x
latest salary per day) + (5 days leave x latest salary per day) +
1/12 of 13th month pay
= (15 x
290.90)
+ (5 x 290.90) + 533.33
= P6,351.33
Retirement
Benefits
= P6,351.33 (30 years)
= P190,539.90[7]
The parties having
failed
to agree on how the retirement benefits should be computed, Hilaria
filed
a complaint[8]
before the NLRC Regional Arbitration, Branch No. IV against petitioner
school and/or petitioner Sr. Loreta Oranza for non-payment of
retirement
benefits. The complaint was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-3-9860.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
By Decision of October
30, 1998, Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos upheld petitioners' position,
disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondents
to pay the complainant the amount of P18,185.26 only as the
differential
of her retirement benefits.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[9]
On appeal, the NLRC,
by Decision of April 27, 1999, set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision
and
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE,
on account of the foregoing, the judgment a quo is SET ASIDE.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent-appellee
is hereby ordered to pay the total amount of P85,287.72 computed as
follows:
P3,935.89 (total computation of the retirement components) MULTIPLIED
by
29 (number of years in service) EQUALS P114,140.81 (total retirement
package)
LESS P28,287.72 (representing respondent-appellee's contribution with
the
PERAA proven to have already been received by complainant-appellant).
However,
the gratuity pay earlier already given shall not be deducted from the
retirement
package.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.[10]
Not satisfied with the
NLRC decision, petitioners brought the case on certiorari[11]
to the CA which, by the assailed decision, dismissed it, holding that
petitioners
failed to prove that Hilaria had abandoned her position in 1970, as
petitioner
school even gave her a Plaque of Appreciation for thirty years of
service
"precisely because of her thirty year continuous service," and that
petitioner
school never sent notice to her dismissing her, hence, the
employer-employee
relationship was not severed and, therefore, her services for
petitioner
school during the period from 1955-1970 should be credited in the
computation
of her retirement benefits. Held the CA:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x Despite the absence of the Private Respondent for a period of
eleven
(11) years or so from 1970 to 1982 and her employment with the Liceo de
San Pedro and San Pedro Parochial School, her employer-employee
juridical
relationship, with the Petitioner School, had not been severed, namely:
(a) the Petitioner School never sent any notice to the Private
Respondent
dismissing her from her employment on account of her unexplained and
prolonged
absence as required by Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code (Reno Foods, Inc. versus NLRC, et al., 249
SCRA 386); (b) the Private Respondent did not receive any amount, from
the Petitioner School, by way of separation pay, indemnity pay, and her
share of her retirement contributions for the period from 1955 when she
commenced her employment with the Petitioner School until her leave of
absence in 1970; (c) the Petitioner School gave the Private Respondent
a "Plaque of Appreciation" for her thirty (30) year continuous service
to the Petitioner School on the occasion of the 51st Commencement
Exercise
of her Petitioner School on March 22, 1997; (d) she was given a
gratuity
of P12,000.00 on account of her exemplary services to the Petitioner
School
until the time when she reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years.[12]
(Emphasis
supplied.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
With respect to the
gratuity
pay awarded to Hilaria, the CA upheld the NLRC ruling that it should
not
be deducted from the retirement benefits due her.
Their motion for reconsideration[13]
having been denied by the CA Resolution[14]
of August 11, 2000, petitioners lodged the present petition which
imputes
the following error to the appellate court:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN AWARDING THE RETIREMENT BENEFITS DIFFERENTIAL OF
[HILARIA] COMPUTED BASED ON HER 29 YEARS OF SERVICE WHEN SHE MERELY
RENDERED
15 CONTINUOUS YEARS OF SERVICE PRIOR TO HER RETIREMENT. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
COMPLETELY IGNORED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN CARANDANG V.
DULAY,
188 SCRA 793 (1990) THAT SEPARATION PAY SHOULD BE BASED ON THE NUMBER
OF
CONTINUOUS YEARS OF SERVICE OF THE EMPLOYEE BEFORE THE DATE OF HIS
SEPARATION
FROM EMPLOYMENT.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners argue that
when Hilaria did not report upon the expiration in 1971 of her one year
leave of absence without pay nor request for an extension thereof, she
actually voluntarily resigned from or abandoned her employment,[16]
thus effectively forfeiting all the benefits she had earned for
services
rendered from 1955 to 1970, hence, she ceased to be an employee of the
school. Prescinding from this ratiocination, petitioners conclude that
the period from 1955 to 1970 cannot be included in the determination of
her retirement benefits, for when she was rehired in 1982, she was a
new
employee.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In support of their
position, petitioners cite the case of Carandang v. Dulay which held
that
when therein petitioner was rehired as teacher six years after
resigning,
she had to start from "zero experience" and her previous years of
service
with the therein respondent school could not be credited to her. What
was
in issue in Carandang, however, was the therein petitioner's
separation,
not retirement pay, this Court therein ruling that separation pay
should
be computed on the basis of her last continuous period of service.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners further
argue that the P12,000.00 gratuity earlier given to Hilaria should be
considered
part of the retirement benefits due her since it was given precisely
because
she had retired and was in addition to the amount that the school
contributed
to PERAA for her retirement.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As a general rule, the
factual findings and conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies such as the
NLRC are, on appeal, accorded great weight and respect and even
finality
as long as they are supported by substantial evidence or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to
justify
a conclusion.[17]
Where, as in the present case, the findings of the NLRC contradict
those
of the Labor Arbiter, this Court must of necessity examine the records
and the evidence presented to determine which finding should be
preferred
as more conformable with the evidentiary facts.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The threshold issue
is whether Hilaria's services for petitioner school during the period
from
1955 to 1970 should be factored in the computation of her retirement
benefits.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The inapplicability
to the present case of the ruling in Carandang notwithstanding, Hilaria
cannot be credited for her services in 1955-1970 in the determination
of
her retirement benefits. For, after her one year leave of absence
expired
in 1971 without her requesting for extension thereof as in fact she had
not been heard from until she resurfaced in 1982 when she reapplied
with
petitioner school, she abandoned her teaching position as in fact she
was
employed elsewhere in the interim and effectively relinquished the
retirement
benefits accumulated during the said period.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For a valid finding
of abandonment, two factors must be present:
(1) the
failure
to report for work, or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and
(2) a clear intention
to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the
more determinative factor, being manifested by some overt acts.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To prove abandonment,
the
employer must show that the employee deliberately and unjustifiably
refused
to resume his employment without any intention of returning.[20]
There must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt
acts from which an employee may be deduced as having no more intention
to work.[21]
The law, however, does not enumerate what specific overt acts can be
considered
as strong evidence of the intention to sever the employee-employer
relationship.[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is not disputed that
the approved one year leave of absence without pay of Hilaria expired
in
1971, without her, it bears repeating, requesting for extension thereof
or notifying petitioner school if and when she would resume teaching.
Nor
is it disputed that she was rehired only in 1982 after filing anew an
application,
without her proffering any explanation for her more than a decade of
absence.
Under the circumstances, abandonment of work at petitioner school in
1971
is indubitably manifest.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As regards the requirement
of notice of termination, it was error for the CA to apply Sec 2, Rule
XIV, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code.[23]
It should be noted that when Hilaria abandoned her teaching position in
1971, the law in force was Republic Act 1052 or the Termination Pay
Law,
as amended by Republic Act 1787, Section 1 of which provides:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 1. In
cases of employment, without a definite period, in a commercial,
industrial,
or agricultural establishment or enterprise, the employer or the
employee
may terminate at any time the employment with just cause; or without
just
cause in the case of an employee by serving written notice on the
employer
at least one month in advance, or in the case of an employer, by
serving
such notice to the employee at least one month in advance or one-half
month
for every year of service of the employee, whichever is longer, a
fraction
of at least six months being considered as one whole year.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The employer, upon
whom
no such notice was served in case of termination of employment without
just cause may hold the employee liable for damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The employee, upon
whom
no such notice was served in case of termination of employment without
just cause shall be entitled to compensation from the date of
termination
of his employment in an amount equivalent to his salaries or wages
corresponding
to the required period of notice. x x
x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
Above-stated law should
thus apply in the case at bar, so Mapua Institute of Technology v.
Manalo[24]
instructs:
Without
declaring
that a private college or university like the Mapua Institute of
Technology
is a commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishment, we believe
that there being no special law governing the dismissal or separation
of
professors from colleges and universities, the provisions of Republic
Act
No. 1052, as amended by Republic Act No. 1787, should be made to apply.
Authority for such a course of action is 78 Corpus Juris Secundum 617,
which says:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Contracts
between private schools and teachers or other instructors are governed,
in general, by the rules applicable to other contracts of employment." (Emphasis
supplied.) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Abandonment of work
being
a just cause for terminating the services of Hilaria, petitioner school
was under no obligation to serve a written notice to her.
That Hilaria was in
1997 given a plaque of appreciation for thirty years of service to the
school and awarded P12,000.00 as gratuity pay should not be taken
against
petitioners, for acknowledgment of the total number of years of her
service,
which was discontinuous, should not obliterate the fact that she
abandoned
her employment in 1971, albeit she was rehired in 1982.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It was error too for
the CA to conclude that since petitioner school did not award
separation
pay and Hilaria's share of her retirement contributions when she
"temporarily"
stopped working after she left her teaching position in 1971,
employer-employee
relation between them was not severed. It bears noting that an employee
who is terminated for just cause is generally not entitled to
separation
pay. Moreover, the PERAA, petitioner school's substitute retirement
plan,
was only established in 1972, such that when Hilaria abandoned her work
in 1971, there were no retirement contributions to speak of.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As Hilaria was considered
a new employee when she rejoined petitioner school upon re-applying in
1982, her retirement benefits should thus be computed only on the basis
of her years of service from 1982 to 1997. This is what JAM
Transportation
Co., Inc. v. Flores[25]
teaches:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Private
respondent's
re-employment as a new employee x x
x
would mean a demotion in rank and privileges, retirement benefits, for
example, as his entire previous eighteen (18) years of service with
petitioner,
would simply be considered as non-existent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This Court is not
unmindful
of Hilaria's rendition of a total of thirty years of teaching in
petitioner
school and should be accorded ample support in her twilight years.
Petitioner
school in fact acknowledges her dedicated service to its students. She
can, however, only be awarded with what she is rightfully entitled to
under
the law. So Sosito v. Aguinaldo Development Corporation dictates:[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While the
Constitution
is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the
working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will
be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own
rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest
of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privilege
in
life, this Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and
upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism,
however,
has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every case for the
deserving,
to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the
applicable
law and doctrine.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As for the ruling of
the
CA affirming that of the NLRC that the P12,000.00 gratuity pay earlier
awarded to Hilaria should not be deducted from the retirement benefits
due her, the same is in order. Gratuity pay is separate and distinct
from
retirement benefits. It is paid purely out of generosity. So Republic
Planters
Bank v. NLRC[27]
holds:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Gratuity
pay
x x x is paid to the beneficiary for the past
services
or favor rendered purely out of the generosity of the giver or grantor.
Gratuity, therefore, is not intended to pay a worker for actual
services
rendered or for actual performance. It is a money benefit or bounty
given
to the worker, the purpose of which is to reward employees who have
rendered
satisfactory service to the company. (Emphasis supplied.)
Retirement benefits, on
the other hand, are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining
years
of his life, releasing him from the burden of worrying for his
financial
support, and are a form of reward for his loyalty to the employer.[28]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Hilaria's case, her
retirement pay as computed by petitioners amounts to P59,038.35,
P28,853.09
of which had already been given to her under the PERAA. Since the
computed
amount of her retirement pay is much lower than that provided under the
law, she is entitled to receive the difference between the actual
amount
of her retirement benefits as required by law and that provided for
under
the PERAA. Although she did not appeal from the NLRC decision awarding
her P85,287.72, this Court awards the entire amount of the retirement
benefits
to which she is rightfully entitled under the law. Technical rules of
procedure
are not binding in labor cases.[29]
The application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve
the demands of substantial justice.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Article 287 of the Labor
Code, as amended by Republic
Act 7641 or the New Retirement Law, provides:
Art. 287.
Retirement.-
Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age
established
in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment
contract.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In case of
retirement,
the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as
he
may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining
agreement
and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee's retirement
benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not
be less than those provided herein.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the absence of
a
retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of
employees
in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60)
years
or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared
the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years
in
the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement
pay equivalent to at least one-half (½) month salary for every
year
of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as
one
whole year.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Unless the parties
provide
for broader inclusions, the term one half (½) month salary shall
mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay
and
the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive
leaves.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x
x (Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, Section 3.3,
Rule II of the Rules Implementing R.A.
7641 provides:
3.3. Where
both the employer and the employee contribute to a retirement fund in
accordance
with an individual or collective agreement or other applicable
employment
contract, the employer's total contribution thereto shall not be less
than
the total retirement benefits to which the employee would have been
entitled
had there been no such retirement fund. In case the employer's
contribution
is less than the retirement benefits provided under this Rule, the
employer
shall pay the difference.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, Hilaria is
entitled
to receive P98,706.45 computed as follows:
One-half
month
salary = (15 days x latest salary per day) + (5 days leave x latest
salary
per day) + (1/12 of 13th month pay)
= P4,512.30 +
P1,504.10 + P547.33
= P6,563.73
Retirement Pay =
number
of years in service x one-half month salary
= 15 years x
P6,580.43
= P98,455.95
Since petitioner school
had already paid Hilaria P28,853.09 representing employer contributions
under the PERAA, the same should be deducted from the retirement pay
due
her, to thereby leave a balance of P69,602.86 still due her.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED in part. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
28,
2000 is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioners are directed to pay the balance of
the retirement benefits to private respondent Hilaria G. Tercero in the
amount of P69,602.86, as computed above. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez
and Corona, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
CA Rollo at 61–78.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Records at 25–26.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Id. at 17.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id. at 21.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id. at 28.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id. at 21.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id. at 12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id. at 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Rollo at 59.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id. at 68–69.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
CA Rollo at 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Rollo at 44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Records at 81.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Rollo at 51.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Id. at 13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id. at 16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Progressive Development Corporation v. NLRC, 344 SCRA 512, 516 (2000).
[18]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Masagana Concrete Products v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 576, 592 (1999) (citations
omitted).
[20]
Icawat v. NLRC, 334 SCRA 75, 80 (2000) (citations omitted).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Masagana Concrete Products v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 576, 592 (1999) (citation
omitted).
[22]
Premiere Development Bank v. NLRC, 293 SCRA 49, 60 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
SEC. 2. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a
written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the
grounds for his dismissal. In case of abandonment of work, the notice
shall
be served at the worker's last known address.
[24]
108 Phil. 628 (1960).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
220 SCRA 114 (1993).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
156 SCRA 392 (1987).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
266 SCRA 142, 150 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517, 524 (1998)
(citation
omitted).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Samahan ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 324 SCRA 242, 252 (2000) (citation
omitted).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |