FIRST DIVISION..
GRACIANO P. DELA
CHICA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR,
AND EVAN C. ACEVEDA,
MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, BACO,
ORIENTAL MINDORO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
144823
December 8, 2003
-versus-
HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN,
4TH DIVISION,
AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA,
J.:
In this special
civil action for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction, petitioners Graciano P. Dela Chica and
Evan
C. Aceveda are challenging two resolutions issued by the 4th Division
of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25188, in which petitioners
stand
charged for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The resolutions assailed are those dated
April
14, 2000[1]
which ordered the suspension pendente lite of petitioners for a period
of ninety days; and dated September 1, 2000,[2]
which denied petitioners' demurrer to evidence and motion for
reconsideration
of the suspension order. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The records show that
in an information dated February 8, 1999, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman
for Luzon charged petitioners before the Sandiganbayan for violation of
Section 3 (e), R.A.
No. 3019, which reads, as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That on
November
28, 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Baco, Oriental
Mindoro
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused, Municipal
Mayor Graciano P. Dela Chica and Municipal Engineer Evan C. Aceveda, of
the Municipality of Baco, Oriental Mindoro, while in the performance of
their official functions, and taking advantage of the same, acting in
conspiracy
with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally
cause undue injury to the government by making revisions in the
completion
of the municipal building without prior approval by the proper
authorities
resulting to cost deficiency of P375,682.32, to the damage and injury
of
the government, in the amount aforestated.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On August 20, 1999,
petitioners were arraigned and both entered a plea of not guilty.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners thereafter
sought to question the sufficiency of the information by filing a
motion
for bill of particulars, praying that the prosecution be directed to
specify
the persons referred to in the information as "proper authorities."
This
was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan, as it ruled that the
arraignment
had barred it from approving amendments beyond the matter of form.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 3, 1999,
the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite
pursuant
to Section 13, R.A.
No. 3019.[5]
Petitioners thereafter filed an opposition thereto, on the ground that
the information is invalid as not all the essential elements of the
offense
charged were alleged therein, particularly the element of "evident bad
faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence."[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Sandiganbayan handed
down the first assailed resolution on April 14, 2000, ordering
petitioners'
suspension pendente lite for 90 days.[7]
It ruled that in its previous order denying petitioners' motion for
bill
of particulars, it in effect upheld the sufficiency of the information,
hence the mandatory suspension pendent lite of petitioners is called
for.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent court
denied in its subsequent resolution on September 1, 2000.[8]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners now allege
that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolutions.
Petitioners
cite the following as errors:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A.
RESPONDENT
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE INFORMATION
ANNEX
'C' HEREOF, IS VALID.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
B. RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
IN ORDERING THE SUSPENSION OF PETITIONERS FOR NINETY (90) DAYS.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
C. RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION ON THE GROUND OF ITS INVALIDITY
AND
LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.[9]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
These assigned errors
boil
down to one pivotal issue: the validity of the information under which
petitioners stand charged.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners contend
that respondent court wrongly ordered their suspension despite the
patent
defect of the information. They posit that the failure to allege the
essential
element of "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence" as defined by R.A.
3019 renders the information invalid, as it fails to comply with
the
requirements of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. At the same juncture,
they seek a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
to
restrain the respondent court from implementing its order of
suspension.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondents, on the
other hand, maintain that the facts alleged in the information clearly
and sufficiently constituted the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A.
3019.
They contend that an information is valid as long as the statutory
designation
of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof are
distinctly
stated therein.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court finds merit
in the petition.cralaw:red
The issue on how the
acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to
meet
the standard of sufficiency has long been settled.[10]
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed
must
be alleged in the information.[11]
No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately
and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.[12]Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court requires, inter alia,
that the information must state the acts or omissions so complained of
as constitutive of the offense.[13]
Recently,[14]
this Court emphasized that the test in determining whether the
information
validly charges an offense is whether the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information will establish the essential elements of the
offense
charged as defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are
not considered.[15]
The law essentially requires this to enable the accused suitably to
prepare
his defense, as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be stated in the information must be determined by
reference
to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crime.[17]Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioners are charged,
provides:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 3.
Corrupt
practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of
public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(e) Causing any undue
injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In a number of cases,[18]
the elements of this offense have been broken down as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(1) That
the
accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy
with
them;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(2) That said
public
officers committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their
official duties or in relation to their public positions;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(3) That they
caused
undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(4) That such
injury
was caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such
parties; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(5) That the public
officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable
negligence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A scrutiny
of the information in this case discloses that petitioners are accused
of the following acts, as stated in the pertinent portion of the
information:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x x
wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally causing undue injury to the government by
making
revisions in the completion of the municipal building without prior
approval
by the proper authorities resulting to cost deficiency of P375,682.32,
to the damage and injury of the government, in the amount aforestated.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Evidently, the
information
failed to allege that petitioners, in causing undue injury to the
government
by revising the completion of the municipal building without prior
approval
of the proper authorities, did the same through "manifest partiality,
evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence," an essential element of the
crime charged. Neither did the information embody words which would
have
characterized the elements, such as "partiality," or bias which excites
a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather
than
as they are; "bad faith," which connotes not only bad judgment or
negligence
but also a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing; or "gross
negligence,"
which is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or
acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act
willfully
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far
as other persons are concerned.[19]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondents would,
however, argue that Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court,[20]
does not require that the information be worded in the terms of the
statute
defining the offense, as long as it enables a person of common
understanding
to know the offense being charged and the court to pronounce
judgment. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondents' contention
is untenable. It is not enough to allege that the acts were willfully,
unlawfully or criminally caused without stating that the same was done
in a manner by which the accused could be held liable for the specific
offense charged. This Court has ruled that in order that one may be
held
criminally liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the act of the
accused
which caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or
with gross inexcusable negligence.[21]
This draws more significance considering that good faith and regularity
are always presumed in the performance of official duties by public
officers.[22]
Therefore, manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence must be alleged with particularity in the information
sufficiently
to inform the accused of the charge against him and to enable the court
properly to render a decision.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondents, however,
question petitioners' right to raise the issue of the validity of the
information
at this stage, arguing that by entering a plea of not guilty during the
arraignment, petitioners had waived all possible objections to the
sufficiency
of the information.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The argument is without
legal basis. It is true that pursuant to Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to assert any ground for
a motion to quash before he pleads to the information shall be deemed a
waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash. Respondents, however, may
have overlooked that the same section admits of certain exceptions, as
when: (1) no offense was charged, (2) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged, (3) the offense or penalty has
been
extinguished, and (4) the accused would be twice put to jeopardy.[23]
In the present case, given that the information failed sufficiently to
charge the offense, petitioners are not precluded from attacking its
validity
even after their arraignment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Considering the foregoing,
this Court finds the information in the present case to be fatally
defective.
Where it is clear that the information does not really charge an
offense,
the case against the accused must be dropped immediately. There is no
point
in proceeding under a defective information that can never be the basis
of a valid conviction.[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions. dated April 14, 2000 and
September
1, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan, 4th Division, are hereby SET ASIDE. The
February
8, 1999 information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 filed
against
petitioners Graciano P. dela Chica and Evan C. Aceveda is hereby
DISMISSED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
No pronouncement as
to costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 17–24.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Id., at 26–30.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Id., at 31–32.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Certificates of Arraignment, Records, Volume I, pp. 73–74; Order,
Records,
Volume I, p. 77.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Rollo, pp. 35–37.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id., at 38–45.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id., supra, note 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id., supra, note 2.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Id., at 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 538 (2002).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
People v. Estopito, 373 SCRA 212 (2002); Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudsman
(Visayas),
380 SCRA 325 (2002); Balitaan v. CFI, 115 SCRA 729 (1982).
[12]
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Torres v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 10, citing Balitaan v. CFI,
supra,
note 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Balitaan v. CFI, supra, note 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Mendoza-Arse v. Ombudsman (Visayas), supra, note 11; Bunye v.
Sandiganbayan,
306 SCRA 663 (1999); Llorente, Jr., v. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 382
(1998);
Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 13; Villanueva v. Sandiganbayan,
223
SCRA 543 (1993); Ponce de Leon v. Sandiganbayan, 186 SCRA 745 (1990).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudsman (Visayas), supra, note 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
SEC. 9 Cause of the accusation — The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person
of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well
as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce
judgment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Fernando v. Sandiganbayan, 212 SCRA 680 (1992), citing Alejandro v.
People,
170 SCRA 400 (1989).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Mama, Jr., v. CA, 196 SCRA 489 (1991); Revised Rules of Court, Rule
131,
Sec. 3 (m).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
People v. Gonzales, Jr., 373 SCRA 283 (2002).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Cruz, Jr. v. CA, 194 SCRA 145 (1991).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |