FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
144621
May 9, 2003
-versus-
ISAGANI
GUITTAP
Y PENGSON (ACQUITTED),WILFREDO MORELOS
Y CRUZ (ACQUITTED),CESAR OSABEL ALIAS
DANILO MURILLOALIAS DANNY ALIAS
SONNY VISAYA ALIASBENJIE CANETE, ARIEL
DADOR Y DE CHAVEZ
(DISCHARGED),
DECENA
MASINAG VDA. DERAMOS, LUISITO
GUILLING
ALIAS LUISITO(ACQUITTED), AND
JOHN DOE ALIAS PURCINO,
Accused.
|
DECENA MASINAG VDA.
DE RAMOS,
Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appellant Decena Masinag
Vda. de Ramos assails the Decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case
No. 92-387, finding her and accused Cesar Osabel guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties
provided by law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims the amounts
of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P67,800.00 as actual damages.
On September 1, 1992,
an Amended Information for Robbery with Double Homicide was filed
against
appellant Masinag, Isagani Guittap y Pengson, Wilfredo Morelos y Cruz,
Cesar Osabel,[2]
Ariel Dador y De Chavez, Luisito Guilling and John Doe alias
"Purcino".
The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or
about the 17th day of July 1992, in the City of Lucena, Province of
Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said
accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, armed with
bladed
weapons, by means of violence, and with intent to gain, did then and
there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
certain
personal items, to wit:chanrobles virtual law library
one (1) solid gold
ring
valued at P8,000.00
one (1) diamond
ring
valued at P40,000.00
one (1) necklace
with
pendant valued at P2,000.00
cash money in the
amount
of P4,500.00chanrobles virtual law library
one (1) samsonite
bag
valued at P650.00chanrobles virtual law library
one (1) .22 Cal.
Squibbman
with SN 64130 valued at P5,000.00chanrobles virtual law library
one (1) pair of
sandal
valued at P650.00
one (1) music mate
(karaoke)
valued at P5,000.00
one (1) jacket
(adidas)
valued at P1,000.00; and
one (1) pair of
shoes
valued at P1,000.00
with a total value
of
P67,800.00, owned by and belonging to spouses Romualdo Jael and Lionela[3]
Caringal, without the consent and against the will of the latter, to
the
damage and prejudice of the aforementioned offended parties in the
aforestated
sum of P67,800.00, Philippine Currency, and, on the same occasion of
such
robbery, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one
another,
armed with the same bladed weapons, taking advantage of superior
strength,
and employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure
or afford impunity, and with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab both of said spouses Romualdo Jael and
Lionela Caringal thereby inflicting upon the latter several fatal
wounds
which directly caused the death of the aforenamed spouses.chanrobles virtual law library
Contrary to law.[4]
Upon arraignment,
appellant
Masinag pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.
Accused Ariel Dador was discharged as a state witness while accused
Purcino
remained at large.
On February 15, 2000,
the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, this court finds Cesar Osabel and Decena Masinag
GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and they
are sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties
provided
by law. For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Isagani
Guittap,
Wilfrido Morelos and Luisito Guilling are hereby acquitted.chanrobles virtual law library
The accused Cesar
Osabel
and Decena Masinag are also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased
Romualdo Jael and Leonila Caringal Jael in the amount of (P100,000.00)
One Hundred Thousand Pesos plus actual damages of (P67,800.00) Sixty
Thousand
and Eight Hundred Pesos, Philippine Currency.
SO ORDERED.[5]
During the trial, state
witness Ariel Dador testified that in the evening of July 15, 1992,
Cesar
Osabel asked him and a certain Purcino to go with him to see appellant
Masinag at her house in Isabang, Lucena City. When they got
there,
Osabel and Masinag entered a room while Dador and Purcino waited
outside
the house. On their way home, Osabel explained to Dador and
Purcino
that he and Masinag planned to rob the spouses Romualdo and Leonila
Jael.
He further told them that according to Masinag, the spouses were old
and
rich, and they were easy to rob because only their daughter lived with
them in their house.
The following day, at
7:00 p.m., Dador, Osabel, and Purcino went to the house of the Jael
spouses
to execute the plan. Osabel and Purcino went inside while Dador
stayed
outside and positioned himself approximately 30 meters away from the
house.
Moments later, he heard a woman shouting for help from inside the
house.
After two hours, Osabel and Purcino came out, carrying with them one
karaoke
machine and one rifle. Osabel’s hands were bloodied. He
explained
that he had to tie both the victims’ hands with the power cord of a
television
set before he repeatedly stabbed them. He killed the spouses so
they
can not report the robbery to the authorities.cralaw:red
Osabel ordered Dador
to hire a tricycle while he and Purcino waited inside the garage of a
bus
line. However, when Dador returned with the tricycle, the two
were
no longer there. He proceeded to the house of Osabel and found
him
there with Purcino. They were counting the money they got from
the
victims. They gave him P300.00. Later, when Dador
accompanied
the two to Sta. Cruz, Manila to dispose of the karaoke machine, he
received
another P500.00. Osabel had the rifle repaired in Gulang-Gulang,
Lucena City.cralaw:red
Dador and Osabel were
subsequently arrested for the killing of a certain Cesar M.
Sante.
During the investigation, Dador executed an extrajudicial confession
admitting
complicity in the robbery and killing of the Jael spouses and
implicating
appellant and Osabel in said crime. The confession was
given
with the assistance of Atty. Rey Oliver Alejandrino, a former Regional
Director of the Human Rights Commission Office. Thereafter,
Osabel
likewise executed an extrajudicial confession of his and appellant’s
involvement
in the robbery and killing of the Jaels, also with the assistance of
Atty.
Alejandrino.chanrobles virtual law library
SIMEON TABOR, a neighbor
of the Jaels, testified that at 8:00 in the morning of July 17, 1992,
he
noticed that the victims, who were known to be early risers, had not
come
out of their house. He started calling them but there was no
response.
He instructed his son to fetch the victims’ son, SPO1 Lamberto
Jael.
When the latter arrived, they all went inside the house and found
bloodstains
on the floor leading to the bathroom. Tabor opened the bathroom
door
and found the lifeless bodies of the victims.cralaw:red
DR. VICENTE F. MARTINEZ
performed the post-mortem examination on the bodies of the victims and
testified that since rigor mortis had set in at the back of the neck of
the victims, Romualdo Jael died between six to eight hours before the
examination
while Leonila Jael died before midnight of July 16, 1992. The
cause
of death of the victims was massive shock secondary to massive
hemorrhage
and multiple stab wounds.cralaw:red
Appellant Masinag, for
her part, denied involvement in the robbery and homicide. She
testified
that she knew the victims because their houses were about a kilometer
apart.
She and Osabel were friends because he courted her, but they never had
a romantic relationship. She further claimed that the last time
she
saw Osabel was six months prior to the incident. She did not know
Dador and Guilling at the time of the incident. According to her,
it is not true that she harbored resentment against the victims because
they berated her son for stealing their daughter’s handbag. On
the
whole, she denied any participation in a conspiracy to rob and kill the
victims.cralaw:red
From the decision convicting
appellant Masinag and Osabel, only the former appealed, based on the
lone
assigned error:
THE TRIAL
COURT
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE
DOUBT OF CONSPIRING WITH HER CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF HER ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE
COMMISSION
OF THE SAID CRIME.
The appeal is
meritorious.
While it is our policy
to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court,[6]
owing to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and
note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination,[7]
where there exist facts or circumstances of weight and influence which
have been ignored or misconstrued, or where the trial court acted
arbitrarily
in its appreciation of facts,[8]
we may disregard its findings.cralaw:red
Appellant contends that
the extrajudicial confessions of Osabel and Dador were insufficient to
establish with moral certainty her participation in the
conspiracy.
Firstly, Dador was not present to hear appellant instigate the group to
rob the Jael spouses. He only came to know about the plan when
Osabel
told him on their way home. Thus, Dador had no personal knowledge
of how the plan to rob was actually made and of appellant’s
participation
thereof. Secondly, while Osabel initially implicated her in his
extrajudicial
confession as one of the conspirators, he repudiated this later in open
court when he testified that he was forced to execute his statements by
means of violence.cralaw:red
On direct examination,
Dador narrated what transpired in the house of appellant on July 15,
1992,
to wit:
PROSECUTOR GARCIA:chanrobles virtual law library
Q. And do
you remember the subject or subjects of that conversation that
transpired
among you?
A.
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q. Please
tell us what was the subject or subjects of the conversation that
transpired
among you on July 15, 1992 at the house of Decena Masinag?
A.
The subject of our conversation there was the robbing of Sps. Jael, sir.cralaw:red
Q. How did
that conversation begin with respect to the proposed robbery of Sps.
Jael?
A.
It was only the two (2) who planned that supposed robbery, Daniel
Murillo
and Decena Masinag, sir.cralaw:red
Q. And why
were you able to say that it was Danilo Murillo and Decena Masinag who
planned the robbery?
A.
Because they were the only ones who were inside the house and far from
us and they were inside the room, sir.cralaw:red
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Q. On that
night, July 15, 1992 did you ever have any occasion to talk with Decena
Masinag together with your companions Danilo Murillo and Purcino?
A.
No, sir.chanrobles virtual law library
Q. Was there
any occasion on the same date that Decena Masinag talk to you?
ATTY. FLORES:
Already answered, your
Honor.cralaw:red
COURT:
Witness, may answer.cralaw:red
WITNESS:
None, sir. (Emphasis
ours.)[9]chanrobles virtual law library
We find that the foregoing
testimony of Dador was not based on his own personal knowledge but from
what Osabel told him. He admitted that he was never near
appellant
and that he did not talk to her about the plan when they were at her
house
on July 15, 1992. Thus, his statements are hearsay and does not
prove
appellant’s participation in the conspiracy.cralaw:red
Under Rule 130, Section
36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts
which
he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from
his
own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay.
Hearsay
evidence is defined as "evidence not of what the witness knows himself
but of what he has heard from others."[10]
The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites
what
someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing.[11]
In Sanvicente v. People,[12]
we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the
witness,
the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently
hearsay.
Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is
inadmissible
as evidence.[13]
Osabel’s extrajudicial
confession is likewise inadmissible against appellant. The res
inter
alios acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of another.[14]
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant
and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the
rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a
man’s
own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him.
So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be
rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by
the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be
bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be
used as evidence against him.[15]
The rule on admissions
made by a conspirator, while an exception to the foregoing, does not
apply
in this case. In order for such admission to be admissible
against
a co-accused, Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires that
there must be independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession
to prove conspiracy. In the case at bar, apart from Osabel’s
extrajudicial
confession, no other evidence of appellant’s alleged participation in
the
conspiracy was presented by the prosecution. There being no
independent
evidence to prove it, her culpability was not sufficiently established.chanrobles virtual law library
Unavailing also is rule
that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when it is used as a
corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt
of his co-accused. The implication of this rule is that there
must
be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which, when taken
together
with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-accused beyond
reasonable
doubt.[16]
As earlier stated, there is no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial,
which the extrajudicial confession may corroborate.cralaw:red
In People v. Berroya,[17]
we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of
conspiracy,
he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance
of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist of active
participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the
commission
of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other
co-conspirators
by moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.cralaw:red
In the case at bar,
no overt act was established to prove that appellant shared with and
concurred
in the criminal design of Osabel, Dador and Purcino. Assuming
that
she had knowledge of the conspiracy or she acquiesced in or agreed to
it,
still, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime
in
furtherance of the conspiracy, mere knowledge, acquiescence in or
agreement
to cooperate is not sufficient to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy.[18]
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship.[19]
Conspiracy must be proved
as convincingly as the criminal act itself. Like any element of
the
offense charged, conspiracy must be established by proof beyond
reasonable
doubt.[20]
Direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for
conspiracy
may be deduced from the acts of appellant pointing to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest. Nevertheless, except
in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that
appellant
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.[21]
All told, the prosecution
failed to establish the guilt of appellant with moral certainty.
Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for
conviction.
Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of appellant’s innocence
must
be upheld and she must be acquitted.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena
City, Branch 60 in Criminal Case No. 92-487, insofar only as it finds
appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. De Ramos is
ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. She is ORDERED
RELEASED
unless there are other lawful causes for her continued detention.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five
(5)
days from notice, of the date and time when appellant is released
pursuant
to this Decision.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________________
Endotes
[1]
Penned by Judge Abelio M. Marte.chanrobles virtual law library
[2]
Also known as "Danilo Murillo", "Danny", "Sonny Visaya", "Benjie
Canete".
[3]
Spelled elsewhere in the records as "Leonila".chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Rollo, pp. 10-11.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Rollo, p. 57.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
People v. Franco, 336 Phil. 206, 213 [1997].
[7]
People v. Abayon, G.R. No. 142874, 31 July 2002.
[8]
People v. Bertulfo, G.R. No. 143790, 7 May 2002.
[9]
TSN, November 23, 1993, pp. 17-22.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
People v. Manhuyod, G.R. No. 124676, 20 May 1998, 290 SCRA 257, 270.
[11]
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 124514, 6 July 2000, 335 SCRA 208, 215.
[12]
G.R. No. 132081, 26 November 2002.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
People v. Ubongen, G.R. No. 126024, 20 April 2001.
[14]
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 25.
[15]
People v. Raquel, 333 Phil. 72, 80 [1996].chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 138022, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA 637,
649,
citing People v. Aquino, 369 Phil. 701, 725 [1999].
[17]
347 Phil. 410, 430 [1997].chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
People v. Campos, G.R. No. 111535, 19 July 2001, 361 SCRA 339, 349.
[19]
People v. Listerio, G.R. No. 122099, 5 July 2000, 335 SCRA 40, 59.
[20]
People v. Leaño, G.R. No. 138886, 9 October 2001, 366 SCRA 774,
788.
[21]
People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 138608, 24 September 2002. |